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Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, the matter might not stop there if the Assembly were to change the methods, terms, and conditions of repayment. It would require us to take a very careful and hard look at the entire range of United Nations finances. In this connection I would recall the position taken by the United States in August 1965 with respect to consensus reached as a result of the refusal of certain countries to pay their assessments properly made against them, when it set aside the applicability of Article 19 for Congo and UNEF expenses." Failure to invoke Article 19 and then changing the agreed terms and conditions for the repayment of United Nations bonds would, indeed, raise serious questions

Text ibid., 1962, pp. 117-118. See ibid., 1965, pp. 101-104.

about the reliability and responsibleness of the United Nations in honoring its commitments and paying its obligations.

Mr. Chairman, the United States must urgently appeal to the cosponsors of this Resolution not to press their proposal. We feel that if any such Resolution were to be pressed the result would be to plunge the United Nations into the most serious financial difficulties."1

Document II-17

Statement Made by the U.S. Representative (Case) in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, November 23, 1966 12

"Options for Peacekeeping
Must Be Kept Open,
Supported by Those
Willing To Support
Such Operations"

We have been much encouraged by the fact that, both in the General Debate and in this Committee's discussion thus far, a very large number of Delegations have emphasized the importance they attach to United Nations peacekeeping. In our view, peacekeeping is the very heart of this Organization's work. If the United Nations should fail to fulfill its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of peace and security, the life, vitality and purpose will have gone out of our Organization.43

We recognize that certain members have held opinions with respect to the constitutional and financial aspects of peacekeeping which diverge substantially from those of the majority. Yet, despite this divergence of views, vital peacekeeping operations go on in Kashmir, in Cyprus and in the Middle East. The United Nations has

41 Consideration of the draft resolution proposing establishment of a special account for amortization and interest on U.N. bonds, and amendments (U.N. doc. A/C.5/ L.877) to it proposing creation of a working group on interest payments, was postponed by Committee V until the 22d session of the U.N. General Assembly.

42 U.S.-U.N. press release 4984.

43 For the text of the U.N. Charter, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 134-161.

chosen to deal in a pragmatic and common-sense fashion with crises as they arose even though a few members have raised constitutional and financial questions on which there is as yet no agreement. For our part, we believe that the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations can be further strengthened, that such action is desired by virtually the entire membership, and that this session of the General Assembly should make progress in that direction.

Mr. Chairman, our inability to reach agreement on precise rules for the future need not and should not prevent the U.N. from carrying out the great tasks of keeping the peace. Ideally-as certain speakers have said-we should move with the concurrence or acquiescence of all powers, particularly those that bear a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. But where action embracing all members is not possible, the Organization should not be stopped from acting with the broad support of those members that are willing to assume the responsibility for carrying out duly authorized operations.

Several speakers have noted that even if this General Assembly cannot lay down precise rules and arrangements for authorizing and conducting peacekeeping operations in the future, we can take certain steps in the interim to improve the Organization's capacity to mount peacekeeping operations and to insure equitable and reliable modes of financing.

Since the United States had occasion to express its views to this Committee in a statement by Ambassador Goldberg on November 24, 1965," I shall not repeat them in any detail now. Briefly summarized, they are as follows:

First, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for initiating and supervising peacekeeping operations and everything feasible should be done to enable it to exercise that responsibility.

Second, the General Assembly has authority under the Charter to initiate and supervise peacekeeping operations where the Security Council is unable to act. Otherwise, one Permanent Member alone could prevent 120 other members from initiating action

"Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 106-112.

to protect their common interest in the maintenance of peace.

Third, the General Assembly has the exclusive authority to make an apportionment among the Membership.

Fourth, the expenses of United Nations peacekeeping operations should, in principle, be the collective financial responsibility of the entire membership.

Fifth, the cost of peacekeeping operations should be shared fairly among the members in accordance with their capacity to pay.

Sixth, General Assembly procedures for peacekeeping operations should provide an appropriate voice for those members that bear the principal responsibility for supporting them.

Seventh, the Secretary-General is the most appropriate executive agent for managing peacekeeping operations, and he should be given every support within the scope of his mandate.

Mr. Chairman, we have been most encouraged by the fact that a very large number of speakers, both in the General Debate of the Assembly and in this Committee, have supported the basic philosophy which underlies the key principles I have cited above as reflecting the United States position. If I cite just a few of those speakers now, it does not indicate any lack of appreciation for the many other excellent statements made on this subject.

We are particularly struck by the number of speakers who stressed the need for improved preparations for peacekeeping and for a model scale for sharing equitably costs of operations involving heavy expenditures.

The distinguished representatives of Sweden and Norway proposed that members be invited to inform the Secretary-General of the kinds of forces, supplies and services that they could provide in response to a request to participate in a U.N. peacekeeping operation. As Ambassador Astrom of Sweden pointed out, the United Nations would be under no obligation to make use of facilities or personnel offered or indicated, nor would the provision of such information constitute an obligation on the part of the country furnishing it to participate in a

given peacekeeping operation without its express consent. Moreover, as he pointed out, it would be highly useful to compile and analyze experience gained and practice acquired over many years of U.N. peacekeeping operations.

