Ozero-Dzhankoy-Simferopol' and [to the east] of the motor road Simferopol'-Alushta; with the exception of the cities of Dzhankoy, Simferopol', and Alushta;

cities of Dnepropetrovsk, Nikolayev, Sevastopol', Balaklava;

Azerbaydzhan S.S.R.

Territory of the Nakhichevanskaya A.S.S.R.;

areas situated to the west and southwest of the railroad Tbilisi, Alyaty-Pristan' (50 kilometers southwest of the city of Baku). Transit passage is authorized along the Tbilisi-Baku Railroad;

Kazakh S.S.R.

Gur'yevskaya, Karagandinskaya, Kzyl-Ordinskaya, Pavlodarskaya, Semipalatinskaya, and Alma-Atinskaya Oblasts, with the exception of the city of Alma-Ata;

Dzhambulskaya Oblast-area to the east of the Myn-Aral-Lugovoy Railroad;

Ural'skaya Oblast-area to the west of the Ural River;

Transit passage to the city of AlmaAta is authorized along the railroad from the city of Tashkent by way of Dzhambul and by air;

Kirgiz S.S.R.

Territory of the republic, with the exception of the city of Frunze, Keminskiy, Chuyskiy, Kantskiy, Sokulukskiy, and Moskovskiy Rayons, and Oshskaya Oblast minus Batkenskiy Rayon;

Uzbek S.S.R.

Karakalpakskaya A.S.S.R.;

areas of Surkhandar’inskaya Oblast in the confines of the inhabited points: Denau, Baysun, Shirabad, Dzhar-Kurgan;

Turkmen S.S.R.

Areas situated to the west of the common boundary between Uzbek SSR and Kazakh SSR and then to the south by way of Kizyl-Arvat, KaraKala;

Area limited by the inhabited points: Yerbent-Sernyy Zavod-Dar

The Soviet Union

On Aug. 5, 1967, the Department of State announced an easing of restrictions on travel in the United States by diplomats from the Embassies of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the U.S.S.R. It reduced by about 3.5 percent the areas closed to Soviet Embassy diplomats, approximately the equivalent of the enlarging of Soviet territory accessible to foreigners, announced above. (The New York Times, Aug. 6, 1967.)

26 The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XVIII, No. 31, Aug. 24, 1966 pp. 11-18.

[Doc. VI−61 479

ing the future of Soviet-American relations.

However, we do not believe that Soviet-American relations could not be different from the way that, through the fault of the U.S.A., they are now shaping up. To normalize them it is necessary for the U.S.A. to observe the norms of international law, to stop interfering in the internal affairs of other states and peoples. Aggressive moods obviously predominate in Washington at the present stage. But we know that there also exist other, healthier tendencies there. A strengthening of these tendencies will meet with due understanding on our part.

The liquidation of American aggression in Asia and the adoption of measures to ensure European security would indisputably bring in their wake a relaxation of international tension and would facilitate the implementation of new, far-reaching measures along the path to stopping the arms race, toward universal and complete disarmament.

The Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the struggle for disarmament is not a tactical move but a policy of principle, an integral part of Soviet foreign policy.

Our state has pursued this course with the utmost consistency from the very first steps of Soviet rule. Back at the Genoa conference in 1922 the Soviet delegation proclaimed the Lenin program of universal disarmament. One can state confidently that today the importance of the disarmament problem has not declined but has grown immeasurably. It has increased particularly because the destructive power of modern weapons has reached truly vast dimensions. Military expenditures also have become tremendous and weigh heavily as a burden on the shoulders of the working population.

The present moment, of course, when the international situation is exceedingly tense, when war is going on in Vietnam, little favors the adoption of fundamental disarmament measures. Nevertheless, even now a number of important partial measures could be taken in this sphere in order at least to arrest the further accumulation of arms and growth of military production.

