Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was asked about the meaning of the "commitment to the survival and security of Israel," which the questioner said had been declared by six Presidents. The Secretary replied as follows:

We have a historic commitment to the survival and the wellbeing of Israel. This is a basic national policy reaffirmed by every Administration. But we are in no way committed to the status quo. Israel itself has said that it does not insist on the existing territorial arrangement for a final peace.

See Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1880, July 7, 1975, pp. 15–23.

Korea (South)

Secretary Kissinger, on June 16, 1975, was asked at a panel discussion, sponsored by the Public Broadcasting Service in Washington, whether the United States would use troops to defend South Korea if it was invaded by the North Koreans. The Secretary responded:

There are American troops in South Korea, and an attack on South Korea would be barely possible that did not involve American forces . . . we have a security treaty. Of course we would follow constitutional procedures and the provisions of the War Powers Act. But we are bound by international obligations that have been ratified by the Congress to come to the assistance of South Korea.

See Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1880, July 7, 1975, pp. 25-29. The Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea was signed Oct. 1, 1953 (TIAS 3097; 5 UST 2368; entered into force Nov. 17, 1954).

Use of Nuclear Weapons

Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger discussed the possibility of "first use" of nuclear forces in the European theater in a report to the Congress required to be submitted by April 1, 1975, in compliance with Section 301(d) of Public Law 93-365, approved August 4, 1974. The Secretary's report, entitled "The Theater Nuclear Force Posture in Europe," contained a section on interdependence of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic forces. Regarding the overall concept for use of theater nuclear forces in the event of an overwhelming conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact (WP) forces, the Secretary stated:

NATO conventional forces are structured for a range of likely conditions of NATO and WP mobilization, likely assumptions about the number of Soviet divisions committed against NATO, and expected performance of forces of both sides. It is possible to envision significantly worse circumstances than those planning assumptions, in which NATO conventional forces are unable to hold under conventional attack. Consequently, such a contingency makes it impossible to rule out NATO first use of theater nuclear forces.

The first use of theater nuclear forces, even in very limited ways, carries grave risks of escalation and should be considered only when the consequences of conventional defeat would be even more serious. If the alternative is, for example, major loss of NATO territory or forces, NATO political leaders may choose to accept the risks of first use.

As is the case with retaliatory theater nuclear attacks, NATO should have a wide range of nuclear options to provide responses suitable to the provocation. First use should be clearly limited and defensive in nature, so as to reduce the risks of escalation. However, the attack should be delivered with sufficient shock and decisiveness to forcibly change the perceptions of WP leaders and create a situation conducive to negotiations.

Report to Congress in compliance with P.L. 93-365, Apr. 1, 1975, pp. 15-16.

On June 25, 1975, President Ford was asked in a news conference whether it was U.S. policy, in view of recent developments, to disavow the "first use of nuclear weapons." The President replied:

... the United States has a policy that means that we have the maximum flexibility for the determination of what is in our national interest. We had a change of some degree about a year and a half ago.

When I took office, or since I have taken office, I have discussed this change to maximize our flexibility and to give us the greatest opportunity for our own national security with Secretary Schlesinger, and I can assure you that it is a good policy, and it is a policy that I think will help to deter war and preserve the peace.

Asked if he would use the "first strike," in terms of tactical or strategic weapons, the President avoided the term "first strike," but said:

I don't think it is appropriate for me to discuss at a press conference what our utilization will be of our tactical or strategic weapons. This is a matter that has to be determined if and when there are any requirements for our national interests.

And I don't believe under these circumstances that I should discuss how, when, or what kind of weapons should be used. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 11, No. 26, June 30, 1975, p. 676.

On July 1, 1975, Secretary Schlesinger made the following statements before the Godfrey Sperling Group:

The United States has consistently refrained from disavowing the first use of nuclear weapons. It has been under pressure from various quarters basically for more than twenty-five years to disavow first use. . . .

The American policy on this has been unchanged for many years. The changes that have occurred, in fact, have been the result of a gradual evolution towards increasing stress on the conventional components, a diminution on the threat of immediate recourse to nuclear weapons. This has, I think, been an evolution that has been followed for the past twenty years, but under no circumstances could we disavow the first use of nuclear weapons. . . .

