Uganda is that provided by the Adoption of Children Act of 1943 of Uganda.' Moreover, the report also notes that the legal institution of adoption does not exist under Islamic religious law. See also Matter of Ashree, Ahmed and Ahmed, 14 I. & N. Dec. 305, (BIA 1973); Matter of Boghdadi, 12 I. &. N. Dec. 666 (BIA 1968). The petitioner concedes that the beneficiary was not adopted in accordance with the Adoption of Children Act of Uganda. The petitioner points out that he has raised and supported the beneficiary since childhood, that he has treated the beneficiary as a member of the family, and that having been forced to flee from Uganda the beneficiary has nowhere else to resettle but in this country. Unfortunately, these sympathetic considerations do not permit us to approve the petition where no legal adoption has been established. We must dismiss the appeal. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 1 The Adoption of Children Act states, in part: Sec. 3 (1). Upon an application in the prescribed manner by any person desirous of being authorized to adopt an infant who has never been married, the court may, subject to the provisions of this Act, make an order (in this Act referred to as "an adoption order”) authorizing the applicant to adopt the infant. Sec. 4 (5). An adoption order shall not be made in favour of any applicant unless he is a British subject or a citizen of Uganda and is a resident in Uganda or in respect of any infant unless he is a British subject or a citizen of Uganda and is resident in East Africa. MATTER OF OZCAN In Deportation Proceedings A-20062639 Decided by Board May 16, 1975 (1) Where the applicant for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, misstated or at least materially overstated his qualifications as a diesel mechanic on his application for a labor certification a favorable exercise of discretion to grant permanent residence status was not warranted. (2) An immigration judge may set the time for voluntary departure at the time of his initial decision; at a reopened hearing the judge may grant voluntary departure anew, however the period of departure may then only be set by the District Director. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(9) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(9)]—After admission as a nonimmigrant under section 101(a)(15)—failed to comply with the conditions of such status. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Paul C. Vincent, Esquire Appellate Trial Attorney This is an appeal from a decision of an immigration judge dated February 8, 1974, denying the respondent's application for adjustment of status which was submitted at a reopened hearing. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a 34-year-old married male alien who is a native and citizen of Turkey. He entered the United States as a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure on May 25, 1973. On August 21, 1973, the respondent was found deportable under section 241(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as an alien who had failed to maintain his nonimmigrant status. He was granted sixty days voluntary departure time. No appeal was taken from that decision. Thereafter, the respondent's motion to reopen to permit him to apply for adjustment of status was granted. The respondent predicates his application for adjustment of status on a claim that a visa is immediately available to him as a nonpreference immigrant. The respondent has submitted an approved labor certification as a diesel mechanic. The immigration judge denied the application on the ground that the respondent was statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status in that he had misrepresented his work experience in obtaining his labor certification. He also found that the application should be denied in the exercise of discretion. There is at least some question that the respondent's statements on his application for a labor certification amount to a material misrepresentation. See 29 CFR 60.5(g). Cf. La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (C.A. 9, 1974). However, we need not resolve that issue since we agree with the immigration judge that adjustment of status should be denied in the exercise of discretion. The respondent has submitted, in connection with his application for a labor certification, a letter of reference showing that he worked as a diesel mechanic for nearly five years, from 1959 to 1964. He admitted that he had obtained this letter subsequent to obtaining his visa, but prior to his departure from Turkey. The immigration judge properly inferred that the respondent obtained this letter to assist him in locating a job in the United States and thereby circumvent the normal visa issuing procedure. The respondent's explanation of why he brought this letter with him to the United States is not persuasive. He claims that he intended to use this letter to obtain employment when he returned to Turkey. The immigration judge found also that the respondent's claim that he had been employed as a mechanic from 1959 to 1964 to be doubtful. The respondent was unable to recall the name of his employer or the dates of employment when asked for this information by the immigration judge. Finally, the immigration judge found that the respondent has misstated, or at least overstated, his qualifications as a diesel motor repairman. The respondent has admitted at the reopened hearing, that contrary to the statements made on his application for a labor certification, he had not been self-employed as a diesel repairman from 1964 to 1973, but had instead worked on his own farm. The respondent claims that he did not make such a statement, but only intended to state that he had repaired diesel engines while running his own farm. Nonetheless, this information appears over the respondent's signature. Balanced against these unfavorable factors, the respondent has shown no factors in his favor. His wife and child remain in Turkey. The respondent's only relatives in the United States appear to be his sister, who is a lawful permanent resident, and her husband. We thus agree with the immigration judge that a favorable exercise of discretion is not warranted in this case. The appeal will therefore be dismissed. The immigration judge granted the respondent 28 days additional voluntary departure time, notwithstanding that the respondent had failed to depart when previously granted voluntary departure. An im migration judge may set the time for voluntary departure at the time of his initial decision, but extension may be granted only by the district director.' The immigration judge however, may grant voluntary departure anew. Matter of Onyedibia, 15 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 1974); Matter of Yeung, 13 I. & N. Dec. 528 (BIA 1970). Where there is a new grant, the time and conditions of departure are to be set by the district director. Thus the immigration judge here had only the power to grant the respondent voluntary departure anew. Accordingly, we shall modify the immigration judge's order by treating it as a new grant of voluntary departure, but directing that the time and conditions of departure be set by the district director. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Further order: The respondent is permitted to depart the United States voluntarily at such time and under such circumstances as the district director may direct; and in the event of failure so to depart he shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. 1 See 8 CFR 244.2 MATTER OF BLAICH In Section 245 Proceedings A-19568960 Decided by Regional Commissioner May 15, 1975 The applicants are husband and wife, and seek adjustment of status under section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The male applicant alleges that he is a religious worker who is eligible for a blanket labor certification under Schedule A of 29 CFR 60.7 as established by the Labor Department, which will satisfy the labor certification requirement of section 212(a)(14) of the Act. The district director denied the applications but certified the cases to the Regional Commissioner for decision pursuant to 8 CFR 103.4. Where the record showed that the applicant will be employed for 20 hours a week by a synagague to provide religious instruction and spiritual and moral guidance to the members, and also will be employed as a religious teacher in a Hebrew High School for 20 hours a week, the application for permanent residence was approved. ON BEHALF OF APPLICANTS: William J. Bluestein, Esquire 130 South Robertson Blvd., Beverly Hills, California 90211 These cases have been certified to the regional commissioner for a decision pursuant to Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations (8 CFR) Section 103.4. The district director denied the applications reasoning that the applicants are subject to the labor certification requirements of Section 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act with which they have not complied. The applicants are natives of Germany and citizens of Israel. Mr. Blaich was admitted to the United States via pre-flight inspection at Montreal, Canada, on August 19, 1970. He was admitted as a visitor for pleasure for a period of twelve days. Subsequently, he changed his status to exchange visitor to participate in Program P III 2360 which is sponsored by the American Association for Jewish Education, New York City. His wife last entered the United States on July 29, 1971, at New York City. She was admitted as an exchange visitor also. However, the record is silent concerning her participation in any program. They have applied for adjustment of status to permanent resident alleging that the "Blanket Certification" provisions apply to Mr. Blaich as a religious worker. |