PROHIBITION OF WEATHER MODIFICATION AS A WEAPON OF WAR TUESDAY, JULY 29, 1975 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 3:25 p.m. in room 2255, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Donald M. Fraser (chairman) presiding. Mr. FRASER. The subcommittee will come to order, please. The Subcommittee on International Organizations meets this afternoon to consider House Resolution 28, which calls on the U.S. Government to seek an agreement with other members of the United Nations on the prohibition of research, experimentation, or use of weather modification activity as a weapon of war. [The text of House Resolution 28 follows:] [House Resolution 28, 94th Cong., 1st sess.] Whereas the Declaration of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment declared that nations have the responsibility to insure that their own activities do not damage the environment of other nations; and Whereas the World Meteorological Organization has machinery to facilitate international cooperation in meteorology; and Whereas the impact of bad weather on crops aggravates world food shortages; and Whereas there is urgent need for further research in weather modification for improved agriculture and other peaceful purposes; and Whereas environmental cooperation can help build a foundation for world peace; and Whereas there is great danger to the world environment if weather modification activities are used for warfare: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States Government should seek an agreement with other members of the United Nations on the prohibition of research, experimentation, or use of weather modification activity as a weapon of war. Mr. FRASER. This subject is of particular importance now as the United States and the Soviet Union are reportedly drawing near agreement on a treaty draft on environmental warfare, pursuant to the Joint Statement on Environmental Warfare issued during the 1974 Moscow Summit. Another U.S./U.S.S.R. summit is slated for this fall in Washington and according to some observers, such a treaty may be signed then. But there are disturbing indications that the prospective accords will be permissive, allowing certain types of weather warfare. Such a pact (1) could very well become the world's model and raise many more problems than it solves. This subcommittee had hoped to probe developments in the United States/Soviet negotiations, and perhaps be assured that a permissive treaty is not in the works as well as examine progress and prospects for a multinational agreement emerging from the UN's conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Unfortunately, however, the administration witness, Adm. Thomas Davies, Assistant Director for Nuclear and Advanced Weapons Technology, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, will not be present at this hearing. Still, this hearing will attempt to frame the issues of environmental warfare and the implications of the reported American/Russian agreement. We are most fortunate to have with us today two men whose involvement and expertise in this issue is both long-standing and respected. Dr. Gordon MacDonald, former member of the Council on Environmental Quality, currently with Dartmouth College, will testify, to be followed by Hon. Gilbert Gude, our distinguished colleague from the State of Maryland. Mr. MacDonald is not only a respected scientist, but is a former government official with both Republican and Democratic administrations. Mr. MacDonald has frequently addressed this important topic and has graciously agreed to offer his knowledge and insights. Mr. MacDonald, we are delighted to have you here and apologize for the late start and the problems that are generally created by the fact that the House is trying to close out business before the end of the week. We welcome you here today and look forward to your testimony and a candid ventilation of this issue. Why don't you proceed? STATEMENT OF DR. GORDON J. F. MACDONALD, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE Mr. MACDONALD. Mr. Chairman, I certainly appreciate this opportunity, knowing how busy you are. It is important to comment on the House Resolution 28. I strongly support the concept embodied in the resolution. My reasons are twofold. First, the need for the United States to maintain leadership in arms control and particularly in attempting to prevent the development of totally new technologies as weapons of war. Second, the need to experiment with weather modification technology to determine if it can be used for peaceful purposes without harming the environment. As any new proposal in disarmament does, House Resolution 28 raises a number of questions. The following ones, in my opinion, are significant: First, why, at this time, should we propose a ban on military uses of weather modification? Two: How can military uses of weather modification be defined so that legitimate, peaceful undertakings are not inhibited? Three: Can such a ban be effectively monitored and verified? Four: How would such a prohibition affect the civilian development of weather modification, and five: What is the relation of a ban on weather modification to a more general ban on all aspects of environmental warfare? I can see only two circumstances in which weather modification could be usefully employed by the United States as a weapon of war. First, some fundamental breakthrough might make weather modification a weapon of mass destruction. In such an event, weather modification would have a strategic purpose totally unlike the unsuccessful tactical uses of rainmaking in Southeast Asia. There would seem to be little advantage for the