explosive device, or for research on or development of any such device, regardless of how the device itself is intended to be used."

The extending agreement was submitted to Congress under Sec. 123 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended by P.L. 93–485 (88 Stat. 1460; 42 U.S.C. 2153), approved Oct. 26, 1974. See the 1974 Digest, Ch. 10, § 8, p. 575. It was approved by concurrent resolution of Congress on Mar. 11, 1975 (S. Con. Res. 15).

On November 5, 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger and Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy initialed a statement recording agreement in principle between the United States and Egypt to conduct a program of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The statement envisaged a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to be signed upon completion of technical negotiations and defined the areas of cooperation in power generation and related technology. In addition, it outlined safeguard measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons technology to the Middle East. The statement also envisaged that the same safeguards would be applied in any Nuclear Cooperation Agreement to be concluded between the United States and Israel.

The text of the United States-Egyptian Joint Statement on Proposed Cooperation in Fields Pertaining to the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy follows:

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the United States of America have agreed in principle to conduct a program of cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy pursuant to a proposed agreement for cooperation in accordance with the following principles:

1. The agreement is expected to cover cooperation in fields pertaining to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including design, construction and operation of research and power reactors, desalinization, the beneficial uses of radioisotopes and radiation sources, the exploration and development of uranium resources, and related health and safety considerations.

2. The agreement for cooperation will enable Egypt at the outset to purchase from the United States nuclear power reactors having an approximate total electrical capacity of 1200 MWe and the slightly enriched uranium necessary to fuel these facilities.

3. Such cooperation will be under the terms fully compatible with the nonproliferation objectives of the two governments including their desires to assure that the introduction of nuclear power for civil uses into the Middle East will occur under carefully safeguarded conditions. These conditions will be designed to assure that the U.S.-supplied facilities, materials, and their products, as well as the associated relevant technology, are used for peaceful purposes only and will include the following main provisions to ensure that:

a. None of the assistance provided will be employed for any military purposes, including the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

b. The materials and facilities to be supplied as well as the produced plutonium will be subjected to international safeguards, administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency, designed to assure their continued uses for peaceful purposes.

c. The plutonium produced in the agreed upon 1200 MWe power reactors under the agreement or derived from the U.S. fuel supplied for these facilities will be reprocessed, fabricated and stored outside Egypt.

d. Facilities utilizing relevant nuclear technology obtained from the United States will be under effective safeguards.

e. The Government of Egypt guarantees to apply effective physical security measures to the facilities and nuclear material covered by the agreement.

It is the intention of the United States that at such time as negotiations are completed the same safeguard provisions and special measures will be included in both the U.S. Cooperation Agreements with Egypt and Israel respectively. If certain provisions are modified or altered in one agreement, it is the intention of the United States Government to introduce such modifications or alterations in the other agreement.

Both Governments will consult closely with their respective legislatures on the nature and details of their proposed new agreement, bearing in mind the importance that such an agreement will hold for their peaceful nuclear cooperation, and their respective non-proliferation policies.

After finalization of the text of the Agreement for Cooperation, it will enter into force after the completion of statutory and constitutional requirements of both parties.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1900, Nov. 24, 1975, p. 732.

Defense Uses

On January 27, 1975, the United States and the United Kingdom exchanged notes bringing into force an amendment signed July 22, 1974 (TIAS 8014; 26 UST 110), to the Agreement of July 3, 1958, between the two Governments for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes (TIAS 4078; 9 UST 1028; entered into force August 4, 1958). The amendment extends, under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 919; 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), those provisions of the 1958 Agreement, as amended, which provide for the transfer of materials and equipment for research on, development of, or use in atomic weapons. The amendment specifically extends the materials transfer provisions of the basic agreement for a five-year period terminating on December 31, 1979, unless extended again.

Indemnity

Public Law 94-197 (89 Stat. 1111), approved December 31, 1975, amended the Price-Anderson provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2014, 2210), to provide for the phaseout of governmental indemnity as a source of funds for public remuneration in the event of a nuclear incident. It also extended indemnity coverage outside the territorial limits of the United States for certain limited activities.

The report of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the new legislation states, in part:

There are two situations in which the protection afforded by the Price-Anderson Act with respect to licensed activities

would be extended to nuclear incidents occurring outside the territorial limits of the United States. The first situation involves ocean shipments of new or spent fuel which may move outside the territorial limits of the United States during ocean transit from one licensed nuclear facility to another. The second situation involves nuclear facilities which are physically located outside of the territorial limits of the United States but whose construction and operation are licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, such as a floating nuclear powerplant located beyond the limits of the territorial sea of the United States. The legislation would authorize the Commission to extend PriceAnderson indemnity protection to such shipments and such facilities.

See S. Rept. No. 94-454 and H. Rept. No. 94-648, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

Safeguards and Export Controls

President Gerald R. Ford, in a message to the Congress on May 6, 1975, forwarding a report on U.S. laws and regulations governing nuclear exports and on domestic and international safeguards, stated his conclusion that "current laws provide ample authority to control the export and re-export on nuclear related material, equipment, and technology." He added:

.. Nevertheless, existing policies and regulations are constantly being reexamined and changed as appropriate. Domestic safeguards are under continuing review for the purpose of making them even more effective. The international safeguard system will detect and thus help to deter efforts to divert such materials by other nations.

