Imagini ale paginilor
PDF
ePub

my thoughts, but have not yet been able to determine positively which to fix on.

The first goes upon the supposition, that there are certain rights granted to every man indifferently by the laws of nature; such as the right to food, right to truth, right of punishment, &c.; and these rights contain in their idea, that the law protects every man in the exercise of them: so the rule will run thus, That every man is obliged to act thus with relation to his neighbour, as not directly to do him damage, or, which is the same thing, disturb him in the exercise of his rights; but, on the other hand, that he is not bound to advance, his good. The second goes also upon the foundation of rights, only it carries the point a little further, viz. That every man is positively bound to advance the good of others, in all cases where it does not contradict his own good. The third commands, That every man must directly choose that which, taking in all circumstances, will do most good, without considering himself but as one of the infinite number whose good he is equally bound to advance. This last, it is plain, destroys all other rights and obligations, to raise itself upon their ruins. The first, were I obliged to fix, would be my scheme; and I have the securest side of the question, the presumption being for me, from the nature of rights. It is indeed evident, that I am bound to do my neighbour no harm; but if you carry the point higher, and oblige me also to do him good, yours must be the probation; for I will never submit myself to a greater burden than I see myself in duty bound: besides that, if you establish any of the other schemes, of consequence you make all the common epithets, generosity, benevolence, selfishness, kindness, &c. mere empty sounds, without any fixed ideas; for how can you reckon that man generous or benevolent, who, in doing all the good he is capable of, does nothing more than what he is directly bound, &c. to do. Sure nobody

2 A

is

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

is reckoned generous for paying his just debts; and the man also who neglects this duty is not properly named selfish, but wicked. But still, after all, there is no direct demonstration; and if you adhere to your rule laid down in page 72., you will be so kind as to acquaint me what strictly is the meaning; but whatever sense you put upon it, I expect you will join it with some other demonstration than that already given: for I cannot help thinking, that it is not far from a contradiction to assert, that God does always what is absolutely best on the whole; though, upon the other hand, I shall readily grant, if you prove aliundè, that this duty is incumbent upon mankind, God's not doing always what is absolutely best, will be no solid objection; for it is no good consequence to say, that since it is impossible God should do what is absolutely best, therefore, man, (though there be no impossibility), is not obliged to contribute Call his endeavours. I cannot deny, even granting the reasonableness of the first scheme, but there may be some exceptions, which, too, may be drawn from the nature of the thing: for an example, I have set down the following, which occurred to me, as I was considering a short essay that a friend of mine had drawn up upon the subject of Conjunctions; and though I cannot help thinking, that I have carried the point too far, yet I am not able for the life of me to find out where the weak side lies.

[ocr errors]

The Reverend Dr SAMUEL CLARKE to Mr HENRY HOME.

SIR,

You will pardon my sending you such a brief answer, as is according to my custom, and to the time allowed me for such mat

ters.

C 2

815

Though

[ocr errors]

Though the ideas of necessity and self-existence are indeed distinct, yet every necessity not founded in self-existence, is in reality either merely figurative, or merely hypothetical. An endless succession of beings, produced one from another, without any self-existent cause, is nothing but a verbal removing of the difficulty a little out of sight: It is in reality the same supposition, as the endless (the beginningless) duration of one being, neither self-existent itself, nor having its existence founded in any self-existent cause; which is absurd and contradictory.

If we see no necessity for more than one Deity, (that is, if one necessary being sufficiently answers for that necessity, by which I am obliged to allow some one being at least to be necessary), it doth from thence follow, that there can possibly be no more: Because whatever being can possibly be conceived not to be necessary, cannot possibly be necessary; the idea of necessity, effectually excluding all possibility of being so much as conceived to be not necessary. He that conceives the equality of the three angles of a triangle to two right ones, not to be necessary, does not in truth conceive any such thing, but only carelessly affirms a contradiction, of which no man can ever possibly have any conception at all: It is only talking nonsense in an unknown language.

Just as omnipotence is the power of doing all things possible to be done, so omniscience is the power of knowing all things possible to be known. Whether, therefore, future free actions be the object of science, or only of infinitely perfect and unerring judgment, which is a distinct attribute, is the only pertinent question, but of no importance at all to be resolved. Undoubtedly, were there no antecedent preference of truth to falsehood in the nature of things, in every case every one would be left at liberty to choose which of them is fittest for his present purpose: And for the same reason, the whole nature

and

and existence of things would be a mere impertinency. It is certainly true, (speaking morally, not physically), that God cannot but do always what is best and wisest on the whole. But then, by the word whole, you must always remember, not to mean so small a part as mankind in the present time, or mankind in all times, but the sum total of the works of God (taken together as one. system), through infinite space and infinite time; with regard to which, infinity is by no. means inexhaustible.

[ocr errors]

I agree, that " actions only are the proper objects of law :" And, therefore, I mean only what you rightly express, that "we are obliged to act, by applying our faculties to the consideration of the at"tributes of the Deity;" the consequence of which, in a sincere mind, cannot but be veneration, honour, and esteem. As to the obligation upon men to do all the good they can, I take it to be, not a point or a line, but a matter of great latitude. To do any wrong, is punishable in proportion to the wrong done or intended. To do barely what is just, is barely not being punishable. To be totally negligent and inactive, and to do no good, is (I think) a species of vice, punishable. To do good actually, is a power and a duty, unlimited, and divisible in infinitum; commendable in proportion to the innumerable different possible degrees of it, and proposed to us as such, by the nature of things, and by the Author of our being. I take a right to be, not only (what you define it) a moral power to act, but also a moral fitness and capacity to receive, which belongs as much to infants as to men. I am, Sir, your very humble servant,

London, August 29. 1723.

S. CLARKE.

APPEN

APPENDIX.-No. III.

[ocr errors]

On Final Causes,

[ocr errors]

A VERY striking feature in all the philosophical writings of Lord Kames, is, his frequent reference to Final Causes. He omits no opportunity that occurs of pointing them out to the attention of his reader; and indulges himself with evident delight in considering all the phenomena both of the natural and moral world, as evidences of consummate wisdom, combined with benevolent design, and therefore furnishing irresistible conviction, not only of the power, but of the wisdom and beneficence of the Supreme Being. So unjversally indeed is this argument diffused through the author's writings, that we are induced to conclude, he regarded it as a primary object of his philosophy: A noble object, and worthy of those superior endowments of intellect, with which it has pleased our Creator to distinguish the highest order of his creatures. In this important point of view, not less than in its subserviency to the acquisition of knowledge, and the improvement of science, the consideration of Final Causes has been recommended by the ablest philosophers. But as it is capable of being pushed to a hurtful extreme, we willingly admit, that it is to be cautiously pursued; and it must be acknowledged, that, in those of a warm and sanguine temperament, and in whom the generous affections strongly predominate, a want of due

caution

« ÎnapoiContinuă »