hibit the institution or prosecution of suits at law. In the Federal Courts of Equity that jurisdiction, so far as it relates to suits in the Federal Courts, remains unimpaired, but Congress, having in view the dual nature of our Government, and for the purpose of preventing unseemly conflicts of jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts, has provided that "the writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy.1

363. Do. Neither State Court Nor its Suitors May Be Enjoined. While the language of the statute simply forbids injunctions to stay proceedings in the State Courts, it means that such writs of injunction are not to be issued to the parties to those proceedings, and not merely that the Federal Court shall not enjoin State Courts. The method of enjoining proceedings in other tribunals has always, or nearly always, been by enjoining the parties from prosecuting, and therefore an injunction from a Federal Court to prohibit. an individual from instituting or prosecuting a suit in a State Court is within the mischef intended to be guarded against by the statute.1 With the exception of cases in bankruptcy, under the limited liability Acts of Congress protecting vessel owners, or in which an injunction is necessary for the protection of its own suitors, and the enforcement of its own decrees, a Federal Court may not grant a writ of injunetion restraining individuals from instituting or prosecuting suits in the State Courts.

364. Do.-Federal Court May Enjoin State Court Proceedings When Necessary to Enforce its Own Decrees or Judgments.-In spite of this sweeping prohibition, it has been decided that where a case is properly pending in a Court of the United States, and that Court has proceeded to judgment or decree therein, it may, if necessary to

1R. S., sec. 720.

1

Central National Bank vs. Stevens, 169 U. S. 461.

give effect thereto, enjoin parties from instituting or prosecuting actions in State Courts.

Thus, a replevin proceeding was instituted in a State Court for Cook County, Ill., a replevin bond given and the property seized. The plaintiffs, who under the then existing statutes had the right to remove, filed a proper petition for the removal of the case to the Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The defendants opposed the removal and the State Court refused to order it. The plaintiffs, however, as they were authorized by law to do, filed a transcript of the record in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Illinois. That Court held that it had jurisdiction, and upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States its decree was affirmed. Before the appeal was heard the State Court had gone ahead with the case, which it held to be still pending before it, and decided in favor of the defendants and ordered a return to them of the property replevied. This order was not obeyed. Thereupon the defendants began suit on the replevin bond.

The United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illinois enjoined the prosecution of this proceeding in the State Courts. Upon appeal the Supreme Court held that it was right in so doing. The Court said:

"The bill in this case was, therefore, ancillary to the replevin suit, and was in substance a proceeding in the Federal court to enforce its own judgment by preventing the defeated party from wresting the replevied property from the plaintiffs in replevin, who, by the judgment of the court, were entitled to it, or what was in effect the same thing, preventing them from enforcing a bond for the return of the property to them. A court of the United States is not prevented from enforcing its own judgments by the statute which forbids it to grant a writ of injunction to stay proceedings in a State court."***"The original plaintiff in the action on the replevin bond, represented the real parties in interest, and he was a party to the action of replevin, which had been pending, and was finally determined in the United States Circuit Court. That Court had jurisdiction of his person, and could enforce its judgment in the replevin suit against him, or those whom

he represented, their agents and attorneys. The bill in this case was filed for that purpose and that only."

365. Do. Enjoining State Court Judgments on the Ground That They Were Procured by Fraud, Accident or Mistake. The jurisdiction of a Court is not exhausted by the rendition of a judgment; it continues until the judgment is satisfied.1

Ordinarily, therefore, a Federal Court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the holder of a State Court judgment from enforceing it. To this rule there is no exception where the inequity of allowing the enforcement is based upon an error in the proceedings of the State Court itself. The Supreme Court has held, however, that where a defendant was prevented by fraud from setting up in a State Court a meritorious defense which he had, the Federal Court may, in spite of the statute, enjoin the enforcement of such judgment provided there is the necessary diversity of citizenship between the parties.2

