"But if the strike was still pending, the members of the Central Labor Union had no right to interfere with the plaintiff's business for the illegal purpose of forcing it to abandon the making of individual contracts with its employes.

"The findings of the master were that the individual contract committee by its acts intentionally attempted to interfere with the plaintiff in its business, that such acts were calculated to injure the plaintiff in the sale of its products, and were without lawful justification; the acts above recited were in substance a boycott and illegal."

Concerning the defendant's contention that the plaintiff had been guilty of fraud in failing to confer as to methods to avoid waste when a conference on the subject had been broached and agreed to, the Court said:

"The defendants contend that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief in equity, for the reason that it fraudulently failed to carry out the agreements made by it with the defendants respecting notice, before the working agreements could be terminated; and because Fuller, the plaintiff's manager, failed to meet the committee as agreed on Oct. 27, 1920, for the purpose of considering the question whether the cost of production could be reduced. As to the first of the contentions, the master expressly found that the plaintiff's manager (who gave notice to the committee on October 11 that all agreements would be terminated in thirty days from date) did not at any time state to any person that the notice in question was withdrawn or revoked; but that the committee was led to believe by Mr. Fuller and did believe that the matter of wages, which was the only subject then under discussion, could be disposed of and the plaintiff's employes would be allowed to continue their employment under the terms and conditions then in effect. This finding makes it plain that the notice originally given was not

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at any time withdrawn or revoked, nor were the defendants justified in believing that it would be revoked or withdrawn unless an amicable settlement of the disputed question of wages was reached. Accordingly when the period of the notice expired on November II the agreement ceased to exist, although the employes continued to work for nearly a month thereafter at the same wages they had previously received. The circumstance that the plaintiff's manager failed to meet the committee as agreed on Oct. 27 falls far short of showing that his absence was intentional, and that he did not propose to keep the appointment in good faith. The committee were notified that he was in Detroit on that day and would not be able to meet the committee until a later date; he returned about Nov. 1, thereafter but did not make any attempt to meet the committee, nor does it appear that the latter ever made any effort to confer with him. ***

"The acts complained of committed by the Central Labor Union were entirely apart and distinct from the controversy which in Dec., 1920, had arisen between the plaintiff and its employes; that controversy related to wages and resulted in a strike which on the findings of the master ended in Aug., 1921. The present suit is brought to prevent unjustifiable interference with the plaintiff's employes and with its business. In these circumstances, even if the plaintiff had failed to give due notice before terminating the working agreements, or had intentionally refused to meet the committee as its general manager had agreed, the rule that a plaintiff must come into court with clean hands to be entitled to relief in equity is not applicable to the facts in the present case. The acts now complained of have no direct relation to the original controversy. The plaintiff does not ask for relief arising from any contract or transaction tainted with fraud or bad faith." The decree was affirmed.

The opinion in this case of the Trial Court was reported at 2 Law and Labor 96 and of the Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois at 4 Lam and Labor 124. The statement of the facts in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois written by Chief Justice Thompson is unusually concise, and is here given in full, as follows:

"John Carlson, plaintiff in No. 14776, is a journeyman carpenter and a member of the Carpenters' Union. July 18, 1919, and for a long time prior thereto, he was in the employ of Simon Hill, a contractor who did not belong to a contractors' organization. Hill had work to be done, and desired to retain Carlson in his employ, and Carlson was able and willing to work, and desired to continue his employment. Representatives of the union of which Carlson was a member had signed a working agreement

with the Carpenter Contractors' Association, one of the defendants, which did not expire until 1921. This agreement provided, among other things, that there should be no strikes or lockouts without the sanction of a joint conference board composed of members of the contracting parties, and that the minimum rate of wages until May 31, 1921, should be 80 cents an hour. Notwithstanding this agreement, the representatives of the carpenters, in June, 1919, presented to representatives of the contractors a demand that the minimum rate of wages be increased to $1 an hour, giving as their reason the increased cost of living. Following this demand the contractors agreed to increase the wages 121⁄2 cents an hour, but refused to grant the rate demanded. Thereupon July 9, 1919, a general strike was called, in violation. of the working agreement. Those contractors or mem

bers of the public who were willing to pay $1 an hour to carpenters were allowed by the carpenters' union to proceed with their work without molestation. Hill agreed to pay Carlson $1 an hour, and Carlson continued in his employ.