As the volume of material and the nature of facilities grow in the world, commensurate increases and improvements in the international safeguarding system will be needed. The United States is encouraging the strengthening of international safeguards by aiding and supporting IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguard development efforts. It is also seeking to enhance physical security through the adoption of an international convention. The U.S. is taking the lead in advocating in-depth physical protection measures necessary to preclude terrorist groups from capturing such material or conducting sabotage activities.

I wish to assure Congress that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of nuclear explosive materials for possible nonpeaceful uses is a priority concern in my Administration. Whatever efforts are needed to allow the U.S. and other countries to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power, without fear, will be taken by the Government of the United States.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1874, May 26, 1975, pp. 696-697. The President's message is also printed as H. Doc. 94-131, which includes the text of the accompanying report, submitted in accordance with § 14 of the Export

Administration Act Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-500; 42 U.S.C. 2153 note), approved Oct. 29, 1974.

New requirements for the issuance of licenses to export nuclearrelated commodities to non-nuclear-weapons countries not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (TIAS 6839; 21 UST 483; entered into force for the United States March 5, 1970) were incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15, Part 378, effective July 21, 1975. Rauer H. Meyer, Director of the Office of Export Administration in the Department of Commerce, filed the following announcement in the Federal Register on July 24, 1975:

In accordance with U.S. adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and consistent with U.S. Non-Proliferation policies, special assurances must be obtained by the U.S. Government from the consignee government or appropriate international organization before a license is issued for export of certain nuclear-related commodities to a non-nuclear-weapon country not a party to the Treaty.

The list of nuclear-related commodities subject to this assurance procedure is set forth in a new Supplement No. 2 to Part 378, and the countries that are parties to the Treaty are set forth in a new Supplement No. 3 to Part 378. Effective date of action: July 21, 1975.

Accordingly, Part 378 of the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR Part 378) is amended as follows:

2. The special assurances are set forth in a new § 378.5 as follows: § 378.5 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty provisions.

Consistent with its obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.S. Non-Proliferation policies, the U.S. Government will not authorize the export of the commodities listed in Supplement No. 2 to Part 378 to nonnuclear weapon states not party to the NPT for peaceful purposes until the consignee government or appropriate international organization certifies in writing to the U.S. Government either (a) that the export will be subject to the terms and conditions of an appropriate Agreement for Cooperation with the Government of the United States; or (b) that (1) the source of special fissionable material produced, processed or used in any facility in which the item is used shall not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or for research on or development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or for any military purposes;

(2) Safeguards, under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with its safeguards system, will be applied to such source or special fissionable material; (3) the equipment or material to be exported will fall under a safeguards agreement with the IAEA; and (4) the commodities will not be reexported to any non-nuclear-weapon state not party to the NPT unless arrangements corresponding to those required hereby are made with the government of the country or the international organization receiving such reexport. Accordingly, upon receipt in the Office of Export Administration of an application to export a commodity listed in Supplement No. 2 to a nonnuclear-weapon state not party to the NPT, the U.S. Government will initiate

action to secure the above-required written certification from the appropriate foreign authorities. The applications will be held until such certification is received.

Fed. Reg., Vol. 40, No. 144, July 25, 1975, pp. 31209–31211. A new Supplement No. 2 to Part 378, listing nuclear-related commodities, and a new Supplement No. 3 listing countries parties to the NPT are appended to the announcement.

89

Communications and Transportation

Ocean Transportation

Vessels in Cuban Trade

On September 23, 1975, the Maritime Administration issued a report, which appeared in the Federal Register on September 29, 1975, listing vessels that were declared ineligible, under established U.S. Government policy, to carry U.S. Government-financed cargoes from the United States. The named vessels were those which had arrived in Cuba since January 1, 1963, exclusive of vessels that called at Cuba on U.S. Government-approved noncommercial voyages. The list, based on information received through July 1, 1975, included a total of 203 free world and Polish flag vessels, listed by flag and individual name. The Maritime Administration also provided a list of 150 vessels which had called at Cuba after January 1, 1963, and had reacquired eligibility to carry U.S. Government-financed cargoes from the United States by virtue of the persons who control the vessels having given satisfactory certification and assurance:

(a) That such vessels will not, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuban trade so long as it remains the policy of the U.S. Government to discourage such trade; and

(b) That no other vessels under their control will thenceforth be employed in the Cuban trade, except as provided in paragraph (c) and

(c) That vessels under their control which are covered by contractual obligations, including charters, entered into prior to December 16, 1963, requiring their employment in the Cuban trade shall be withdrawn from such trade at the earliest opportunity consistent with such contractual obligations.

See Fed. Reg., Vol. 40, No. 189, Sept. 29, 1975, pp. 44595-44597. For the regulations of the Federal Supply Service of the General Services Administration concerning shipments by foreign flag vessels in Cuban trade, see 41 CFR 5A-19.108-50 and the 1974 Digest, pp. 576-577.