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ful accomplishments. Finally, we decided on the following course:

In the present atmosphere in which the reactionaries, in collaboration with imperialism, are taking hostile action against the Arab nationalist forces, we feel that they have made use of summit conferences in order to switch from defense to attack against Arab nationalist forces. Therefore, we cannot sit at future summit conferences with these reactionary elements, otherwise we would be exonerating them in spite of the charges hanging on their heads. This means that we of the United Arab Republic will not go to the next summit conference. But it does not mean that we have withdrawn from summit conferences for good. We have contacted the Arab countries and have asked them, and we shall ask the Arab League, that the next summit conference be postponed indefinitely."

Should there be an end to the alliance of reaction with imperialism against the Arab nationalist forceswhich has replaced unity of action for Palestine and should we see a change and should there be pledges and genuine agreements to follow the right path and not to betray, then there will be a chance for holding the conference. But if things go on as they are at present, then we cannot attend the conference. If the rest of the Arab countries wish to hold the conference, they are free to do so but we cannot possibly participate in it with conditions as they are at present. As I have already told you, Arab reactionaries are utilising summit conferences in order to strike at the Arab revolutionary forces.

Of course our decision will deprive us of the opportunity to visit the land of the heroes of Algeria since the conference was scheduled to be held in their capital. But we are confident that another opportunity will come soon. We are also confident that our Algerian brothers appreciate all the circumstances.

The reactionaries have had bad intentions and they are being supported by imperialism.

The U.A.R.'s request for a postponement of the Arab League Summit Conference was supported by a majority of the Arab Governments, and the Arab League Secretariat announced, on Aug. 5, that the Arab League Summit Conference, scheduled to open in Algiers on Sept. 5, 1966, had been postponed indefinitely.

At any rate, we shall cooperate inside and outside the framework of the Arab League with those whom we feel are linked to us by unity of aim. Unity of aim is not constitutional unity, but it brings complete independence and an understanding of the necessity of aspiring to and working for social justice. The unity of aim we seek means our unlimited support of the aspirations of the Arab peoples-support without embarrassment and without wavering in the face of any danger. It means our readiness, regardless of any written agreements and of prevailing social systems, to participate in the defence of the territory of any Arab country against any Israeli or imperialist aggression.

As far as Syria is concerned, we are ready to coordinate our defences with her. This has been proved and reaffirmed in all circumstances."

This is our view of the Arab situation and summit conferences.

As regards the world at large, we seek good relations with all countries. We are interested in the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. We are interested in non-alignment and we have sought to emphasise its concept anew. Nonalignment means taking an independent stand on any question without any prior commitment except to principles alone.

Of course we all feel today that the situation is deteriorating. The most serious deterioration is taking place in Viet-Nam. Naturally, the American aggression against Viet-Nam is having a great effect on the possibility of solving the problem by peaceful means. We are working for peace and we cannot but denounce the policy of force and condemn aggression. Peoples cannot determine their future while being bombed. They cannot build their life while being subjected to the ravages of war.

Peoples everywhere want peace which cannot be established except on the basis of justice and right. Our Arab people, more than any other people, are aware of the requisites of development, the most important requisite being the creation of a peaceful atmosphere. Our people, more

29 Syria and the U.A.R. announced the signing of a joint defense agreement on Nov. 7, 1966.

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United States Appeal to Israel and Syria To Avoid Resort to Force in Dealing With Their Differences

The Security Council is considering serious complaints about breaches of the peace on the frontiers of Israel

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 29, 1966, pp. 313-315.

With God's will, they will always triumph because the principles of right, justice, peace and goodwill are but reflections of the will of God Almighty.

May God guide your footsteps. Peace be upon you.

May God be with you.

and Syria. All members of the Council, I am confident, realize that this is a matter of great importance, involving as it does a dangerous situation on a tense border. In fact, of the more than 200 times which the Council has met on various aspects of the Arab-Israel conflict, about onehalf of our sessions have been devoted to this particular and tragically intractable problem.

I want at the outset, Mr. President, to reiterate what I said in this Council Monday with respect to the policy of the United States. Our purpose is to help maintain peace in the Middle East. We maintain friendly relations with all countries in the area. We support the instrumentalities of the United Nations which are dedicated to the maintenance of peace, and we believe in full utilization of United Nations machinery in dealing with events such as those which this Council is now considering.