United States in deploying such a weapon. Our nuclear arsenal is more than sufficient to achieve whatever purposes we would have in mind in terms of mass destruction. Further, the nuclear arsenal is sufficiently varied in its capabilities that it could meet any conceivable circumstance. The other possible use of weather modification is its employment in a covert war. In the future, it may be to a nation's advantage to engage in covert warfare rather than overt warfare to secure national advantages. As economic competition among advanced nations heightens and the availability of natural resources decreases, a country may seek to insure a peaceful, natural environment for itself and a disturbed environment for its competitors. A nation could conceivably carry out covert operations producing disturbed conditions since nature's great irregularity permits storms, floods, and droughts to be viewed as unusual but not unexpected. However, in both the case of the use of weather modification for mass destruction and for covert purposes, the United States, in my view, would be at a disadvantage. Weather modification, as we know it today, could be developed at far less cost than a nuclear arsenal; and if a weapon of mass destruction could be developed, countries not as well endowed as the United States might be able to develop the needed technology. Further, the deployment for covert purposes could also be to the advantage of countries not yet possessing a nuclear capability. In a narrow, nationalistic sense, a ban on weather war would be to our advantage. However, in a broader context, such a ban would be to the benefit of all mankind. In seeking such a ban, considerable care must be taken in defining the military uses. Today, at certain strategic bomber bases, cold fog clearing techniques are employed. These techniques permit the operation of part of our strategic strike force under adverse weather conditions and the landing of planes when they could not otherwise. do so. Is this one military use of weather modification for offensive purposes? In a strict sense it is, but it can also be considered as a humanitarian aid to pilots. A feasible restriction would be to ban all weather modification activities by parties to a convention over the territory of other nations. All activities within 300 kilometers of a party's boundary would require notification of its neighbors, while any weather making activities over an international regime would require approval of all parties to the convention. I believe that some definition of military uses would be workable and worthwhile. pro Like all agreements in arms control, a key issue is the provision for adequate monitoring and verification. Weather modification duces no greater problems in these areas than does biological or chemical warfare. Since currently available technology uses chemicals such as silver iodide which can be detected at extremely low concentrations in the atmosphere, verification might be possible through atmospheric monitoring although the state of research in this field is not such as to permit a definite statement. I certainly do not believe that difficulties in monitoring should impede progress toward a convention in this area. Weather modification for military purposes is bound to have a significant effect on peaceful applications. Over the years, close cooperation and exchange of weather data among almost all countries has been achieved. Meteorological data secured by other countries has been a great aid to weather forcasting in the United States, and the forecasts have a high economic value to the United States certainly measured in tens of billions of dollars. Through the effort of the World Meteorological Organization, observations taken in virtually every country having a meteorological service are exchanged with all nations. It can be expected that such cooperative efforts will also develop in weather modification. Through the effort of the World Meterological Organization and the International Council of Scientific Unions a worldwide program to observe the atmosphere, the global atmospheric research program (GARP), has been established. The first GARP global experiment (FGGE) scheduled for 1977 will utilize geosynchronous and polar-orbiting satellites, aircraft, ships, balloons, and buoys to observe and measure the characteristics of the atmosphere and oceans. This program will greatly enhance the data base for understanding weather and climate. Because of the very great increase in knowledge of the atmosphere and the way of modifying it that will result from FGGE, the very least that the United States should seek is an agreement that would ban all military weather modification until this first experiment is completed. Both the existing data from exchange arrangements and future cooperation in weather modification are certain to be endangered if countries develop weather modification as a weapon of war. If, for example, it became known that the United States was developing a military weather technology, then scientists from other countries would be reluctant to work with our scientists even on peaceful projects because of the suspicion that their contributions might be used against their own countries or other countries. On the other side of the ledger, there is always the danger that weather modification developed for civilian purposes might be quickly transformed into a weapon of war. There can never be any guarantee that this will not happen. Any convention must, of course, have a provision for any party to raise a question of another country's development of a civilian program that could be a cover for a military program. |