grounds for hope that the situation in South Africa has not rigidified irreparably.

Along with our policy of persuasion, we have followed a policy of continuing certain forms of cooperation with South Africa and keeping open the lines of communication. Pursuing these policies simultaneously has faced us with some difficult dilemmas. Our representatives in South Africa are exposed to strong pressures from the South African Government and its supporters to conform with apartheid practices. Wherever it is legally possible to do so, our representatives resist these pressures.

Our Embassy and consulates hold nonracial receptions and individual officers entertain nonracially. Our diplomatic and consular posts hire local employees on a nondiscriminatory basis. The U.S. Government makes clear that it disapproves of the appearance of Americans, whether as amateurs or professionals, before segregated audiences in South Africa. It will not sponsor visits to South Africa of performers who would appear before such audiences. As a result this aspect of our exchange program is virtually suspended. More importantly, we have canceled operational port calls in South Africa of U.S. naval vessels and aircraft rather than accept the application of racial conditions to our personnel.

In the U.N. the United States strongly supports the application to South Africa and to the mandated territory of South-West Africa of the basic principles of the U.N. Charter's affirmation of respect for human rights, the dignity and worth of the individual, and the equal rights of men and women. We support the aim of promoting respect for international law. We have supported a number of resolutions against apartheid in the U.N. General Assembly.

The shooting of many unarmed men, women, and children at Sharpeville in March 1960 marked a watershed in U.N. treatment of apartheid. For the first time the Security Council considered a South African issue. The United States then supported a resolution deploring apartheid and the loss of life at Sharpeville and calling for abandonment of repressive policies. We have supported several similar Council

6

• Text ibid., 1960, pp. 635–636.

resolutions since then condemning repression and injustice in South Africa.

As concrete evidence of our abhorrence of apartheid and our determination not to contribute to its enforcement, we do not sell to South Africa any arms, ammunition, military equipment, or materials for their manufacture and maintenance. Our first step in this direction was when we placed a ban on arms that could be used in enforcing apartheid within South Africa. As international opposition to apartheid increased in tempo, along with repression in South Africa, the growth of violence, and the flight of refugees, we took a further step in August 1963. We extended our arms ban against South Africa to all arms, ammunition, and military equipment, except those under existing contracts and those which might be required in the interests of world peace.

Ambassador Stevenson, in announcing the arms ban, said that

"... the United States as a nation with many responsibilities in many parts of the world naturally reserves the right in the future to interpret this policy in the light of requirements for assuring the maintenace of international peace and security. If the interests of the world community require the provision of equipment for use in the common defense effort, we would naturally feel able to do so without violating the spirit and the intent of this resolve."

998

We adopted this comprehensive ban prior to the adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution calling on all U.N. members to apply such a ban." We supported the resolution and have strictly observed the ban. In the Security Council the late Ambassador Stevenson explained this policy as intended to contribute to a peaceful solution and to avoid actions adding directly to international friction in the area. In December 1963, in support of another resolution of the Security Council,10 our ban was extended to equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa."

See ibid., 1962, pp. 927-931. 8 Text ibid., 1963, pp. 683-689. Text ibid., pp. 689-690.

10 Text ibid., pp. 698-700. 11 See ibid., pp. 694–698.

Aside from the arms embargo, the U.S. Government does not interfere with trade and investment in South Africa. This is in keeping with our traditional policy of keeping world trade and other economic relations as free as possible from Government interference. An exception is where the national security is directly affected, as in the cases of Communist China and Cuba.

The U.S. Government neither encourages nor discourages investment in South Africa. Potential investors who seek our advice are briefed on the political and racial situation, the outlook, and American policy and interests. The decision about whether to invest remains with the individual or company.

The U.S. Government of course encourages both new and old companies to maintain high standards in the treatment of personnel employed in South Africa. We believe American companies abroad should lead in such respects as fair wages, nondiscrimination, pension systems, and the like. While American companies operating in South Africa are, of course, obligated to abide by South African laws, we are encouraged by their generally progressive record.

Despite strong pressures in the U.N. and from various American organizations concerned about civil and human rights in South Africa, we have not been prepared to support U.N. economic sanctions against South Africa. Several problems are involved. These are:

1. the problem of a legal basis for such actions;

2. the problem of economic effectiveness; and

3. the problem of psychological effectiveness.

With regard to the legal problem, the U.S. Government believes that the conditions envisaged in chapter VII of the U.N. Charter for the imposition of compulsory sanctions, i.e., the existence of a threat to international peace or an act of aggression, do not apply to South Africa at this time.

