abroad, the legality of a marriage between persons sui juris is to be determined by the law of the place where it is celebrated. 305 N. Y. at 490.3 In interpreting subdivision 3 of section 5, the court noted that, although the statute declares a marriage between an uncle and niece to be incestuous and void, the statute by its express terms did not regulate a marriage solemnized in another State where it was legal. 305 N.Y. at 491. While it is true that the marriage in May involved an uncle and niece of the Jewish faith, the New York courts have not so limited the decision, and we are of the opinion that its reasoning applies equally well to the present case. See In re Estate of Saffer, 39 A.D.2d 691, 241 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1963); Campione v. Campione, 201 Misc. 590, 107 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1951); 1933 Op. N.Y. A.G. 83. Matter of Zappia, supra, relied upon by the district director, may be distinguished on the ground that there the statute in question expressly declared incestuous a marriage between residents of Wisconsin contracted in another State for the purpose of evading statutory prohibitions. It appears that an out-of-state marriage entered into by an uncle and niece who are residents of the State of New York does not violate the public policy of that State, and will be recognized as valid in New York. We therefore disagree with the district director's interpretation of the applicable New York law. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded in order that the district director may determine if the marriage between the petitioner and the beneficiary is bona fide. See Matter of Phillis, 15 I. & N. Dec. 385 (BIA 1975). ORDER: The appeal is sustained and the record is remanded to the district director for further proceedings consistent with the above opinion. 3 The court noted that the two exceptions-cases within the prohibition of positive law; and cases involving polygamy or incest in a degree regarded generally as within the prohibition of natural law-were not applicable. 305 N.Y. at 492–93. (1) In order to establish respondent's deportability as an overstay, the Service introduced, over the objections of counsel, a Form I-213 (Record of Deportable Alien), a Form I-214 (Warning as to Rights) and a fingerprint card relating to respondent. The Form I-213 bore the same name and Alien Registration Number as the order to show cause issued respondent; the Form I-214 was signed by respondent and indicated she had been advised of her rights and had voluntarily waived them. No evidence was adduced at the hearing to indicate that the Forms I-213 and I-214 did not relate to respondent or were in any way incorrect, or that the statements given by respondent were not given voluntarily. (2) A respondent in deportation proceedings has no right to refuse to testify except on a reasonable claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment. Remaining in this country longer than permitted is not a criminal offense. Respondent made no showing that there was any basis for a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege and there was no constitutional basis for her refusal to testify. (3) In the absence of any proof that Forms I-213 and 1-214 relating to respondent contain information which was incorrect or obtained by coercion or force, these forms are inherently trustworthy and would be admissible even in court as an exception to the Hearsay Rule as public records or reports as provided in Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (4) Since the respondent's deportability was proven at the hearing by untainted evidence which was clear, convincing, and unequivocal, even assuming a defect in the arrest procedure, it would be of no consequence in this deportation proceeding. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant visitor-remained longer ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Bert D. Greenberg, Esquire 8484 Wilshire Boulevard The respondent appeals from the immigration judge's decision of October 1, 1975. The immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged, granted her 14 days voluntary departure, and entered an alternate order providing for the respondent's deportation to Peru. The appeal will be dismissed. On appeal, the respondent contends, in effect, that her deportability has not been established by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. According to her, all the evidence in the record was produced as a result of her arrest; that arrest was unlawful; and, therefore, the evidence should have been suppressed. At the hearing before the immigration judge, the respondent identified herself by name, and counsel stipulated that the order to show cause related to her. Through counsel, she denied all the allegations in the order to show cause and her deportability as charged. Thereafter, on Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, she refused to answer any questions on the issues of alienage and deportability. Her later testimony was confined to a motion to suppress and to her application for voluntary departure. The immigration judge determined that her refusal to testify on constitutional grounds was unjustified. In the