to be an alien. Next, the Service had a quarter of a year between April 6, 1970, when it filed its appeal, and July 19, 1970, when the respondent was admitted, to revoke the approval granted on March 30, 1970. It did nothing. The respondent entered on July 19, 1970, almost as if he had fallen into a trap set by the Service. It seems too much to suggest that the respondent should have known better. How could he have known? All the while he had in his hands an unrevoked document attesting to the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had approved the status he needed for obtaining an immigration visa. If knowledge is to be imputed to anyone, it should be imputed to the Service. Consequently, it would be unconscionable to permit the Service at this late date to turn around and charge the respondent with deportability on the ground that his visa was defective. Would it be fair play to deport the respondent, who, after all, would not have been admitted to this country except for the Service's error which was of several month's duration? I think not. In my opinion the Service should be estopped from bringing proceedings against this respondent. I therefore, would grant the motion to reopen to raise the bar of equitable estoppel. MATTER OF ROSARIO In Deportation Proceedings A-30143074 Decided by Board August 4, 1975 Conviction of "first degree manslaughter" (homicidio voluntario) in violation of section 635 of Title 33 of the Laws of Puerto Rico, is conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)]—Convicted of crime involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years after entry-First Degree Manslaughter ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Richard Ramos-Algarin, Esquire Box 7037 Barrio Obrero Santurce, Puerto Rico 00916 This is an appeal from a decision of an immigration judge dated April 3, 1974 finding the respondent deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and ordering his deportation to the Dominican Republic. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a 58-year-old male alien who is a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic. He was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent resident on November 27, 1970. On January 17, 1973, the respondent was convicted of "First Degree Manslaughter" (Homicidio Voluntario) in the Superior Court, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Section 241(a)(4) of the Act provides in part that an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry and sentenced to confinement for a year or more is deportable. The crime for which the respondent was convicted was committed on October 30, 1972 which was within five years of his entry. On March 29, 1973 he was sentenced to confinement in prison for five years, his sentence was suspended and he was placed on probation. The only issue on this appeal is whether or not the crime for which the respondent was convicted involves moral turpitude. Section 635 of Title 33 of the Laws of Puerto Rico provides: "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is two kinds: 1. Voluntary-upon sudden quarrel or heat or passion. 2. Involuntary- in the commis sion of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in a unlawful manner, or without due caution or circumspection." The indictment, the minutes of the trial and the sentence, all part of the record of conviction refer to the crime here involved as "First Degree Manslaughter" in English translation. Counsel for the respondent indicates that manslaughter is not divided into degrees under Puerto Rican law, but is classified as voluntary or involuntary. Counsel conceded that the respondent was convicted of voluntary manslaughter but argues that voluntary manslaughter is not a crime involving moral turpitude because it is an unlawful killing without malice. This contention is without merit. It is well settled that voluntary manslaughter-which, under Puerto Rican law is an intentional killing of a human being1 is a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Lopez, 13 I. & N. Dec. 725 (BIA 1971); Matter of B-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1951); cf. Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I. & N. Dec. 269 (BIA 1975). The decision of the immigration judge was correct. Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 1 People v. Figueroa, 80 P. R.R. 317, 321 (1958); cf. People v. Cruz, 49 P. R.R. 637, 641 (1936); People v. Cortés, 42 P.R.R. 886, 887 (1931); see also People v. Ortiz, 86 P.R.R. 431 (1962) MATTER OF LAWRENCE In Deportation Proceedings A-13637499 A-20493015 Decided by Board August 4, 1975 (1) The term "temporary" as used in section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act does not contemplate a potentially limitless visit to the United States. (2) Respondents, natives and citizens of Canada, who, at the time of their last entry as nonimmigrant visitors for business, did not seek to enter the United States for a reasonably short and relatively definite period of time and were not coming here with any limited goal in mind but, instead, were entering to manage the day-to-day operations of a United States enterprise, the business activities of which do not call for their return to Canada, were not entitled to enter as visitors for business and are deportable under section 241(a)(1) of the Act because excludable at entry as immigrants not in possession of valid immigrant visas. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable at time of entry under section 212(a)(20) [8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(20)]– -immigrant not in possession of valid immigrant visa (both respondents) ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Robert O. Wells, Jr., Esquire 3300 Seattle-First National Bank Building Seattle, Washington 98154 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Ray A. Wolstenholme In a decision dated April 14, 1975, the immigration judge found the respondents deportable, but granted them the privilege of voluntary departure. The respondents have appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondents, husband and wife, are natives and citizens of Canada who last entered the United States in January of 1975 as visitors for business. The Service alleges that they did not then qualify as nonimmigrant visitors for business, because they were entering to work and to remain indefinitely in the United States. Unless the respondents qualified as business visitors at the time of their last entry, they are presumed to have been immigrants and are now deportable as charged by the Service. See section 214(b), Immigration and Nationality Act. Through a Canadian holding company, the respondents own 40 percent of the stock of Home Care, Inc. (Home Care), a company incorporated under the laws of the state of Washington in February of 1973. Home Care is in the business of purchasing improved real property, primarily single family residences, with the expectation that a profit can be made on the resale of the property after a period of market appreciation. The holding period for a particular piece of property is indefinite; however, a holding period of between two and five years is contemplated. During this period, Home Care rents the properties. Home Care's financing appears to come both from Canadian lending institutions and from second mortgages held by the sellers of the homes. The male respondent appears to be the person primarily, if not solely, responsible for the activities of Home Care. In the two and one half years Home Care has been in existence, he has inspected and purchased homes, contracted for their renovation, shown and rented them, and generally managed the operations of Home Care. The male respondent has been assisted in these matters by his wife; however, neither respondent draws a salary from Home Care. The respondents claim to live off the proceeds of previous investments in Canada, and they expect that their present efforts will be rewarded in the form of profits from the sale of the houses owned by Home Care. Section 101(a)(15)(B) of the Act defines a nonimmigrant business visitor as, an alien . . . having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning and who is visiting the United States temporarily for business . . . The term "business" as used in section 101(a)(15)(B) has been held not to include ordinary labor for hire, but is limited to intercourse of a commercial character. See Karnuth v. U.S. ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231(1929); Matter of Hira, 11 I. & N. Dec. 824 (BIA 1965, 1966; A.G. 1966). The Service does not contend that the activities of the male respondent fail to come within the definition of the term "business." However, the Service alleges that the respondents do not have an unabandoned foreign residence and that their visit to the United States cannot be considered temporary. We need not resolve the question of whether the respondents have an unabandoned residence in Canada because we agree with the Service that their visit cannot be characterized as temporary. There are no inflexible rules to be applied for determining what is "temporary" within the context of a business visit. In the past, we have indicated that the nature of the business activity itself need not be temporary. See Matter of Hira, supra. However, we have never held |