Union and the existence of nuclear weapons.

To move toward such a Europe is not the way to reach a settlement of the unfinished business of the last war. It is not a way to remove the Iron Curtain except on terms that would preserve and exacerbate discrimination and inequality and thus lay the groundwork for new disasters in the future.

Such a Europe would not secure a lasting peace nor would it bring fulfillment to the European peoples. For there is a new requirement of size in the world which makes it imperative that, if the peoples of Europe are to make their full contribution to world affairs, they must organize themselves on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the modern age. Let us not deceive ourselves; no matter how adroit diplomacy may be, it cannot achieve first-power status for a nation of limited size and resources.

The true course of Western Europe lies not in fragmentation but in unity-a solid unity that will bring not varying degrees of status and citizenship but equality for all. A united Europe will not need to seek first-power status; it will have it. And unity, moreover, will enable the gifted European peoples to play their major role in the large affairs of this turbulent world and make their rich and proper contribution to civilization.

If Europe unites, the world will no longer be faced with the dangers of middle-sized states trying to play a game of maneuver with one another and with the "hegemonies," after the pattern of the past. There will be a third large center of power and purpose-capable, because it is strong, of bringing about a European settlement, competent to come to terms with the East on a basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain and reunify the German people as equal members of a great community.

sense-not something enacted by international law, not something the United States has conferred. It will be an equality founded on unassailable fact, since a united Europe will command vast resources of technology and production, brain power and material.

Americans join with Europeans in wanting this kind of Europe. We want a Europe strong, not enfeebled. We want a Europe independent in spirit as it is interdependent in fact. As President Kennedy once said, “It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually.” But what we look forward to, he said, is "a Europe united and strong— speaking with a common voice, acting with a common will-a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.” 73

Perhaps there are some Americans who would like to see a fragmented Europe, but they have not read history carefully-or if they have, they have not understood it. Certainly, it is not the policy of this administration any more than it was the policy of the Kennedy or the Eisenhower or the Truman administrations to see Europe disunited.

For we are prepared to take our chances on a Western Europe united on principles of equality, a Europe with a common voice. To be sure, it will be an independent voice, not always agreeing with us-but then the United States has no monopoly of wisdom. What we can be sure of is that we and our Western European partners will agree on the broad outlines of the kind of world we want, a world of peace and freedom. For we draw from the deep well of Western civilization, cherish the same ideals of liberty, seek together the dignity of the individual and not the tyranny of the mass.

A Europe so united was the bright hope and the high accomplishment of the fifties. It remains the real hope of Europeans and Americans today. For, as President Johnson said more than a year ago:

As this develops, and only as it develops, will we Atlantic peoples be able to give full meaning to the concept of equal partnership. For no longer will the European nations have to fear, as some apparently do, the preponderance of American weight in our common political councils or the preponderance of American industrial strength in our economic affairs. There will be equality in a realistic

"The unknown tide of future change is already beating about the rock of

72 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 410-415.

the West. These fruitful lands washed by the Atlantic, this half-billion people unmatched in arms and industry, this measureless storehouse of wisdom and genius can be a fortress against any foe, a force that will enrich the life of an entire planet. It is not a question of arms or wealth alone. It is a question of moving ahead with the times, and it is a question of vision and persistence and the willingness to surmount the barriers of national rivalry against which our ancestors have always collided." "

The German Government has already had an opportunity to state that it cannot agree with the reasoning upon which the French Government bases the intentions that it has communicated. It is of the opinion that the threat to the western world, and particularly to Europe, has not ceased. Nor does it see itself in a position to accept the legal grounds on which the French Government bases its action. It regrets that the means provided in the North Atlantic Treaty for discussion of proposed revisions were not used by the French Government.

tioned there. The German Government welcomes this and is satisfied to note from the declaration of the French Government that it intends to adhere to the Alliance beyond 1969. From this the German Government infers that it is France's intention to continue to participate in the common defence of the Alliance.

In the opinion of the German Government, the military mission of the Allied Forces in Germany can only be to safeguard, within the framework of this common defence, the integrity of the territory covered by the Alliance by presenting a credible deterrent.

In view of modern weapons technology, the commitments contained in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty 77 and Article 5 of the revised Brussels Treaty 78 can be effectively fulfilled only if already in peacetime the Allies make arrangements for rendering mutual assistance without delay in the event of an attack. This means that the ground and air forces assume in a defence contingency clearly defined tasks within the framework of the common defence and that the necessary prerequisites to that end are established in peacetime. In view of the narrowness of the territory for defence and the expected swiftness of military operations, a unified chain of command for all ground and air forces is imperative in a defence contingency.

The German Government would therefore appreciate it if the French Government would inform its Allies as to how, in its opinion, the co-operation of the French forces in Germany with NATO forces in war and in peace should be arranged. In particular, the French Government should make it clear to its Allies whether it is prepared:

- in a defence contingency, to take over clearly defined defence tasks within the framework of collective defence with its ground and air forces;

- in peacetime, to establish all necessary prerequisites in co-ordination with the responsible NATO commands;

-to place its forces under the command of the responsible NATO Commander in a defence contingency;

Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 812-815. 78 Text ibid., pp. 972-989.

