know, to be a favourite system amongst them, and as fashionable as any b,) whether it be not as wild enthusiasm as ever was invented and published to the world. It supposes God and nature, or God and the whole universe, to be one and the same substance, one universal being; insomuch that men's souls are only modifications of the Divine substance: from whence it follows, that what men will, God wills also; and what they say, God says; and what they do, God does c. Was there ever any raving enthusiast that discovered greater extravagance? This doctrine first owed its birth to Pagan darkness 4, and revived afterwards among the Jewish cabalists e: from thence it was handed down to Spinoza, who was originally a Jew, and from him it descended to the author or authors of the Pantheisticon; who, while they are themselves the greatest visionaries in nature, yet scruple not to charge the Christian world with enthusiasm.

There is another, though a more pardonable instance of fanaticism, or enthusiasm, among some modern Deists, relating to virtue, considered as subsisting, and in an eminent degree too, independent on hopes and fears, or on future rewards and penalties : a chimerical notion, and betraying the greatest ignorance both of men and things. What but some egregious warmth of imagination could ever induce any man to conceive, that he might be capable of practising a nobler kind of virtue than Abel, or Enoch, or Noah, or Abraham, or even Christ himself, considered in his human nature? All these owed their brightest instances of virtue to faith, to the respect they had to the recompence of reward "," to the "joy that was set before "them;" which is a just and rational principle, suited most certainly to the circumstances of this life. Possibly in a life to come, virtue and pleasure may constantly coincide, where we

66

b Parisiis plurimum versantur [Pantheista] itidem Venetiis ; in omnibus Hollandiæ urbibus, maxime certe Amstelodami; et nonnulli, quod mireris, in ipsa curia Romana: sed præcipue, et præ aliis locis omnibus, Londini abundant, ibique sedem, et quasi arcem suæ sectæ collocant. Pantheisticon, p. 42.

c See the Pantheistic principles drawn out more at large by Mr. Bayle in the article Spinoza, and well confuted, p. 2792.

d See Buddæus's Analecta Histor. Philosoph. in exercitat. de Spinozismo

ante Spinozam, p. 317, &c. Cudworth's Intellect. Syst. p. 306, 344. Bayle's Dictionary in Spinoza, p. 2782.

e See Buddæus, ibid. p. 346, &c. Reimman. Hist. Atheismi, p. 45, 46, 47:

Ad beate vivendum sola sufficit virtus; suaque sibi est satis ampla merces. Pantheisticon, p. 57. Comp. Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 25, 367.

g See Hebr. xi. 4, &c.
h Hebr. xi. 26.
i Hebr. xii. 2.

suppose all to be uniformly virtuous, and where there will be no clashing, no interfering, no trials, no conflicts: but in this life, undoubtedly, virtue, in any high degree of perfection, is present selfdenial, and cannot be made rational, that is, cannot be virtue, (for virtue and folly are not the same thing,) without taking into consideration future prospects. It is romantic to talk of a new kind of virtue never yet practised, nor practicable: or if it were, caprice, or convenience, or vainglory, not virtue, is the name for it. For if it be founded on worldly considerations, it is convenience only, or vainglory; and if it be founded on no considerations, it is caprice and between these two there is no medium, in this case, but faith in a world to come. The ancient Stoics, having but dark and fluctuating views of another life, were, in a manner, driven into that dry doctrine of virtue being constantly its own reward, in order to solve the difficulties concerning Providence. The Epicureans, absolutely rejecting both Divine Providence and a future state, made pleasure, worldly pleasure, the reward of virtue, that they might not seem altogether to desert the cause; and their virtue proved accordingly. The Sadducees, among the Jews, came nearer to the Stoical principles, having fallen into them, as it seems, unawares, through a kind of enthusiastic affectation of soaring above common sense. The Mystics followed, and deviated in like manner with the former, by overrefining and subtilizing plain things. After them came a set of enthusiasts amongst us, in the ill times, who revived the same principles, and were solidly confuted by several of our able and learned Divines. The Deists seem to fall in sometimes with

the Stoics and sometimes with the Epicureans, following virtue (as they say) either for its beauty, or for the present pleasure attending it, abstracted from the consideration of future rewards; that so they may carry on a show of supporting morality, while they are paring away the ground upon which it stands. If they are sincere and honest in their doctrine, it is a spice of enthusiasm; and if they are not, it is worse.

I may further observe, that there appears besides, in the present advocates for Deism, a very particular turn of mind, such as seems not to differ, in any thing material, from a spirit of enthusiasm; if it is not grave banter or solemn grimace. Their way is, to sanctify their flights of fancy, their own roving inventions, under the sacred name of reason, which they style also, in part, Divine inspiration m, and in the whole, internal revelation ". Hereupon they presume to talk as familiarly of God's mind and laws, and with as warm an assurance, as if they had been rapt up into the third heaven, or had sate in council with the Almighty. They prescribe, according as their fancies dictate, where they know nothing what services God ought to expect o, what indulgences he should make to warm desires o, what penalties he may appoint here or hereafter. They enter caveats against his being arbitrary, so as to enact any thing which they see not the reason for; and against his playing the tyrants, either by imposing positive laws without their consent, or by abridging them of their natural right ", (that is, of what they might otherwise enjoy upon the permissive law of nature,) or by interposing in matters indifferent *, (which every petty prince or state may do,) or by punishing the incorrigible for sins past y. This is taking great lengths of freedom with the high and tremendous Deity, such as one would not expect from any but the

o Ibid. p. 3, 105, 115, 116, 124, 125. P Ibid. p. 345.

a Ibid. p. 38, &c.

r Ibid. p. 30, 35, 61, 65, 114, 116, 125, 130, 370.

