In the course of their separate interviews, a number of discrepancies appeared between the information furnished by the petitioner and that furnished by the beneficiary. In addition, the petitioner could not produce identification to establish that she was the person referred to in the Puerto Rican birth certificate which she submitted to establish her United States citizenship. In light of the discrepancies and the failure to furnish proper identification, the petitioner and the beneficiary were referred to the Investigations Section of the Service for inquiry into whether their marriage was a "sham" marriage undertaken for the purpose of circumventing the immigration laws. Upon arriving in the Investigations Section, the petitioner was advised of her rights including the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. She was then asked to furnish fingerprints and photographs to aid in establishing her identity. She refused to be fingerprinted or photographed. Thereupon, the interview was terminated. The district director denied the visa petition on the grounds that the petitioner had failed to establish her identity as a United States citizen and that she had failed to show that her marriage to the beneficiary was not a marriage of convenience, entered into for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits for the beneficiary in circumvention of the immigration laws. On appeal, counsel argues that the petitioner was denied due process because of the Service's request that she submit fingerprints and photographs. In visa petition proceedings, the petitioner has the burden of establishing the validity of the claimed relationship. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). A beneficiary is not entitled to immigration status on the basis of a marriage entered into for the primary purpose of evading the immigration laws, irrespective of the validity of that marriage under the applicable domestic law. Matter of M-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 217 (BIA 1958); Matter of Kitsalis, 11 I. & N. Dec. 613 (BIA 1966). 8 CFR 103.2(b)(1) authorizes the Service to make reasonable requests for the submission of additional evidence and to make any necessary investigation in connection with the adjudication of any application or petition. The issue in the present case is whether the request for fingerprints and photographs was reasonable under the circumstances. The petitioner's failure to identify herself properly, and the discrepancies disclosed upon initial examination, raised the possibility that a marriage fraud was involved in the present case. In order to resolve this possibility of fraud, the petitioner was requested to submit fingerprints and photographs to aid in establishing her identity and the bona fides of her marital relationship with the beneficiary. The purpose of the photographs was for use in a neighborhood inves tigation to ascertain whether the petitioner was known to reside with the beneficiary at the address claimed in the visa petition. Such investigation is within the scope of the authorization contained in 8 CFR 103.2(b)(1). The purpose of the request for fingerprints was to ascertain whether the petitioner was in fact the person she claimed to be. "Fingerprints have long been recognized as a scientific and accurate means of identification." Thom v. New York Stock Exchange, 306 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom., Miller v. New York Stock Exchange, 425 F.2d 1074 (C.A. 2, 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).1 In the specific factual context of this case, where the initial questioning of the petitioner and the beneficiary raised the possibility of fraud, and the petitioner failed to present adequate identification, the request for fingerprints and photographs was reasonable. We emphasize that compliance with this request was not mandatory, but rather was voluntary on the part of the petitioner. The petitioner had the option of declining to submit the fingerprints and photographs. However, by choosing not to submit the requested evidence, the petitioner took the risk that the inadequacy of her identification and the discrepancies in her testimony would result in denial of her visa petition for failure to establish the claimed relationship. Had the petitioner adequately established her identity by other evidence, and if the interview had raised no reasonable possiblity of marriage fraud, the petition presumably would have been granted without resort to fingerprints or photographs. However, it is notable that even on appeal, no allegation has been made that the petitioner has other evidence of her identity to submit, or that she is willing or able to explain the discrepancies that appeared from the interview. Our review of the record satisfies us that the petitioner has failed to sustain her burden of establishing the claimed relationship. Consequently, the appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 1 The court in Thom considered the widespread use of fingerprinting in noncriminal contexts. The court stated: "In sum, the public has long recognized it as a valuable and reliable means of identification, and to suggest that a stigma attaches when it is so used is to fly in the face of reality." 306 F. Supp. at 1009. MATTER OF YOU FU WANG In Deportation Proceedings A-16007602 Decided by Board May 16, 1975 On appeal from the immigration judge's denial of voluntary departure, using the short form I-38 order, the record is remanded for the entry of a proper denial order. A summary decision on form I-38 is permitted only if the alien makes no application under 8 CFR 247.17, or if the alien applies for voluntary departure under section 244(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and such relief is granted. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Entered after being refused permission to land temporarily as a crewman, in violation of section 252(a). ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: David W. Walters, Esquire 100 Biscayne Blvd., North Miami, Florida 33132 This is an appeal from an order of an immigration judge finding the respondent deportable as charged and directing his deportation to Taiwan. The record will be remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings. The record indicates that the respondent, through counsel, applied for a grant of sufficient voluntary departure to enable him to earn money to depart at his own expense. This application was denied by the immigration judge using summary order Form I-38. The immigration judge erred in entering the deportation order on the short Form I-38, which states that "Respondent has made no application for relief from deportation." We note that the immigration judge predicated his request for counsel's consent to a "short form" order, on the finding "the respondent has made no application for relief from deportation because he is unable to show that he has funds. . . .” (Tr. P. 8). A summary decision on Form I-38 or I-39 is permitted only if the alien makes no application under section 242.17 or if he applies for voluntary departure only and the immigration judge grants the application. The action here was in violation of 8 CFR 242. 18(b), and a remand is required for the entry of a proper order by the immigration judge. Accordingly, the following order will be entered. ORDER: The record is remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion. MATTER OF BHEGANI In Visa Petition Proceedings A-20941352 Decided by Board May 16, 1975 The lawful permanent resident petitioner applied for preference classification for the beneficiary as his adopted son under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The petition was denied, and the appeal dismissed because the requisite relationship was not established between petitioner and beneficiary. Petitioner had been the customary guardian of the beneficiary since 1962 when the child was 10 years old. However, since the legal institution of adoption does not exist under Islamic law, the beneficiary could not have been adopted as required under section 101 (b)(1)(E) of the Act, and the petition was properly denied. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Pro se The lawful permanent resident petitioner applied for preference classification for the beneficiary as his adopted son under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In a decision dated March 6, 1975, the district director denied that petition. The petitioner has appealed from that denial. The appeal will be dismissed. In visa petition proceedings, the burden of establishing the claimed relationship is upon the petitioner. Matter of Brantigan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 493 (BIA 1966). In order for the petitioner to establish that the beneficiary is his adopted son, he must show that the beneficiary was adopted in accordance with the requirements of section 101(b)(1)(E) of the Act, which includes: a child adopted while under the age of fourteen years if the child has thereafter been in the legal custody of, and has resided with, the adopting parent or parents for at least two years The beneficiary was born in Uganda in 1952. The petitioner claims that he became the "customary guardian" of the beneficiary under Islamic law in Uganda after the death of the beneficiary's mother in 1962. The district director received a report from the Near Eastern and African Law Division of the Library of Congress regarding the possibility of adoption by Muslims under the law of Uganda. That report indicates that the only form of legal adoption available to Muslims in |