As my Delegation noted in last year's debate on peacekeeping, the Secretary-General's staff must be able to plan for emergencies. In addition to analyzing experience of past peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat should be encouraged to update the guidelines for regulation of U.N. peacekeeping forces, which were compiled in 1958," and to examine what needs to be done to ensure readiness of peacekeeping forces in emergency

situations.

On the financial side, both the Swedish and Norwegian representatives, along with many others, suggested the advisability of attempting to arrive at a presumptive model scale which could be adapted to particular peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis. While we do not feel that such a procedure is idealwe would frankly have preferred full collective responsibility under the Charter had the General Assembly chosen to enforce it as we so strongly urged-we do believe that it is far preferable to a situation where the Secretary-General must go begging with hat in hand to maintain operations, as in the case of Cyprus.

It is with this problem in mind that the Delegation of Ireland, joined by those of Ceylon, Costa Rica, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines, Somalia and Togo, have put forward the proposal which appears in Document A/SPC/L.129.

We have given very careful consideration to the proposal of the Irish Delegation and its co-sponsors. We have great respect for the sponsors of the proposal, staunch supporters of U.N. peacekeeping, and most particularly, for the distinguished Foreign Minister of Ireland.

Our views continue to be those expressed by Ambassador Goldberg in his statement to this Committee on this item at the last Assembly." I will not repeat here the reservations we continue to have with respect to the proposal. We believe that full collective responsibility is the first

choice. We also recognize that it cannot be achieved in practice until there is a change in the attitudes of certain permanent members. If we cannot have full collective responsibility, we favor as much shared responsibility as the members are prepared to support.

I must also repeat the reservation we expressed last year with respect to the proposal that one country might have to pay as much as 50% of the cost of any operation for which it cast an affirmative vote. By Act of Congress, no American delegate in the United Nations may vote for an assessment in which the United States' share is more than 33%." We will, therefore, abstain in a vote on the Irish resolution, since this feature is a central element in what is now its only operative paragraph." If the resolution is adopted by this Assembly, we would be prepared to consult with the Congress on the merits of the plan.

Let me turn now to the draft resolution presented by Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iran, Italy, Nigeria and Norway." These, too, are countries which have traditionally given strong support to U.N. peacekeeping efforts and we wish to express our appreciation to them for putting forward a proposal with clearly constructive purposes.

Referring first to the preamble of this proposal, the United States could support the paragraphs now contained therein. They accord, in general, with our own principles, though they fall short of the precision and comprehensiveness which we would like to see on this matter. We regret, in particular, that no reference has been made to the complementary functions and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly. This principle of complementary powers was put forward in the Guidelines presented to us by the SecretaryGeneral and by the President of the 19th General Assembly, and they have since been widely endorsed.50 In order

47 Restriction under Public Law 495, 82d Cong., approved July 10, 1952 (66 Stat. 550); 22 U.S.C. § 262b.

48 The draft resolution, as revised (U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.129/Rev. 1), was approved by a vote of 33 to 27 (including France and the U.S.S.R.), with 48 abstentions (including the U.S.), in the Special Political Committee, Dec. 14. 1966, and incorporated in the Special Political Committee's report to the U.N. General Assembly (see U.N. doc. A/6603).

49 U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.130 and Rev. 1-4. 50 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, pp. 95-98.

45 Text ibid., 1958, pp. 81–90.

46 Cited in footnote 44 above.

to incorporate this thought, we would suggest the addition of a preambular paragraph along the following lines:

"Convinced that the functions and powers of the Security Council and the General Assembly are complementary and that each of these two principal organs of the United Nations should give due and serious weight to the views expressed by the other,".

We hope the sponsors will find it possible to add a paragraph along this line.

Turning now to the operative section, we could accept the first paragraph as it stands. It sets forth widely recognized principles and practices of financing peacekeeping operations.

We would also support, in general, the provisions of operative paragraph 2. However, we have one question about it, which concerns sub-paragraph (iii). We are prepared to agree that, where certain circumstances warrant, special consideration might be given to the situation of any Member States which are victims of, or are otherwise involved in, the events or actions leading to a peacekeeping operation. While this factor might be taken into account, case by case, when a model scale is applied, it is not one of the basic elements in constructing such a model scale. Any presumptive scale set up as a model should have general application with modifications to be made on an ad hoc basis. We are prepared to support operative paragraphs 3, 4 and 6 as they stand.

