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tice (Tr. pp. 480, 537-38). In rebuttal, the Service introduced a copy of a newspaper "reply" or "advertisement," ostensibly paid for by the respondent. (See Group Exh. 51.) The Service did not affirmatively demonstrate that the respondent had purchased the newspaper space. However, in the absence of contradictory evidence, we believe that there is sufficient basis upon which to connect the respondent with this "article." Cf. U.S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927). The "article" nevertheless can arguably be interpreted as a reply to the earlier Chicago Sun-Times exposé, and not necessarily as an advertisement for business. We do not mean to imply that the "article" was an entirely proper exercise of the respondent's first amendment rights, because much of its language appears designed to attract clients. See Belli v. State of California, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1974). However, the respondent cannot be disciplined on the basis of the newspaper "article," because it was not specifically charged as an act of unprofessional solicitation of practice. Moreover, the respondent, conceivably viewing the "article" as a "reply" to accusations, may not have been attempting to deceive when he testified that he never advertised his law practice. Giving him the benefit of the doubt, we have not considered this proof in judging the case.

We are of the opinion that the respondent should be suspended from practice before the Service and this Board for a period of one year. Although the respondent's deception of Miss Torres cannot be condoned, the record does reflect that he was under stress at the time of his departure from the League and during the weeks following the publication in a Chicago newspaper of an article allegedly "exposing" the nature of his practice. It was during these periods of time that some, but not all, of the deception occurred. Furthermore, the respondent did refund the entire amount of the fee to the brother of Miss Torres. We believe that a six month suspension is warranted for this unethical conduct. Since the record does not establish that the respondent actually authorized the activities of Mr. Angulo which we have found to have been undertaken in furtherance a paid referral agreement, a minor reprimand of the respondent is all that we believe warranted. We shall also impose a six month suspension for the violations of the regulations proven under the fifth and sixth numbered allegations. Although there are several mitigating factors in the respondent's case, the proven violations are sufficiently serious to require that the two six month periods of suspension run consecutively.

ORDER: The respondent is suspended from the practice of law before the Immigration and Naturalization Service and before the Board of Immigration Appeals for a period of one year.

Further order: The record is certified to the Attorney General for final disposition, and the foregoing order is stayed pending such disposition.

APPENDIX

8 CFR Part 292

§ 292.3 Suspension or disbarment.

(a) Grounds. The Board, with the approval of the Attorney General, may suspend or bar from further practice an attorney or representative if it shall find that it is in the public interest to do so. The suspension or disbarment of an attorney or representative who is within one or more of the following categories shall be deemed to be in the public interest, for the purpose of this part, but the enumeration of the purpose of this part, but the enumeration of the following categories does not establish the exclusive grounds for suspension or disbarment in the public inter

est:

(1) Who charges or receives, either directly or indirectly, any fee or compensation for services which may be deemed to be grossly excessive in relation to the services performed, or who, being an accredited representative of an organization recognized under § 1.1(j) of this chapter, charges or recieves either directly or indirectly any fee or compensation for services rendered to any person, except that an accredited representative of such an organization may be regularly compensated by the organization of which he is an accredited representative;

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(3) Who willfully misleads, misinforms, or deceives an officer or employee of the Department of Justice concerning any material and relevant fact in connecton with a case;

(4) Who willfully deceives, misleads, or threatens any party to a case concerning any matter relating to the case;

(5) Who solicits practice in any unethical or unprofessional manner, including, but not limited to, the use of runners, or advertising his availability to handle immigration, naturalization, or nationality matters:

(6) Who represents, as an associate, any person who, known to him, solicits practice in any unethical or unprofessional manner, including, but not limited to, the use of runners, or advertising his availability to handle immigration, naturalization, or nationality matters. . . .

Louis P. Maniatis, Member, Dissenting:

I regret that I cannot join with the majority opinion. I dissent in part and concur in part.

The majority holds that the respondent acted as an attorney and, as such, was not an accredited representative within the meaning of the regulations. It further holds that 8 CFR 292.3(a)(1) applies only to non-attorneys. I have searched the opinion to discover the basis for this

reason to support such a holding (pages 10, 11, 12 and 16 of the opinion). Respondent claims that ambiguity exists as to whether or not an attorney can be considered a "representative," and he arrives at the conclusion that the effect of the regulation is that an attorney is not to be considered a "representative" (page 3 of respondent's brief). I find no such ambiguity because in the first place, taken in its plain everyday meaning, the word "representative" can include any person acting in a representative capacity, including attorneys.

