The General Assembly,

RESOLUTION 3390B (XXX)

Noting that the reunification of Korea has not yet been achieved although thirty years have elapsed since Korea was divided into the North and the South and twenty-two years since the establishment of the armistice in Korea, Recalling the obligations assumed by states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations on respect for the principle of equality and selfdetermination of peoples and on refraining from intervening in matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,

Considering that it conforms with the principles of the Charter to encourage the Korean people to achieve the independent and peaceful reunification of their country at the earliest possible date on the basis of the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity and to create favorable conditions for it,

Hoping that the North and the South of Korea will promote their dialogue to accelerate the reunification of the country in accordance with the spirit of the joint statement of July 4, 1972, and with the decision adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session, on November 28, 1973, which welcomed the joint statement,

Considering that a durable peace cannot be expected so long as the present state of armistice is kept as it is in Korea,

Considering that, in order to guarantee a durable peace in Korea and accelerate its independent and peaceful reunification, it is urgently necessary to take new decisive measures for terminating foreign interference in its internal affairs, removing tension and preventing armed conflicts in that region,

1. Considers that it is necessary to dissolve the "United Nations Command" and withdraw all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;

2. Calls upon the real parties to the armistice agreement to replace the Korean Military Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement as a measure to ease tension and maintain and consolidate peace in Korea in the context of the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" and the withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations;

3. Urges the North and the South of Korea to observe the principles of the North-South joint statement and take practical measures for ceasing arms reinforcement, reducing the armed forces of both sides drastically to an equal level, preventing armed conflicts and guaranteeing against the use of force against the other side, and thereby remove the military confrontation and maintain a durable peace in Korea, conducive to accelerating the independent and peaceful reunification of the country.

On September 22, 1975, Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, wrote a letter to the President of the Security Council of the United Nations, regarding restrictions on the use of the U.N. flag in the Republic of Korea, in consideration of General Assembly Resolution 3333 (XXIX) of December 17, 1974. The text of Ambassador Moynihan's letter follows:

I wish to bring to the attention of the Security Council that, with effect from August 25, 1975, the United Nations flag no longer flies over military installations in the Republic of Korea except at facilities directly associated with the implementation of the armistice agreement of July 27, 1953. Restricting the use of the United Nations flag will contribute to making a distinction between first, those military personnel directly involved in the performance by the United Nations Command of its armistice agreement responsibilities (less than 300 non-Korean per

sonnel); and secondly, United States Forces serving in the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 (Registered as Treaty No. 3363 in the United Nations Treaty Series on May 8, 1956) at the request of the Government of the Republic of Korea. This action is pursuant to the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United States of America of June 27, 1975, addressed to the President of the United Nations Security Council. That letter stated that, in consideration of the recommendations in General Assembly Resolution 3333 (XXIX), adopted on December 17, 1974, the United States would take measures to reduce manifestations of the United Nations Command.

The restriction on the use of the United Nations flag does not alter the responsibilities of the United Nations Command under the terms of the armistice agreement. In that regard I wish to reiterate that the Governments of the United States and the Republic of Korea, as already stated, are prepared to discuss with the other parties directly concerned, at any mutually agreed time and place, the question of the termination of the United Nations Command subject to continuation of the armistice agreement. They are also prepared to discuss this question with the members of the Security Council should they so desire. The Government of the United States reemphasizes that its chief concern in this matter is that the armistice agreement, which has been the basis of peace and security in the Korean peninsula for over twenty years, be maintained in the absence of alternate lasting arrangements between the South and the North. Any proposal for peace on the Korean peninsula which does not provide for the maintenance of the armistice agreement in these circumstances would not be in the interest of international peace and security.

I wish to request that this letter be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Press Release USUN-100(75), Sept. 22, 1975; U.N. Doc. S/11830, Sept. 22, 1975.

Regional Peacekeeping

The Interim Agreement between Egypt and Israel initialed on September 1, 1975, at Jerusalem and Alexandria and signed on September 4, 1975, at Geneva provided in an Annex for an early warning system entrusted to U.S. civilian personnel. An integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, which had been negotiated by Secretary of State Kissinger in the role of mediator, was a U.S. proposal under which American civilian personnel would be stationed in the buffer zone between the Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai to play a role in the early warning system.

The agreement between Egypt and Israel entered into force on Oct. 10, 1975, upon signature by the parties of a detailed military protocol. For the text of the agreement and the U.S. proposal, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1892, Sept. 29, 1975, pp. 466–470.