order to show cause it was charged that the respondent was subject to deportation as an overstay. Remaining in this country longer than permitted does not constitute a criminal offense. A respondent in deportation proceedings has no right to refuse to testify except on a reasonable claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment. Otherwise, the immigration judge may direct the respondent to testify. ChavezRaya v. INS, 519 F.2d 397 (C. A. 7, 1975); Laqui v. INS, 422 F.2d 807, 809 (C.A. 7, 1970). Counsel stated in his brief that the respondent had entered the United States as a visitor. No showing was made that there was any basis for a claim of Fifth Amendment privilege. Thus, there was no constitutional basis for the respondent's refusal to testify. To establish alienage and deportability the Service introduced, over the objections of counsel, a Form I-213, Report of Deportable Alien, a Form I-214, Warning as to Rights, and a fingerprint form. The Form I-213 bears the same name and Alien Registration number as the order to show cause. It reflects birth in Peru and entry into the United States on November 30, 1972 as a visitor. The Form I-214 is signed "Elba Davila". It warns the alien of her rights, including the right to advice of counsel; it also reflects that she understood her rights and voluntarily waived them. The respondent did not deny that these documents related to her, and no offer of proof was made that they are in any way incorrect, or that the information they contained was not given voluntarily. In the absence of any proof that the Forms I-213 and I-214 contain information which is incorrect or which was obtained by coercion or force, we find that these forms are inherently trustworthy and would be admissible even in court as an exception to the hearsay rule as public records and reports. Fed. Rules of Evid., Rule 803(8). See Matter of Swissair "Flight SR 168," 15 I. & N. Dec. 372 (BIA 1975). In view of the identity of name and Alien Registration number on the order to show cause and the Form I-213, the respondent's duty to testify, and her burden to show time, place, manner of entry into the United States pursuant to section 291, Immigration and Nationality Act, we conclude that alienage and deportability were established at the deportation hearing by untainted evidence which is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. Thus, because the respondent's deportability was proved by sufficient evidence at the hearing, even if we were to assume a defect in the arrest procedure, it would be of no consequence in this deportation proceeding. U.S. ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149 (1923); La Franca v. INS, 413 F.2d 686, 689 (C.A. 2, 1969); Vlissidis v. Anadell, 262 F.2d 398, 400 (C.A. 7, 1959). Accordingly, the following order will be entered. Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 14 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. MATTER OF SULEIMAN In Section 246 Proceedings A-18287193 Decided by Board January 4, 1974 (1) Respondent was granted permanent resident status on January 28, 1970, as the immediate relative spouse of a United States citizen, and as such was exempt from the numerical limitations of the Immigration and Nationality Act. After the marriage ended in divorce on August 19, 1970, the Service brought rescission proceedings on the ground the marriage was a sham and the respondent was not entitled to the classification he had been accorded. (2) The burden of proof in rescission proceedings is clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. Where the basis for rescission proceedings is that the alien was not entitled to the numerical classification accorded, it is essential that the Notice of Intention to Rescind allege ineligibility for other numerical classifications. In this case the record contains no evidence that a visa subject to the numerical limitations would not have been available to respondent, nor is that alleged. Proceeding remanded. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Manuel Guzman Ortiz, Esquire P. O. Box 9133 Santurce, Puerto Rico 00908 This is an appeal from an order of rescission entered by the immigration judge. The case will be remanded. The record relates to a married male alien, 23 years of age, a native and citizen of Jordan, whose status was adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence on January 28, 1970. He was granted permanent residence as the spouse of a citizen of the United States. As such he was exempt from the numerical limitations. His marriage to the United States citizen terminated in divorce on August 19, 1970. The Service thereupon concluded that his marriage had been a sham and that the respondent was not entitled to the classification he was accorded. Rescission proceedings were commenced. The Notice of Intention to Rescind alleged that no bona fide marriage relation ever existed between the respondent and his United States citizen wife and that "willful failure to disclose this material fact served to cut off a pertinent line of inquiry which, had it been known, would certainly have prevented approval of your application for permanent residence." However, there was no allegation that the nonpreference |