which flesh itself doth overvalue; as if protection, provision, deliverances, comforts, were not so much to be regarded as our concupiscence, or were not of weight enough to bind us to obey so merciful a God, as if ingratitude were no crime. 16. It is a contempt of those castigatory afflictions, by which God driveth men from sin, by giving them a taste of the bitterness of its fruits. 17. It is a contempt of all the examples of his mercy and his judgment upon others, by which he hath showed us how good he is, and how just a punisher of sin. 18. It is a contempt of all the inward motions and strivings of God, which sinners often feel persuading them to forbear their sins, and to seek after God. 19. It is a contempt of conscience, which beareth witness for God against their sins. 20. It is a contempt of all the instructions and advice of wise and good men, who are required, by God and nature, to warn men, and dissuade them from their sins. 21. It is a contempt of the example of all obedient, virtuous persons, whose lives instruct them and reprove them. 22. It is a contempt of virtue itself, which is contrary to sin, and whose proper worth commandeth love. 23. It is a contempt of God's omnipresence, when we will sin in his very presence; and of his omniscience, when we will sin when we know that he seeth it. 24. It is a contempt of the greatness and almightiness of God, when a silly worm dare sin against him, who upholdeth the world, and can do justice on him in a moment; as if we could make good our part against him. 25. It is a contempt of the attractive goodness of God, by which he is man's End and Happiness; as if all the goodness and love of God were not enough to counterpoise the base and brutish pleasures of sin, and to drive the rational soul to God. (It was his efficient goodness which I spoke of before.) 26. And thus it declareth, that we are so far void of love to God; for love is desirous to please. 27. It is a setting up the sordid creature for our end; as if it were more attractive and amiable than God, and fitter to content and delight the soul. 28. It is a contempt of all that glorious happiness of the life to come, which God hath warranted the righteous to expect ; as if it were not all so good as the defiling, transitory pleasures of sin, and would not recompense us for all that we can do or suffer for God. 29. It is the silencing and laying by our reason by inconsiderateness, or the perverting and abusing of it by error, in the greatest matters, for which it was given us; and so it is a voluntary drunkenness or madness, in the things of God and our felicity. 30. It is a setting up our senses and appetite above our reason, and making ourselves in use, as beasts, by setting up the lower bestial faculties to rule. 31. It is the deformity, monstrosity, disorder, sickness, and abuse of a noble creature, whom God made, in our measure, like himself, and so a contemptuous defacing of his image. 32. It is a robbing God of that glory of his holiness, which should shine forth in our hearts and lives; and of that complacency which he would take in our love, obedience, perfection, and felicity. 33. It is the perverting and moral destruction, not only of our own faculties, (which were made for God,) but of all the world which is within our reach; turning all that against God and our happiness, which was given us for them; yea, it is worse than casting them all away, while we use them contrary to their.nature, against their Owner and their End. 34. It is thus a breach in the moral order and harmony of the world, and as much as in us lieth, the destroying of the world; as the dislocation or rejection of some parts of a clock or watch is a disordering of the whole, and as a wound to the hand or foot is a wrong to the body; and it is a wound to every society where it is committed, and an injury to every individual who is tempted or afflicted by it." 35. It is a contradicting of our own professions, confessions, understandings, and promises to God. 36. It is a preferring of an inch of hasty time before the durable life to come, and things that we know are of short continuance, before those of which we can see no end. ▾ Minus malum est feritas et immanitas quam vitium, etsi terribilior.Arist. 7. Eth. c. 6. z Nil peccant oculi, si non animus oculis imperet.-Sen. Omue animi vitium tanto conspectius in se crimen habet, quantum major qui peceat habetur.-Juv. Omnino ex alio genere impotentia est, ex alio vitium: vitium enim omne suæ culpæ ignarum est, non iguara impotentia.—Arist. 7. Eth. c. 8. Vitia nostra voluntate necesse est suscipi.-Ib. 3. Eth. c. 5.、 Quæ crimini dautur vitia in nostra potestate sunt.-1b. 3. Eth, c. 5. 37. It is the preferring of a corruptible flesh and its pleasure, before the soul, which is more noble and durable. 38. It is an unmercifulness and inhuman cruelty to ourselves, not only defiling soul and body, but casting them on the displeasure and punishing justice of their great and terrible Creator. 39. It is the gratifying of the malicious tempter, the enemy of God, and of our souls; the doing his will, and receiving his image instead of God's. 40. And all this is done voluntarily, without constraint, by a rational, free agent, in the open light, and for a thing of nought. Besides what Christians only can discern, all this the light of nature doth reveal to be in the malignity of sin. Sect. 8. Sin being certainly no better a thing than is here described, it is most certain that it deserveth punishment. Sect. 9. And reason telleth us, that God being the Governor of the world, and perfect government being his perfect work and glory in that relation, it is not meet that in such a divine and perfect government so odious an evil be endured, and such contempt of God and all that is good be passed by, without such execution of his laws as is sufficient to demonstrate the justice of the Governor, and to vindicate his laws and authority from contempt. Nor that it be pardoned on any terms, but such as shall sufficiently attain the ends of perfect government." The ends of punishment are, 1. To do justice, and fulfil the law, and truth of the lawgiver: 2. To vindicate the honour of the Governor from contempt and treason: 3. To prevent further evil from the same offender: 4. To be a terror to others, and to prevent the hurt that impunity would encourage them to: 5. And if it be but merely castigatory, it may be for the good of the sinner himself; but in purely vindictive punishment, it is the governor and society that are the end. 1. It is true, that as the immediate sense of the precept, e. g. "Thou shalt do no murder," is not, de eventu, it shall not come to pass, but de debito, thy duty is to forbear it. So, also, the immediate sense of the penal part is not de eventu, e. g. if thou murder, thou shalt be put to death, but de debito, death shall be thy due, thou shalt be reus mortis: so that if it do non evenire, it is not presently a falsehood. But it is as true, that when the sovereign makes a law, he thereby declareth that this law is a rule of righteousness, that it is norma officii et a Sceleris etiam pœna tristis, et præter eos eventus qui sequuntur, per se maxima est.