impatient about the poor quality of the intelligence coming out of there. Ie
wanted to know: Where was Saddam? Where were the WMD? Most
immediately: Why weren't U.S. troops catching or forestalling the gangs planting
improvised explosive devices by the roads? Rumsfeld pointed out that Gitmo
was producing good intel. So he directed Steve Cambone, his under secretary for
intelligence, to send Gitmo commandant Miller to Iraq to improve what they
were doing out there. Cambone in turn dispatched his deputy, Lt. Gen. William
Jerry) Boykin - later to gain notoriety for his harsh comments about Islam
down to Gitmo to talk with Miller and organize the trip. 136

The record of what orders, if any, Secretary Rumsfeld gave to Gen. Miller is confused. Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen A. Cambone, Secretary Rumsfeld's top intelligence aide, testified that Gen. Miller went to Iraq "with my encouragement," "1" but G Miller testified that he had no conversations with Undersecretary Cambone either before or ...” his Iraq visit. 138 Col. Thomas Pappas, who commanded the 205th Military Intelligence Briga Abu Ghraib, said that Gen. Miller sent a draft report of his findings during his visit to Secre Rumsfeld,139 but both Rumsfeld and Cambone denied having seen any instruction that M used for "enabling interrogation.”110

The interplay between Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Miller is critical to determining
Rumsfeld's causal link with the Abu Ghraib abuses (although does not determine
command responsibility). The questions posed at a congressional hearing by senat er e
Clinton to Gen. Taguba remain largely unanswered:

If, indeed, General Miller was sent from Guantánamo to Iraq for the p
acquiring more actionable intelligence from detainees, then it is fair t
that the actions that are at point here in your report are in some was
to General Miller's arrival and his specific orders, however they were
by those MPs and the military intelligence that were involved
for one don't believe 1 yet have adequate information from Mr

Justan

**quently in

ons, as of to improve

138 John Barry, Michael Hirsh & Michael Isikoff, "The Roots of Torture," Newsweek (inte [online], http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4989481/.

137

Dr. Steve Cambone, "Testimony of Dr. Steve Cambone," Senate Armed Services Iraqi Prisoners, May 7, 2004, p. 24.

138 Major General Geoffrey Miller, "Testimony of Major General Geoffrey Miller Se
Hearing on Iraq Prisoner Abuse, May 19, 2004, p. 25.

139 Sworn Statement of Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, Victory Base, Iraq, Febru
140 Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Treatment of Iraqi Pris.
transcript, Rumsfeld responds to the question "Did you ever see, approve
interrogation?" by saying, "I don't recall that that policy came to me for a
question "...[W]ere you aware that a specific recommendation was to
process?" by saying, "In that precise language, no."

ine]

⚫uary 22, 2002 (dismissing

- Conference with Secretary of

Washington Post, May 8, 2004, p. 1y 12, 2004.

41

the Defense Department as to exactly what General Miller's orders were, what
kind of reports came back up the chain of command as to how he carried out
those orders, and the connection between his arrival in the fall of '03 and the
intensity of the abuses that occurred afterward. 111

On September 14, 2003, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, implemented Gen. Miller's proposals by adopting a policy that brought back into play the techniques which Secretary Rumsfeld had approved in December 2002 for use at Guantánamo. Gen. Sanchez's memo authorized 29 interrogation techniques, including the "presence of military working dog: Exploits Arab fear of dogs while maintaining security during interrogations," and sleep deprivation,142 both approved by Secretary Rumsfeld for Guantánamo. The memo also authorized techniques to alter the environment of prisoners, such as adjusting temperatures or introducing unpleasant smells, while recognizing that “some nations may view application of this technique in certain circumstances to be inhumane." Yelling, loud music, and light control were also approved "to create fear, disorientate [the] detainee and prolong capture shock."143

Between three and five interrogation teams were sent in October from Guantánamo to the
American command in Iraq “for use in the interrogation effort” at Abu Ghraib,144

Beyond this, the Schlesinger report noted that “senior leaders expressed, forcibly at times, their needs for better intelligence.” It also concluded that a number of high-level visits to Abu Ghraib contributed to this pressure, including those by Gen. Miller and “a senior member of the National Security Council Staff."145 This second visit, focused primarily on intelligence collection,116 led "some personnel at the facility to conclude, perhaps incorrectly, that even the White House was interested in the intelligence gleaned from their interrogation reports.”147 Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Jordan, who served as Chief of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing

141

Senator Hillary Clinton, question to General Taguba, Senate Armed Services Committee Testimony. Hearing on Allegations of Mistreatment of Iraqi Prisoners. May 11, 2004 [online], http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A17812-2004May11.html

142 Ricardo S. Sanchez, Lieutenant General, to Combined Joint Staff Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq, and Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq, "CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy," memorandum, September 14, 2003 [online], http//www.aclu.org/Safe and Free/Safeand Free cfm?ID=17851&c=206.

144 Douglas Jehl and Andrea Elliott, "Cuba Base Sent Its Interrogators to Iraqi Prison," The New York Times, May 29,

2004

145

This was a reference to a visit by Ms. Frances Fragos Townsend, deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security advisor for combating terronsm. See Blake Morrison and John Diamond, "Pressure at Iraqi Prison Detailed," USA Today, June 18, 2004.

145 James Schlesinger "Testimony of James Schlesinger, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on DoD Detention Operations. September 9, 2004, p 34

147 Schlesinger report, pp 65-66

Center at Abu Ghraib, told Gen. Taguba that he "spent more time running around, being an aide-de-camp ... [for] general officers and folks from the White House ... than I can shake a stick at. .”148 He added, “Sir, I was just told a couple times by Colonel Pappas that some of the reporting was getting read by Rumsfeld, folks out at Langley, some very senior folks...So, I would Say it is a true statement sir, that Colonel Pappas was under a lot of pressure to produce, sir, and to produce quality reporting." "149

Thus, at a time when (as will be shown below) reports of detainee abuse by U.S. troops were mounting, these troops were placed under added pressure to extract intelligence from detainees, and illegal interrogation methods were re-introduced.