Ibid. p. 29, 30, 32, 38, 70, 122, 176, 188.

t Ibid. p. 113. Compare Script. Vindicat. vol. iv. part 2. p.260. and Puffendorf, book iii. ch. 4. sect. 4. p. 254.

u Ibid. p. 113, 134.

x Ibid. p. 132, 135, 171, 370.
y See Second Address, p. 7.

wildest enthusiasts. Indeed, all claims to any internal notices exclusive of God's written word, whether they be entitled inspiration, or internal revelation, or inward light, or reason, or infallibi lity, or what else soever; I say, all such claims brought to exclude Scripture, are enthusiastic and fanatical, false and vain.

But some perhaps may ask, can those then be enthusiasts, who profess to follow reason? Yes, undoubtedly, if by reason they mean only conceits. Therefore such persons are now commonly called reasonists and rationalists, to distinguish them from true reasoners or rational inquirers. For their great fault is, that they will not suffer reason to have its free course or full exercise, nor allow it sufficient light. Reason desires and requires all useful notices, and all the friendly intimations that can be procured: but these her most insidious adversaries, under a false plea of sufficiency 2, confine her to short measures, and shut up the avenues of improvement: by which it plainly appears, that they are just such friends to reason as they are to morality; friends to the name, and that is all. They follow reason, as they profess: but we maintain, that reason itself directs us to take in Scripture, when we have it before us, for our light and our guide. Who then is the friend to reason? he that flatters her with empty compliments, or he that follows her rules?

5. From the article of enthusiasm, I proceed next to two other terms of reproach, namely, state-craft and priest-craft, nearly allied to each other, (for which reason I mention them together,) and frequently made use of by unbelievers, in order to render true religion odious or suspected. It has often been suggested, that religion owed its birth and progress to the subtle contrivances of politicians and priests. Indeed priests seem to have come in the later, to bear their share in the scandal. Formerly, princes only, or lawgivers, were marked out as the most likely persons to have wrought those marvellous effects upon mankind.

z The common pretences about the sufficiency of reason, for furnishing out a complete system of religion and morality, seem to have just as much sense in them, as if a man should pretend to draw out a complete system of optics, setting aside all the instructions brought in by facts and observations; or a complete system of philosophy or medicine, throwing out the informations of history and experiThe Scripture accounts are

ments.

as necessary to be superadded to abstract reason, in order to form a complete system of religion and morality, as those other accounts are to complete the respective arts and sciences: and if reason requires that these should be taken in, it is running counter to reason, and destroying the use of it, to leave them out. Therefore the pretences of these gentlemen to reason are mere fallacies and impositions upon their readers.

:

In the very nature of the thing, religion should be conceived prior to priesthood appointed to serve in it unless we were to suppose some previous and special designation of the persons by Almighty God. In the natural course of things, if religion was all of human invention, it must have been invented before priests were appointed or made. For example: Evander, suppose, and Numa, invented and formed several religions, or superstitions, and then appointed the Luperci, Potitii, Pinarii, Salii, &c. to administer. I say then, that religion, in such a case, must naturally go before priesthood: which is true, though the inventor should appoint himself. And therefore Critias was so far in the right, when he thought of fathering religion upon human policy, to ascribe the invention of it to lawgivers a or politicians, not to priests. Critias was one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, (in the days of Socrates, whose most unworthy pupil he had once been,) a wicked and profligate man, by all accounts b, a perfect Atheist c. There could not be a fitter person to set on foot the conceit, that all religion was a trick of state. Euripides, in one of his plays, introduces Sisyphus, an ungodly wretch, as saying the same thing 4, agreeably to his character: for there is no reason to suspect with Plutarch e, (or whoever is the author,) that Euripides there expressed his own sentiments under disguise f. I shall not here waste your time in confuting that chimerical notion of Critias and his atheistical companions. It was exploded by all sober men as soon as started: it is sufficiently answered, even by Sextus Empiricus 8, a Pagan sceptic; but has been since more abundantly confuted and exposed by several learned moderns h. The Academic, in Cicero, occasionally makes mention of it, as an impious suggestion, contrived to overturn all religion. Now, as to our particular case, there needs no further

a Sextus Empiricus, adv. Physic. lib. ix. p. 562. edit. Fabric.

b See Bayle's Dictionary in Critias. c Plutarch. de Superstitione, Opp. tom. ii. p. 171. Sext. Empiric. p. 182, 562. Theoph. Antioch. lib. iii. p. 292. edit. Hamb.

d Euripides in Sisyphus, p. 492. edit. Barnes.

e Plutarch. de Placit. Philosoph. tom. ii. p. 880.

f Euripides has been well defended by Barnes, in Notis ad Euripid. p. 492, 493; Fabricius, in Not. ad Sext.

Empiric. p. 562; Bayle, in Euripides
and Critias; Stillingfleet, Origin.
Sacr. part ii. p. 49; Reimman. Hist.
Atheism. p. 123.

Sext. Empiric. p. 556.

h Stillingfleet, Origin. Sacr. part ii. ch. 1. Cudworth, Intellect. Syst. p. 691, &c. Tillotson, Serm. i. p. 16. fol. edit. Fabricius de Veritat. Relig. Christianæ, c. ix. p. 317. Fayi Defens. Relig. contr. Toland, p. 51, 52.

i Quid? ii qui dixerunt totam de diis immortalibus opinionem fictam esse ab hominibus sapientibus reipub