Chapelle, on the Belgian-German frontier, Liege in Belgium, and Maubeuge on the French-Belgium borders. From Aix la Chapelle to Paris is nearly 200 miles, not quite half the distance being across Belgium. From Maubeuge to Berlin, however, the distance is 435 miles. Hence it follows that German armies have considerably less than half the distance to go from their fortified frontier posts to the heart of France, as compared with the distance French troops must go to reach the heart of Germany. Paris is, therefore, simply from the fact of distance, much more subject to attack than Berlin and hence the strenuous effort made by Germany quickly to strike the French capital.

Between Germany and Russia the conditions are reversed. Where the German-Russian boundary line curves westward in Poland the distance from Russian territory to Berlin is 180 miles. Germany's territory comes nearest to Petrograd (St. Petersburg) where the boundary line curves far to the east in East Prussia, but here Petrograd is 420 miles away. Near Thorn on the Vistula River, the main railroad from Berlin to Warsaw and Moscow crosses the boundary 250 miles from Berlin but 780 miles from Moscow. Practically the same conditions exist in regard to Russia and Austria. Vienna is about 225 miles from the Russian frontier near Cracow, while Petrograd is nearly 800 miles from Austria. Judged by distance, therefore, Russia has much the advantage over Germany and Austria for invading the heart of the enemy's country.

BOUNDARIES AND PHYSICAL FEATURES

The French-German boundary. The character of the boundaries and the nature of the country along the frontiers determine, to a large degree, the routes taken by invading armies. The western boundary of Germany extends nearly north and south for about 450 miles, one third or 150 miles being with France. The northern half, bordering Holland, is entirely artificial, crossing a flat and open plain, densely settled and covered with a net work of roads, railways and canals. Along Belgium and Luxembourg, the boundary line crosses the dissected plateau of the Ardennes a rough and wooded region sparsely inhabited. Encircling the northern and western edges of the Ardennes is the Meuse River, which, with its tributary the Sambre, leads from the German frontier across Belgium into France. South of the Ardennes the Moselle skirts the duchy of Luxembourg and offers a route into France. The boundary with France extends from the southern edge of the Ardennes near Longwy across the hilly, but low, plateau of Lorraine to the Vosges Mountains. The high, forested, granite slope of the Vosges continues the boundary southward, and is the most effective natural barrier between the two countries. Several passes cross the range, however, and at the southern end, between the Vosges and the Swiss Jura, a low, wide gateway opens-the Burgundian Gate. So low is this pass that a canal connecting the Rhine and the Rhone crosses it.

The nature of this boundary belt explains the German plan of invasion. A northern army, the Army of the Meuse, followed the route skirting the Ardennes barrier. This is not only the shortest route from Berlin to Paris, but the easiest as far as natural conditions are concerned, and, because of the fertile plain, capable of furnishing large supplies for an army. By leaving German territory near Aix la Chapelle and reaching the Meuse at Liege, Holland's neutrality could be observed, but Belgium must be crossed. Advancing up the Meuse and Sambre through Namur, Charleroi, Maubeuge, La Fere and Givet, low divides, crossed by canals, lead to the headwaters of the Oise and Aisne which continue in a direct line toward Paris.

The Moselle offers a second way of entering France. The army of the Moselle, following up the river to Luxembourg, in order to reach France by the shortest route, must cross Luxembourg territory to Longwy. the invasion of this little country at the beginning of the war.

Hence

A third way of reaching France is across the Lorraine Plateau from the Rhine at Strassburg. The Army of the Rhine, following this route along the line of the Rhine-Marne Canal, reached France near Luneville and Nancy. Once through these frontier passes, by whichever route entered, the land becomes lower and more level and the French rivers lead in converging lines upon Paris. An invasion through the Burgundian Gateway is less advantageous. It is far from the heart of Germany, the narrow entrance is easily defended by the great French fortress of Belfort, and it leads, not into the heart of France, but down into the Rhone Valley.

The physical geography of this boundary belt offers much greater obstacles to an invasion of Germany by the French. In the first place, unless a route is followed across the low plains of Belgium and Holland into North Germany, French armies must leave low and open country for the increasingly more rugged and higher lands that lie west of the Rhine. Not only is the advance of an army into such a country difficult, but invaders can be easily repelled. The passes can be heavily guarded. In the second place, the great rivers of Germany lie across the path of invasion toward Berlin, rather than converging upon it. This is especially true of the deep valley of the Rhine, and beyond the Rhine lies the Ems, the Weser and the Elbe.

The Russian-German Boundary.-The Russian-German boundary is a great inverted S-shaped line 700 miles long, with no natural barrier throughout its length. The eastern extension of German territory between Poland and the Baltic exposes that portion to attack by the Russians from three sides, but the western "wedge of Poland points menacingly towards the German capital, and leaves the military strength of Russia free to choose upon what part of the long frontier it will direct the full force of its onset." (Partsch's Central Europe - Appleton, New York, p. 334). As the rivers of France converge upon Paris, so the rivers of eastern Germany

the middle Vistula and Netze, the Warte, the Oder-point toward Berlin. The only natural barrier to the advance of Russian armies is the tangle of swamps and lakes in East Prussia. That the Russians should cross this long open frontier into Germany as soon as their armies had assembled is not surprising.

The same open frontier separates Russia from Austria, and here again Russian invasion of Austrian Galicia was easy of accomplishment. To cross the Carpathian barrier into central Austria-Hungary, however, would be a much more difficult task. But by taking and holding Galicia, Russia would open a possible line of advance for her armies from Poland up the valley of the Oder toward Berlin. To oppose this advance, Germany must depend upon the strength of her arms, unaided by natural factors.