The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in a very able opinion has held that the exception applies as well to cases where the defendant was prevented from making his defense by accident or mistake.3

In that case the defendant in the State Court suit was a non-resident corporation. In accordance with the laws of the State, the State Auditor had been appointed its attorney to accept service of process. Suit had been brought against it upon a claim as to which it had a perfect and conclusive defense. Process was served on the State Auditor and he, by mistake, failed to notify the defendant of the suit. It knew nothing about it and of coures never appeared. Judgment was given against it for $7,800. Some years later it learned of the judgment. It brought suit in the United States Circuit Court to enjoin the enforcement of it. It was

1 Dietzsch vs. Huidekoper, 103 U. S. 496.

'Central National Bank vs. Stevens, 169 U. S. 464.

* Marshall vs. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589.

National Surety Co. vs. State Bank, 120 Fed. 593.

held that the Court had jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed.

366. Ancillary Jurisdiction in Aid of Another Federal Court.—In addition to the jurisdiction of a District Court over proceedings which are ancillary to other proceedings properly pending before that Court, there is still another kind of ancillary jurisdiction which it is sometimes called on to exercise. The occasion for it usually arises where property involved in litigation is found in two or more districts.

367. Do. Ancillary Receivers.—It is especially important to exercise ancillary jurisdiction when it becomes necessary to appoint a receiver for property. The powers of a receiver do not ordinarily extend beyond the jurisdiction of the Court which appoints him. Where receivers are needed for a great railroad corporation, such as the Northern Pacific Railroad, it becomes necessary to obtain appointments from the Court in each district through which the road runs or in which it has property. Such a corporation may have property lying in a number of different districts in the same circuit. Section 56 of the Judicial Code makes

provision for such a case. It declares that the appointment of a receiver in one district of the circuit and his qualification gives him "full jurisdiction and control over all the property, the subject of the suit, lying or being within such circuit, subject, however, to the disapproval of such order within thirty days thereafter by the Circuit Court of Appeals for such circuit, or by a Circuit Judge thereof, after reasonable notice to adverse parties and an opportunity to be heard upon the motion for such disapproval." If it is disapproved the receiver is divested of jurisdiction over all the property not lying or being within the State in which the suit was brought. The section also requires that within ten days after the filing of the order in the District Court of original jurisdiction, a duly certified copy of the bill and of the order of appointment shall be filed in the District Court of each district of the circuit in which any of the property lies.

It is declared that where a receiver is appointed under the authority so given, process may issue and be executed within any district of the circuit in the same manner and to the same extent as if the property were wholly within the same district. Orders affecting such property shall be entered of record in each district in which the property affected may lie or be.

368. Do. Ancillary Receivers When Property Lies in Different Circuits.-But in some cases, as where a large railroad system is involved, the property may not only be in several districts of one circuit but in a number of different circuits. In such cases an ancillary bill should be filed in some district of each circuit in which the property is found. Usually the judge of the Court of such district appoints as ancillary receivers the same persons as were appointed original receivers. All orders are obtained from the Court of original jurisdiction. Such of them as apply to the property in any other circuit are obtained also in the proper District Court of the latter circuit.

369. Do.-Administration Under Ancillary Receiverships. The assets realized in a district in which the jurisdiction has been ancillary, after paying the necessary expenses and Court costs in that district, and making proper reservations to protect the rights and liens of the creditors living in it, are turned over to the Court of primary jurisdiction for distribution among the general creditors.

370. Do.-Court of Ancillary Jurisdiction May Select its Own Receivers.-There is no binding obligation, however, upon the District Court of another circuit, when application is made to exercise this ancillary jurisdiction, to do so, in the precise manner which is usual and most convenient. If it sees fit it can decline to appoint receivers at all, or it can, and it sometimes does, appoint other receivers, or having appointed in the first instance the same receivers as those of the Court of primary jurisdiction. it may afterwards remove them and appoint others in their place.