the executive branch make it work. . . . Congress must further perfect our own organizational and implementation procedures. We must be assertive of the duty to exercise our responsibilities and prerogatives, while being restrained and responsible in the exercise of our judgments. And the executive branch. . . must be more forthcoming and conscientious both with respect to the prior consultation procedures and the reporting requirements. For the full text of Senator Javits' statement, see Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 91, June 11, 1975, pp. S10339-10340 (daily ed.). Hearings, ibid., pp. 61-75. Introduction of Armed Forces into Hostilities As a followup to his statement of June 4, 1975, concerning the Mayaguez incident, supra, Mr. Leigh was asked in what other situations the President might have inherent constitutional authority to commit American forces to combat situations not listed in section 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution. He supplied the following memorandum for the record: Besides the three situations listed in subsection 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution, it appears that the President has the constitutional authority to use the Armed Forces to rescue American citizens abroad, to rescue foreign nationals where such action directly facilitates the rescue of U.S. citizens abroad, to protect U.S. Embassies and Legations abroad, to suppress civil insurrection, to implement and administer the terms of an armistice or cease-fire designed to terminate hostilities involving the United States, and to carry out the terms of security commitments contained in treaties. We do not, however, believe that any such list can be a complete one, just as we do not believe that any single definitional statement can clearly encompass every conceivable situation in which the President's Commander in Chief authority could be exercised. Hearings, War Powers: A Test of Compliance, before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., May 7 and June 4, 1975, pp. 94-95. SEC. 2(c) of the War Powers Resolution states: (c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces. Indochina Support Activities In Harrington et al. v. Schlesinger et al., 528 F.2d 455(1975), decided October 8, 1975, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge by four Congressmen and 17 other taxpayers to certain U.S. activities in Indochina. Plaintiffs had sought to enjoin certain American support activities in Indochina as violative of a statutory ban on combat activities by U.S. Forces there. The District Court dismissed the case on political question grounds, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue as taxpayers or as Congressmen. The Court, relying on United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), concluded that the taxpayer standing requirements were not met because plaintiffs presented no constitutional challenge to any congressional appropriation. In rejecting plaintiffs' congressional standing argument, the Court held that the Congressmen's voting power was not diluted by the challenged executive action, and that in seeking enforcement of a statute for which they had voted, the Congressmen's interests were "indistinguishable from that of any other citizen." U.S. Attorneys Bulletin, Vol. 23, Oct. 31, 1975, No. 22. 8 9 Military Assistance and Sales Angola On December 19, 1975, the U.S. Senate voted by 54 to 22 to bar use of funds under the pending defense appropriation bill from being programmed for military operations in Angola. The vote came on agreeing to a House amendment to Senate amendment No. 75, introduced by Senator John V. Tunney, to H.R. 9861, the Defense Department appropriation act for the fiscal year 1976 and the period ending September 30, 1976. Under the amendment as agreed, no such funds would be available for use in Angola, directly or indirectly, for other than intelligence-gathering activities. Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 189, Part II, pp. S23051-23056, D1567 (daily ed.). Saudi Arabia On January 7, 1975, the Department of Defense announced the award of a three-year contract to a private corporation, the Vinnell Corporation of Los Angeles, to perform training and logistic services in Saudi Arabia in connection with the modernization of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, in a letter dated March 11, 1975, to Senator Richard S. Schweiker, explained the legal basis for the contract as follows: ... the above contract . . . was made between Vinnell Corporation and the United States Army Materiel Command pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the United States signed in March 1973. Under this memorandum, as part of our longstanding policy of cooperation with and support for Saudi Arabia, we agreed to assist on a fully reimbursable basis—in the training and equipping of the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The provision of equipment and training for the Saudi Arabian National Guard is authorized by the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended. Sections 21 and 22 of the Act authorize the President to sell defense articles and services to friendly countries, either by sale of Department of Defense stocks or services or by entering into contracts for the procurement of defense articles or services. The contract with the Vinnell Corporation is an example of the latter. The Saudi Arabian National Guard modernization program includes other Defense Department contracts with civilian companies as well as direct sales from the Department of Defense. The memorandum of understanding between the United States and Saudi Arabia concerning the Saudi Arabian National Guard modernization program was signed at Jidda Mar. 19, 1973 (TIAS 7634; 24 UST 1106; entered into force Mar. 19, 1973). Secs. 21 and 22 of the Foreign Military Sales Act are found at 22 U.S.C. 2761 and 2762. Military Bases Greece The United States and Greece announced, on April 29, 1975, the termination of the U.S. homeporting facility for the U.S. Sixth Fleet near Athens and the closing of the American air base at Athens airport. A joint statement issued at Athens and Washington upon conclusion of a second round of negotiations said: 1. At Greek request: A. The United States agreed to terminate homeporting at Elefsis. B. The United States base at Hellenikon will be closed. Certain United States facilities which contribute to Greek defense needs will continue to operate on the Greek Air Force Base at Hellenikon. 