Much thought has been given in this Government and in the U.N. to the problem of the economic effectiveness of sanctions. In the summer of 1964 the U.N. Security Council estab

lished a committee of experts to study the feasibility, effectiveness, and implications of sanctions, or as it described them, measures which might be taken against South Africa within the framework of the U.N. Charter.12 The committee was requested to make a technical and practical study of sanctions without reference to the circumstances in which their application might be considered. The United States participated actively in the work of the committee. Its report was submitted to the Security Council in February 1965.15 It emphasized the view that, although South Africa would not be readily susceptible to economic measures, South Africa is not immune to impact from such measures. It concluded that the degree of effectiveness of economic measures would directly depend on the universality of their application and on the manner and the duration of their enforcement. Should a situation arise in which the U.N. appropriately might consider resort to sanctions, the United States believes the availability of this detailed, practical study will be helpful.

Cessation of investment is most often urged as a first step in applying graduated economic pressures. Could the United States exert effective pressure on South Africa by withholding investment? A generation ago the South African economy depended to a very large extent on foreign investment. Now foreign investment plays a much smaller role in the economy. The United States provides only a small proportion either of total investment in South Africa or of foreign investment there. Our investment in South Africa is only 14 percent of all foreign investment there. From 1950 to 1963 U.S. direct investment in South Africa by companies amounted to only 2.3 percent of the total net domestic capital formation there. If one includes portfolio investment, the percentage is still only 3.5.

South Africa is one of the countries which is subject to all aspects of the United States program to improve its balance of payments. This means that all types of U.S. private capital flows to South Africa are subject either to the interest equalization tax or to the President's program of voluntary restraints on private corporate investment and bank lending abroad. It is probable that new U.S. investment in South Africa will be reduced as a re

12 See ibid., 1964, pp. 802-804. 13 See ibid., 1965, p. 663, footnote 11.

sult. Even before this program was begun American companies had been financing their investments largely by profits made in South Africa, advances from South African banks, and the issuance of stock both in South Africa and Europe. From 1955 to 1963 the net outflow to South Africa of new American capital amounted to only $9 million. American investment in South Africa is minor-compared with that of the United Kingdom, about onefourth. The United States, alone, would have little leverage. Since U.S. investment is not essential to South Africa, the argument for such action is largely psychological, i.e., that it would jar South African whites into a better appreciation of the worldwide opposition to their policies.

Discouraging or prohibiting U.S. investment in South Africa would, of course, improve our relations with much of the world. It is also undoubtedly true that the stopping of American investment would have a considerable impact on South Africans. Even though the economy were not shaken, the confidence of those relying on apartheid as a permanent pattern for South Africa's economy and society would be undermined. The cessation of investment would be seen as one of a long series of developments tending to isolate South Africa. Many who profit from apartheid would be induced to reflect on its long-term disadvantages more seriously than they do now.

Whether increased doubt about the advantages of apartheid would affect South African policies beneficially is questionable. It might harden South African policies even further and undoubtedly would impel South Africa to turn to other sources of investment and to accelerate its already considerable efforts to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

While cessation of investment might increase our credibility and influence with African countries in our efforts to encourage a nonviolent solution, it could seriously handicap our ability to carry on a dialog with South Africa. It could cause some damage to our own economic, scientific, and strategic interests.

The United States, at both public and private levels, has a wide variety of cultural and scientific contacts with South Africa. Such contacts are intended to promote mutually bene

ficial relations in these fields. We hope they may also have the effect of combating the tendency of South Africa to drift off into sterile isolation.

Both public and private U.S. educational and exchange programs, though small, include all cultural groups as well as supporters of the Government and Opposition. A special effort is made, particularly in Government programs, to reach nonwhites, in view of their greater need and the many obstacles encountered. The South African Government's reluctance to give travel documents to nonwhites is one such obstacle, but we do not believe the effort should be abandoned. Particular aims of these programs include familiarizing South Africans with how the United States is dealing with its own problems, including civil rights, and providing leaders and especially young potential leaders with opportunities for training and observation in the United States. Of the approximately 400 South (and South-West) African students in U.S. institutions of higher learning, 137 are supported by U.S. Government funds. Of this number 122 are nonwhite. The U.S. Government has specific programs in Africa and the United States to help refugees from South Africa and South-West Africa obtain training and education. We have also contributed to U.N. programs for the education of SouthWest Africans and South Africans.

While the international territory of South-West Africa is not part of the Republic of South Africa, it is a problem that affects U.S. policy toward South Africa; so I think I should say a few words about it. The territory was mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations. South Africa's administration of the territory is the subject of a case before the International Court of Justice brought by Ethiopia and Liberia. They seek a determination as to whether South Africa, which has applied apartheid in South-West Africa, is complying with the terms of the mandate and whether the U.N. has inherited the supervisory functions of the League. As the matter is still before the Court, it would not be proper for me to comment on the substance of the case.

