California, initiated after the commencement of these proceedings, is too self-serving to be convincing. The female respondent is not a credible witness. We do not believe her testimony that she attempted to contact the doctor who offered to employ her, nor do we believe that she made any other attempts to obtain employment as a nurse after her entry. At the time of her entry, the female respondent evidently knew that she could not obtain employment in California as a nurse because she was not licensed as such in that state. She may well have been willing to accept employment as a nurse should future circumstances permit her to be so employed. The Act, however, requires more; it requires that she have an affirmative intent at the time of entry to engage in her profession. We find that the female respondent had no such intention at the time of her entry. The evidence of deportability is clear, convincing and unequivocal. The decision of the immigration judge was correct and the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the respondents are permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 13 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondents shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. MATTER OF CHIANG In Deportation Proceedings A-18504376 Decided by Board July 30, 1975 Respondent, an applicant for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, who seeks exemption from the labor certification requirement of section 212(a)(14) of the Act under the provisions of 8 CFR 212.8(b)(4) as an investor in one company, and who holds with another company an unrelated full-time job for which he has not obtained a labor certification, would be ineligible for exemption from the labor certification requirement as an investor even if he could submit adequate proof of his investment since a grant of "investor" status to such an alien who holds an unrelated full-time job in competition with American labor would circumvent the labor certification requirements of the statute. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant— remained longer than permitted, ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Hiram W. Kwan, Esquire 840 North Broadway, Suite 200 In a decision dated December 14, 1972, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged, denied his application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and granted him the privilege of departing voluntarily from the United States in lieu of deportation. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. The alien respondent is a native and citizen of China. At the hearing, he conceded deportability. The only issue on this appeal concerns the respondent's application for adjustment of status as an alien who is exempt from the labor certification requirements of the Act by virtue of the "investor" exemption contained in 8 CFR 212.8(b)(4). The respondent entered the United States in 1969 as a nonimmigrant student. Shortly thereafter, in violation of his student status, he took employment with the Global Marine Company as an accountant. The respondent was still employed by the Global Marine Company at the time of the hearing, earning $805 per month. No labor certification for such employment was obtained. The respondent claims to have invested in an enterprise known as the California Herb Tonic Company. The exact nature of this business is somewhat unclear from the record. The only evidence of the alleged investment is an unaudited balance sheet, prepared by the respondent himself, and a City of Los Angeles Business Tax Statement. 1 The respondent formally presented his "investor" claim prior to the 1973 amendment of 8 CFR 212.8(b)(4). He is therefore entitled to have his claim judged by whichever formulation of the regulations is more favorable to him. Matter of Heitland, 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (BIA 1974); Matter of Ko, 14 I. & N. Dec. 349 (Dep. Assoc. Comm. 1973). However, the respondent's "investor" claim is patently inadequate to qualify under either form of the regulation. With respect to the pre-1973 regulations, the respondent has not established either that his investment tends to expand job opportunities or that the investment is of an amount adequate to insure that the alien's primary function will not be as skilled or unskilled laborer. See Matter of Heitland, supra. With respect to the present form of the regulations, the respondent has not met the standards of proof set forth in Matter of Ahmad, 15 I. & N. Dec. 81 (BIA 1974), nor has he demonstrated any likelihood that he could meet them. Finally, even if the respondent could submit adequate proof of his investment, we would still find him to be statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status, because of his employment with Global Marine Company for which no labor certification has been obtained. In Matter of Pfahler, 12 I. & N. Dec. 114 (BIA 1967), we held that where an alien applicant for admission was coming to the United States with labor certification for one job, but was planning on obtaining a second job, it was incumbent upon him to obtain labor certification for the second job as well. We believe that the same rationale should be applied to one seeking the "investor" exemption from the labor certification requirements of the Act. We have stated that the "the 'investor' exemption contained in 8 CFR 212.8(b)(4) should not become a means of circumventing the normal labor certification procedures for an ordinary skilled or unskilled laborer." Matter of Ahmad, supra. To grant "investor" status to an alien who holds an unrelated full-time job in competition with American labor would be to countenance the very type of evasion of the labor certification procedures that we were concerned with in Matter of Ahmad. The immigration judge's decision was correct. The appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the re 'The latter has the respondent's name written in over the crossed out name of his "partner's" former spouse. spondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 90 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. MATTER OF VALERIO In Visa Petition Proceedings A-20800337 Decided by Board January 21, 1976 (1) Under Article 17, Law 1306-bis, Civil Code of the Dominican Republic a divorce judgment will not become final unless the spouse who obtained the judgment appears personally before the Official of the Civil Registry within two months of the date of the judgment to have the divorce "declared" or pronounced, and the judgment registered. (2) Alien beneficiary obtained a divorce in the Dominican Republic July 20, 1970, married the U.S. citizen petitioner on December 18, 1973, and had the previous divorce judgment "declared" or pronounced in the Dominican Republic on May 7, 1974. Thus divorce is not valid for immigration purposes because it was not "declared" or pronounced until after the marriage on which the visa petition is based took place, and because it was not pronounced within the two month period as required by Dominican law. Since the beneficiary's prior marriage was never legally terminated, the visa petition filed to classify the beneficiary as the immediate relative spouse of United States citizen under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, was properly denied. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Richard Dana, Esquire 100 West 72nd Street New York, New York 10023 Counsel of record: Claude Henry Kleefield, Esquire ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: The United States citizen petitioner applied for immediate relative status for the beneficiary as her spouse under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The district director denied the petition on the ground that a prior marriage of the beneficiary was never legally terminated. The petitioner has appealed from that denial. The appeal will be dismissed. The petitioner submitted a certified copy of a decree of divorce, rendered on July 20, 1970 in the Dominican Republic, to show dissolution of the beneficiary's prior marriage. The copy of the decree presented indicates that it was not "declared" or pronounced by an official of the Civil Registry until almost four years later, on May 7, 1974. The claimed marriage of the petitioner to the beneficiary took place in the interim, on December 18, 1973. The district director ruled that the |