MATTER OF TAJER In Deportation Proceedings A-20597132 Decided by Board October 17, 1974 Respondent had been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude. Section 241(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that such a conviction will not support a deportation charge, where at a time after such conviction, a full and unconditional pardon is granted by the President of the United States or a Governor of any State, as appropriate. It may be considered a Governor's pardon where the state has a constitutional provision for such authority to be exercised by the Board of Pardons, and such Board so exercises that power. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(4) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(4)]—Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after entry. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Fred F. Filsoof, Esquire Filsoof and Mykal 1416 Gaslight Tower 235 Peachtree Street, N.E. This is an appeal from the immigration judge's denial of the respondent's motion to reopen and reconsider his decision of October 17, 1973 to deport the respondent on the above-stated charge. Oral argument is requested by the respondent. Oral argument will be denied. The matter will be remanded for further proceedings. The record relates to a single female, native and citizen of Iran, who was admitted to the United States as a nonimmigrant student with permission to remain to September 3, 1973. On August 30, 1973 she was convicted upon her plea of nolo contendere, in the Criminal Court of Fulton County, Georgia, for the crime of theft. The court ordered her to pay a fine of $100 and be confined in prison for a term of 12 months. She paid the fine and her sentence was suspended. On March 27, 1974 the respondent was granted an unconditional pardon by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles. Section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act specifies that the provisions regarding deportation for a crime or crimes involving moral turpitude "shall not apply (1) in the case of an alien who has subsequent to such conviction been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States." By amendment to Art. V, sec. 1, par. 12 of the Georgia Constitution of 1877, which was made part of the Constitution of 1945, the State Board of Pardons and Paroles was made a constitutional body. The Constitution and the Act (Code Ann. §2-3011) confer on the Board practically all the clemency powers formerly conferred upon the Governor (Code Ann. § 77-511). The pardon granted the respondent is unconditional and is an executive pardon duly granted by executive authority as provided in the Constitution of the State of Georgia. It meets the requirements of that portion of section 241(b), supra, limiting the grant of a pardon to the President of the United States or the Governor of a State. The limiting provisions of section 241(b) were designed by Congress to eliminate the effectiveness of a legislative pardon, Matter of R—, 5 I. & N. Dec. 612 (BIA 1954). The pardon here under consideration is the only unconditional executive pardon that can be obtained in the State of Georgia. We recognize executive pardons granted by a State which has constitutional provision for executive pardons to be issued by other than the Governor of a State, Matter of D-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 476 (BIA 1957). In the circumstances, we shall remand this matter to the immigration judge to have the pardon received into evidence. The immigration judge can then make a new decision on the record. ORDER: The request for oral argument is denied. Further order: The case is remanded to the immigration judge for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing opinion. MATTER OF LOO In Deportation Proceedings A-11407844 Decided by Board October 25, 1974 The respondent last entered this country claiming to be a United States citizen; he later confessed alienage. The Service instituted deportation proceedings in 1968 charging deportability under section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On a prior remand the Board drew attention to a stipulation by the parties to reopen the proceedings for the lodging of a new charge and for the introduction of evidence that respondent had been accorded the opportunity to depart voluntarily prior to the institution of the deportation proceedings. After the last remand the immigration judge terminated the proceedings. Respondent appealed evidently seeking suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Act. The Board again remanded for institution of appropriate proceedings under section 241(a)(2) of the Act. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1), [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(1)-Excludable at time of entry, no immigrant visa. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Robert S. Bixby, Esquire 30 Hotaling Place San Francisco, California 94111 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: David L. Milhollan The alien respondent is a native and citizen of China. His case has been the subject of numerous opinions both at the Board and below. After our last remand, the immigration judge entered an order, dated August 31, 1973, terminating the proceedings against the respondent. The respondent does not appear to be satisfied with the resolution of his case and he has appealed from that decision. He evidently desires to become an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, and consequently he maintains that he is both deportable and eligibile to receive relief under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. We have concluded that the respondent is deportable. Accordingly, we shall remand the record for additional proceedings. In 1954 the respondent obtained a court decree declaring him to be a citizen of the United States. Several years later he was issued a certificate of citizenship. The respondent last entered this country as a citizen on February 2, 1966, after having worked as a crewman. Shortly after that entry he confessed alienage; thereafter, the court decree was set aside and the certificate of citizenship was cancelled. In 1968, the Service instituted deportation proceedings against the respondent. The respondent was charged with deportability under section 241(a)(1); the Service alleged that the respondent was excludable at the time of his last entry, because he was an immigrant alien not in possession of valid documentation. See section 212(1)(20), Immigration and Nationality Act. The case came to the Board on appeal from a finding of deportability. We initially sustained the appeal; however, we remanded the case upon motion of the Service. Matter of Loo, 13 I. & N. Dec. 182 (BIA 1969). The record again came to the Board, and we once more remanded it in a decision dated November 17, 1972. In our opinion of that date we drew attention to a stipulation entered into by the parties. In this stipulation the parties consented to the reopening of the proceedings for the lodging of a new charge of deportability and for the introduction of evidence indicating that the respondent had been accorded the opportunity to depart voluntarily prior to the institution of the proceedings. We remanded the record so that this stipulated material could be formally introduced at a hearing. On remand, however, the stipulated charge was not lodged. Instead, a charge of entry without inspection under section 241(a)(2) was lodged. The circumstances surrounding the respondent's last entry cause difficulty in the application of either an "entry without inspection" or an "excludable at entry" charge of deportability. The respondent, however, is presently in the United States without authority. He is not here in a legal status, nor is he saved from deportation by any specific provision of the Act. See e.g. section 241(f), Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been afforded the opportunity to depart voluntarily, but has not done so. As an alien without any colorable claim to lawful status, he is in the United States in violation of the Act. Cf. U.S. ex rel. Schirrmeister v. Watkins, 171 F.2d 858 (C.A. 2, 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 942 (1949); U.S. ex rel. Von Heymann v. Watkins, 159 F.2d 650 (C.A. 2, 1947). Accordingly, we perceive nothing which would prevent a finding of deportability under the appropriate portion of section 241 (a)(2). We shall remand the record for further proceeding, and specifically for the lodging of the charge set forth in the July 11, 1969 stipulation. ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings. MATTER OF PIGGOTT In Deportation Proceedings A-14872513 A-14343531 Decided by Board October 30, 1974 Respondents are natives of Antigua and citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, as such they come within the purview of section 101(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under section 244(f)(3) of the Act they are not eligible for suspension of deportation unless they can establish that they are ineligible to obtain special immigrant visas. Such aliens are, by definition in section 101(a)(27) of the Act, not eligible for special immigrant visas, therefore they are eligible for the suspension they seek upon the establishing of the requisite physical presence and extreme hardship requirements. CHARGE: Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)]—Nonimmigrants remained longer. ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS: Clara Binder, Esquire 401 Broadway New York, New York 10013 ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: Allan A. Shader In decisions dated August 12, 1971, the immigration judge found both respondents deportable as charged and granted them the privilege of voluntary departure. The proceedings were subsequently reopened to allow the respondents to apply for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In a decision dated May 3, 1974, the immigration judge granted suspension of deportation to both respondents. The Service has appealed from that decision. The appeal will be dismissed. DISCUSSION AS TO DEPORTABILITY: At their original hearing, the respondents conceded deportability. The only issue on this appeal involves the immigration judge's grant of suspension of deportation. DISCUSSION AS TO ELIGIBILITY FOR SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION: The respondents are both natives of Antigua and citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies. The trial attorney argues that the respondents are ineligible for suspension of deportation under the pro |