Document IV-1

Reply Made by the President of the French Republic (General de Gaulle) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, February 21, 1966 (Excerpt)1

Determination of the
French Government To
Modify the Manner of
Its Participation in NATO

Nothing can make a law enforceable, without amendment, when it no longer agrees with the ways of the times. Nothing can make a treaty wholly valid when its object has can make an changed. Nothing alliance remain as such when the conditions in which it was concluded have changed. It is therefore necessary to adapt the law, the treaty and the alliance to the new factors, failing which the texts, emptied of their substance, will, if circumstances so require, be nothing more than useless papers in the archives, unless there is a harsh break between these obsolete forms and the living realities.

Well! If France considers, today still, that it is useful to her security and to that of the West that she be allied with a certain number of States, particularly with America, for their defense and for hers in the event of aggression against one of them; if the declaration made in common on

1 French Embassy Press and Information Service, New York, Speeches and Press Conferences, No. 239.

this subject, in the form of the Atlantic Alliance treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949, still remains valid in her eyes, at the same time she recognizes that the measures for implementation taken subsequently no longer correspond to what she deems satisfactory, with respect to herself, in the new conditions.

I say, the new conditions. For it is quite clear that, owing to the internal and external evolution of the countries of the East, the Western world is no longer threatened today as it was at the time when the American protectorate was set up in Europe under the cover of NATO. But, at the same time as the alarms were dying down, there was also a reduction in the guarantee of security-one might say absolute-that the possession of the nuclear weapon by America alone gave to the Old Continent, and in the certainty that America would employ it, without reservation, in the event of aggression. For Soviet Russia has since that time equipped itself with a nuclear power capable of striking the United States directly, which has made the decisions of the Americans as to the eventual use of their bombs at least indeterminate, and which has, by the same token, stripped of justification-I speak for France-not the Alliance, of course, but indeed integra tion.

On the other hand, while the prospects of a world war breaking out on account of Europe are dissipating, conflicts in which America engages in other parts of the world-as the day before yesterday in Korea, yesterday in Cuba, today in Vietnam-risk, by

2 Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955 : Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 812-815.

virtue of that famous escalation, being extended so that the result could be a general conflagration. In that case Europe--whose strategy is, within NATO, that of America-would be automatically involved in the struggle, even when it would not have so desired. It would be so for France, if the intermeshing of her territory, of her communications, of certain of her forces, of several of her air bases, of some of her ports with the military system under American command were to continue much longer. Moreover, our country, having become for its part and by its own means an atomic power, is led to assume itself the very extensive strategic and political responsibilities that this capacity involves and that, by their nature and by their dimensions, are obviously inalienable. Lastly, France's determination to dispose of herself, a determination without which she would soon cease to believe in her own role and be able to be useful to others, is incompatible with a defense organization in which she finds herself subordinate.

Consequently, without going back on her adherence to the Atlantic Alliance, France is going, between now and the final date set for her obligations, which is April 4, 1969, to continue to modify successively the measures currently practiced, insofar as they concern her. What she did yesterday in this respect in several domains, she will do tomorrow in others, while taking, of course, the necessary measures so that these changes take place gradually and so that her allies cannot be suddenly, and because of her, inconvenienced. In addition, she will hold herself ready to arrange with one or another of them, and in the same manner in which she has already proceeded on certain points, the practical relations for cooperation that will appear useful on both sides, either in the immediate present or in the eventuality of conflict. a This naturally holds for allied cooperation in Germany. In sum, it means reestablishing a normal situation of sovereignty, in which that which is

French as regards soil, sky, sea and forces, and any foreign element that would be in France, will in the future be under French command alone. This is to say that it in no way means a rupture, but a necessary adaptation.

Document IV-2

Letter From the President of the French Republic (General de Gaulle) to the President of the United States (Johnson), March 7, 1966 3

"France Considers That the Changes That Have Occurred. . . Since 1949 No Longer Justify

... the Arrangements of a Military Nature Made After the Conclusion of the [Atlantic] Alliance"

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In 3 years, our Atlantic alliance will complete its first term. I wish to tell you that France appreciates the extent to which the solidarity of defense thus established among 15 free Western nations helps insure their security, and, especially, what an essential role the United States of America plays in this respect. Therefore, France now expects to remain, when the time comes, a party to the treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. This means that, unless events in the course of the next 3 years should change the fundamental elements of the relations between East and West, she would

3 Report of Special Subcommittee Visiting American Military Installations and NATO Bases in France, by Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, EightyNinth Congress, Second Session, September 12, 1966, pp. 10584-10585.

Text in American Foreign Policy, 19501955: Basic Documents, vol. I, pp. 812-815.

be, in 1969 and later, determined, just as today, to fight beside her allies if one of them should suffer unprovoked aggression.

However, France considers that the changes that have occurred, or are in the process of occurring, since 1949, in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, as well as the evolution of her own situation and her own forces, no longer justify, insofar as she is concerned, the arrangements of a military nature made after the conclusion of the alliance, either jointly in the form of multilateral agreements, or by special agreements between the French Government and the American Government.

That is why France intends to recover, in her territory, the full exercise of her sovereignty, now impaired by the permanent presence of Allied military elements or by the habitual use being made of its airspace, to terminate her participation in the "integrated" commands, and no longer to place forces at the disposal of NATO. It goes without saying that, in order to implement these decisions, she is prepared to make arrangements with the Allied Governments, and in particular with the Government of the United States, regarding the practical measures that concern them. Furthermore, she is prepared to reach agreement with them regarding the military facilities to be accorded on a mutual basis in the event of a conflict in which she would join battle at their side, and regarding the conditions governing the cooperation between her forces and theirs in the event of joint action, especially in Germany.

And, so, Mr. President, my government will get in touch with yours regarding all these points. However, in order to act in the spirit of friendly candor that should inspire the relations between our two countries, and, allow me to add, between you and me, I have sought, first of all, to let you know personally, for what reasons, to what end, and within what limits France believes that she must, for her part, change the form of our Alliance without altering its substance.

Please accept, [etc.].