court which has actual jurisdiction is conclusive on all persons with respect to the existence of that status, unless that adjudication is subsequently reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside pursuant to law. Restatement of Judgments, section 74 and comments (1942); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, section 74 and comments (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973); see e.g., Bair v. Bair, 91 Idaho 30, 415 P.2d 673 (1966); Presbrey v. Presbrey, 6 App. Div. 2d 477, 480, 179 N.Y.S.2d 788, 792 (1958), aff'd 8 N.Y.2d 797, 168 N.E.2d 135 (1960); cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 287 (1942); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945). See also Headen v. Pope and Talbot, Inc., 252 F.2d 739, 744 (C.A. 3, 1958), in which it was held that an adjudication under a South Carolina statute nearly identical to Michigan Statutes Annotated section 25.84 was conclusive upon the world, even in a subsequent action on a different subject matter. Several federal courts have recognized a state court decree declaring marital status as determinative when that status was brought into question in the course of a federal administrative proceeding under the Social Security Act. Zeldman v. Celebrezze, 252 F.Supp. 167 (E.D. N.Y., 1965); Collins v. Celebrezze, 250 F.Supp. 37 (S.D. N.Y., 1966). Even federal courts which have held that the Government cannot be absolutely bound by a state trial court decree rendered in an action to which the Government was not a party have noted that special deference should be given to state court decrees in the area of domestic relations, since the states have traditionally been the sole arbiters of rights in that area. Gray v. Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370, 1373 (C.A. 6, 1973); Collins v. Celebrezze, supra. 2 This is not the first time that the issue of the effect of a state court decree affirming a marriage has been before the Board. In Matter of Kwan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 205 (BIA 1965), the Board was faced with a decree under the very same Michigan statute. In that case we noted our concern both with the propriety of the procedure sanctioned by the Michigan statute and with the problem posed by the in rem effect of an adjudication of status. We concluded that the wisest administrative policy would be to accept the decree of the Michigan court as proof of a valid marriage under Michigan law. We applied a similar policy in Matter of Allison, 12 I. & N. Dec. 835 (BIA 1968), in which we accepted an adjudication from a court of the state of the petitioner's domicile 2 Collins v. Celebrezze, supra, dealt with a Social Security claim based on a state court decree that the parties had entered into a common law marriage. The court stated: “If, as here, the state courts have decided the issue the Secretary [of H.E.W.] cannot summarily disregard that adjudication and proceed to re-decide de novo the issue of status. He cannot ignore what the state courts already determined on the spurious ground that he was not a party to the proceeding." 250 F. Supp. 37, at 41. declaring that it recognized and considered valid the petitioner's Mexican divorce decree. I wish to make it clear that nothing I have said is intended in any way to diminish the Service's unquestionable authority to attack a marriage which is entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. It is well established that a sham marriage is entitled to no effect under the immigration laws, regardless of its validity under the applicable domestic law. Matter of Gamero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 674 (BIA 1974); Matter of Kitsalis, 11 I. & N. Dec. 613 (BIA 1966); Matter of M—, 8 I. & N. Dec. 217 (BIA 1958). However, in the present case there is no suggestion whatsoever that the marriage in question was entered into to evade the immigration laws. The petitioner has presented the judgment of a Michigan state court of competent jurisdiction affirming his present marriage to the beneficiary. I believe that the matter should end there. In the absence of evidence that this judgment has been reversed on appeal or otherwise set aside according to the law, I would accept it as determinative of the petitioner's marital status under Michigan law. Consequently, I would grant the petition. Louisa Wilson, Member, Dissenting: I concur in the dissent of the Chairman. I believe the judgment of the Michigan court is determinative of the petitioner's marital status, and should be accepted in the present case. I would approve the petition. MATTER OF ONYEDIBIA In Deportation Proceedings A-19701496 A-20607204 Decided by Board July 25, 1974 Respondents, who failed to depart within the time initially granted to depart voluntarily, subsequently filed a motion to reopen seeking a new grant of voluntary departure. The Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to grant the form of relief sought; however, in the absence of respondents' demonstration of any compelling reason or circumstance for their failure to depart within the period of time initially granted, the motion is denied. CHARGES: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(9) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(9)]-Failed to maintain status (male respondent) Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant-remained longer than permitted (female respondent) Lodged: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant-remained