Secretary Rumsfeld knew or should have known that soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq were committing torture and war crimes

Secretary Rumsfeld was personally warned about the abuse of detainees Throughout the period in question, Secretary Rumsfeld was personally notified about the mistreatment of detainees:

Journalists raised questions about abuse allegations in Afghanistan during press
conferences with Secretary Rumsfeld in January and February of 2002,150

• Officials in Afghan President Hamid Karzai's government reportedly raised concerns about detainee abuse allegations with Secretary Rumsfeld during his visits to Afghanistan in 2002.151

Secretary of State Colin Powell reportedly raised the issue of detaince abuse frequently in meetings with Rumsfeld and others. 152

• According to The Washington Post, citing U.S. officials familiar with the discussions, as of August 2003, U.S. Administrator in Iraq L. Paul Bremer "pressed the military to improve

148 Lieutenant Colonel Stephen L. Jordan, AR 15-6 Investigation Interview, February 24, 2004, [online] http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/a53.pdf, p. 96.

140 Ibid., p. 111.

150

See e.g., Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, January 22, 2002 (dismissing claims about mistreatment of detainees captured in Afghanistan as "utter nonsense"); Press Conference with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Pentagon, February 12, 2002.

151 Human Rights Watch interviews with Afghan officials, Kabul, September 2002.

152

Peter Slevin and Robin Wright, "Pentagon Was Warned of Abuse Months Ago," The Washington Post, May 8, 2004, p. A12; Mark Matthews, "Powell: Bush Told of Red Cross Reports," The Baltimore Sun, May 12, 2004.

708

conditions and later made the issue a regular talking point in discussions with Rumsfeld, Vice President Cheney and national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.”153

The Defense Department was warned about the abuse of detainees

The ICRC delivered repeated warnings during the same period. The organization paid 29 visits to 11 detention centers in Iraq, delivering oral and written reports to U.S. officials in Iraq after Pach visit 151

According to the ICRC:

In May 2003, the ICRC sent to the CF [Coalition Forces] a memorandum based
on over 200 allegations of ill treatment of prisoners of war during capture and
interrogation at collecting points, battle group stations and temporary holding
areas. The allegations were consistent with marks on bodies observed by the
medical delegate. The memorandum was handed over to [redacted portion] US
Central Command in Doha, State of Qatar.

In early haly [2003] the ICRC sent the CF a working paper detailing
appixximately 50 allegations of ill-treatment in the military intelligence section
of Camp Cryppet, at Baghdad International Airport. They included a
Commutation of pesty and deliberate acts of violence aimed at securing the
espre ation of the persons deprived of their "berty with their interrogators,
Macað ̧ðantom æânduls and finger, to arrot her family members to
TRANNY KARYNĖJAs to Quintinım`gant perses depoved of their iherty or
que cast speakers at the times in particular wives and daughters hooding,

concerns" to occupation authorities, reminding them of obligations under the Geneva Conventions and intemational treaties. 156

When, in the midst of the worst abuses at Abu Ghraib, the ICRC complained to Coalition forces, Army officials apparently responded by trying to curtail the ICRC's access, 157

The Army provost marshal, Maj. Gen. Donald Ryder, investigated U.S.-run prisons in Iraq. His report on the treatment of Iraqi detainees, delivered to Gen. Sanchez, on Nov. 6, 2003, found "potential human rights training and manpower issues system-wide that needed immediate attention."158

In December 2003, retired Col. Stuart A. Herrington presented a confidential report that warned of detainee abuse throughout Iraq. Herrington's findings were reportedly passed on by Gen. Sanchez to officials at U.S. Central Command. 159

Iraq's former human rights minister Abdel Bassat Turki told the British Guardian that he had "informed Mr. Bremer last November and again in December of the rampant abuse in US military prisons." Turki said that he had asked Bremer for permission to visit Abu Ghraib to investigate abuse allegations but was turned down. 160

There was substantial public information about abuses against detainees Well before the Abu Ghraib investigation began, Secretary Rumsfeld had access to abundant public information and reports from NGOs that U.S. officials in Afghanistan and Iraq were committing torture and war crimes:

In April 2002, images were released of American John Walker Lindh being held naked and bound by duct tape to a stretcher in Afghanistan.

158 Peter Slevin and Robin Wright, "Pentagon Was Warned of Abuse Months Ago," The Washington Post, May 8, 2004, p.

A 12.

157 Douglas Jehl and Eric Schmitt, "Army Tried to Limit Abu Ghraib Access," The New York Times, May 20, 2004. This pattern continued even after the Abu Ghraib disclosures. In June 2004, DIA Director, Vice Adm. Lowell Jacoby, complained in a letter to Undersecretary for Intelligence Stephen Cambone, that two DIA agents had witnessed special forces in Baghdad beating a prisoner in the face severely enough to require medical attention. When they protested, Jacoby told Cambone, the DIA officers were threatened and their photos of the injuries confiscated.

168 "Report on Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq," Office of the Provost Marshal General of the Army, November 5, 2003 [online], http://www.aclu.org/torture foia/released/18TF.pdf, "Chronology: Early Warnings Missed; A Prison-Abuse Timeline," Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2004.

159 Josh White, "U.S. Generals in Iraq Were Told of Abuse Early, Inquiry Finds," The Washington Post, December 1, 2004. Luke Harding, "Bremer Knew, Minister Claims," The Guardian, May 10, 2004.

160