"Oscar Carlson, plaintiff in No. 14777, was, in July, 1919, engaged in erecting a building for himself. He is not a carpenter nor a carpenter contractor. After the strike was called he continued to employ union carpenters, and paid them the wages demanded.

"A week after the strike was called the Carpenter Contractors' Association and the Building Construction Employers' Association declared a lockout of all union workmen in the building trades throughout Lake and Cook counties, and the members of such contracting associations ceased operations. This lockout had little, if any, effect on the situation, because all the union workmen had left the employ of the associated contractors before the lockout was declared. After the associated contractors left the field, independent contractors who had been operating in Cook and Lake counties continued to employ union carpenters, and new contractors entered the field and employed the striking carpenters at the wage demanded. In order to make the lockout effective the associated contractors sought and secured the aid of the dealers in building material. After several conferences the material dealers agreed, at the request of these contractors, who had theretofore been their best and largest customers, representing about 80 per cent. of their business, to cease selling and delivering materials to any person employing or about to employ union carpenters or other union labor in the building trades. Thereafter independent contractors, private builders and members of the general public were refused material for the purpose of erecting or repairing buildings, and as a result of their inability. to obtain building materials they were compelled to discharge workmen, although willing to pay the wages demanded and to comply with all other requirements of the unions. As a result of the refusal of the material dealers to sell and deliver material Simon Hill was forced to discharge John Carlson, and Oscar Carlson was not able to complete his building."

The Court's statement of the issue is as follows:

"These are simple actions ex delicto. We are called upon to decide whether (1) a legal right of plaintiffs (2) has been invaded (3) by defendants (4) to the injury of plaintiffs."

Thrusting aside the unrelated issues raised by counsel, the Court said:

“The right of employes to organize and to quit their employment singly or as a group; the right of employers to organize and to discharge their employes singly or to lock them out as a body; the right of dealers to organize and to refuse to sell merchandise to a particu

lar individual, to a group of individuals or to the public at large; the presence of a few crooked business agents in the ranks of labor and of a few criminal profiteers in the ranks of employers and dealers; and the obligation of employers and employes to respect their working agreements-are all subjects full of interest, but which have no bearing whatever on the issues involved in these cases, and a discussion of any of the subjects would be entirely out of place."

plaintiff in a tort action of this sort should be tested, the Considering the principle by which the right of the

Court said:

"Whenever a court permits itself to be led afield into a discussion of the rights of the defendant in tort actions and to become entangled in the subtleties connected with the phrases 'primary purpose' and 'legal justification,' it is apt to have its attention diverted from a consideration of the question whether plaintiff's rights have been invaded by the doing of the act charged. To discuss the rights of the defendant is to confuse rather than clarify the issue. To argue that defendant had a legal right to do what he did, and that plaintiff cannot complain of the damage incidentally following the exercise of defendant's rights, is to approach th question from the rear. Where A. by close attention to business, by aggressive business methods, and by offering better values takes customers from B., and thereby damages B.'s business, B. is not entitled to recover from A. for the reason that he had no legal right to have a monoply on the business in the territory, and not for the reason that A. had a right to enter the field. If A. digs a well on his farm and thereby destroys a well on B.'s farm by intercepting the source of water, B. cannot recover from A. because he had no legal right to a continuance of the exclusive use of the source of water, and not because A. had the

right to dig his well. The court should first determine whether plaintiff has a legal right which it is the duty of defendant to respect, and then proceed from that point to determine the controversy. We shall therefore approach the consideration of this case from the standpoint of the plaintiffs."

Turning then to the right of John Carlson to work, and the right of Oscar Carlson to build his house, unmolested by a combination of dealers, regardless of their purpose, the Court said:

"John Carlson has a right, under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor according to his own will. He had the right to contract with Simon Hill to work for an agreed wage and under agreed conditions. He was under no contractual relations with any of the defendants which limited this right. He had a right to receive for his services $1 an hour or any other amount to which he and his employer could agree. Oscar Carlson had the right, under the law, to full freedom in investing his capital in the building which he was erecting and in employing any person free to accept employment from him, at a wage and under conditions agreeable to him. He had the right to a free and open market in which to purchase materials with which to

ing with questions of transportation and with common carriers.

"(e) To deal with improved methods of plant and mine operation, including sanitation, safety appliances, accident prevention, labor, plant and mine development, housing conditions, insurance, and methods of accounting.

“(f) To maintain a credit bureau for the sole purpose of furnishing credit information.