longer (male respondent) ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Martin Held, Esquire 1725 K Street, N.W. The alien respondents, husband and wife, are natives of Nigeria. In decisions dated June 6, 1973, the respondents were found deportable by an immigration judge as nonimmigrants who had remained beyond the authorized length of their stays. They were accorded the privilege of voluntary departure; however, they failed to depart from the United States within the period of time authorized by the immigration judge. They subsequently filed a motion to reopen the proceedings, seeking forms of relief over which neither the Board nor the immigration judge has jurisdiction. The immigration judge denied that motion, and, in an order dated April 30, 1974, we dismissed the respondents' appeal from that denial. The respondents have submitted a second motion seeking reopening. The motion will be denied. The present motion requests reopening for the purpose of permitting the respondents to apply for a new grant of voluntary departure. The motion is accompanied by a partially completed brief whose preparation was evidently begun in connection with the respondents' earlier motion to reopen. The respondents have not directly attempted to justify or to explain their failure to take advantage of the immigration judge's initial grant of voluntary departure. The respondents are not seeking an extension of voluntary departure, a request which could not properly be entertained by an immigration judge. See Matter of Albano, 13 I. & N. Dec. 59 (BIA 1968); Matter of Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 258 (BIA 1969). Instead, they desire a new grant of voluntary departure. An immigration judge does possess the power to make such a grant, although the departure period must be set by a district director. Matter of Yeung, 13 I. & N. Dec. 528 (BIA 1970). Accordingly, we do have jurisdiction to grant the form of relief which the respondents presently seek. However, in order to warrant a new grant of voluntary departure, an alien must demonstrate the existence of compelling reasons or circumstances for his failure to depart within the time originally allotted. Were we to require less justification on the part of an alien, there would be little motivation for the alien to depart promptly and the result would be additional delay in the deportation process. See Fan Wan Keung v. INS, 434 F.2d 301 (C.A. 2, 1970); Matter of Arao, 13 I. & N. Dec. 156, at 159 (BIA 1969). The respondents have not shown any compelling reasons or circumstances for their failure to depart within the period of time initially authorized by the immigration judge. They have failed to make out a prima facie case for reopening these proceedings. The motion will be denied. ORDER: The motion is denied. MATTER OF HARRIS In Visa Petition Proceedings A-18953024 Decided by Board November 6, 1970 For the purpose of legitimation under section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, the legal custody requirements of that section have not been met where beneficiary, a child born out of wedlock, has at all times resided with her natural mother in Liberia and has not at any time been in the care of or resided with the putative father (husband of the United States citizen petitioner), and the natural parents never married. Beneficiary does not qualify as a stepchild of the petitioner under section 101(b)(1)(B) of the Act within the meaning of Nation v. Esperdy, 239 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. N.Y., 1965), for failure of petitioner to establish the existence of a close family unit; neither does beneficiary qualify as a stepchild of the petitioner under section 101(b)(1)(B) of the Act under the rationale of Andrade v. Esperdy, 270 F. Supp. 516 (S.D. N.Y., 1967), that a preexisting bona fide family unit is not necessary to establish a stepchild relationship, since that rule is applicable only to cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Southern District of New York (Matter of Soares, 12 I. & N. Dec. 653 (1958), and Matter of Amado and Monteiro, 13 I. & N. Dec. 179 (1969)). ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: John T. Vance, III, Rep. 8708 Garfield Street Bethesda, Maryland 20014 Lois Mae Harris, Petitioner (Brief filed) ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Irving A. Appleman This is an appeal from the decision of the district director denying the visa petition filed by the petitioner on behalf of her alleged stepdaughter, Precious Hannah T. Harris. Petitioner seeks the issuance of an immigrant visa to the beneficiary as an immediate relative, as provided by section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The petitioner, Lois Harris, is a 28-year-old married female, a native-born citizen of the United States. The beneficiary is a 5-year-old child, a native and citizen of Liberia, who resides with her natural mother, Henrietta Bull, in Liberia. The petitioner's husband, Mr. Moses P. Harris, Jr., is residing with the petitioner in the United States, and is now a lawful permanent resident. He declares himself to be the natural father of the child. He and the child's mother, Henrietta Bull, were never married. Section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act defines "immediate relatives" as "children, spouses and parents of a citizen of the United States." Section 101(b)(1) defines the term "child" in five sepa |