part of the world, but they clearly cannot be expected to bear a disproportionate share of the common burden indefinitely. If, for example, other nations genuinely believe-as they say they do that it is in the common interest to deter the expansion of Red China's economic and political control beyond its national boundaries, then they must take a more active role in guarding the defense perimeter.

Let me be perfectly clear. This is not to question the policy of neutralism or nonalinement of any particular nation. But it is to emphasize that the independence of such nations can, in the end, be fully safeguarded only by collective agreements among themselves and their neighbors.

The plain truth is the day is coming when no single nation, however powerful, can undertake by itself to keep the peace outside its own borders. Regional and international organizations for peacekeeping purposes are as yet rudimentary, but they must grow in experience and be strengthened by deliberate and practical cooperative action.

In this matter, the example of Canada is a model for nations everywhere. As Prime Minister Pearson pointed out eloquently in New York just last week: Canada "is as deeply involved in the world's affairs as any country of its size. We accept this beIcause we have learned over 50 years that isolation from the policies that determine war does not give us immunity from the bloody, sacrificial consequences of their failure. We learned that in 1914 and again in 1939. . . . That is why we have been proud to send our men to take part in every peacekeeping operation of the United Nations-in Korea, and Kashmir, and the Suez, and the Congo, and Cyprus." 22

The Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic, the more than 30 nations contributing troops or supplies to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam, indeed even the parallel efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Pakistan-India conflict-these efforts, together with those of the U.N., are the first attempts to substitute multinational for unilateral policing of violence. They point to the peacekeeping patterns of the future.

22 See The New York Times, May 12, 1966.

We must not merely applaud the idea. We must dedicate talent, resources, and hard practical thinking to its implementation.

In Western Europe, an area whose burgeoning economic vitality stands as a monument to the wisdom of the Marshall Plan, the problems of security are neither static nor wholly new. Fundamental changes are under way, though certain inescapable realities remain. The conventional forces of NATO, for example, still require a nuclear backdrop far beyond the capability of any Western European nation to supply, and the United States is fully committed to provide that major nuclear deterrent.

However, the European members of the alliance have a natural desire to participate more actively in nuclear planning. A central task of the alliance today is, therefore, to work out the relationships and institutions through which shared nuclear planning can be effective. We have made a practical and promising start in the Special Committee of NATO Defense Ministers.23

Common planning and consultation are essential aspects of any sensible substitute to the unworkable and dangerous alternative of independent national nuclear forces within the alliance. And even beyond the alliance we must find the means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That is a clear imperative.

There are, of course, risks in nonproliferation arrangements, but they cannot be compared with the infinitely greater risks that would arise out of the increase in national nuclear stockpiles. In the calculus of risk, to proliferate independent national nuclear forces is not a mere arithmetical addition of danger. We would not be merely adding up risks. We would be insanely multiplying them.

If we seriously intend to pass on a world to our children that is not threatened by nuclear holocaust, we must come to grips with the problem of proliferation. A reasonable nonproliferation agreement is feasible. For there is no adversary with whom we do not share a common interest in avoiding mutual destruction triggered by an irresponsible nth power.

23 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1965, p. 440, footnote 45; post, doc. IV-16.

That brings me to the third and last set of relationships the United States must deal with: those with nations who might be tempted to take up arms against us.

These relationships call for realism. But realism is not a hardened, inflexible, unimaginative attitude. The realistic mind is a restlessly creative mind, free of naive delusions but full of practical alternatives. There are practical alternatives to our current relationships with both the Soviet Union and Communist China.

A vast ideological chasm separates us from them-and to a degree separates them from one another. There is nothing to be gained from our seeking an ideological rapprochement; but breaching the isolation of great nations like Red China, even when that isolation is largely of its own making, reduces the danger of potentially catastrophic misunderstandings and increases the incentive on both sides to resolve disputes by reason rather than by force.

There are many ways in which we can build bridges toward nations who would cut themselves off from meaningful contact wth us. We can do so with properly balanced trade relations, diplomatic contacts, and in some cases even by exchanges of military observers. We have to know where it is we want to place this bridge, what sort of traffic we want to travel over it, and on what mutual foundations the whole structure can be designed.

There are no one-cliff bridges. If you are going to span a chasm, you have to rest the structure on both cliffs. Now cliffs, generally speaking, are rather hazardous places. Some people are afraid even to look over the edge. But in a thermonuclear world, we cannot afford any political acrophobia.

President Johnson has put the matter squarely: By building bridges to those who make themselves our adversaries, "we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust, and a community of effort."

99 24

With respect to a "community of effort" let me suggest a concrete proposal for our own present young generation in the United States.