The announced intention of the French Government to withdraw its forces in Germany from NATO command by 1 July, 1966, affects an essential part of this system, viz. Part IV of the Final Act of the London NinePower Conference and the implementing resolution of the NATO Council of Ministers of 22 October, 1954. In these the nine powers of the London Conference and subsequently all member States of the Alliance expressly committed themselves to place their forces stationed on the European continent under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The only exceptions were forces intended for the defence of overseas territories and other forces which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recognized, or will recognize, as suitable to remain under national command. The responsibilities and powers of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe regarding the forces under his authority were laid down in detail in the same resolution of the NATO Council of Ministers of 22 October, 1954.

That arrangement not only corresponded to military necessities but was

"Text ibid., pp. 1474-1491.

Text ibid., pp. 1493-1496.

81 Cited in footnote 78, above.

at the same time the expression of the political equality of all members of the Alliance.

In connection with this commitment undertaken by all members of the North Atlantic Alliance, the Federal Republic of Germany, within the system of treaties of 1954, i.e. in the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 October, 1954, had agreed with the United States, Great Britain and France that forces of the same effective strength as stationed at that time on Federal territory may be stationed there also in the future.

The withdrawal of the French forces on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany from the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe therefore affects their right to be stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany; for it makes an essential difference whether the foreign forces stationed on Federal territory are placed under a joint command in which the Federal Republic of Germany participates in an appropriate degree, or whether these forces are solely under the national command of their State of origin.

As from the time at which the French forces on Federal territory are withdrawn from the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe without the agreement of the other members of the Atlantic Alliance, France could therefore no longer exercise its right of stationing under the Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany of 23 October, 1954.

It is, however, the desire of the German Government to reach new agreements with the French Government which would enable the French forces to stay on Federal territory if a satisfactory arrangement can be made for the military tasks of these forces and their functions within the framework of common defence. To this end it would be necessary to create a new legal basis for their presence and to adjust their status to the changed circumstances.

The new arrangements would have to rest on the principles of equality and reciprocity, take into account the sovereignty of the receiving States and contain corresponding provisions on their duration.

82 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 610-612.

ment of the Federal Republic desires the maintenance of the French forces on its territory. Of course, various considerations of a legal character can be brought up by both sides, but the essential question lies elsewhere.

The French Government has made it known-in unambiguous termsthat, although it does not exclude the possibility of maintaining certain of its forces on German territory, it has no intention of doing so if the Federal Government does not so desire.

As the above-mentioned Note did not take any position on this matter, the French Government wishes to state that it is ready to withdraw its forces from German territory. The evacuation could take place over a period of one year, that is, spaced out between 1 July 1966 and 1 July 1967, with all practical steps for implementation to be discussed eventually between the two Governments.

If, however, the Government of the Federal Republic desires the maintenance of the French forces, but in this case only, the French Governmentas it has already made known-would be ready to examine the questions that would arise. In such a case, it would in its view be necessary to discuss: 1-between the two Governments, an arrangement on the practical conditions for stationing French forces; 2-between the interallied command and the French command, a co-operation agreement providing for the missions to be assumed by French forces and the conditions regarding their command in the event that Article V of the Treaty of Washington were to come into play," the maintenance of the status quo being of course excluded, and this agreement being approved by the Governments of the member countries of the Alliance.

On the first point, the French Government continues to think that, although some improvements in the conditions for implementing the status of the forces may be useful, the Convention of 23 October 1954 on the presence of foreign forces on the territory of the Federal German Republic constitutes an adequate legal basis.* Once the two Governments reach agreement on this subject, the legal arguments invoked to the contrary, and into whose discussion the French Government sees no purpose in enter

87 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 812-815. 88 Text ibid., pp. 610–612.

the alliance that 14 partners wish to maintain, thereby making it even more effective.

All these questions, which were the topic of my talks in London," are being worked on by the 14 NATO ambassadors in Paris. They have made good progress in the preparatory work. We expect that their proposals will be on hand at the Council conference in Brussels early in June," so that the necessary decisions can then be made and the negotiations between NATO and France initiated.

An important problem in connection with these things-though not the only one-is the matter of the continued presence of French troops in Germany. The French Government has asked us whether we wish the troops to remain." We have, with conviction, several times answered in the affirmative. Before this High House I should now like once more to say "yes", emphatically, clearly and unequivocally, in addition stressing that the affirmative reply refers not only to the French land forces in Germany, but also and no less to the French air-force units and the French airdefence forces.

But surely it is self-evident as we have repeatedly urged-that French troops in Germany should have a certain military mission within the framework of common defence, and that furthermore, a clear-cut situation should be created regarding the supreme command and the co-operation of all the armed forces joined in the alliance. This complex of questions concerns not only us Germans but all the NATO partners. It should therefore, we think, be clarified by, on the one side, the 14 NATO governments that wish to maintain common defence in the form it has had so far and, on the other side, France. We have been told that it would be pointless if, by such agreements, France were led to re-enter by the back door, as it were, the integration from which it is just wanting to detach itself. I wish to make very clear that this is not our intention.

The purpose of the military agreements that we and our partners deem necessary is a different one. These

92 Chancellor Erhard visited London, May 22-25, for discussions with U.K. Prime Minister Harold Wilson; a communiqué issued at the conclusion of the talks is printed in the source text.

93 See infra.

See supra.

Bulletin of the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1966.

Ellipsis in source text.