card to the immigration inspector. He further testified that the immigration inspector took the card from him and told him to wait in the secondary inspection lane. According to the respondent's testimony, he became frightened and did not wait as he was instructed, but instead fled, passing through the inspection area.

On the basis of the respondent's testimony, the immigration judge found that the respondent had presented himself for inspection and that "some sort of inspection did take place". He concluded that the charge of entry without inspection had not been sustained. We disagree.

Every alien seeking to enter the United States must present himself for inspection. The term "inspection " is not defined in the Act. The regulations, however, state that the alien must apply in person to an immigration officer at a designated port of entry at a time when the immigration office at the port is open for inspection. 8 CFR 235.1(a). He must present any required documents and establish his admissibility to the satisfaction of the immigration officer. 8 CFR 235.1(d). The inspecting officer must be afforded a full and fair opportunity to question the alien. See Matter of F-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 90, (BIA AG 1941).

Although the respondent briefly appeared before the immigration officer, his statements show that he did not establish his admissibility to the satisfaction of the immigration officer. Moreover, he deprived the Service of a full opportunity to question him. Accordingly, we conclude that the respondent evaded the inspection contemplated by the Act.

Evidence that the respondent, unrestrained, passed through the United States inspection area after intentionally evading inspection establishes an entry into the United States. Matter of Pierre, 14 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 1973).

The deportability of the respondent under section 241(a)(2) has been proved by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. The appeal will be sustained. We shall remand the record to the immigration judge in order that he may give the respondent an opportunity to apply for any discretionary relief for which he may be eligible.

ORDER: The appeal is sustained; the record will be remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings consistent with the above opinion.

MATTER OF HUSSEIN

In Visa Petition Proceedings

A-20167543

Decided by Board August 12, 1976

(1) Where petitioner, a native of Palestine and resident of New York had returned to her home country and had personally appeared before a divorce court of that country where both she and her first husband had been born, where they had been married, and where both their children had been born, there were substantial contacts between the divorcing jurisdiction, the parties, and the marital res.

(2) Service of process on petitioner's first husband was had by publication in accordance with local Islamic law because his whereabouts were unknown. The Islamic law is similar to that of New York (section 316 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New York), and under those circumstances the service of process herein met minimal due process requirements.

(3) Under the circumstances, it is concluded that New York courts would extend recognition to the foreign divorce decree secured by petitioner as a matter of comity; the decree is valid for immigration purposes; and the visa petition filed to accord beneficiary preference classification under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act is approved.

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Omar Z. Ghobashy, Esquire

377 Broadway

New York, New York 10013

In a decision dated March 8, 1974, the officer-in-charge in Athens, Greece, denied the visa petition filed by the petitioner in behalf of the beneficiary as her spouse under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We dismissed the petitioner's appeal from that decision on April 10, 1975. The petitioner has moved to reopen the proceedings. The motion will be granted, and the visa petition will be approved.

The officer-in-charge denied the petition on the ground that, under New York law, a previous marriage of the petitioner had not been dissolved and, as a consequence, her marriage to the beneficiary is invalid.

Briefly, the relevant facts appearing in the record are as follows: The petitioner and the beneficiary are natives of Palestine, born in BirNabala, a village now occupied by Israel. This is the second marriage for the petitioner. She was first married in 1967 by the Shari'a Court in

Jerusalem to a man from the same village. She followed her husband to the United States in 1971. They separated a year later. The petitioner has stated under oath that, from the time of the separation, her husband concealed his whereabouts to prevent her from gaining custody of their children and from obtaining financial support from him. The petitioner, after living in New York for three months, returned to Bir-Nabala. Her husband remained in the United States. On August 20, 1973, the petitioner obtained a divorce from the Shari'a court in Jerusalem. She was married to the beneficiary by the same court on January 19, 1974. She now wishes to return to New York with her new husband.

The issue raised in this appeal is whether the divorce obtained by the petitioner from her first husband would be accorded recognition, as a matter of comity, by the State of New York.

