decision sets forth the adverse factors present in the respondent's case, and our review of the record satisfies us that the immigration judge's discretionary denial of voluntary departure was proper. The decision of the immigration judge was correct. MATTER OF ALLOTEY In Deportation Proceedings A-19790414 Decided by Board June 17, 1975 (1) In an application for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the applicant's preconceived intent to remain as a student, having entered the country on the pretext of being a nonimmigrant visitor, was held to be an adverse factor which could only be overcome by unusual or outstanding equities. See Matter of Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494 (BIA 1970). (2) Applicants marriage to a United States citizen-entered into during the voluntary departure period he was given to make departure arrangements-was not, standing alone, such an unusual or outstanding equity. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant visitor-remained longer than permitted. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Rodney W. Banks, Esquire P. O. Box 505 Gearhart, Oregon 97138 This is an appeal from the immigration judge's denial of the respondent's application for adjustment of status. In his decision, entered on June 18, 1972, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable and granted to him the privilege of voluntary departure. The appeal will be dismissed. The record relates to a married male alien, 27 years of age, a native and citizen of Ghana, who entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor on August 3, 1971, authorized to remain until February 2, 1972. Deportability is conceded. The immigration judge denied the respondent's application for adjustment of status as a matter of discretion. We agree with the decision of the immigration judge. The respondent applied for a student visa for the United States which was denied, because he was unable, due to foreign exchange regulations of his own country, to establish that he would have sufficient funds. He thereupon joined a travel group which was arranging a charter flight to and tour of the United States. He entered the United States as a member of the group, classified as a visitor for pleasure. Two days later, he left the group and flew to Oregon, where he commenced studies at the institute which he had previously arranged to attend. From these facts we find that at the time of the respondent's application for his visitor's visa and his admission as a visitor he had a preconceived intention to be a student in the United States, for which status he had been unable to obtain a visa. We find his use of a pretext to gain entry to the United States to constitute an adverse factor. Where an adverse factor is present, it can be overcome only by a showing of unusual or outstanding equities, Matter of Arai, 13 I. & N. Dec. 494, 496 (BIA 1970). We do not find his marriage to a United States citizen-entered into during the month for which he had requested and been granted voluntary departure in order to make his departure arrangements-alone, to constitute such an unusual or outstanding equity that we would grant him the extraordinary remedy of adjustment of status as a matter of discretion. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. Board Member Louisa Wilson, dissenting, would grant adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. MATTER OF MONTEMAYOR In Deportation Proceedings A-31346993 Decided by Board June 13, 1975 (1) Respondent was admitted to the United States in 1971 as an immigrant, based on marriage to a United States citizen. Such marriage was void because he then had a prior existing marriage which had not been terminated. He fraudulently misrepresented his marital status in obtaining his immigrant visa. The immigration judge found respondent deportable on three grounds of deportability, under section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, based on excludability at time of entry-under section 212(a)(14) of the Act (no labor certification), section 212(a)(19) of the Act (fraudulent procurement of documents), section 212(a)(19) of the Act (no valid visa). Respondent claims benefits of section 241(f) of the Act. (2) BIA found respondent not protected by section 241(f) as to the grounds of deportation based on no labor certification (section 212(a)(14)) and no valid visa (section 212(a)(20)), citing Supreme Court's opinion in Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619 95 S. Ct. 1164 (1975). Latter construed INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966) as extending waiver provisions of section 241(f) of the Act only to subsection 19 of section 212(a), but to no other ground of excludability specified in said section 212(a). CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable at time of entry-no labor certification, no valid immigrant visa, obtained visa by fraud, or misrepresentation. Robert S. Bixby, Esquire ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: 30 Hotaling Place San Francisco, CA 94111 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: In a per curiam decision dated March 5, 1975, we dismissed the respondent's appeal from an order of an immigration judge which directed the respondent's deportation to the Philippines. The respondent has filed a motion in which he seeks reopening and eventual termination of these proceedings pursuant to section 241(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The motion will be denied. The respondent is a native and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines. He was admitted to the United States as an immigrant in September of 1971. His admission was in part based on his marriage to a United States citizen. This marriage was invalid from its inception because the respondent had a prior marriage which had not been legally terminated. The respondent, however, fraudulently misrepresented his marital status in obtaining his immigrant visa. In the order to show cause instituting these proceedings the Service alleged three grounds of deportability, each of which was predicated on section 241(a)(1). The Service contended, and the immigration judge found, that the respondent was excludable at entry under section 212(a)(14), which relates to the absence of a valid labor certification, under section 212(a)(19), which relates to the fraudulent procurement of documents, and under section 212(a)(20), which relates to the absence of a valid visa. We affirmed the immigration judge's decision in our order of March 5, 1975. The respondent no longer challenges these earlier determinations; he merely contends that his deportation on these charges is presently precluded by virute of section 241(f) of the Act. Section 241(f) provides:. The provisions of this section relating to the deportation of aliens within the United States on the ground that they were excludable at the time of entry as aliens who have sought to procure, or have procured visas or other documentation, or entry into the United States by fraud or misrepresentation shall not apply to an alien otherwise admissible at the time of entry who is the spouse, parent, or child of a United States citizen or of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The evidence submitted with the respondent's motion indicates that he has obtained a divorce from his first wife, and has obtained a decree of annulment with respect to his second marriage. Both of these judgments were rendered by a Nevada court on April 3, 1975. On that same day, the respondent entered into another marriage; he asserts that his present wife is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Service does not challenge this assertion, and for the purposes of this motion we shall assume that the respondent has the requisite familial relationship to qualify for the benefits of section 241(f). The Service contends that the respondent was not "otherwise admissible at the time of entry," and thus cannot avail himself of section 241(f). The Service's position appears to be that the respondent would have admitted the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude, namely bigamy, had he told the truth regarding his marital status at the time he applied for his immigrant visa. However, we need not address ourselves to the questions raised by this argument,' because we have concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 95 S. Ct. 1164 (1975), precludes the application of section 241(f) to two of the charges of deportability in this case. In Reid v. INS, supra, the Supreme Court held that section 241(f) did 1 See generally Matter of G-M—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA 1955; A.G. 1956). |