24 Post, doc. V-12.

It is a committed and dedicated generation. It has proven that in its enormously impressive performance in the Peace Corps overseas and in its willingness to volunteer for a final assault on such poverty and lack of opportunity that still remain in our own country.

As matters stand, our present Selective Service System draws on only a minority of eligible young men. That is an inequity.

It seems to me that we could move toward remedying that inequity by asking every young person in the United States to give 2 years of service to his country-whether in one of the military services, in the Peace Corps, or in some other volunteer developmental work at home or abroad. We could encourage other countries to do the same, and we could work out exchange programs—much as the Peace Corps is already planning to do.

While this is not an altogether new suggestion, it has been criticized as inappropriate while we are engaged in a shooting war. But I believe precisely the opposite is the case. It is more appropriate now than ever. For it would underscore what our whole purpose is in Viet-Nam-and indeed anywhere in the world where coercion, or injustice, or lack of decent opportunity still holds sway. It would make meaningful the central concept of security-a world of decency and development where every man can feel that his personal horizon is rimmed with hope.

Mutual interest, mutual trust, mutual effort those are the goals. Can we achieve those goals with the Soviet Union, and with Communist China? Can they achieve them with one another?

The answer to these questions lies in the answer to an even more fundamental question. Who is man?

Is he a rational animal? If he is, then the goals can ultimately be achieved. If he is not, then there is little point in making the effort.

All the evidence of history suggests that man is indeed a rational animal but with a near infinite capacity for folly. His history seems largely a halting, but persistent, effort to raise his reason above his animality. He draws blueprints for utopia. But never quite gets it built. In the end he plugs away

It is a privilege to address once again the national convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

I am very glad to have this opportunity to express again my respect for this great organization and all that it has done to defend freedom and peace. Your members have proved their devotion to their country and to freedom by fighting for them. You have helped to strengthen our democratic way of life by your humanitarian and civic and educational activities, including your Voice of Democracy high school essay contest.

In the familiar words of the preamble of our Constitution, you are determined to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." But you would deeply prefer to do that by peaceful means. For, as Commander Andy Borg has said: "If there is any group that knows what war means and does not want warit is the veterans of our country." And, as the presence of the Ladies Auxiliary reminds us, most of you are parents and many of you who served in the Second World War or earlier are by now grandparents.

Four years ago at your national convention in Minneapolis I discussed the goal of American foreign policy.20 26 I called our goal "a worldwide victory

Department of State Bulletin, Sept. 12, 1966, pp. 362-368.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 30-37.

for freedom." And I described it this way:

"A world free of aggression-aggression by whatever means.

"A world of independent nations, each with the institutions of its own choice but cooperating with one another to their mutual advantage.

"A world which yields continuing progress in economic and social justice for all peoples.

"A world which provides sure and equitable means for the peaceful settlement of disputes and moves progressively toward a rule of law which lays down and enforces standards of conduct in relations between nations.

"A world in which, in the great tradition shared by peoples in every continent, governments derive 'their just powers from the consent of the governed.'

"A world in which the powers of the state over the individual are limited by law, practice, and custom-in which the personal freedoms essential to the dignity of man are secure."

66

As I said 4 years ago, we must try to achieve that goal without a great war, although, as I said also, we will defend our vital interests and those of the free world by whatever means may be necessary. .

Our goal remains unchanged. And that is as it should be. For our goal springs from the basic commitments we made to ourselves and to history at our birth as a nation. It expresses aspirations that are shared by men and women in every part of the earth. It cannot be allowed to remain just a dream. For it represents the most vital interests of mankind-the kind of world order which must be achieved if civilization, or even the human race, is to survive in the age of intercontinental rockets with thermonuclear warheads.

This morning I should like to survey with you where we stand in the struggle toward our goal.

The first essential in organizing a peaceful world is to eliminate aggression. The primary purpose of our military forces is to make resort to force by the adversaries of freedom un

profitable and dangerous. Our nuclear deterrent has been vastly strengthened. The destructive capacity of the super-weapons is almost unimaginable. I believe that all governments in the world must surely recognize that to initiate a thermonuclear exchange would be a wholly irrational act.

I believe also that it is recognized very widely, if not universally, that aggression by masses of conventional forces moving across frontiers is far too reckless an act for the world in which we now live.

But there is a third type of aggression-what the Communists, in their inverted jargon, call "wars of national liberation." As I said at your convention in Minneapolis 4 years ago: "This is the form of the present aggression against South Viet-Nam. And it will not be allowed to succeed."

When I made that categorical assertion, the President of the United States was John F. Kennedy. In 1956, while still a Senator, he had said that South Viet-Nam's independence was "crucial to the free world. . . ." If, as President, he ever had any doubt about that, he never indicated it to his Secretary of State. Never to my knowledge did he falter in his resolve to do whatever might be necessary to prevent the Communists from seizing South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia.