One such measure could be the conclusion of a treaty for nonprolifera

tion of nuclear weapons on a basis that would rule out all possibilities of their further spread. Another such measure could be the banning of all nuclear tests.

We attach great importance to the United Nations, which is called upon to play a substantial role in safeguarding peace and ensuring the security of peoples. In recent years the circle of U.N. member-countries taking a peace-loving, anti-imperialist position has grown considerably. In the activation of these forces we see a real possibility of heightening the effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for cutting short aggression and safeguarding universal peace.

The Soviet Union is exerting great efforts to enlarge its commercial-economic ties, believing that the development of these ties corresponds both to the national interests of the individual countries and to the relaxation of world tension. Modern scientifictechnical progress also requires broad international contact. We shall take practical steps for ever more active participation in world trade, in international scientific-technical and cultural cooperation.

Our foreign-economic organizations face big tasks in the further activation of their work and in raising its effectiveness in every way.

Comrade Deputies! The presentday international situation requires us to be especially vigilant. The C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government, the entire people, will constantly strengthen the defenses of our state. We speak with pride of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, which are equipped with first-class military technology and have highly qualified personnel boundlessly loyal to the great cause of communism. Our armed forces stand guard staunchly over the Soviet borders, which are firm and inviolable. They are able to deal a crushing blow to anyone who dares test the might of Soviet weapons. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that its policy is a policy of resolutely rebuffing any imperialist aggression.

At the same time we shall display restraint and calm and shall not succumb to the provocations of those who would like to warm their hands at the hotbeds of international tension, at the hotbeds of war. The Soviet Union pursues and will continue to pursue

a policy of peace and the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, a policy of striving for a relaxation of international tension. We are prepared-to the extent that others are prepared to do this-to traverse our part of the road toward mutual understanding and accord among states.

27

In carrying out the foreign policy confirmed and developed by the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the C.P.S.U., the Soviet Union proceeds from the real conditions existing in the world today and at the same time takes into account the broad perspective of international development. To orient oneself correctly in policy means not to confine oneself within the framework of the events of today but to perceive the basic tendencies of long-range significance. If one looks at things broadly, despite the present tension caused by imperialist aggression these tendencies are favorable to the forces coming out for ensuring peace and international security.

Approaching the appraisal of the present international situation from these positions, we are once again convinced that the conclusion drawn by the C.P.S.U. and the whole world Communist movement concerning the possibility of curbing the aggressors and preventing a new world war is profoundly correct. This conclusion remains valid in the present situation as well.

Even greater solidarity of all the progressive forces of our time will greatly facilitate success in the struggle against imperialist aggression, for peace and the security of peoples. The Soviet Union will unswervingly exert efforts to achieve this goal of strengthening the single anti-imperialist front.

Document VI-7

Announcement Issued by the Department of State, August 3, 1966

Held from Mar. 29 to Apr. 8, 1966. See ibid., No. 15, May 4, 1966, pp. 3-9 and 12; and ibid., No. 16, May 11, 1966, pp. 3-20; also ante, doc. IV-10.

28 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 22, 1966, pp. 273–274.

United States-Soviet Technical Discussions in Moscow on Problems Relating to the Conservation and Use of Fishery Resources Off the United States Coast

Fishery experts of the United States and the Soviet Union on July 30 concluded a week of technical discussions in Moscow on problems relating to the conservation and use of fishery resources off the U.S. coast. The two delegations agreed to recommend to their respective Governments measures to alleviate the short-term problems and to establish procedures looking to long-term solutions.

Among the recommendations was a proposal that scientists and technical experts of the two countries meet in Moscow the week of November 13, 1966, to consider further the problems of conservation and of rules governing fishing vessels on the high seas, with respect to areas of both the Pacific and Atlantic off the U.S. coast. Following this meeting there would be a subsequent meeting of representatives of the two Governments to consider the conclusions of the scientists and technicians and to decide on further measures as might be indicated.