We know of no New York decision which is factually identical to the present case. However, as the Court declared in another case involving the recognition of a foreign divorce judgment

In the absence of a statutory provision or judicial precedent directly laying down our policy applicable to the circumstances of a particular case, we must look for guidance to the general spirit and purpose of our laws and the trend of our judicial decisions. De Pena v. De Pena, 298 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1969)

From a review of New York decisions, it is evident that, for many years and in appropriate circumstances, New York courts have recognized divorces which foreign nationals residing in New York had secured abroad in accordance with the laws of their native countries. See, Oettgen v. Oettgen, 94 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1949); Martens v. Martens, 20 N.Y.S. 206 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1940, rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.Y. 363 (1940); Hansen v. Hansen, 8 N.Y.S.2d 655 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1938); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 220 N.Y.S. 242 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1927). Such judgments have been recognized, as a matter of comity, where the foreign jurisdiction had a legitimate interest in the marital status of the parties and where minimal due process standards had been met.

This petitioner had returned to her home country and had personally appeared before a divorce court of that country where both she and her first husband had been born, where they had been married, and where both of their children had been born. Thus, there were substantial contacts between the divorcing jurisdiction and the parties and the marital res.

On the facts of this record, recognition of the divorce would not violate due process requirements or established local policy. On August 20, 1973, a "first sentence of divorce" was issued by the Primary Court of Jerusalem. On August 28, 1973, notice of that judgment was served on the defendant by publication. in his village newspaper. Although the

defendant was in the United States, and his whereabouts was unknown to the petitioner, his relatives continue to live in his native village in Palestine. In the English translation of the notice, the sentence is described as "a Judgment given in absence with the right of opposition and appeal".

On September 9, 1973, the petitioner requested confirmation of the judgment from the Highest Court of Appeal in Jerusalem. The issue of proper service on the defendent was reviewed by the appellate court, and the judgment was modified to allow the defendant thirty days from the date of publication in which to challenge the judgment. The defendant did not respond within the time allotted. Thereafter, the appellate court reviewed the lower court's decision on the merits, and affirmed the judgment.

The publication requirements under the applicable Islamic law and under New York law (section 316 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules of the State of New York) in a case in which the defendant's whereabouts is unknown, are quite similar.

We conclude that New York courts would extend recognition to the foreign divorce decree secured by the petitioner, as a matter of comity, and that the decree is valid for immigration purposes.

ORDER: The motion to reopen is granted.

Further order: The visa petition is approved.

Board Member Irving A. Appleman abstained from consideration of this case.

MATTER OF KODEN

In Disbarment Proceedings Under 8 CFR 292.3

A-18919327

Decided by Board August 16, 1976 and August 30, 1974
Decided by Deputy Attorney General July 22, 1976

(1) The term “accredited representative" as defined in 8 CFR 292.1(a)(4) includes any person who has been accredited as a representative of a recognized organization as defined in 8 CFR 292.2(a), whether he is an attorney or not. The determinative question is not whether the individual is an attorney, but is whether the individual is accredited by the Board as the organization's representative.

(2) There is no constitutional impediment to the Service disciplining an attorney who practices before it. Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1103) provides ample statutory authority to promulgate regulations implementing section 292 of the Act so as to provide appropriate regulations for institution of disciplinary proceedings against members of the agency's bar for unethical conduct. An administrative body may regulate, supervise, and discipline those who practice before it in the same manner as may a court.

(3) Where the charges allege the willful commission of acts respondent should have known were wrong, and where those charges were properly brought against respondent, section 558(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. 558(c)) does not shield respondent from responsibility for any of the alleged acts of misconduct regardless of whether he had actual knowledge that the acts were proscribed by 8 CFR 292.3(a). (4) Any acts of misconduct in disbarment proceedings brought under 8 CFR 292.3 must be established by evidence that is clear, convincing and unequivocal before discipline may be imposed.

(5) Depending on its probative value, circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to prove a charge in disbarment cases.

(6) Hearsay evidence is admissible in a disciplinary proceeding. Its admissibility is not so much predicated on administrative expertise as on the ability of an administrative tribunal properly to discern the probative force of all the evidence before it. It is proper for an administrative adjudicator to admit any relevant evidence, and then accord appropriate weight to that evidence after the record has been made.

(7) Where respondent was afforded ample opportunity to cross examine witnesses against him, the evidence was fully disclosed, and he was not denied a reasonable opportunity to defend on the charges levied in the complaint, denial of certain discovery motions, while perhaps unconvenient to respondent, was not prejudicial to him.

(8) The allegation that respondent wilfully misled and deceived an alien by purporting to represent her for a $550 fee when in fact he did not do so, in violation of 8 CFR 292.3(a)(4), is substantiated by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence and discipline may be imposed upon respondent for that violation.