2. Agreement is also expected on the elimination, reduction and consolidation of other United States facilities in Greece. 3. The privileges, immunities and exemptions of American personnel in Greece were reviewed and satisfactory progress has been made. The installations where United States facilities remain will be placed under Greek commanders. The scope and conditions of operations of remaining facilities will be discussed in detail in the third round. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1873, May 19, 1975, p. 645. Diego Garcia On May 12, 1975, President Ford, by letter, certified to the Congress that the construction of facilities on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean was vital to the national interests of the United States. On May 19, Senator Mike Mansfield introduced a resolution of disapproval (S. Res. 160) under the provisions of Section 613 of the Military Construction Authorization Act of 1975 (P.L. 93-552; 88 Stat. 1766), approved December 27, 1974, which provides that funds appropriated under the Act for construction at Diego Garcia may not be obligated if either House of Congress, within 60 days of continuous session after receiving the President's certification, adopts a resolution of disapproval. No similar resolution was introduced in the House. On July 28, 1975, when the 60 days had expired, the Senate rejected the resolution, by a vote of 53-43, thus permitting appropriated funds to be used for construction of a naval facility on the British-owned island in the Indian Ocean. The United States already maintained a small communications station on Diego Garcia under an agreement with the United Kingdom (TIAS 7481; 23 UST 3087; entered into force October 24, 1972). Signature of a revised agreement was deferred pending congressional review of the proposed expansion of the facility. The revised Diego Garcia Agreement, 1976, was signed on February 25, 1976 (TIAS 8230; 27 UST). Spain On September 17, 1975, the United States and Spanish Delegations conducting negotiations for a new agreement on U.S. facilities in Spain issued a joint communique which included the following statement regarding interim continuation of the 1970 Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation (TIAS 6924; 21 UST 1677; entered into force September 26, 1970): * While the present agreement expires September 25, 1975, it provides that, in the event it is not renewed, U.S. forces may remain in Spain for one year in accord with and in the form prescribed by Article 39 of the present agreement. It is understood that this provision will be applied in a way which would permit the two sides to continue to work on a new agreement without interrupting the cooperative defense arrangements which serve the interests of both countries, and both sides expect that negotiations looking toward a new agreement will continue beyond the expiration date. * Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1893, Oct. 6, 1975, p. 508. A new U.S.Spain Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on Jan. 24, 1976, and submitted to the Senate on Feb. 18, 1976, for advice and consent (S. Ex. E, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.). Military Sales On July 10, 1975, the Department of Defense notified Congress of the intention to issue two letters of offer to the Government of Jordan for the Vulcan air defense system and the Hawk air defense system. On July 14, Congressman Jonathan Bingham introduced House Concurrent Resolution 337, disapproving the proposed sales under the concurrent resolution procedure provided in Section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, 22 U.S.C. 2776(b). On July 24, the House Committee on International Relations reported the resolution favorably (H. Rept. 94-392, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.), and on July 28 the Department of State informed that committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it had been decided not to proceed with the proposed sale during the imminent congressional recess, but to resubmit the proposal upon Congress' return. A new notice of intent to sell Hawk air defense equipment to Jordan was transmitted to Congress on September 3, 1975, and again Congressman Bingham introduced a concurrent resolution to disapprove the sale. On September 17, 1975, following receipt from President Ford of a letter to both Houses of Congress informing them of the conditions of the sale, the assurances that had been received from the Government of Jordan regarding use of the Hawk missiles solely for defense purposes at specified sites, and the existing restrictions on their use under pertinent legislation and agreements, Congressman Bingham withdrew his resolution. See Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 136, Sept. 17, 1975, pp. H8780, S16108, D1086 (daily ed.). |