Secondly, the language of the regulation is clear. If the intent was to rule out attorneys from the scope of the first enumerated misconduct, the drafters of the regulation would have so stated. The majority opinion in my judgment, by an overly simplistic and literal reading of the regulation reaches the conclusion that an attorney cannot be considered a "representative." Literal interpretation of words is not always a safe guide to their meaning, particularly when such an interpretation defeats the manifest purpose of the regulation as a whole. This was clearly pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in the majority opinion in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corporation, 274 F.2d 487 (C.A. 2, 1960).

We cannot brush away the fact that the regulation specifically states that "an attorney or representative who is within one or more of the following categories," shall be disbarred or suspended when it is deemed "in the public interest to do so," 8 CFR 292.3(a). It will be noted that the regulation covers both an attorney and representative, if found violating any of the enumerated categories including section 292.3(a)(1). How then, can we arbitrarily rule that an attorney is not included in the category cited by the Service as having violated 8 CFR 292.3(a)(1)?

Lastly, the majority interpretation defeats the clear intent of the regulation. In absolving the respondent from the first allegation of the complaint, the majority opinion states that there is nothing inherently unethical in permitting an attorney to represent indigents for a fee. Such a statement bypasses the facts established at the hearing.

Without going into the detailed opinion of the majority, it must be emphasized that the respondent had entered into a contractual relationship with the charitable organization and had agreed to act as its representative for a stated salary. He was not his own free agent to do as he pleased, but was acting in a representative capacity before the Service.

If we follow the majority rule than it would mean that any organization authorized to appear before the Service must of necessity not employ attorneys as their representatives. That qualified non-attorney representation for indigents is generally preferable to no representation is accepted, but it by no means follows that the regulation intended to bar a charitable organization from its attorney as its representative.

Otherwise it would seem that an indigent, being assisted by a recognized charitable organization, may fall by the way side, since the representative appearing in his behalf cannot be a competent and qualified attorney, knowledgeable in immigration matters, a state of affairs that both the organization and the Immigration and Naturalization Service would undoubtedly prefer and which has been acceptable in the past. All the regulation says is that the accredited "representative," whether an attorney or qualified layman, shall not charge the alien a fee, but shall be recompensed solely by the organization, if at all. I do not see it as a defense that what would be improper conduct for a representative" if he is a layman, suddenly becomes proper conduct because he is also a lawyer.

In this context the regulation embraces the attorney's conduct as a "representative." True that so far as the regulation is concerned there is no reason why an attorney-"representative" cannot have his own practice on the side (however dangerous that may be). But what is required is that when acting as a "representative" there shall be a clear delineation as to his capacity to charge a fee. The evidence clearly establishes that Koden was guilty of the grossest lacity and misconduct, in disregarding this delineation.

In my view, the Service has amply established by the requisite evidence and proof, even under the higher clear and convincing standard of proof adopted by the majority, that tht respondent is in clear violation of the first allegation of the complaint.

I reluctantly concur in the one-year suspension imposed by the majority opinion. I consider respondent to have been guilty of gross misconduct, and of violating the standard of ethics so necessary to upholding the public interest.

MATTER OF LIBURD

In Deportation Proceedings

A-20411943

Decided by Board August 17, 1976

(1) The "60-day rule" agreement between Virgin Islands employers and the Immigration and Naturalization Service which provides that following termination of employment, an H-2 worker may have up to 60 days to obtain authorization for other employment in the Islands or depart from the United States, has no bearing on the date to which the alien is authorized to remain in the United States. The date shown on the documents governs,

(2) Where respondent was admitted as an H-2 temporary worker authorized to remain until March 3, 1975 but became unemployed August 12, 1974 and did not obtain reemployment and recertification within the 60 days grace period granted by the Service, she was deportable under section 241(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an alien who has failed to maintain status. Orders to show cause drawn under section 241(a)(2) of the Act issued Jan. 29, 1975 which charged that respondent had remained longer than permitted because she had failed to depart by October 11, 1974 were improperly drawn because they did not state the proper charge or ground on which respondent's deportation was being sought.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrantremained longer than permitted

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Sharon L. Nolan, Esquire

#4 Nye Gade

St. Thomas, V. I. 00801

In a decision dated March 13, 1975 the immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged and granted her the privilege of voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. The respondent appeals from that order. The appeal will be sustained.

The respondent, native of British West Indies and a citizen of the United Kingdom, entered the Virgin Islands of the United States as a nonimmigrant temporary worker (H-2 visa), authorized to remain until March 3, 1975. An order to show cause was issued on January 29, 1975 charging the respondent with remaining beyond the authorized period of admission under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

At issue in this case is the effect of the so-called "60 day rule."

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