President Ford transmitted the text of the U.S. proposal to Congress on September 2, 1975, and requested its formal approval. On October 7, 1975, Secretary Kissinger appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the proposal. The following is an excerpt from his statement:

. I urge this committee and the Congress to respond promptly and sympathetically to the President's request for approval of the stationing of up to 200 Americans in the Sinai. The proposed American presence is a limited but crucial American responsibility. It is not a role we sought; it is a role we accepted reluctantly at the request of both sides and only when it was clear that there would be no agreement without it. The American personnel will be volunteers, and they will be civilian. Their function will be to assist in an early warning system in the small area of the Sinai passes in the U.N. buffer zone. They are not combat personnel or advisers for one side; they will serve both sides at their request. They will complement the U.N. military contingents already there from such countries as Canada, Sweden, Austria, and Finland whose responsibility it is to protect the buffer zone. Nor is our presence in the area new; 36 Americans are serving there at this moment with the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. Americans have been serving in this capacity for over 25 years.

The proposal we ask you to approve provides that the President may withdraw these volunteer technicians if we believe them to be in jeopardy or no longer necessary. We are prepared, as well, to accept the congressional proposal to make withdrawal mandatory in the event of hostilities.

Hearings on Early Warning System in Sinai before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 6 and 7, 1975, p. 208. See also ante, Ch. 5, § 5, pp. 316–323.

A joint resolution to implement the U.S. proposal for the early warning system in Sinai, subject to a number of limitations, was passed by Congress on October 9, and was approved by the President on October 13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110; 89 Stat. 572; 22 U.S.C. 2441 note).

The text of P.L. 94-110 follows:

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East; Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975, transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an early warning system, the text of which has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified noncombat functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof;

Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary; and

Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the early warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai": Provided, however, That United States civilian personnel assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. Nothing contained in this resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

SEC. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described in the first section of this resolution which is introduced in either House of Congress shall be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution of the type described in section 5(c) of Public Law 93-148 is privileged under secton 7 of such law.

SEC. 3. The United States civilian personnel participating in the early warning system in Sinai shall include only individuals who have volunteered to participate in such system.

SEC. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pursuant to this resolution, participate in an early warning system, the President shall, so long as the participation of such personnel continues, submit written reports to the Congress periodically, but no less frequently than once every six months, on (1) the status, scope, and anticipated duration of their participation, and (2) the feasibility of ending or reducing as soon as possible their participation by substituting nationals of other countries or by making technological changes. The appropriate committees of the Congress shall promptly hold hearings on each report of the President and report to the Congress any findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

SEC. 5. The authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" does not signify approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch.

The U.S. proposal for an early warning system was subsequently published by the Dept. of State in the form of bilateral agreements with Israel and Egypt, respectively (TIAS 8155; 8156; 26 UST 2271, 2278; entered into force Oct. 13, 1975).

Turkey

§ 6

Military Sanctions

Arms Embargoes

On February 5, 1975, the United States suspended all military assistance and sales, as well as licenses for the transportation of munitions items, to Turkey, as required by Section 22 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-559; 88 Stat. 1801; 22 U.S.C. 2370), approved December 30, 1974. The statutory embargo, which constituted subsection 620(x) of the Foreign Assist

ance Act of 1961, had been imposed in reaction to Turkish military intervention in Cyprus and congressional charges of Turkish use of U.S.-provided equipment in ways not envisaged by the Foreign Assistance Act. President Ford issued a statement on February 5 urging that Congress reconsider its action and authorize the resumption of the U.S. assistance relationship with Turkey. He warned that suspension of military aid to Turkey was likely to impede the negotiation of a just Cyprus settlement and adversely affect American security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. A bill (S. 846) empowering the President to lift the arms embargo against Turkey was introduced in Congress on February 26, 1975, and was approved by the Senate on May 19, 1975, by a vote of 41 to 40. On June 17, 1975, when the House of Representatives had still failed to act on the bill, the Government of Turkey formally notified the United States that unless the embargo was lifted within 30 days there would be a change in the status of the American military installations in Turkey. The Turkish Government also requested negotiations in 30 days on U.S. base rights; such negotiations were begun on July 17, 1975.

On July 24, 1975, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 223 to 206, rejected a compromise version of the earlier bill. The compromise had the support of the Administration and would have allowed the President to release $185 million in equipment that was en route to Turkey when the embargo went into effect. It would also have permitted Turkey to purchase military equipment for cash from American commercial sources.

The Government of Turkey immediately announced its intention to suspend all American activities at joint U.S.-Turkish defense installations and to take over control and supervision of those installations. President Ford again urged the House of Representatives to reconsider its decision.

On July 31, the Senate passed a bill (S. 2230) for a partial lifting of the embargo, and on October 2, the House of Representatives reversed its earlier stand and voted 237 to 176 in favor of the compromise bill. The President approved the bill on October 6, 1975 (Public Law 94-104; 89 Stat. 508; 22 U.S.C. 2370). Section 2(b)(1)(A) authorized the furnishing to Turkey of defense articles and services contracted for prior to February 5, 1975, and issuance of licenses for transportation of military equipment, so long as Turkey observed the cease-fire and refrained from increasing its forces in Cyprus or transferring U.S.-supplied military equipment to Cyprus.

President Ford announced on October 3 that the United States intended (1) to rebuild the security relationship with Turkey; (2) to