east Asia during the 1960's apparently did not achieve the damaging effects on the enemy that are the inherent objective of military operations, thus demonstrating the present substantial inadequacies in the technology of precipitation modification. However, it is my view that if future progress should make this technology effective so that its use had widespread, long-lasting or severe effects, its use would be prohibited. If drought were the objective, the same would be true.

The anticipatory nature of the proposed Convention carries with it many of the basic uncertainties of the future, and I anticipate criticisms of different aspects of the agreement from several sides. The alternative to action now would be to attempt restraint at a later time, when the possibilities of hostile use of environmental modification techniques may be more real. An agreement on prohibitions might then be more difficult to achieve.

For the texts of Representative Gude's letters of inquiry and Dr. Iklé's replies, see Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 154, Oct. 21, 1975, pp. H10179–10180 (daily ed.).

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

On September 22, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger made an address to the 30th General Assembly of the United Nations expressing U.S. support for renewed negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. He stated:

Another urgent task is a substantial reduction in the high levels of military forces now confronting each other in various parts of the world. The United States believes that the time has come to give new impetus to the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. The significance of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe depends importantly on whether we can achieve progress in this area. An agreement that enhances mutual security in Central Europe is feasible and essential. We will work toward this goal.

For the full text of Secretary Kissinger's address, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1894, Oct. 13, 1975, pp. 545-553. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Ministerial session in Brussels on Dec. 11 and 12, 1975, issued a communique in which the Ministers stressed that existing disparities in ground force manpower and tanks were the most destabilizing factor in Central Europe and reconfirmed an Allied proposal to establish in the area of reductions "approximate parity in ground forces in the form of a common collective ceiling for ground force manpower on each side." The Ministers also reaffirmed the principle that NATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of a Mutual and Ba

lanced Force Reductions agreement with the East." Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1907, Jan. 12, 1976, pp. 57-58.

Regional Cooperation

In the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted on August 1, 1975, the 35 participating states recognized their interest in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They stated their conviction of the necessity to take measures constituting steps toward "the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

For the text of the subsection of the Final Act of the CSCE on "Questions relating to disarmament,” see ante, Ch. 14, § 1, p. 786. For the full text of the Final Act of the CSCE, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1888, Sept. 1, 1975, pp. 323-350. For reference to other provisions of the Final Act, see index entries, this Digest, under Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (1975).

88 War Powers of the President and the

Congress

Presidential Powers

Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Foreign Nationals

President Ford, on March 29, 1975, directed U.S. participation in an international humanitarian effort in which U.S. naval vessels with helicopters and troops would be used to evacuate civilian refugees from Danang and other South Vietnamese coastal communities to points farther south in Viet-Nam. On April 4, 1975, in a letter to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, he reported the issuance of his directive, stating his desire to keep Congress fully informed and taking note of section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148; 50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(2)), enacted November 7, 1973. The letter reads in part as follows:

. . This effort was undertaken in response to urgent appeals from the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam because of the extremely grave nature of the circumstances involving the lives of hundreds of thousands of refugees. This situation has

been brought about by large-scale violations of the agreement ending the war and restoring the peace in Viet-Nam by the North Vietnamese who have been conducting massive attacks on the northern and central provinces of South Viet-Nam.

In accordance with my desire to keep the Congress fully informed on this matter, and taking note of the provision of section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), I wish to report to you concerning one aspect of United States participation in the refugee evacuation effort. Because of the large number of refugees and the overwhelming dimensions of the task, I have ordered U.S. naval vessels to assist in this effort, including Amphibious Task Group 76.8 with 12 embarked helicopters and approximately 700 marines. These naval vessels have been authorized to approach the coast of South Viet-Nam to pick up refugees and U.S. nationals, and transport them to safety. Marines are being detailed to vessels participating in the rescue mission. The first vessel entered South Viet-Nam territorial waters at 0400 a.m. EDT on April 3, 1975.

Although these forces are equipped for combat within the meaning of section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their sole mission is to assist in the evacuation including the maintenance of order on board the vessels engaged in that task.

As stated above, the purpose of the introduction of United States naval vessels into Vietnamese waters is to assist in an international humanitarian effort involving vessels of several nations, including both military and civilian craft. The United States participation in this effort includes the charter of commercial vessels, the use of military Sealift command vessels with civilian crews, as well as United States naval vessels with military crews. This effort is being undertaken pursuant to the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive in the conduct of foreign relations and pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which authorizes humanitarian assistance to refugees, civilian war casualties and other persons disadvantaged by hostilities or conditions relating to hostilities in South Viet-Nam.

