THE CALL TO ARMS 1870 given Sadowa. The Czechs, Poles, and Magyars, who, of late, had acquired influence in the Austrian Empire, all sympathized with the French. Count von Beust, the Austrian Chancellor, was ready to form an alliance with France. At the Tuileries it was felt that the blow, if struck at all, must be struck quickly. Eugénie and her clerical friends were outspoken in their eagerness for a war that would raise France by humbling Prussia. The Ambassador at Berlin was commissioned to express the deep pain which France felt at Leopold's acceptance of the proffered crown of Spain. Under the pressure of the foreign Powers, Spain was induced to withdraw the offer which she had made, and Leopold voluntarily renounced his candidacy through his father. The French ambassador Benedetti, however, was commanded to obtain from King William a declaration that the candidacy of Leopold of Hohenzollern would never be supported again. At Ems, where King William was taking the waters, Benedetti gained an audience with the Prussian sovereign and pressed his suit hard, refusing to take William's refusal as final. At last the King refused to confer with him. Of what had occurred at Ems, Bismarck knew nothing. He had invited Roon and Moltke to dine with him on July 13. In their presence a telegram from Ems reached him containing King William's version of recent events with permission to publish the matter. Bismarck made use of the royal authorization to publish the contents of the telegram. This publication was indeed "a call to arms." Germany was in a delirium of joy when the news of the supposed humiliation of Benedetti was published. Frenchmen were wild with rage at the affront which they thought had been offered to their Minister. In a fiery speech to the Assembly, Ollivier called for an appropriation of five hundred millions "to safeguard the interests, the security, and the honor of France." Almost unanimously the sum was granted. 975 XIXth Century-Vol. III-6 1870 FRENCH MOBILIZATION In Paris mobs were fiercely shouting “À Berlin, à Berlin." In Germany the cry was, "Zum Rhein, zum Rhein.” When Ollivier had gathered the French reserves, the order was given to mobilize the North German Army Corps. The national song, "Die Wacht am Rhein," swept through the land as did the "Marseillaise" in France. On July 19, the day on which the Reichstag of the North German Confederation was opened, France declared war. It was to be a struggle à l'outrance between France and Germany alone. Neither side was supported by an ally. England, Italy, and Russia proclaimed their neutrality. Von Beust, the Austrian Chancellor, Saxon though he was, would gladly have come to Napoleon's aid, but the sympathy for Germany felt by most Austrians of German descent-"Teutonic effervescence" he called it-prevented him from carrying out his intentions, and compelled him, "not without regret," to declare Austria neutral. Although there had been no little indecision and even hostility in South Germany, the States which were not already members of the North German Confederation all joined the Prussian standard. On July 28 Napoleon III, with the little Prince Imperial, left Paris for the front, and proceeded to Metz, where forces had been gathered which were designated the "Army of the Rhine." At Metz were 150,000 men; at Strasburg 100,000; at Châlons 50,000. The French troops were so distributed that the Prussians should not foresee where the principal attack would be made. The combined forces were to cross the Rhine at Maxau, compel the South German States to remain neutral, and proceed to the Elbe, where friendly assistance was expected from Italy and Austria. The plan was good; but presupposed the gathering of 300,000 men on the banks of the Rhine before the Prussian forces could be mobilized; the possibility of throwing these men across the river and entering Southern Germany without PRUSSIAN MOBILIZATION 1870 stoppage; the ability of the French generals to hold their own until they could be joined by the Austrians and Italians. It was likewise presupposed that the French fleet would land 30,000 men on the Baltic coast, who were to join 40,000 Danes, and thus compel Prussia to divide her forces. No step had been taken to cover the retreat of the army if it met with reverses, nor were the French officers provided with war maps of their own country. Moltke's scheme was less complex. A year before war had been declared maps of the probable theatre of war had been drawn up. The German forces were to be mobilized in the Bavarian Palatinate and "to look for the principal force of the enemy and to attack it wherever found." In ten days the entire North German army was raised from a peace-footing of 300,000 to a war-footing of 900,000. With equal rapidity the South German troops were mobilized. Day and night the railroads carried troops to the frontier. The first army (right wing, 61,000 men) came by way of Coblentz under General Steinmetz; the second army (centre, 206,000 men) by way of Mainz and Bingen, under Prince Frederick Charles; the third army (left wing, 50,000 men) by way of Mannheim and Maxau, under Crown Prince Frederick. Preparations were made to protect the seacoast. Three army corps and 160,000 mobile militia (Landwehr) were left in Germany to resist a possible Austrian invasion. Long before the outbreak of war the secret intelligences of the Prussian War Office had fixed the time limit of French mobilization at nineteen days. Moltke's plan of mobilization accordingly provided for eighteen days. The whole German army was mobilized strictly within that time. As it turned out, the French War Office required twenty-one days to put its army on a war-footing. The strong offensive movements of the German forces during the latter part of this operation upset all the French plans. Thus it came that the French plan |