The delegations agreed to recommend that exchanges of fisheries personnel aboard fishing and research vessels of the two countries in both the Atlantic and Pacific areas be initiated within a month. It is expected that U.S. participants in the exchanges would include scientists, fishery-management experts, and representatives of the fishing industry.

It was also recommended that the Soviet Government take action to ease problems arising out of concentrations of vessels on fishing grounds customarily used by American fishermen, with immediate attention to the area off Oregon and Washington."

29 See the U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Certain Fishery Problems in the Northeastern Part of the Pacific Ocean Off the Coast of the United States, With Exchange of Notes, Signed at Washington, Feb. 13, 1967 (TIAS 6218; 18 UST 190).

Common reasons for agreement have not eluded us in the past, and let no one forget that these agreementsarms control and others have been essential to the overall peace in the world.

In 1963 we signed the limited test ban treaty that has now been joined by almost 100 other countries.

In 1959 the Antarctic Treatywhich restricted activity in this part of the world to peaceful purposeswas signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. It has now been joined by all countries interested in Antarctica.

43

In 1963 the United Nations unanimously passed a resolution prohibiting the placing in orbit of weapons of mass destruction."

When I first became President-almost my first act-I informed Premier Khrushchev that we in the United States intended to reduce the level of our production of fissionable materials, and we hoped that he and the Soviets would do likewise. Premier Khrushchev agreed."

36

I believe that the Soviets share a genuine desire to enlarge the area of agreement. This summer we have been negotiating with the Soviet Union and other nations a treaty that would limit the future activity on celestial bodies to peaceful purposes. This treaty would, for all time, ban weapons of mass destruction not only on celestial bodies but also in orbit around the earth.

Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, our Ambassador to the United Nations, has just informed me that much of the substance of this treaty has been resolved. Negotiations were originally recessed on August 4 of this year, but the Soviet Government has now indicated its willingness to pursue them again as soon as possible. The Soviet Union has joined with us in requesting that all of the countries participating in the negotiations be prepared to resume discussions on the 12th day of next month. I am confident that with good will the remaining issues could be quickly resolved.

We are also seeking agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

This treaty would bind those who sign it in a pledge to limit the further spread of nuclear weapons and make it possible for all countries to refrain, without fear, from entering the nuclear arms race. It would not guarantee against a nuclear war; it would help to prevent a chain reaction that could consume the living of the earth. I believe that we can find acceptable compromise language on which reasonable men can agree. We just must move ahead-for we all have a great stake in building peace in this world in which we live.

In Southeast Asia the United States is today fighting to keep the North Vietnamese from taking over South Viet-Nam by force.

That conflict does not have to stop us from finding new ways of dealing with one another." Our objective in South Viet-Nam is local and it is limited: We are there trying to protect the independence of South Viet-Nam, to provide her people with a chance to decide for themselves where they are going and what they will become.

These objectives, I think, can be attained within the borders of VietNam. They do not threaten the vital interests of the Soviet Union or the territory of any of her friends. We seek in Southeast Asia an order and security that we think would contribute to the peace of the entire worldand in that, we think, the Soviet Union has a very large stake.

It is the responsibility, then, of both of us to keep particular difficulties from becoming vehicles for much larger dangers. For peace does not ever come suddenly or swiftly; only war carries that privilege.

40 In announcing the resumption of talks looking toward signature by the United States and the U.S.S.R. of a civil air transport agreement (see post, doc. VI-16), on Oct. 3, 1966, the Director of the Office of News (McCloskey), Department of State, said that the "main reason" for moving ahead on the agreement at that time was to prove the sincerity of President Johnson's declaration that the United States sought areas of agreement with the Soviet Union despite the differences arising from the war in Viet-Nam. He said the air transport agreement was "one area where we can make progress in a demonstrable and forthcoming fashion without raising broader considerations of national policy." (The New York Times, Oct. 4, 1966.)