You will appreciate, I am sure, my difficulty in telling you precisely how long United States forces may be needed in this effort. Our present estimate, however, is that this operation may involve the presence of United States naval vessels in Vietnamese waters for a period at least several weeks.

The full text of the President's letter may be found at Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 52, Apr. 7, 1975, p. S5280 (daily ed.). Sec. 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution requires that in the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which U.S. Armed Forces are introduced into the territory, air space or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces, the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Congress a report, in writing, setting forth the circumstances necessitating the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces, the constitutional and legislative authority for it, and the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or involvement. The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93–148; 50 U.S.C. 1541-1548) was enacted into law on Nov. 7, 1973, over President Nixon's veto.

On April 12, 1975, President Ford made a second report to Congress, in which he took note of section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148; 50 U.S.C. 1543). He informed Congress that he had ordered U.S. troops into Cambodia in order to facilitate an evacuation of U.S. citizens from that country in view of the deteriorating military situation there. He reported the use of ground combat troops of the U.S. Marines, helicopters, and supporting tactical air and command and control elements, beginning on the night of April 11, and the successful completion of the evacuation on April 12. The report noted that there had been no firing by U.S. forces during the operation, that no U.S. Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and that there were no casualties among the American evacuees. The President added:

Although these forces were equipped for combat within the meaning of section 4(a)(2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to effect the evacuation of U.S. nationals. Present information indicates that a total of 82 U.S. citizens were evacuated and that the task force was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U.S. Government.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's constitutional Executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.

The President's report was contained in letters dated Apr. 12, 1975, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate. For the full text, see Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 56, Apr. 14, 1975, p. H2706, and No. 57, Apr. 15, 1975, p. S5933 (daily ed.); H. Doc. No. 94-105, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 16, Apr. 21, 1975, p. 378.

On April 30, 1975, President Ford made his third report to Congress under section 4 of the War Powers Resolution. He stated that he had ordered U.S. military forces to proceed by means of rotary wing aircraft with the emergency final evacuation of U.S. citizens and their dependents in and around Saigon, together with foreign nationals whose lives were in jeopardy. He reported that the defensive lines to the northwest and south of Saigon had been breached by the North Vietnamese, that the Tan Son Nhut Airfield and Saigon had come under increased rocket attack and had received artillery fire for the first time, that Tan Son Nhut

Airfield had become unusable, that North Vietnamese forces were approaching within mortar and anti-aircraft missile range, and that the situation presented a direct and imminent threat to the remaining U.S. citizens and their dependents. The President reported specifically that 70 evacuation helicopters and 865 marines had evacuated about 1,400 U.S. citizens, together with approximately 5,500 third country nationals and South Vietnamese, between 1 a.m. and 7:46 p.m. EDT on April 29, 1975. He also noted the loss of two crew members, as well as two marines the previous day at Tan Son Nhut Airfield, the use of U.S. fighter aircraft to provide protective cover, and firing by ground security forces during the evacuation operation.

The President again cited the President's constitutional Executive power and his authority as Commander in Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces.

The President's report was contained in letters dated April 30, 1975, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate. For the text, see Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 69, May 1, 1975, p. H3592 (daily ed.); H. Doc. No. 94-124, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 18, May 5, 1975, p. 467.

When President Ford addressed a Joint Session of Congress on April 10, 1975, to request additional military and economic aid for South Viet-Nam, he asked the Congress "to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by ensuring their evacuation if this should be necessary." He also asked "prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation, and whose lives may be in danger, should the worst come to pass."

See Cong. Rec., Vol. 121, No. 55, Apr. 10, 1975, p. H2684 (daily ed.). See also H. Doc. No. 101, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

On the following day President Ford submitted for congressional consideration three draft bills-one to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of U.S. Armed Forces in Indochina, the others for additional military and economic assistance for South Viet-Nam. His proposed bill on clarifying restrictions on the availability of funds provided:

.. That nothing contained in section 839 of Public Law 93437, section 741 of Public Law 93-238, section 30 of Public Law 93-189, section 806 of Public Law 93-155, section 13 of Public Law 93-126, section 108 of Public Law 93-52, section 307 of Public Law 93-50, or any other comparable provision of law shall be construed as limiting the availability of funds for the use of