The United States believes the Security Council should concentrate primarily upon steps which will help

2 The U.N. Security Council met on July 25, following receipt of communications from Syria and Israel accusing each other of acts of aggression. The Security Council decided first to consider the Syrian complaint that, on July 14, Israel planes had violated Syrian territory and attacked areas on the site of the Jordan River development scheme (U.N. docs. S/7412 and S/7419), and then to decide whether to consider the Israel complaint that repeated acts of sabotage and aggression from Syria had made necessary the July 14 attack in order to impress upon Syria the seriousness with which Israel viewed repeated acts of violence launched from Syria (U.N. docs. S/7411 and Corr. 1, and S/7423).

3 U.N. doc. S/PV.1288.

restore and secure peace in all the area. We can at least hope that our deliberations will help quiet the atmosphere and calm aroused tempers, will help persuade the parties concerned that there are other ways of resolving their difficulties besides deplorable resorts to force, will stimulate movement on both sides to return to the relatively quiet and encouraging conditions which prevailed along these frontiers earlier this summer, and bulwark the continuing efforts of the UNTSO [United Nations Truce Supervision Organization] to this end.

The problems before us have a long history. In 1949 when the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement was signed the two parties wisely agreed to set up machinery for the settlement of disputes between them. Unfortunately, this machinery is not fully effective. We have on numerous occasions appealed for full utilization of the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice

Commission.

At the time of the Almagor incident in 1963 and the Tel El Qadi incident in 1964 the United States led the effort to embody in resolutions a call for full implementation of the UN machinery. Unfortunately, one of the members of this Council-one who with words rather than with deeds has been posing as a champion of peace in the Middle East-saw fit to veto those resolutions." If the UNTSO had actually been strengthened at that time, such incidents as we face today might not have occurred.

We have now heard the statements of both Syria and Israel regarding this new outbreak of violence. We have also received the very useful reports of the Chief of Staff about the particular events which each of the parties has described in his own way and from his own particular vantage point. We have also been given a note by the Secretary-General which cites efforts by the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to relieve tension in the area."

One of the principal causes of tension along the Israel-Syria frontier has been disagreement over areas of cultivation. In June the Chief of Staff was successful in obtaining a cease

Text in American Foreign Policy, 1950– 1955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 719-724.

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, p. 584; ibid., 1964, p. 710. U.N. doc. S/7434.

fire and an agreement to refrain from cultivation of certain areas. There appeared to be some chance of an agreement which would have resulted in a more lasting easing of tension.

It is very regrettable that this period of quiet was broken on July 13 and 14 by a series of deplorable terrorist incidents in Israel close to the Syrian border. The report of the Chief of Staff contained in document S/7433 discusses these incidents. The Chief of Staff reports that the United Nations Military Observers verified damage from explosions at the locations given in the Israel complaints to the Israel-Syria Mixed Armistice Commission. The Military Observers also saw or received medical certificates for the casualties reported by witnesses to these incidents: two dead and two wounded. Finally, the Military Observers viewed tracks between the scene of the incidents and the Israeli border.

From this evidence it seems reasonably clear that individuals responsible for these acts of sabotage came from Syria. The available evidence did not demonstrate, of course, whether they were acting as private individuals, with or without the knowledge of Syrian authorities, or as agents of the Government of Syria. We note the Government of Syria denies responsibility for these raiding parties, but we find it difficult to believe that Syrian authorities could have been ignorant of the movements across their frontiers in such sensitive areas, especially as there was a pattern of incidents at several places and over a short period of time. We find it particularly difficult to understand why the official radio in Damascus continues to broadcast so-called Fatah' communiques on sabotage and raids across the borders. And we cannot in any case concur with the statement of the distinguished representative of Syria in the Security Council implying that Syria has only a defensive responsibility and is not required to prevent raids across its borders to Israel. Syria is required to maintain peace under the armistice agreements.

The Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement provides, moreover, in article III, paragraph 3, that no war

7 El Fatah was a nonofficial organization accused by Israel of perpetrating acts of sabotage under the patronage of the Syrian Government (see U.N. doc. S/PV.1288). 8 See ibid.

like act or act of hostility shall be conducted from territory of one of the parties to this agreement against the other party or against civilians in territory under control of that party. It is regrettable that the Government of Syria did not take adequate precautions to prevent these raids.

