whether the father was domiciled there at the time legitimating acts took place, it is inconsistent with the approach taken by the Attorney General with respect to section 1993, and it will not be followed by us. Decisions of this Board interpreting section 101(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, relied upon by counsel, are inapposite. We are concerned with the law in effect at the time of the respondent's father's birth in 1903. However, we should point out that if the applicability of the decisions rendered under the 1952 Act is seriously urged, legitimation under section 101(b)(1)(C) of that Act requires that the parent or the child become a domiciliary or a resident of California prior to the child's eighteenth birthday. Matter of Singh, 15 I. & N. Dec. (BIA November 11, 1974). We see no reason for a different position with respect to nationality and citizenship, except that the age limit under section 309(a) of the 1952 Act is 21. We conclude that the respondent's father did not acquire United States citizenship from his father, Morris Varian, under section 1993 of the Revised Statutes. Consequently, the respondent could not have acquired United States citizenship from his father under section 201(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Our disposition of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to reach the question of the respondent's legitimacy for the purpose of section 201(e). The respondent is a native and a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of his birth there in 1943. See Matter of Hermosa, 15 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 1973). We agree with the immigration judge that the respondent is an alien and is therefore subject to the deportation provisions of the Act. Consequently, we shall dismiss the respondent's appeal from the immigration judge's decision. With respect to the section 241(f) issue, we agree with the Service's contention that an alien such as the respondent, who is charged with deportability as a nonimmigrant overstay, is not entitled to the benefit of section 241(f) of the Act. Cabuco-Flores v. INS, 477 F.2d 108 (C.A. 9, 1973), cert. denied in companion case, Mangabat v. INS, 414 U.S. 841 (1973). Moreover, in the recent case of Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 95 S. Ct. 1164 (1975), the Supreme Court indicated that section 241(f) is not available to an individual charged with deportability as a nonimmigrant overstay. The Service appeal will be sustained and the immigration judge's order terminating proceedings will be reversed. The record will be remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings. 4 ORDER: The respondent's appeal is dismissed. Further order: The Service's appeal is sustained, the order of the immigration judge terminating proceedings is reversed, and the record is remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings. 'David L. Milhollan, Chairman, abstained from consideration of this case. MATTER OF RINA In Deportation Proceedings A-13197621 Decided by Board June 11, 1975 (1) Respondent found deportable for entry without inspection (sec. 241(a)(2)), after conviction for such entry in U.S. District Court. Immigration judge, as matter of discretion, denied voluntary departure. (2) Definition of entry in section 101(a)(13) of Immigration and Nationality Act applies to both the criminal provisions of section 275 and the deportation provisions of section 241 (a)(2). (Matter of Barragan-Garibay, Intermin Decision 2315-BIA 1974). The definition of "entry" in section 101(a)(13) was interpreted in Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Such decision is dispositive of any possible Fleuti issue, since respondent was convicted of illegal entry under the Act. Fleuti is likewise inapplicable to an alien who enters the Fleuti is likewise inapplicable to an alien who enters the United States without inspection (Matter of Kolk, 11 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 1965); cf. Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9 Cir. 1974). (3) Respondent, by reason of his conviction for illegal entry, is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of illegal entry in these deportation proceedings. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Entry without inspection ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Eoanna Combothekras, Esquire 515 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10022 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Paul C. Vincent In a decision dated January 24, 1973, upon a remand from this Board, the immigration judge found the respondent deportable as charged and denied his application for voluntary departure. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. The Service has introduced a record of conviction showing that on November 16, 1969, the respondent was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York for entering the United States without inspection on November 15, 1969 in violation of section 275 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 1 (Exh. 2). The definition of "entry" contained in section 101(a)(13) of the Act is 18 U.S.C. 1325. 1 applicable to both the criminal provisions of section 275 and the deportation provisions of section 241(a)(2). Matter of Barragan-Garibay, 15 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 1974). We believe that the respondent is collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of illegal entry in the present proceedings. Matter of Barragan-Garibay, supra; Matter of Grandi, 13 I. & N. Dec. 798 (BIA 1971); Matter of Campos, 13 I. & N. Dec. 148 (BIA 1969); Matter of Z—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 708 (BIA 1954). See also Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785 (C.A. 9, 1968); United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Anselmo v. Hardin, 253 F.2d 165 (C.A. 3, 1958). Since Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), relied upon by counsel, was a case interpreting the definition of "entry" contained in section 101(a)(13) of the Act, the respondent's conviction for illegal "entry" under the Act is also dispositive of any possible Fleuti issue. Even if it were necessary for us to look beyond the record of conviction, we would reach the same result. On the record as a whole, we are satisfied that the Service has established the respondent's deportability under section 241(a)(2) of the Act by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence. Counsel's allegations of illegal arrest, search, and seizure have not been established. The Fleuti doctrine is clearly inapplicable to an alien such as the respondent who entered the United States without inspection in violation of the Act. Matter of Kolk, 11 I. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 1965); cf. Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (C.A. 9, 1974). Finally, counsel challenges the immigration judge's discretionary denial of voluntary departure. We agree with the immigration judge that the circumstances of this case do not warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. MATTER OF JOQUIN In Deportation Proceedings A-19672307 Decided by Board June 11, 1975 (1) Respondent, deported in July, 1972, as a nonimmigrant visitor who remained longer, returned to the United States in December, 1972, and was admitted as a nonimmigrant visitor, although he had never obtained permission to reapply for admission after his prior deportation. He argues he was never informed of the need to obtain permission to reapply, and that deportation is barred by section 241(f) of the Act. Nothing in the Act requires the Service to notify respondent that he needed permission to reapply for admission after deportation. (2) Respondent was properly held deportable, with section 241(f) held not applicable to a nonimmigrant "overstay" or to an alien excludable at entry under section 212(a)(17) for having failed to obtain permission to reapply for admission. In Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 95 S. Ct. 1164 (1975), the Supreme Court indicated that section 241(f) cannot benefit an alien charged under section 241(a)(2) as having remained beyond the authorized length of his stay. Also, section (a)(1) charge based on section 212(a)(19) or section 211(a) charge similar to that at issue in INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966). Section 241(f) of the Act does not preclude the deportation of an alien under section 241(a)(1), where the basis for the charge is excludability under section 212(a)(17) of the Act. CHARGES: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1)[8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)]—Excludable-arrested and deported, no permission to reapply for admission. Lodged: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrant -remained longer. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Peter M. Siegel, Esquire 204 West Seventh Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 In a decision dated March 19, 1974, the immigration judge ordered the respondent deported from the United States. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a native of Bermuda and a citizen of the United Kingdom. He was deported from the United States in July of 1972 as a nonimmigrant visitor who had remained beyond the authorized length of his stay. He last returned to the United States in December of 1972 and was admitted as a visitor authorized to remain until February 20, 1973. Although admitted as a visitor in December of 1972, the respondent has never obtained permission to reapply for admission after his deportation in July of 1972. The Service alleges that the respondent is deportable as a nonimmigrant "overstay" under section 241(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and is deportable under section 241(a)(1) as an alien excludable at entry under section 212(a)(17) for having failed to obtain permission to reapply for admission. The respondent has admitted the factual allegations contained in the order to show cause. He argues, however, that he was never informed of the need to obtain permission to reapply, and that his deportation is precluded by virtue of section 241(f) of the Act. The record fails to indicate whether the respondent was informed prior to his return that he needed permission to reapply for admission. However, the Act places no requirement on the Service to so inform a deported alien. The respondent's lack of knowledge does not preclude a finding of deportability. The respondent was excludable at entry as alleged by the Service. Moreover, section 241(f) does not benefit the respondent with respect to either charge of deportability. In Reid v. INS, 420 U.S. 619, 95 S. Ct. 1164 (1975), the Supreme Court held that section 241(f) did not benefit an alien who had entered the United States under a false claim to United States citizenship and who was charged with deportability as an alien who had entered without inspection under section 241(a)(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court's opinion in Reid also indicates that section 241(f) cannot benefit an alien charged under section 241(a)(2) as one who has remained beyond the authorized length of his stay. See also CabucoFlores v. INS, 477 F.2d 108 (C.A. 9, 1973), cert. denied in companion case of Mangabat v. INS, 414 U.S. 841 (1973); Preux v. INS, 484 F.2d 396 (C.A. 10, 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1973); Milande v. INS, 484 F.2d 774 (C.A. 7, 1973); Cortez-Flores v. INS, 500 F.2d 178 (C.A. 5, 1974). The Supreme Court's discussion of section 241(f) in Reid further indicates that section 241(f) will only prevent an alien's deportation on a section 241(a)(1) charge which is based either on section 212(a)(19), or on a section 211(a) charge similar to the charges at issue in INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966). Section 241(f) therefore does not preclude the respondent's deportation on the charge based on section 212(a)(17). See also De Vargas v. INS, 409 F.2d 335 (C.A. 5, 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895 (1969); Hames-Herrera v. Rosenberg, 463 F.2d 451 (C.A. 9, 1972). The respondent's deportability on the charges alleged by the Service has been established by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence. His deportation is not barred by section 241(f). The immigration judge denied the respondent's application for voluntary departure in the exercise of discretion. The immigration judge's |