For the full text of Ambassador Scali's statement, see U.N. Doc. S/PV.1825, June 3, 1975, pp. 46-51; Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1880, July 7, 1975, pp. 42-44. Ambassador Scali's statement also stated the opposition of the United States to the imposition of an arms embargo on South Africa. For a discussion of the veto in the Security Council of such an embargo, see post, Ch. 14, § 6, pp. 833–836. Chad 8 2 83 Continuity and Succession of States Diplomatic Relations and Recognition Following the overthrow on April 13, 1975, of the government of former President N'Garta Tombalbaye in Chad by a military coup, a nine-member Supreme Military Council took effective control of the country and organized a provisional administration based on four technical commissions, which included numerous officials who had served in the previous government. General Felix Malloum, as President of the Supreme Military Council, received United States Ambassador Edward S. Little on April 25, 1975, and gave assurances that the post-coup government sought close relations with the United States and would abide by the international commitments of the previous regime. Ambassador Little informed General Malloum that the United States was ready to resume full scale diplomatic relations. Cuba On June 11, 1975, William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, spoke to the International Trade and Commerce Subcommittee and the International Organizations Subcommittee of the House Committee on International Relations concerning current United States policy with respect to normalizing relations with Cuba. He stressed the interrelationship of trade and diplomatic relationships in that process and described some of the issues to be resolved. The following are excerpts from his statement: The problem is, in the first instance, a multilateral problem. You will recall that a resolution adopted by a two-thirds vote at the meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States in 1964 mandated that the member states of the OAS [Organization of American States] should terminate diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba. Our denial program antedated that resolution. But the 1964 resolution, in effect, made it a matter of international law that we not reinstate trade or diplomatic relations with the island until the resolution is changed. . . We take the resolution seriously. A number of other OAS countries have resumed relations, of course. But we consider that the United States has a particular responsibility to honor international legal commitments and that a breach by us would have particularly grave consequences for the integrity and legitimacy of the general peace-keeping structure of the Rio Treaty. As for future bilateral U.S. policy, Secretary Kissinger has made clear that we do not favor perpetual antagonism with Cuba. We have noted forthcoming and conciliatory statements by high Cuban Government officials recently. There is a change of mood in Havana toward Washington. By the same token, the United States has made several gestures on its part toward Cuba recently. These include, for example, the permission for Cuban diplomats accredited to the United Nations to travel 250 miles from New York. Cuba has not reciprocated these gestures. . The process of improving and normalizing relations, in the case of Cuba as in other instances, is first and foremost a process of negotiation. That negotiation can only be conducted by direct contacts between representatives of the two governments concerned. It cannot be done indirectly through thirdparty intermediaries, or through public statements to the press. As to our policy, when and if the multilateral measures against Cuba are repealed by the OAS, there are a considerable number of issues on both sides. Trade is one. We are also concerned with the question of family visits in both directions; we are concerned with prisoners now in Cuban jails; we are concerned with the return of aircraft-hijack ransom money which found its way to Cuba and which Cuba has retained; we are concerned with the question of compensation for expropriated U.S. property; we are concerned with Cuba's attitude about Puerto Rico; and we are concerned whether Cuba is prepared to follow a clear practice of nonintervention everywhere in the hemisphere. Cuba, on the other hand, is interested not only in resuming trade. It is also concerned with the reinstitution of diplomatic relationships; it is concerned with Guantanamo; and it is concerned with expanding athletic and cultural relations among other things. This agenda of interrelated and sensitive national interest issues can only be addressed through a diplomatic process which can deal with the total agenda coherently. . . . For the Congress to concentrate on one issue only, to mandate the premature dismantlement of the present ban on Cuban trade and to open the U.S. market to Cuban imports and permit quite free export from the United States to Cuba without regard to the other circumstances of our complex relationship, would be a mistake. It would take away an important element of executive discretion in the conduct of our foreign relations. This should further complicate the task of putting relations with Cuba on a solid and mutually satisfactory basis. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1880, July 7, 1975, pp. 30–35. For Assistant Secretary Rogers' discussion of human rights in Cuba as related to the normalizing of relations with Cuba, see post, Ch. 3, § 6, pp. 184–185. On July 29, 1975, at San José, Costa Rica, the Organ of Consultation of the Organization of American States (OAS) terminated the OAS requirement of diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. The Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, acting under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) (TIAS 1838; 62 Stat. 1681; entered into force for the United States December 3, 1948), adopted the following resolution: FREEDOM OF ACTION OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE IN- The Sixteenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, acting as Organ of Consultation, in application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Considering: That the states parties to the Rio Treaty have reiterated their adherence to the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, nonintervention, and reciprocal assistance set forth in the Rio Treaty and the Charter of the OAS and Desiring: To further inter-American relations in the broadest possible sense, Resolves: 1. To solemnly reaffirm the principle of nonintervention and to call upon the states parties to ensure its observance in this hemisphere, in accordance with the Charter of the Organization, for which purpose they once again proclaim their solidarity and reiterate their will to constantly cooperate with a view to fully achieving the goals of a policy of peace. 2. To leave the states parties to the Rio Treaty free to normalize or conduct in accordance with the national policy and interests of each their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the form that each state deems advisable. 3. To transmit the text of this resolution to the Security Council of the United Nations. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 16 to 3, with 2 abstentions. The United States, which had abstained from voting on a similar resolution at Quito, Ecuador, on November 12, 1974 (see the 1974 Digest, pp. 602-603), joined in the affirmative vote. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.F/II.16, Doc. 9/75 rev.2, July 29, 1975; U.N. Doc. S/11786, Aug. 1, 1975. For a discussion of the OAS resolution as regards its removal of economic sanctions against Cuba, see post, Ch. 10, § 11, p. 691. Viet-Nam and Cambodia On April 29, 1975, at a news conference in Washington announcing the evacuation of all American personnel from South VietNam, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger was asked, "What is the current relationship of the United States to the South Vietnamese political grouping, whatever you would call it?" The Secretary replied: We will have to see what grouping emerges out of whatever negotiations should now take place between the two South Vietnamese sides. After we have seen what grouping emerges and what degree of independence it has, then we can make a decision about what our political relationship to it is. We have not made a decision on that. Asked whether he would say "diplomatic relations are in abeyance with the government in South Viet-Nam," he said, "I think that is a fair statement." Later in the same news conference the Secretary stated, "The United States will not recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam.” Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1873, May 19, 1975, pp. 629, 631. When Secretary of State Kissinger was asked by Barbara Walters in a television interview, broadcast May 5, 1975, whether he foresaw the United States Government recognizing the North Vietnamese, he replied: we now have to see what the conduct of this Government is internationally and partially domestically. For example, we know that in Cambodia very tragic and inhuman and barbarous things are going on. We don't regret not having recognized Cambodia immediately. We want to observe the conduct of the Vietnamese Government for a while before we make this decision. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1874, May 26, 1975, p. 667. In an address before the Japan Society in New York on June 18, 1975, Secretary Kissinger stated that a basic principle of U.S. foreign policy is that peace depends ultimately on reconciliation among nations. He added: New regimes have come to power in Asia in the last few months. They have flouted international agreements and flagrantly violated accepted international standards, and that we cannot ignore. But we are prepared to look to the future. Our attitude toward them will be influenced by their conduct toward their neighbors and their attitude toward us. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1880, July 7, 1975, pp. 1-8. In a television interview with Secretary Kissinger on June 19, 1975, Walter Cronkite asked what specific signs might signal the possibility of detente with Viet-Nam and Cambodia. The Secretary replied: With respect to Viet-Nam and Cambodia, we would look for particularly the implementation of the Paris agreement, especially with respect to the missing in action; and we would expect that they maintain peaceful relations without pressure or subversion with their neighbors. Under those conditions we would be willing to consider our relationship to them. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1881, July 14, 1975, p. 64. On the same subject, Secretary Kissinger, on July 15, 1975, in a question and answer session following an address at Minneapolis, stated: With respect to Cambodia, we are dealing with a government that at this moment is engaged in one of the most barbaric practices that we have seen, in which three million people that lived in cities were told in a matter of minutes to go out into the countryside a countryside that will not have a crop until November, and in which thousands, probably tens of thousands, are going to die from starvation and disease. It is a government, moreover, that has refused to establish diplomatic relations with all of the countries that have offered to have diplomatic relations with it. And, therefore, the question of diplomatic relations with Cambodia has never come up in any concrete way. With respect to Viet-Nam, . . . the United States is willing to look to the future, and to gear its policies towards Viet-Nam to the policies which it pursues towards us, and towards its neighbors. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIII, No. 1884, Aug. 4, 1975, p. 169. Secretary of State Kissinger was asked at a press conference in the Department of State on November 10, 1975, for his views concerning press reports about early reunification of the two VietNam states. He replied: |