We now come to the other document before us, S/7432, the report of the Chief of Staff on the first item on the agenda before us. The Government of Israel has openly admitted its airstrike against Syrian territory on July 14, contending that it "was meant to impress upon the Syrian authorities the gravity with which the Israel Government views continual Syrian violence against Israel's population and territory."" The strike has also been investigated and verified by the Chief of Staff, who reports visual U.N. sightings of the aircraft and inspection of the damaged site, of equipment and casualties. There is no question that this is another serious violation of the General Armistice Agreement.

My Government considers it deplorable that the Government of Israel chose to reply to these raids in a manner which not only caused further civilian injuries and deaths but also increased the danger of continued and more serious breaches of the cease-fire. The U.S. Government was not consulted and had no knowledge of this strike. Moreover, this attack took place when the previous incidents were still under investigation by the United Nations Military Observers. We believe that reliance on the United Nations machinery was clearly called for in this instance.

The United States supports the continuing efforts of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, General [Odd] Bull, to help maintain reasonably quiet conditions along these frontiers. I want in particular to emphasize General Bull's conclusions as passed on in the note by the Secretary-General, document S/7434. I quote:

"I appeal to both parties to reestablish the unconditional ceasefire to which both had agreed at the beginning of June 1966.

"Despite the deplorable events of the last two days, I intend to continue conversations with both sides

9 U.N. doc. S/7411.

and try to settle the cultivation problems which have been the origin of too many serious incidents. Efforts to reduce tension through negotiations must be pursued so long as there is a will to succeed."

We also agree fully with the observation made in the Secretary-General's note that a settlement of the problem of cultivation will help relieve present tension between the two countries. It is our hope that the reactions of the parties, as reported in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the SecretaryGeneral's note, will result in early and fruitful discussions leading not only to a settlement of cultivation problems but also to the firm reestablishment of an unconditional cease-fire.

Mr. President, I conclude with a simple appeal to both sides to deal with differences by peaceful means, to avoid resorts to force, and to abide scrupulously by their solemn obligations under the armistice agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. This is the road to peace in the Middle East-a peace which would benefit all peoples there.

Document VII-7

Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Thant), September 7, 1966 (Excerpts) 10

Operations of the United Nations Emergency Force During the Period August 1, 1965-July 31, 1966

2. The Suez crisis, the emergency which led to the establishment of UNEF in late 1956 and which gave rise to its description as the "Emergency Force", has long since ended. But the buffer function which UNEF undertook unavoidably almost from its beginning is still indispensable.

3. This Force continues to be a major stabilizing influence and the principal means of maintaining quiet in the area in which it operates. Des

10 U.N. doc. A/6406. The report was submitted in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1125 (XI); text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1957, p. 896.

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II. REORGANIZATION, DEPLOYMENT AND
DAILY ROUTINE

6. The process of reducing the numerical strength of the Force has been continuing since 1957 when its numerical strength was 6,615. The present numerical strength is 3,959. In 1965-1966 the Force was reduced by 622 men.

Contingent

13. As a consequence of the Review of the Survey Team of 1965, the Force was reduced in size and now consists of the following operational units: the Brazilian Indian and Scandinavian Battalions and the Yugoslav Reconnaissance Battalion. In pursuance of recommendations of the Survey Team,

7. The composition of the Force as of 31 July 1966 was as follows:

Infantry battalion (including 4 military
police)

Headquarters staff
Service units
Headquarters staff
Military police
Air transport unit
Infantry battalion
Headquarters staff
Headquarters medical staff
UNEF hospital

Military police
Infantry battalion
Brass band

Headquarters staff
Service units
Military police
Infantry battalion
Headquarters staff
Military police
Headquarters staff

Reconnaissance battalion (including 13 mili

tary police) Headquarters staff

Grand Total:

All

ranks

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5

Total

605

804

417

1, 138

289
1

The Canadian Reconnaissance Squadron was withdrawn on 20 February 1966

The Norwegian and Danish units are placed under a single battalion and the structure of command is mixed. Commanding officers are alternately Danish and Norwegian. The present Commanding Officer is Norwegian and will be replaced by a Dane in October 1966. The authorized total strength of the "Danor" Battalion is 600 all ranks.

• The Swedish Battalion returned to Sweden on 10 March 1966.

705 3,959

the Swedish Battalion as a separate unit and the Canadian Reconnaissance Squadron were withdrawn in February-March 1966 and the remaining operational units were reorganized as indicated in paragraph 7.

16. The system of patrolling, manning of observation posts and obser

11 See U.N. doc. A/C.5/1049.

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