found deportable by an immigration judge on June 12, 1974, and was ordered deported to Columbia. He has not appealed from that decision. After he was found deportable, the respondent applied to the district director for bail or its equivalent, alleging that because of the Service detainer, he was more restricted in his ability to participate in prison programs at the Danbury institution than he would otherwise be. The district director answered the application by letter stating that when the respondent is released from prison into the actual custody of the Service, then he will notify the respondent of a decision specifying the conditions, if any, under which release will be permitted from the custody of the Service. The respondent then appealed to this Board. Although he is imprisoned for criminal convictions, the respondent contends that he is nonetheless in Service custody at the present time and that the district director must, under the circumstances, exercise his discretion and render a decision on his application for bond or its equivalent. The Service asserts that its detainer is only for the purpose of having the prison authorities turn the respondent over to the Service for deportation upon his release from prison. The Service does not wish to cause the respondent to suffer any deprivations while in prison. The pertinent parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the corresponding regulations provide as follows: An alien sentenced to imprisonment shall not be deported until such imprisonment has been terminated by the release of the alien from confinement.1 For the purposes of this section an order of deportation heretofore or hereafter entered against an alien in legal detention or confinement, other than under an immigration process, shall be considered as being made as of the moment he is released from such detention or confinement, and not prior thereto.2 An alien confined in an institution or hospital shall not be accepted into physical custody by the Service until an order of deportation has been made and the Service is ready to deport the alien." Since the respondent has not yet been released from prison, the district director may not take him into physical custody and has not so taken him. Therefore, the time is not yet ripe for the district director to make a determination concerning the conditions, if any, upon which the respondent may be released from custody. Consequently, the provisions of 8 CFR 242.2(a) and (b) concerning apprehension, custody, and detention are not yet triggered. Accordingly, the district director lacks jurisdiction to consider the respondent's application for bond or its equivalent, and he correctly declined to consider it. We correspondingly lack jurisdiction to adjudicate this appeal. We acknowledge that case law establishes that while the respondent 1 Section 242(h), Immigration and Nationality Act. 2 Section 242(c), Immigration and Nationality Act. 38 CFR 242.3(b). is not yet in the actual physical custody of the Service, still he is in its "technical custody." Chung Young Chew v. Boyd, 309 F.2d 857 (C.A. 9, 1962). Accord, Slavik v. Miller, 89 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. PA.), aff'd 184 F.2d 575 (C.A. 3, 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 955 (1951). He is currently in the actual physical custody of a federal correctional institution. In Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308 (C. A. 8, 1973), relied on by counsel, the issue before the court was whether the custodial state could be required to remove the harmful consequences which flow from a detainer placed upon the petitioner because of a pending parole revocation in another state. The court found that the cooperating custodial state denies a prisoner due process by continuing the effects of a detainer placed on him solely on the strength of a request for one by a sister state. It held that the special conditions of confinement brought about by the filing of the detainer would have to be discontinued in the event that the detainer-requesting state should not request that the prisoner be made available for prompt disposition of the parole revocation proceeding. In other words, the detainer was based on the possibility that the prisoner's parole privilege might be revoked. The court held that the detainer, with its effects, could not continue without an adjudication of the issues underlying it at a prompt parole revocation proceeding. In the present case the respondent had a deportation hearing. At that proceeding the issue underlying the detainer, viz. his deportability, was adjudicated. He does not challenge the deportation order and did not appeal from the immigration judge's decision finding him deportable. He simply wishes to be relieved of the deprivations visited upon him by the prison authorities because of the detainer filed against him. Since the respondent has not yet been released from nonimmigration legal detention, the deportation order is not considered final. Section 242(c), Immigration and Nationality Act. Therefore, the respondent does not yet have a remedy in habeas corpus proceedings against the Service. Section 106(a)(9), Immigration and Nationality Act. If he wishes to be relieved of the consequences of the detainer, he should seek a remedy from the present custodial authorities rather than from the Service. ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. MATTER OF ZOELLNER In Deportation Proceedings A-10316628 Decided by Board December 16, 1974 (1) Where an alien had been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude and was thereafter, in a deportation proceeding, found deportable under section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, he was properly advised that he could apply for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act in conjunction with an application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act. (2) The constitutionality of the immigration laws is not a proper subject for consideration in an administrative deportation hearing. (3) British Honduras is included in the definition of an adjacent island to the United States in section 101(b)(5) of the Act. Respondent is precluded from naming British Honduras as the country of deportation under section 243(a) of the Act because he is neither native, citizen nor resident of that country. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(4), [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)]—Convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude at any time after entry. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Glen H. Downs, Esquire Legal Aid Service 732 S.W. Third Avenue In a decision dated October 26, 1973, the immigration judge found the alien respondent deportable as charged and ordered his deportation to West Germany. The respondent has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. The respondent is a native and a citizen of Germany who entered the United States in 1955. At the hearing, the Service introduced certified records showing the following convictions relating to the respondent: (1) September 17, 1957, in the District Court of Grayson County, Texas, for the crime of theft over $50 (Exh. 2); (2) December 10, 1959, in the Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, California, for the crime of petit larceny, section 488 of the California Penal Code (Exh. 3); (3) July 12, 1972, in the Circuit Court for Multnomah County, Oregon, for the crime of forgery in the first degree (Exh. 4). We agree with the immigration judge's conclusion that the respondent's deportability under section 241(a)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act has been established by clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence. The immigration judge informed the respondent that he could apply for adjustment of status under section 245 of the Act in conjunction with an application for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(h) of the Act (Tr. p. 41). No such application was submitted. The respondent is ineligible for any other discretionary relief from deportation because of his recent conviction. On appeal, counsel claims that the immigration judge should have terminated the proceedings because section 241(a)(4) of the Act is unconstitutional. However, as the immigration judge pointed out, the constitutionality of the immigration laws is not a proper subject for consideration in an administrative deportation hearing. Matter of Santana, 13 I. & N. Dec. 362 (BIA 1969); Matter of L-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 556 (BIA 1951). Counsel also contends that the immigration judge erred in refusing to allow the respondent to designate British Honduras as the country of deportaton pursuant to section 243(a) of the Act. Section 243(a) permits an alien to designate the country to which he wishes to be deported, except that an alien may not designate "any foreign territory contiguous to the United States or any island adjacent thereto or adjacent to the United States unless such alien is a native, citizen, subject, or national of, or had a residence in such designated foreign contiguous territory or adjacent island." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 101(b)(5) of the Act defines the term "adjacent islands" as including "... other British, French, and Netherlands territory or possessions in or bordering on the Caribbean Sea." In Matter of Longsworth, 13 I. & N. Dec. 225 (BIA 1969), we held that British Honduras is within the section 101(b)(5) definition of “adjacent islands," because it is a British territory bordering on the Caribbean Sea. In Matter of Piggott, 15 I. & N. Dec. 129 (BIA October 30, 1974), we receded from the result reached in Matter of Longsworth with regard to the eligibllity of a native of a foreign colonial possession to apply for suspension of deportation under section 244 of the Act. Our holding in Matter of Piggott, had no effect on our holding in Matter of Longsworth that British Honduras was within the section 101(b)(5) definition of "adjacent islands." Since British Honduras is within the section 101(b)(5) definition of "adjacent islands," its designation by one who is not a native, citizen, subject, national, or resident of that country is precluded by section 243(a) of the Act. Consequently, it was proper for the immigration judge to refuse to order deportation to British Honduras, and instead to direct deportation to West Germany, the country in which the respondent was |