the world. The German child has impressed upon him in the most thorough manner the importance of his native land.

Anton Jahr has given in the Journal of Geography an outline of the course of geography in the Leipzig schools.* It is much the same as that in Munich. It starts with the home and gives the same intensive study to the province and native country, but the study of the earth as a globe is left until the seventh year when the pupils can better understand it.

The writer has long held that the formal study of the globe and the distribution of the main features of the earth's surface in the third or fourth year is wholly out of place at this stage. The pupil is not mentally able to grasp these relations in such a manner as to do him any good. It is sufficient that he acquire a general idea so as to be able to orient himself. Stories and descriptions of people and places in other parts, and how these are situated with reference to his home will accomplish this.

Most German schools give the third and fourth years to heimatkunde. Then follows the formal text-book work. The geographies published by Tischendorf are in five parts, of which three are devoted to Germany. The first part embracing about 300 pages is given entirely to Saxony, one of the smallest German states.

Prull gives one third of the space in his Methodisches Handbuch to Germany. Fritsche, whose books it seems to the writer are the best of any in the German schools, emphasizes the home land in the same manner.

In an extended article in the German Pedagogical Magazine entitled "New Paths in Geography Teaching", Fritsche while criticising certain practices in geography teaching in his own country, says, "He who thinks he can. reach this high mark (speaking of culture) if he takes his children three years. into foreign countries and has only one year for the observation of the Fatherland makes a great mistake and has wholly forgotten the purpose of the German folk schools."

If our thesis is correct that the home and its interests as they reach out over the world are of the most importance, then a school in New England would require quite a different course in geography from one in the Mississippi Valley or upon the Pacific Coast.

If we accept the German estimate of the relative importance of the home and state we shall have to revise our courses of study radically, and in most cases more than double the time given to them.

In taking up the geography of the United States we should pay less attention to political boundaries and more to the natural geographic regions into which the country is divided. Such a region in which the home is situated should be studied. in its entirety without regard to whether it corresponds to a county or state boundary. The idea of studying groups of states forming a

*Journal of Geography, May, 1911.

natural region instead of the old artificial one has been hardly more than suggested in any of our texts. Prull, the author of an excellent series of German books for the elementary schools has made the study of "natural geographic regions" the especial point of departure.

As to the manner of presentation of the facts of geography most of the work is still descriptive and based upon the memory, although the newer texts in our schools lay more or less emphasis upon the causal relation.

Fritsche, in the article already referred to, develops out of Ritter's comparative geography what he calls the "biologic method." This is not so essentially different from the more advanced ideas of some other school geographers but is more thoroughly and carefully worked out. Fritsche would pay less attention to the outward form of geographic phenomena and develop more clearly the idea of the inward relationship. Nothing exists by itself; each thing conditions others, and all together form the earth organism. He says the teacher must not pass on too quickly to generalizations when there has been an insufficient basis in observation. Each new point of view, each relationship worked out must be tied up with what has already become a part of experience. If this is not done the new facts will remain in the air as far as the pupil is concerned and never become a part of his real knowledge.

When we come to the maps in our textbooks and to our methods of map study we find again that the Germans are far ahead of us. The maps in all our school books are far from what they ought to be and in some they are so small and indistinct as to be almost worthless.

In our ordinary method of taking up map study we forget entirely that the symbols of the map mean no more to the pupil than the hieroglyphics of an unknown language. He must first be taught to interpret these upon a basis of actual reality.

Fritsche and other German teachers rightly insist that the study of maps. is useless unless the pupil first knows the landscape represented in the map through actual observation. The map is not an image of the landscape, but consists of a variety of signs and symbols standing for it, and must be translated into the experience of the pupils. The map says there is a mountain here, a steep slope there, a gentle one farther along, a river here, there a plain, there a forest, etc. The pupil has no means of translating these symbols without first having made observations upon the real things. According to Fritsche this ability must be gained from excursions, from the study of pictures and from the stereopticon. Without this basis of perceptive experience it is impossible to acquire any real understanding of maps.

An important adjunct of the German texts is the atlas of which a great deal is made. It is bound in a volume by itself which practice has many things to recommend it. There are a number of German school atlases which for distinctness and beauty of coloring cannot be excelled. There is no reason why the maps put before our children should not be as attractive as these.

The older German texts had few pictures of value, but the new ones

contain many excellent half tones. It has also become customary to introduce a number of colored illustrations which with certain subjects are very effective.

In what has been said the writer has tried to point out what appear to be grave errors in the commonly accepted view of geography, as well as some fundamental defects in the text-books and the class room methods, with the hope that if his views are not accepted they will at least arouse a discussion which will help to clarify the situation.

IT

THE EUROPEAN WINTER AND THE WAR*

By Robert DeC. Ward

Harvard University

T IS in the eastern war zone that there has been the greatest suffering on account of the cold, and it is there that the winter weather controls have been most marked, but the dispatches from this area have given us much less information on this point than have those from the Franco-Belgian zone.

From Galicia, with its high ground and its northern exposure, came, in mid-September, the first mention of the suffering of troops from the cold, and early in October the soldiers there were already marching and camping in the snow. The Russians, well protected by their heavy overcoats, suffered little discomfort, but the Austrians, whose winter clothing had been captured by the Russians in Lemberg, were less fortunate. In the northeast the Germans seem to have been surprised by the setting in of cold weather in the first half of October, and not having heavy clothing they suffered severely. The Russians, on the other hand, were well protected, having fur caps covering both their heads and necks, and being otherwise well equipped with requisites for a fall and winter campaign. After their early attempts to crush Russia were unsuccessful, the Germans prepared for winter fighting in Poland, for the troops which went to the front late in October were well equipped with fur gloves and sheepskin coats. The Germans seem to have suffered from the cold all along the eastern battle line. They commandeered all available colthing, furs, and sheepskins, and at Lodz the great cloth factories were kept working night and day to supply clothing.

