counsel and to fully litigate all possible defenses. He chose instead to take a calculated risk by pleading guilty to the charge. Deportation proceedings are not a forum for redetermining the question of guilt, which has already been established by the respondent's plea. See Rassano v. INS, 377 F.2d 971, 974 (C.A. 7, 1966), vacated and remanded on other grounds 377 F.2d 975 (C.A. 7, 1967); Giammario v. Hurney, 311 F.2d 285, 287 (C.A. 3, 1962); Matter of Gutierrez, 14 I. & N. Dec. 457 (BIA 1973). Although counsel indicated at oral argument that a challenge to the British conviction was being contemplated, we have received no information that such a challenge has actually been undertaken (Transcript of oral argument, pp. 45-6). B. Is Cannabis Resin Marihuana Within the Meaning of Section 212(a)(23)? The respondent asserts that the term "marihuana" as used in section 212(a)(23) does not include cannabis resin. Counsel introduced expert testimony by Lester Grinspoon, M.D., and a book written by Dr. Grinspoon, to show that cannabis resin is not marihuana (Transcript of hearing, pp. 35-43; Exh. 13). According to Dr. Grinspoon, there are three grades of intoxicating drug which are prepared in India from the plant Cannabis sativa (L.), and which serve as standards against which preparations produced in other parts of the world are compared for potency. Bhang consists of Cannabis sativa leaves dried and then crushed into a coarse powder and perhaps mixed with seeds and chopped up stems of the plant. Ganja, the second strongest preparation, is made from the tops of cultivated female plants and is estimated as being two or three times as strong as bhang. Pure resin of the pistillate flowers is called charras and is the most potent of the intoxicants, being five to eight times more potent than bhang. Charras, or cannabis resin, is called hashish in some places. Dr. Grinspoon has stated that the chemical compounds responsible for the intoxicating effect of cannabis are commonly found in the resin. Although it is generally believed that the plant's active agents are found solely in the resin, there is insufficient evidence to support this hypothesis. It is possible that other parts of the female and male plants may contain active substances. The gist of Dr. Grinspoon's testimony is that, as used in the United States, the term "marihuana" refers only to a preparation comparable to Indian bhang, and should be distinguished from cannabis resin which is comparable to Indian charras (or hashish) (Transcript of hearing, p. 37). While this argument has some technical appeal, we are not persuaded by it. The term "marihuana" is not defined in the Act, nor is the legislative history explicit as to the meaning to be given to the term. In the absence of explicit legislative guidance, we must strive to interpret the Act in a manner consistent with the congressional purpose. The provisions for the exclusion and deportation of persons convicted of possession of marihuana were part of a congressional scheme to deal with the evils of drug abuse. S. Rep. No. 1651, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3134–35 (1960). In other statutes having the same objective, Congress has treated the term "marihuana" as including cannabis resin. 21 U.S.C. 802(15); Act of August 16, 1954, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 565; Act of July 18, 1956, ch. 629, §106, 70 Stat. 570; see United States v. Piercefield, 437 F.2d 1188 (C.A. 5, 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 933 (1971); United States v. Cepelis, 426 F.2d 134 (C.A. 9, 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971). In the absence of express congressional direction to the contrary, we shall not create a distinction between cannabis resin and marihuana under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Several federal courts have noted that hashish (cannabis resin) is merely a refined form of marihuana. United States v. Piercefield, supra; see United States v. Cepelis, supra. It would be illogical to construe the term "marihuana" under section 212(a)(23) as including the cannabis leaves (possibly mixed with stems and seeds) which contain intoxicating cannabis resin, while not including the pure form of the resin which has a much greater intoxicating effect. While it is true that ambiguous, provisions of the immigration laws are often construed in favor of the alien, this general maxim does not require us to ignore common sense and legislative objectives in order to reach a construction favoring the alien. Cf. Chanan Din Khan v. Barber, 253 F.2d 547, 550 (C.A. 9, 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958). Matter of Paulus, 11 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1965), is distinguishable. That case involved a factual issue concerning the identity of the drug that the alien was convicted of trafficking in. The record of conviction referred only to a "narcotic drug" under California law, which included substances not defined as "narcotic drugs" under the immigration laws as interpreted by the federal courts. Since the conviction was alleged to be the ground for deportation under section 241(a)(11), we held that the factual uncertainty as to what drug was involved had to be resolved against the Service, the party bearing the burden of proving deportability. In the present case, however, there is no factual dispute as to what drug the respondent was convicted of possessing. The issue is a legal one: Is cannabis resin "marihuana" within the meaning of section 212(a)(23)? We have resolved this legal issue against the respondent. Counsel has cited Matter of Gray, A-30310271 (IJ September 23, 1971), an unpublished decision by an immigration judge, which held that hashish is not “marihuana” within the meaning of section 212(a)(23) of the Act. The Service took an appeal from that decision, but the appeal was later withdrawn. Such withdrawal, however, does not indicate Service acquiesence to that decision. Cf. Matter of Mangabat, 14 I. & N. Dec. 75 aff'd (BIA 1972), on other grounds Cabuco-Flores v. INS, 477 F.2d 108 (9 Cir. 1973). Our decisions are binding precedent on the immigration judges, rather than vice versa. 