-Cic. 2. de Leg. jndicii; that the subject must do according to it, and expect to be done by according to it; that it is the instrument of government. Therefore, these two things are declared by it: 1. That, ordinarily, judgment and execution shall pass according to it. 2. That it shall never be, extraordinarily, dispensed with by sovereignty, but upon terms which as well declare the justice of the Governor, and discourage offenders from contempt, and are as fit to preserve the common good, and the honour of the sovereign. So that, thus far, a law doth assert also the event, which I put, to prevent objections, and to show that truth and justice require the ordinary execution of just and necessary laws.b 2. And should they be ordinarily dispensed with, it would intimate that the ruler did he knew not what in making them; that he repented of them as unjust, or oversaw himself in them, or foresaw not inconveniences, or was not able to see them executed. It would, also, make him seem a deceiver, that affrighted subjects with that which he never intended to do; which omnipotency, omniscience, and perfect goodness, cannot do, whatever impotent, ignorant, bad men may do. 3. And the offender must be disabled, when penitency showeth not the change of his heart, that he do so no more; and, therefore, death is ordinarily inflicted. 4. And, especially, offences must be prevented, and the honour of the sovereign and safety of the people be preserved. If laws be not executed, they and the lawgiver will be despised, others will be let loose, and invited to do evil; and no man's right will have any security by the law; therefore, it is a principle in politics, that pœna debetur reipublicæ; it is the commonwealth to which the punishment of offenders is due; that is, it is a means which the ruler oweth them for their security: and Cato was wont to say, "Se malle pro collato beneficio nullum reportare gratiam, quam pro maleficio perpetrato non dare pœnam." (Plutar. Apoth. Rom.) He had rather miss thanks for his kindnesses 1 Αγει τὸ θεῖον τες κακές πρὸς την δικην. Θεξ δ ̓ ὄνειδ@ τις κακές ευδαιμονεῖν. Καὶ ζῶν ὁ φαῦλος, καὶ θανὼν κολάζεται. Menand. Nemo malus felix.-Juv. Malo benefacere tantundem est periculum, quantum bono malefacere.-Plaut. Pen. See also the advertisement before the Unreasonableness of Infidelity ;' and in the book itself, (P. I. pp. 53,) &c. and 'More reasons,' &c. (pp. 93,94,) and of this book (pp. 64, 232. and 253,254). Noxæ par pœna esto, ut in suo vitio quisque plectatur.-Cic. 3. de Leg. с Injusti judicis est bene agentem non remunerare, et negligentem non corripere.-Sen. de Benef. Turpe quid ausurus, te, sine teste, time.-Auson, Veterem ferendo injuriam, invitas novam.-Gell, Noc. Attic. 1. 18. and gifts, than punishment for his faults; and was wont to say, that "Magistratus qui maleficos prohibere possent, et tamen impunitate donarent, lapidibus obruendos esse, ut Reipub. perniciosissimos." A hundred such sayings are in Cicero: ('Offic.' 3:) "Quotusquisque reperietur qui impunitate propositá abstinere possit injuria. Impunitas peccandi maxima est illecebra;" (De Natur. Deor.' 3 ;) "Nec domus, nec Respubl. stare potest, si in ea nec recte factis præmia extent ulla, nec supplicio peccatis ; (In Verrem' 5;) "Est utilius unius improbi supplicia multorum improbitarent coercere, quam propter multos improbos uni parcere;" (Offic.' 1;) "Non satis est eum qui lacesserit, injuriæ suæ pœnitere; ut ipse nequid tale posthac committat, et cæteri sint ad injuriam tardiores." This is the common sense of all that know what it is to govern. Object. But God is so good, that all his punishments tend at last to the sinner's good, and are merely castigatory. Answ. God is so wise, that he knoweth better than we what is good and fittest to be done; and God is so good, that for the honour of his government, and holiness, and goodness, he expresseth his hatred of sin, to the final ruin of the sinners; and he is so wise and good, that he will not spare the offender, when the penalty is necessary to the good of the innocent, to prevent their falls. The objection is a surmise not only groundless, but notoriously false. Sect. 10. He that would know how far punishment is necessary to the ends of government, must first know how far the penal law itself is necessary; for the first and chief benefit to the commonwealth is from the law, and the next from the execution. The first benefit is to constrain men to duty, and to restrain them from doing ill. This is done immediately by the fear of punishment, with the expectation of the benefit; this fear of d All laws were made for these two causes; both that no man might be suffered to do that which is unjust, and that transgressions being punished, the rest might be made better.-Demosth. Or. 2. cont. Aristog. It is your part, who are judges, to preserve the laws, and to make them strong and valid; for it is by the benefit of these that good men are better than the bad.—Id. ib. Or. 1. The government is useless which hath not nerves and force against the wicked and injurious, and in which pardon and the request of friends can do more than the laws.-Id. Or. de fals. Leg. Let no man be thought of so great authority, as to escape unpunished, if he break the laws.-Id. 3. Olynth. Puniendis peccatis tres esse causas existimatum est. 1. Cum adhibetur pœna castigandi et emendandi gratia; ut is qui deliquit attentior fiat correctiorque. 2. Quum dignitas ejus authoritasque in quem peccatur tuenda est, ne prætermissa animadversione contemptum ei pariat. 3. Propter exemplum ut cæteri metu pœnæ terreantur.-Gell. 1. 6. |