A German invasion of Russia meets many difficulties. In addition to long distances, already mentioned, are the difficulties of poor roads formed by the deep soils of the plains; great stretches of swamp and lake; and the large area that would be necessary to conquer. As the Czar's armies advanced into Germany, they would constantly become more and more concentrated. They go from the large end of a funnel toward the small end. German invading armies must constantly spread out, from the small to the large end of the funnel.

Climate also offers protection to Russia. The long and severely cold winters are more effective than armies or fortifications, and the intensely hot days of summer would be very trying upon an invading army.

Sea Coast and Naval Warfare.-Germany does not need a navy to defend her sea-coast. Nature is her best defense. A low, flat, plain, slightly submerged, the German shore is bordered by very shallow waters, blocked with sand bars. All German seaports are situated far up the mouths of submerged rivers or at the ends of deep bays or "haffs," whose entrances are protected by bay-bars. No port is near enough to the open sea to be bombarded by warships; the narrow, crooked entrances to the rivers and bays are easily protected by land forts and sea-mines; the gently sloping shore line and barrier beaches would make the landing of a large army a slow and difficult task. Hence, the most that an enemy's fleet can do is to blockade the German coast and keep her fleet bottled up in her protected ha ens until such time as it will voluntarily come out. No matter how powerful the navy, it cannot harm the German coast nor force the German fleet to open waters. On the other hand, with the aid of the Kiel canal across the neck of the Danish peninsula and the enclosed bays, the German fleet can move along her own coast and concentrate in either the North Sea or Baltic at will. Any general naval battle that may occur between the English and the Germans will be the Germans' own choosing. As long as the English fleet is undefeated, however, Germany must remain cut off from the rest of the world by sea.

A

THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM

By Lawrence Martin

University of Wisconsin

CHANGES IN POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

T the end of the third month of the general European War in 1914 a

number of features of interest to the geography teacher have been modified. Russia has changed the name of its capital from St. Petersburg to Petrograd, apparently adopting a Slavic rather than a Teutonic form of name because of race prejudice. France and Belgium are temporarily using as capitals the cities of Bordeaux and Havre, respectively, Brussels having been captured by the Germans on August 31st and Paris seriously threatened early in September. The capitol of Servia had been moved from Belgrade to Kragujevatz before the war broke out. Russia invaded the Austrian province of Galicia north of the Carpathians, capturing the strongly fortified city of Lemburg, surrounding Przemysl, and claiming Galicia as a province. Germany occupies Luxembourg and a large part of Belgium. The war on the sea and in the air was less important during the first three months than on land, although aeroplanes were used extensively in scouting. Zeppelin dirigibles dropped a few bombs in Antwerp and aeroplanes dropped bombs in Paris.

TOPOGRAPHIC INFLUENCES

Interest is centered, however, on the German campaign in France. The geographical factors involved, admittedly with others, in the plan of campaign include the topography of the region between the Paris Basin and the delta of the Rhine. The intervening highland,* which we know (a) west of the broad rift valley of the middle Rhine as the Vosges and Hardt, (b) in western Germany as the Rhine Highland, with its four divisions of Hunsrück, Taunus, Westerwald, and Eifel, and (c) in Luxembourg, Belgium, and France as the Ardennes, decreases rapidly in elevation west of the River Meuse. The boundary between France and Belgium lies, not on the low divide in the highland of Artois but a short distance to the north. As is pointed out elsewhere in this magazine, Luxembourg and eastern Belgium are directly on the path from Berlin to Paris. The main German army, however, invaded Belgium near Aix-le-Chapelle or Aachen, crossed the River Meuse at and near Liege, passed through Brussels, and invaded France on

* Among the good descriptions, in English, of the physical geography of the area involved in this campaign are the articles by De Lapparent, Kirchhoff, du Fief, and others in Mill's International Geography; Partsch's Central Europe: Reclus' France, Germany, and Belgium in volumes II and III of The Earth and Its Inhabitants; Chisholm's Europe in Stanford's Compendium of Geography and Travel; and Davis's Rhine Gorge and the Bosphorus (Journal of Geography, Vol. XI, 1913, pp. 209-215) and The Seine, the Meuse, and the Moselle (National Geographic Magazine, Vol. VII, 1898, pp. 189-202, 228-238, and Geographical Essays, pp. 587-616). The latter even includes details concerning the origin of the surface features of some af the battlefields. See also Paris sheet, Nord M31, International Map of the World on the scale of 1:1,000,000.

the portion of its frontier west of the Ardennes. Here topography clearly played a part, for it was easier to cross the French frontier in Belgium than in the hilly Ardennes to the east. It seems possible that the development of the modern siege gun may have much to do with the control of routes of invasion by topography and by roads in the future. A sixteen-inch gun, such as the Germans are reported to be using, must be drawn by 30 to 40 horses or by a powerful traction engine. If the army using these guns is to advance with rapidity the route must not involve rough country or poor roads. West of the River Meuse and its tributary the Sambre, the German army found the favorable topography and good roads they desired. To the east in the Ardennes such rapid progress would have been impossible, as the threechief valleys were guarded by the French fortresses of Maubeuge, Givet, and Longwy, which the invaders did not wish to take time to capture, although each of them has subsequently fallen into the hands of the German armies, due to the secret development of remarkably large siege guns.

Fig. 1. Successive areas occupied by the German armies invading France. Lines drawn at intervals of a week. Modified from a map (Copyright, 1914) by the New York Evening Post. Line of battle Oct. 20th shown by a dashed line.

INVASION MOVING DOWN STREAM

The rapidity of the German invasion of France is unparalleled. As is shown in Fig. 1 the Germans passed Liege about August 8th. They occupied a small area in Belgium near Louvain and Namur on August 22nd. During the following week they spread out into northern France, so that August 29th saw them at Lille, Arras, St. Quentin, Laon, and near Verdun..