8 CFR 3.1(g). The short answer to counsel's use of Gray is that we disagree with that decision and decline to adopt its reasoning in the present case. In his brief, counsel attacks the constitutionality of section 212(a)(23).19 As he concedes, however, we have no power to consider a constitutional challenge to the statutes which we administer. Matter of Santana, 13 I. & N. Dec. 362, 365 (BIA 1969); Matter of Wong, 13 I. & N. Dec. 820, n. 2 (BIA 1971); Matter of L-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 556, 557 (BIA 1951). We are not unsympathetic to the plight of the respondent and others in a similar situation under the immigration laws, who have committed only one marihuana violation for which a fine was imposed. Nevertheless, arguments for a change in the law must be addressed to the legislative, rather than the executive, branch of government. IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION We have concluded that the respondent's motion to defer our decision must be denied. We have also concluded that the respondent is deportable under section 241(a)(2) of the Act, and that he is statutorily ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act. The respondent is not eligible for any relief from deportation except voluntary departure, which has been granted to him by the immigration judge. The immigration judge reached the correct result; the appeal will therefore be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. Further order: Pursuant to the immigration judge's order, the respondent is permitted to depart from the United States voluntarily within 60 days from the date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be granted by the district director; and in the event of failure so to depart, the respondent shall be deported as provided in the immigration judge's order. 19 We have also considered the amicus curiae brief submitted in behalf of the respondent by the American Civil Liberties Union. A large portion of that brief is devoted to arguments concerning the constitutionality of section 212(a)(23). We believe that the other issues raised in the amicus brief have been dealt with adequately in the course of our opinion and need not be reiterated. MATTER OF SAMSEN In Visa Petition Proceedings A-14047005 Decided by Board July 19, 1974 An immigration judge's order rescinding beneficiary's section 245 adjustment of status as a second preference immigrant based on the existence of a legal impediment to his marriage to a lawful permanent resident, is not a conclusive determination in subsequent visa petition proceedings that beneficiary's prior marriage comes within the purview of section 204(c) of the immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, as a marriage entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Such section 204(c) determination should be made independently by the district director, on the basis of the evidence actually before him, in the course of his adjudication of the subsequent visa petition. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Triantafyllos Thanasoulis, Esquire 19 West 44th Street New York, New York 10036 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Irving A. Appleman The lawful permanent resident petitioner applied for preference status for the beneficiary as her spouse under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In a decision dated March 22, 1974, the district director denied the petition. The petitioner has appealed from that denial. The appeal will be sustained and the record will be remanded to the district director. The beneficiary is a 37-year-old native and citizen of Thailand. He married the petitioner in 1971. The record shows that the beneficiary had been married twice previously-first to another native and citizen of Thailand, and then, in 1967, to a lawful permanent resident of the United States. On the basis of his 1967 marriage, the beneficiary was granted preference status under section 203(a)(2) of the Act as the spouse of a lawful permanent resident, and his status was subsequently adjusted to that of a lawful permanent resident under section 245 of the Act. On January 13, 1979, after proceedings under section 246 of the Act, an immigration judge ordered the beneficiary's grant of status as a lawful permanent resident rescinded. The basis for rescission was the existence of a legal impediment invalidating the petitioner's marriage to his lawful perma nent resident wife. On appeal, we affirmed the immigration judge's decision rescinding status. The district director has based his present decision on section 204(c) of the Act, which states that "no petition shall be approved if the alien has previously been accorded a nonquota or preference status as the spouse of a citizen of the United States or the spouse of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, by reason of a marriage determined by the Attorney General to have been entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws." The district director apparently considered the prior decision of the immigration judge in rescission proceedings to be a conclusive determination that the beneficiary's prior marriage to a lawful permanent resident was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. This conclusion was erroneous. Neither section 204(c) nor the regulations specify who may make the Attorney General's section 204(c) decision and at what point it is to be made. However, we have held that the determination is to be made in behalf of the Attorney General by the district director in the course of his adjudication of the subsequent visa petition. Matter of Iezza, A-10792574 (BIA November 17, 1970). In making that adjudication, the district director may rely on any relevant evidence, including evidence having its origin in prior Service proceedings involving the beneficiary, or in court proceedings involving the prior marriage. But the determination is for the district director to make (subject, of course, to possible review by us on appeal). In making his decision, the district director should not ordinarily give conclusive effect to the determinations made in the prior collateral proceedings, but should reach his own independent conclusion based on the evidence actually before him. See Matter of F-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 684 (BIA 1962). The present record does not support the district director's conclusion that the beneficiary's prior marriage was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. The rescission determination dealt only with a legal impediment to the marriage; section 204(c) goes to the underlying purpose of the marriage. A legally invalid marriage is not necessarily one which was undertaken for the purpose of evading the immigration laws. Although an examination of the entire record of the rescission proceedings could conceivably shed some light on the issue of whether there was an intent to evade the immigration laws, the present record does not contain any of the evidence or testimony on which the decision to rescind was grounded. The information presently before us is insufficient to enable us to determine whether or not the beneficiary's prior marriage was undertaken to evade the immigration laws. In addition, the petitioner has submitted several new items of evidence on appeal. Consequently, we shall remand the record to the district director in order to give him an |