I would point out, however, that in this case the Court's judgment will be binding on all parties. A judgment is

expected within the next few months." The United States naturally expects the parties to the suit to comply with the judgment. Moreover, under article 94 of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is empowered to make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. Thus, depending on the nature of the judgment and the reaction of the parties to it, members of the Security Council may be called upon after the judgment to consider various means of enforcing international law, including sanctions. This case can be an important landmark both in the development of the rule of law in international affairs and in the evolution of the southern African problem.

I should perhaps also mention in passing another group of territories closely related to our policy toward South Africa. These are the British territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland, which are wholly or partially surrounded by South Africa. Two of these territories-Basutoland and Bechuanaland-are expected to reach independence this year, and Swaziland is expected to follow before long.

15

The economies of these new African countries will, of course, remain closely related to South Africa's. Politically and socially, however, they are taking quite a different path. All are dedicated to nonracial democracy. The degree to which they are successful in establishing themselves on this basis could have in time a significant impact on racial patterns in southern Africa. In any event, I believe developments in these emerging countries will be worth following with sympathetic interest. It is partly for this reason that we are planning a modest expansion of our representation in these territories. By this summer instead of one consul, based in Swaziland, covering all three territories, we expect to have consuls in all three territories.

Mr. Chairman, we must frankly admit that the problems that we and other like-minded nations face regarding South Africa remain virtually intractable. Nobody can overlook the fact that race relations in that part of the world have worsened despite the efforts of the outside world, whether of persuasion, condemnation, pressure. We must recognize that many countries have reacted to the

or

14 See post, doc. VIII-17. 15 See ante, doc. II-24.

worsening situation in South Africa by increasingly favoring a policy of pressures and that many others favor at least a policy of disengagement. We must recognize these as political factors affecting our own attitude toward the South African situation. At the same time we believe we must constantly examine and reexamine ways to ameliorate the situation.

Frustrated by the harm that apartheid does to human beings and to our policies, many believe we should manifest our disapproval of apartheid in more concrete ways. We in the Department, too, keep looking for new and constructive measures that we can take in dealing with this problem. In doing so, however, we constantly ask ourselves whether a particular action would be effective. That is, would it actually improve the situation in South Africa, or might it even worsen it? We must also ask ourselves what effect the action would have on our position in Africa and the rest of the world and thus on our ability to influence the various forces that may be brought to bear on the situation.

We cannot neglect either our own values and specific interests in South Africa or those of major allies whose cooperation is of great importance to our worldwide policy goals. It is a frustratingly difficult set of policy considerations to juggle. In view of our position of world leadership and our commitment as Americans to equality here at home, it is impossible for us to have fully satisfactory relations with South Africa as long as it pursues policies so diametrically opposed to our own fundamental beliefs. At the same time it would be shortsighted and unwise to turn our backs on the South African problem. To the extent that we can without compromising our principles, we believe we must keep the channels of communication with South Africa open. Despite all frustrations, we must keep on seeking ways to influence constructively the problem of race relations in South Africa.

In the meanwhile we must do what we can to encourage more progress on the periphery of the main problem by aiding nonracial states in the rest of southern Africa. It may be that such states, while resisting the virus of apartheid, can have constructive relations with South Africa and by their example perhaps may gradually undermine the fear and prejudice which

so obstruct healthy human relations at the foot of the continent.

American policy in southern Africa is, of course, part and parcel of our policy toward Africa as a whole and toward emergent peoples everywhere. We seek to assist independent African states in their efforts to achieve stable, progressive societies based on self-determination, the rule of law, and the dignity of the individual. Is it not reasonable to assume that progress along these lines in the rest of Africa, and especially in the emergent states in southern Africa itself, will have a constructive influence on the South African problem?

Despite all the barriers, the wind of change is blowing ever stronger in southern Africa, and we must do what we can to see that, instead of destruction, it brings a new, more hopeful day to all the peoples living there and therefore to the cause of peace and freedom in the world.

Document VIII-16

Resolutions 2202 A and B (XXI), Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly, December 16, 1966 16

The Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

17 A 17

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions on this question, in particular resolutions 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962,18

16 U.N. General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-First Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/6316), pp. 20-21.

17 This resolution was adopted by a vote of 84 to 2 (Portugal and South Africa), with 13 abstentions (including the U.S.). For an explanation of the United States position regarding the policy of apartheid in South Africa, see supra. The United States abstained because of reservations about the wisdom and legality of imposing economic sanctions on South Africa in existing circumstances and because it deemed certain portions of the text too general or inappropriate in the existing context (see U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1966 (Department of State publication 8276, 1967), pp. 52-57).

18 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 931-933.