"(3) That the said defendants, their officers, agents, servants, and employes and all persons acting under, through, by, or in behalf of them or any of them, or claiming so to act, be perpetually enjoined, restrained, and prohibited directly or indirectly from

"(a) Agreeing to fix or establish by agreement among themselves the prices to be charged for said Gypsum products.

(b) Agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever to charge purchasers of said Gypsum products uniform prices or doing by agreement any act or acts which will result in maintaining uniform prices. "(c) Agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever to advance or decrease prices for their products to purchasers thereof.

"(d) Agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever to advise or communicate with one another as to proposed advances or decreases in prices for their products to purchasers thereof or agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever to circulate among themselves in any way information concerning or relating to such proposed advances or decreases, or to the prices charged or to be charged.

"(e) Doing any act or acts by agreement among themselves which will result in advising or communicating with one another as to proposed advances or decreases in prices for their products to purchasers thereof or in circulating by agreement among themselves information concerning or relating to such proposed advances or decreases.

“(f) Agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever to limit, curtail, restrict, or otherwise control the amount of said product to be produced for manufacture at any time by any or all of the defendants, or by doing by agreement among themselves any act or acts which will limit, curtail, restrict, or otherwise control the production or manufacture of said products by any or all of the said defendants, such as the withdrawal of salesmen from a certain territory over stipulated periods.

(g) Agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever as to the territory in which any or all of the defendants may sell or otherwise dispose of their products.

“(h) Agreeing among themselves in any manner whatsoever to effect any discrimination of any character, whether in prices charged or otherwise, in favor of or against any purchaser of their products by reason of the fact that such purchaser is a mail order house, purchasing agency, coöperative buying association, or so-called dealer,' or for any other reason, or doing any act by agreement among themselves to effectuate any such discrimination in favor of or against any purchaser for any reason, except, of course, that each defendant may independently of the other defendants select his or its own trade and dispose of his or its

products to such persons and on such terms as he or it may choose.

"(i) Agreeing among themselves to use a published credit list and credit information for the purpose of blacklisting an undesirable purchaser or for the purpose of putting the name of the purchaser on such list with the intent of the manufacturer who submits the name reserving the purchaser's business for himself.

"(j) Agreeing to fix, establish, or maintain by agreement among themselves the terms, differentials, discounts, or prices which should be followed by a dealer, jobber, or other middleman upon his resale to a consumer or by any such agreement the uniform discounts which should be subtracted by each manufacturer, as an inducement for cash payment.

"(k) Agreeing among themselves to adopt or follow any price list, published or compiled, or caused to be published or compiled by themselves or by any newspaper, trades paper, or periodical as a fixed price. (1) Agreeing among themselves to enforce any arbitrary freight rates in excess of those lawfully made. (m) Agreeing among themselves that certain individual manufacturers engage in the manufacture of a certain gypsum product of a certain definite composition, and that all other manufacturers desist from manufacturing a product of such composition.

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(n) Aiding or abetting or assisting individually or collectively others to do all or any of the matters herein set forth and enjoined and restrained herein.

"(4) That nothing herein contained shall be construed to restrain or interfere with the action of any of the said defendants acting with respect to his or its own corporate or individual business property or affairs, or furnishing necessary information to their own customers in connection with bona fide sales of such products; or individually doing any of said act or acts done in good faith to meet competition when such action or the furnishing of such information is not made or done in concert or as the result of any agreement among themselves; or to save any patent rights of any of said defendants; and that this decree and any of its provisions or the entry thereof shall be without prejudice to the rights or interests of any of the said defendants in any proceedings which may be brought by or against them or any of them, except only any proceedings in this cause to enforce the terms of this decree.

"(5) That jurisdiction of this cause be and hereby is retained for the purpose of enforcing this decree, and for the purpose of enabling any of the parties to apply to the court for modification hereof if it be shown to the satisfaction of the court, that by reason of changed conditions or changes in the statute law of the United States or in the interpretation of said law by the courts, or by reason of any new or different activities other than those hereby specifically authorized to be maintained and deemed necessary or desirable by the said defendants for the welfare of the gypsum industry or for any other reason, the provisions hereby have become inappropriate or unnecessary to maintain competitive conditions in interstate trade or commerce in Gypsum products, or have become unduly oppressive to the defendants and no longer necessary to secure or maintain competitive conditions in such interstate trade."