In his news conference of September 12, 1963, he summed up what he called "a very simple policy" in regard to Viet-Nam:

".. we want the war to be won, the Communists to be contained, and the Americans to go home. That is our policy. I am sure it is the policy of the people of VietNam. But we are not there to see a war lost, and we will follow the policy which I have indicated today of advancing those causes and issues which help win the war." "

In his last public address, at Fort Worth, on November 22, 1963, President Kennedy reviewed what the United States had done in the preceding 18 years in the defense of freedom. He spoke of our defensive alliances "with countries all around the globe," of our indispensable role in SEATO and in support of CENTO as well as in NATO and the Alliance for Progress. And he said:

27 Text ibid., 1963, pp. 873-874.

"We would like to live as we once lived. But history will not permit it. . . . We are still the keystone in the arch of freedom, and I think we will continue to do, as we have done in our past, our duty. . . .” 28

He never ceased to be the man who said in his inaugural:

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.""

I know that the Veterans of Foreign Wars are not confused about why we are fighting in South Viet-Nam. You have been giving our military forces there the support they deserve. They and their allies are doing what unfortunately must be done, with great skill and valor. And I should like to pay my respects to Commander Borg for visiting our troops in all parts of Viet-Nam and for his clear and vigorous speeches and press interviews since his return.

Our objective in South Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia, as in the rest of the world, is peace-a peace which permits independent peoples to live in freedom under governments and institutions of their own choice. We have sought with the utmost persistence to bring the other side to the conference table. We shall continue to explore every possibility of an honorable peace. But we will not be driven out of South Viet-Nam by aggressive force. And we will not agree to a settlement that does not assure to the people of South Viet-Nam their right to peace and a free choice.

The Government of the United States, under four successive Presidents, reached the considered judgment that the defense of Southeast Asia is very important to the security of the free world, including the United States.

Nearly 12 years ago, this judgment was reinforced when we solemnly committed ourselves by treaty to the defense of certain countries of Southeast Asia, including South Viet-Nam. Our defensive alliances are the backbone of world peace. It is imperative

28 Text in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 888-890.

29 Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 7–10.

that our adversaries and our friends know that the United States will do what it promises to do.

Because the other side has escalated the aggression against South VietNam, we and others have been compelled to increase our assistance. We will do our share of whatever may be necessary to prevent the seizure of South Viet-Nam by force. President Johnson has clearly warned the other side: "As long as you persist in aggression, we are going to resist." And anyone who thinks that he can be swerved gravely misjudges one of the most resolute Presidents we have ever had.

30

But, as President Johnson has emphasized equally, we are not trying to wipe out North Viet-Nam or to change its government, and we want neither permanent bases in South Viet-Nam nor one inch of territory for ourselves. We merely want an assured and enduring peace.

Our firm support of South VietNam has already yielded important dividends. Throughout the western Pacific, governments and peoples now know that the advance of communism in Asia has been challenged and that the United States has the will and the means to make good on its pledges. As a result, the free nations of the area are moving forward with new confidence.

Six weeks ago I returned from a trip to the western Pacific. It was my eighth to that area as Secretary of State and the most encouraging.

Most of the non-Communist nations of the western Pacific are making impressive economic and social progress. The extraordinary economic growth of the new Japan is generally known. At its present rate, Japan may well become, within a few years, third in rank among industrial nations. It is playing an increasingly important and constructive role in the affairs of the western Pacific and the free world as a whole. We are pleased to see this. We are glad to have as a partner a strong, independent, and democratic Japan.

The Republic of Korea is forging ahead. And it continues to make large contributions to the defense of security and peace in Asia. The Republic of China on Taiwan continues its re

20 Post, doc. IX-10.

The free nations of Asia and the western Pacific are coming together in various promising cooperative undertakings. The new Asian Development Bank, with 31 members, which will hold its first meeting in October, will further stimulate economic growth in Asia. Japan took the lead in convening a conference on Southeast Asian development. Development of the lower Mekong Valley is proceeding despite the war. Korea took the lead in bringing together representatives of 10 nations, at which ASPAC (the Asian and Pacific Council) was founded." The Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand are strengthening the Association for Southeast Asia.

32

An important element in the progress of the free nations of Asia has been the declining position and influence of Communist China. Its attacks on Tibet and India, its support of the aggression against South VietNam, and its militant doctrine have destroyed its claim to be a peace-loving state. The collapse of the "great leap forward" punctured its claims to be a model for developing states seeking rapid economic growth. Today, the growing gap in living standards between the China mainland and neighboring Asian states is convincing evidence that free societies have more to offer their citizens.

31 See post, doc. IX-56. 32 See post, doc. IX-11. 33 See post, doc. IX-6.