NATO strategy since the 1950's has been based either on the so-called trip-wire strategy, which prevailed into the 1960's and formally prevailed to 1967 when it was shifted to flexible response. The trip-wire strategy, sometimes called the plate glass window, was designed to have a small force sometimes referred to as a corporal's guard up front so that the nuclear bell could ring. The intention was to respond to conventional attack with a nuclear response. Throughout the period since the 1950's we have put emphasis upon the availability of tactical nuclear weapons but I think that the emphasis has gradually shifted towards conventional weapons without in any way reducing the role that nuclear weapons play in deterrence.

If one accepts the no first use doctrine, one is accepting a self-denying ordinance that weakens deterrence. The underlying purpose and premise of U.S. military policy is to deter attack on the U.S. itself and our allies and part of the deterrent, a major part of the deterrent, is the existence of our tactical nuclear force.

It is, I believe, known that we have deployed nuclear weapons in Europe and Korea along with our forces and that those nuclear weapons are available as options to the President but I reiterate that the main thrust of U.S. policy has been to raise the nuclear threshold. We will not foreclose the use of nuclear weapons.

We cannot exclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons, but our thrust has been towards reliance upon conventional

capabilities to the extent that we can. Therefore, I would not expect, given any reasonable stalwartness of our conventional capabilities, early recourse of nuclear weapons either strategic or tactical. We, however, will make use of nuclear weapons should we be faced with serious aggression likely to result in defeat in an area of very great importance to the United States in terms of foreign policy. This has clearly been the case in Western Europe for many years and has been stated again and again by all Secretaries and all Presidents going back to the 1950's with regard to NATO.

See "U.S. Policy on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1975," by Herbert Y. Schandler, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Doc. UC 650 A, 75-175 F.

On July 14, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger, responding to a question on the subejct following his address to the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Wisconsin, said:

I do not believe that the United States has changed its basic policy with respect to first strike. It has always been the United States' policy that in certain extreme circumstances, if the national survival were at stake or if the survival of our close allies, especially Europe, were at stake, and if no other means were available, that the United States might have to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1884, Aug. 4, 1975, p. 158.

Dr. Fred C. Iklé, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in an address at Milwaukee on November 24, 1975, recommended that nuclear powers not confine arms control efforts to formal agreements, but manage their own forces so as to reduce the danger of nuclear catastrophe. He said, in part:

To have effective deterrence we need not guarantee_to kill millions of innocent people-people who could never influence the decision we wish to deter. Rather, for fundamental morality, we should not rig our forces in such a way as to cause mass killing-totally unnecessary killing-in any nuclear war. If the war had been caused by accident, what would be the sense of such "retaliation"? We should never lock our own forces into a posture that would make us the first to use nuclear weapons in a cruel and wanton way. We must not be the first to use nuclear weapons against cities.

ACDA press release No. 75-21, Nov. 24, 1975.

§ 2 The Laws of War

General

On August 11, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger addressed the annual convention of the American Bar Association at Montreal on the subject of international law, world order, and human progress. Among the contemporary issues presenting international challenge he included "the laws of war where new practices of barbarism challenge us to develop new social and international restraint." He emphasized the need for greater protection of war victims and the application of international standards for humane conduct in civil wars. The following is an excerpt from his address:

The struggle to restrain violence by law meets one of its severest tests in the law of war. Historically, nations have found it possible to observe certain rules in their conduct of war. This restraint has been extended and codified, especially in the past century. In our time new, ever more awesome tools of warfare, the bitterness of ideologies and civil warfare, and weakened bonds of social cohesion have brought an even more brutal dimension to human conflict.

At the same time our century has also witnessed a broad effort to ameliorate some of these evils by international agreements. The most recent and comprehensive is the four Geneva Conventions [of 1949 ] for the Protection of War Victims.

But the law in action has been less impressive than the law on the books. Patent deficiencies in implementation and compliance can no longer be ignored. Two issues are of paramount concern: First, greater protection for civilians and those imprisoned, missing, and wounded in war; and, second, the application of international standards of humane conduct in civil wars.

An international conference is now underway to supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the law of war. We will continue to press for rules which will prohibit nations from barring a neutral country, or an international organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, from inspecting its treatment of prisoners. We strongly support provisions requiring full accounting for the missing in action. We will advocate immunity for aircraft evacuating the wounded. And we will seek agreement on a protocol which demands humane conduct during civil war, which bans torture, summary execution, and the other excesses which too often characterize civil strife.

The United States is committed to the principle that fundamental human rights require legal protection under all circumstances; that some kinds of individual suffering are intolerable no matter what threat nations may face. The American people and Government deeply believe in fundamental standards of