In the matter of general tactics of the war, it is unlikely that the Germans, even if they had been distinctly victorious in the east, would have thought of penetrating far into Russia, to face, as did Napoleon, the might of Generals January and February. It is probable that the early German activity against Russia was at least in part due to the desire to gain a distinct advantage before the setting in of the rigorous Russian winter. The capture of Warsaw before winter would have greatly strengthened the German line in

* Continued from p. 171 of the February number of the Journal of Geography.

East Prussia, would have endangered the Russian frontier, and would have had a distinct moral effect on the Poles. Further, if a large body of German troops could then have been transferred to France, a new campaign against Paris might perhaps have been attempted during the milder French winter. Whatever may have been the other reasons for the Russian advance into Austrian Poland, it is clear that this southern route into Austrian and German territory would naturally offer certain important climatic advantages. One of the reasons why Italy has so long kept out of the war is believed, by at least one authority, to be due to her desire to avoid a winter campaign.

Toward the latter part of October snow was interfering with the offensive of the Russian army in Poland by delaying the movement of its supplies. The German and Austrian troops, therefore, retreated less rapidly and made a more determined resistance. They were, however, themselves greatly hampered by a breakdown of their own supply trains. In December, the whole German Polish campaign was practically at a standstill, owing to the mild. weather, which impeded the movement of guns over the soft ground and favored Russian trench digging.

The weather of the eastern war zone has been the dominant control in the campaign throughout the winter. Every spell of mild weather has been accompanied by an immediate slackening of military operations, owing to the difficulty of transportation. Every cold spell has stimulated military movements. Whenever the curve of temperature has gone up the curve of military activity has gone down, and whenever the curve of temperature has gone down the curve of military activity has gone up. To follow these seesaws of weather and military operations in detail would be tedious and profitless at this time. In January the Germans were using ice breakers on the Masurian lakes in East Prussia to make it possible for their gunboats to remain effective and to prevent the Russians from crossing on the ice. As long as the rivers were open they afforded protection to the Russian troops who were on the defensive behind them, and prevented the Germans from crossing on the ice. Zero temperatures were reported at Galicia early in January, and many soldiers have been frozen to death. There is an interesting and welcome human touch in a dispatch that, in Poland, by mutual agreement, neither side fired on the men of the other who were carrying straw to make their winter quarters in the deep trenches more comfortable.

The Russians are more accustomed to severe cold than are the men from the west and south of Europe, and it was reasonable to expect that they would prosecute the war with little diminution of energy during the winter. They are splendid cold weather fighters. Their midwinter military maneuvers each year have taught them cold weather tactics. Von der Goltz also, when German commander in eastern Prussia a few years ago, conducted experimental winter maneuvers along the lines followed by the contending armies in the

campaign of 1806-07 in that region, a campaign the horrors of which Von der Goltz has himself depicted in his book, "Jena to Eylau."*

The most dramatic achievements of the winter thus far have been the marches of the Russian armies over the mountain passes of the Carpathians, deep in snow. Fighting among the spurs and in the passes of the Carpathians has been terrific, and carried on under extraordinary difficulties of severe cold, and bitter winds, and heavy snowstorms. Often the troops had to cross, waist deep, the icy waters of the mountain streams. The sufferings from frost bites and exhaustion are reported to have been terrible. When we hear of snow three to six feet deep in Serbia it is not difficult to understand why Austria tried to crush Serbia before winter came on.

In the French and Belgian war zone the advances and retreats have seemed more like the tactics of a football game than of a war. It is impossible to follow the details in the present discussion. It has been a seesaw of weather and military operations, much like that in the east. The "autumn chill" of the nights and early mornings of late September in the western war zone roused the commanders to a realization of what was coming. On all sides there were sudden preparations for winter. The German Crown Prince telegraphed to the Emperor for winter socks and underclothing for his men. Germany ordered sheepskin clothing and fur coats from Rotterdam. The French minister of war sent a circular to all the prefects requesting them to obtain, as rapidly as possible, supplies of woolen underclothes, socks, gloves, and blankets for the use of the French soldiers during the winter. England made special provision for her Indian troops in the way of mufflers and warm underwear; commandeered large quantities of woolen goods, and imported from this country rubber boots and cardigan jackets. From the United States the different nations have bought immense quantities of sweaters, woolen socks, gloves and underwear, blankets, paper vests, woolen boots, and millions of horseshoe calks. The fact that this war is being fought in the winter means hundreds of thousands of dollars to the manufacturers of winter supplies in the United States.

*Petre, describing the night before the battle of Eylau, says: "It requires a strong effort of the imagination to picture the horrors of that night. The valley and the heights on either side, deeply buried in snow, were lit by the bivouac fires of 120,000 men. The flames flickered in the icy north wind which swept along the position, carrying with it the smoke from the damp wood and the constantly falling snow. Not even the pale light of all these hundreds of fires could impart warmth to this arctic scene. The men crowded round the fires for warmth, hardly for rest; for what rest was possible in such circumstances? Between the opposing lines of fires stood the outposts of the armies and the sentries, who, on their cheerless posts, must have thought with envy even of their companions behind them. The battle was fought in a winter tempest. The snow prevented the commanders from seeing their troops, the howling north wind rendered it impossible for the soldiers to hear the word of command. At times it was not possible to see ten yards off. The action at such moments had the character of a night attack." Von der Goltz says that the Russians were not allowed to have fires lest these should betray the position of the troops.