Let me address myself now to operative paragraph 5. We fully endorse a study of the means of improving preparations for peacekeeping. This would include, as suggested by various Delegations, the provision by Member States to the Secretary-General of information on the kinds of forces, supplies and services they could provide in response to a request to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

We have no difficulty with the idea expressed in paragraph 5(b) that, as a matter of general practice, the Security Council should obtain from the Secretary-General an estimate of the expenditure involved when recommending or deciding measures to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Paragraph 5(c) provides for the exploration of the prospects for agreement with member states for the provision of armed forces assistance and facilities pursuant to Article 43 of the Charter. If in the future it becomes possible to give effect to the original design of the Charter provided for in Article 43, the peacekeeping mechanism of the United Nations will then be in full working order to perform its appointed role of peacemaker and peacekeeper. Thus, it is entirely appropriate to explore the possibilities for the negotiation of Article 43 agreements.$1

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51 On Nov. 30, 1966, in the Special Political Committee, Jamaica introduced a draft resolution (U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.133/Rev. 1) which recommended that the Security Council negotiate agreements with member states for provision of armed forces to the Council in accordance with Article 43 of the Charter. The Special Political Committee adopted the Jamaican draft resolution by a vote of 20 (including France and the U.S.S.R.) to 5 (including the U.K.), with 80 abstentions (including the U.S.), Dec. 14, 1966. The Jamaican draft resolution was incorporated in the report of the Special Political Committee to the U.N. General Assembly (U.N. doc. A/6603); see infra.

52 Speaking on this draft resolution in the Special Political Committee, Dec. 13, 1966, the U.S. Representative (Case) said: "Some of the Ethiopian amendments which have been incorporated represent a strengthening of the text along the lines we suggested. We are now prepared to give our wholehearted and unequivocal support to this proposal." (U.S.-U.N. press release 5025.) The Special Political Committee adopted the draft resolution, as revised (U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.130/Rev. 4), by a vote of 52 (including the U.S.) to 14 (including France and the U.S.S.R.), with 42 abstentions, Dec. 14, 1966.

The U.N. General Assembly then referred the draft resolution, as part of the report of the Special Political Committee (U.N.

Mr. Chairman, this Organization cannot afford to wait for the ideal solution or complete agreement. We cannot risk moving at the pace of the most laggard. In the absence of unanimity, options for peacekeeping must be kept open, supported by those willing to support such operations.

We must move now, in this General Assembly, on concrete matters, on assuring reliable financing and on strengthening the capacity and readiness of the U.N. to act for peace. The ability of the U.N. to engage in peacekeeping depends as much on political will as on finances or mechanisms for mustering peacekeeping forces. This political will the General Assembly must demonstrate. If we are to go beyond rhetoric, if nations are indeed in real life to depend on the U.N. for their security, we must demonstrate that the U.N. is willing and able to respond to appeals for help when the peace is threatened or violence menaces the sovereignty or political independence of member states who ask for help.

Document II-18

Resolution 2220 (XXI), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, December 19, 1966 5

53

Decision To Refer the Question of Peacekeeping Operations to the Fifth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly To Be Held No Later Than April 30, 1967

The General Assembly

1. Decides to refer the report of the Special Political Committee on the

doc. A/6603), to the Fifth Special Session of the General Assembly; see infra. On May 23, 1967, the General Assembly decided without vote to refer the report of the Special Political Committee (subsequently reissued as U.N. doc. A/6637) to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (U.N. doc. A/ PV.1521).

comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects" to the General Assembly at its fifth special session, to be held not later than 30 April 1967;

2. Requests the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to continue the review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations and to report to the General Assembly at its fifth special session.55

1499th plenary meeting.

Document II-19

Statement by the U.S. Representative at the U.N. (Goldberg), Issued December 21, 1966 (Excerpt) 58

"Failure To Act on the Related Issues of Peacekeeping and Financing Must Be Set Down Among the Chief Shortcomings of This Session [of the United Nations General Assembly]"

Although a constructive Canadian resolution on the highly important issue of peacekeeping was approved by a large majority in committee," the Assembly, to our regret, put off final action on this measure until its resumed session in April. The Canadian resolution's most important provisions are those reaffirming the role of the General Assembly in peacekeeping in circumstances where the Security Council is unable to act and suggesting a model scale for the broad and equitable sharing of the costs of expensive peacekeeping forces.

54 U.N. doc. A/6603. See footnotes 48 and 51-52, to doc. II-17, supra.

55 The U.N. General Assembly's action reversed a decision made in the Special Political Committee, which had rejected a draft resolution, supported by France and the U.S.S.R., calling for referral of the peacekeeping question to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see U.S. Participation in the UN, 1966, p. 74); see also footnote 16 to doc. II-14, ante.

53 U.N. doc. A/6316, p. 21. This resolution, sponsored by the representatives of 19 member states, was adopted by a vote of 56 (including France and the U.S.S.R.) to 36 (including the U.K. and the U.S.), with 25 abstentions and 5 member states absent. For an explanation of the U.S. reason for opposing this resolution, see infra.

The United Nations and International Law

56 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 16, 1967, pp. 98-102.

57 See footnote 52 to doc. II-17, ante. 68 Supra.

[Docs. II-18, 19] 63

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