MATTER OF LINDNER In Deportation Proceedings A-11038815 Decided by Board January 31, 1975 Respondent was convicted for the illegal possession of marijuana in a criminal proceeding which was not conducted in connection with any provision of either a State or Federal Youth Corrections Act. Thereafter, he was granted a full and unconditional pardon. Under these circumstances, the pardon is not effective to remove respondent's deportability because aliens charged with being deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Act are excepted from the pardon provisions of section 241(b). CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(11) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(11)]-Convicted of a crime relating to narcotics, at any time after entry. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: J. Ward Rafferty, Esquire 190 Broad Street New London, Conn. 06320 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Irving A. Appleman This is an appeal from an order of an immigration judge finding the respondent deportable as charged, and, finding him statutorily ineligible for any form of discretionary relief from deportation, directing his deportation to England. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a 26-year-old male alien, native and citizen of Germany, who was admitted to the United States for permanent residence on February 20, 1957. At a hearing before an immigration judge at which he was represented by other counsel, the respondent admitted the truth of the factual allegations of the order to show cause but denied deportability. The immigration judge found him to be deportable and ordered his deportation. On appeal present counsel contends that the respondent is saved from deportation because he has allegedly been granted a full pardon in the State of Connecticut with respect to the crime which forms the basis for these deportation proceedings, and has petitioned for the erasure of his criminal records. We reject this contention in reliance upon the plain 1 The record contains a certified copy of the record of respondent's conviction on April 29, 1971 in the Superior Court of Connecticut, New London County, for the offense of language of section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which states that the provisions which remove deportability for an alien who has been granted a full and unconditional pardon "shall not apply in the case of any alien who is charged with being deportable from the United States under subsection (a)(11) of this section." We find the present case distinguishable from recent decisions which hold that marijuana violators whose convictions have been expunged under federal or state "youth corrections" statutes are not deportable under section 241(a)(11) of the Act, Mestre Morera v. INS, 462 F.2d 1030 (C.A. 1, 1972); Matter of Zingis, 14 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 1974); Matter of Andrade, 14 I. & N. Dec. 651 (BIA 1974). There is no evidence in the record, nor does counsel assert, that the respondent was treated as a youthful offender in Connecticut. This factor, together with the clear mandate of section 241(b), persuades us that the respondent is not entitled to relief from deportation on the basis of his alleged pardon. Nor can we accept counsel's premise that the erasure of respondent's criminal record completely negates his conviction for consideration under section 241(a)(11). We cannot impute to Congress an intention to allow for such metaphysical distinctions when they enacted sections 241(a)(11) and 241(b). See generally Matter of A-F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (A.G. 1959). Accordingly, while we are aware of the sympathetic factors in this case, we find that we have no alternative but to affirm the decision of the immigration judge and dismiss the appeal. The following order will therefore be entered. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. illegal possession of marijuana, in violation of the Connecticut General Statutes, sections 19-452 and 19-481(b). We note the absence from the record of a copy of the alleged official pardon order; only the pardon petition and two newspaper articles which indicate one had been granted, have been submitted. MATTER OF YACHT "SANDPIPER" In Fine Proceedings MIA-10/12.378 Decided by Board January 23, 1975 The involved carrier pleaded guilty to criminal charges which related to the transportation of the same aliens involved in this civil fine proceeding. Carrier contends that imposition of fine under section 273 of the Immigration and Nationality Act would result in a double penalty for the same offense. The mere fact that the same conduct gives rise to both a civil and criminal penalty does not equate with the imposition of a double fine. The decision of the district director was correct. IN RE: YACHT “SANDPIPER", which arrived at the port of Miami, Florida, from foreign on August 26, 1973. Alien passengers involved: Jose VillamilRodriguez, Antonio Perez-Lopez, Maria Emilia Marti-Del Toro, Lidia Morales Bernal and Lidia Miguez-Lugones. BASIS FOR FINES: Act of 1952-Section 273(b) [8 U.S.C.1323(b)] ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT: Steadman S. Stahl, Jr., Esquire In a decision dated November 23, 1973, the district director imposed a fine of $5,000 upon the carrier under section 273(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act for five violations of section 273(a) of the Act. The district director also denied the carrier's request for remission of the fine. The carrier has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. Our review of the record satisfies us that the carrier's liability for the fine has been established and that the district director properly denied the carrier's request for remission of the fine. Counsel has informed us that the carrier has entered a plea of guilty to criminal charges stemming from his transportation of the alien passengers involved in these fine proceedings. Counsel contends that if the carrier is fined for both the criminal violation and the section 273 violation, he will be subjected to a double penalty for the same offense. Counsel's contention is without merit. An administrative fine under section 273 is a civil obligation and is entirely separate and distinct from any punishment imposed for violation of the criminal law. See Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329 (1932); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909). The mere fact that the same incident may give rise to both civil liability under section 273 and criminal liability under the criminal provisions of the Act does not equate with the imposition of a double fine for the same violation. The district director's decision was correct. The appeal will be dismissed. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. MATTER OF ARENAS In Visa Petition Proceedings A-20723462 Decided by Board February 25, 1975 In determining the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes, the law of the place of celebration of the marriage will generally govern. Under section 2.22 of the Texas Family Code a marriage is void if either party was married and the prior marriage is not dissolved. However, the marriage becomes valid when the prior marriage is dissolved and the parties continue to reside together as husband and wife and represent themselves to others as being married. As the parties were domiciled and married in Texas, and the previously married spouse alleged her prior marriage was dissolved by divorce after the present marriage, the record was remanded to give the petitioner the opportunity to establish the divorce, and that they had resided together thereafter as husband and wife and had represented themselves to others as being married. Upon the presentation of such evidence the beneficiary would be eligible for an immigrant visa as an immediate relative under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: James A. Douglas, Esquire 688 W. Robertson San Benito, Texas 78586 The United States citizen petitioner applied to have his wife classified as an immediate relative under section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In a decision dated August 19, 1974, the district director denied the petition on the ground that the beneficiary had a prior undissolved marriage at the time she married the petitioner and therefore her marriage to the petitioner was not valid. The petitioner has appealed. The appeal will be sustained and the record remanded. The beneficiary is a 47-year-old female, who is a native and citizen of Mexico. She married the petitioner in a ceremonial marriage in Texas on March 10, 1972. At that time the beneficiary's first marriage had not been dissolved or otherwise terminated. The petitioner alleges that on May 29, 1974, the beneficiary obtained a divorce, in Mexico, from her first husband. In determining the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes, the law of the place of celebration of the marriage will generally govern. See e.g., Matter of Moncayo, 14 I. & N. Dec. 472 (BIA 1973); Matter of Levine, 13 I. & N. Dec. 244 (BIA 1969); Matter of Dagamac, 11 I. & N. |