were had, and fines imposed amounting to $250 against the business agent and several pickets. Picketing still continued, accompanied by violence. A skilled operator was struck in the mouth with brass knuckles and several teeth knocked out. In June, 1921 a second strike manager was sent over from New York, and proceedings were taken against him and others for contempt. Upon this proceeding, it appeared from the report of the master that, while there was no direct evidence connecting the accused with the violence, they had general conduct of the strike and the pickets, who reported regularly at headquarters, received strike benefits, that the accused had been on the picket line, and that when pickets were arrested the bail, counsel, and fines were provided by the union. Upon the filing of this report, the union called a truce, and agreed to refrain from further interference. That was June,

1921.

On October 6, 1922, without warning or presentation of grievances, a majority of the Talbot employes, supposed to be members of the United Garment Workers, quit work and began to picket the shop. Later one of them presented a written statement demanding that the Talbot shop recognize and enter into an agreement with the Amalgamated. Investigation disclosed that the strikers were in daily attendance at Amalgamated headquarters. A proceeding was brought against four of the ring leaders to punish them for violation of the injunction. The proceeding was sent to a master, who reported that strikers were receiving $700 per week from the Amalgamated, and were conspiring with that organization to force the Company to employ only Amalgamated members. The report also showed that a general organizer from New York was in active charge of the strike. Violence again occurred. Contempt proceedings were commenced in rapid succession, including a blanket petition against the daily pickets which was served upon them as they appeared on the picket line. The court decided to hear all proceedings in person without regard to reports of masters and the various dilatory motions advanced by counsel for the defense. The hearing was set for November 20th. When the day arrived, counsel for the union asked for terms of settlement.

Thereupon a permanent injunction, without hearing o the merits, was entered by consent, and the union gave security company bond in the sum of $10,000 providin that the amount should be paid to the Talbot Company a liquidated damages in case any member of the union should be found guilty of a violation of the injunction a any time within ten years. In addition the union pai $500 to the man whose teeth had been knocked out. Th final decree restrained the Amalgamated as follows:

"1. That the respondents, and each of them, thei servants, agents, representatives, employes and attor neys are hereby strictly enjoined from

66

(c) Interfering with said Talbot Company, or it business, wherever conducted, by intimidation, threats annoying or hindering any person or persons now o hereafter in the employ or business of said company or who may desire to enter such employ or business of remain therein;

"(d) Spying upon this plaintiff's business whereve conducted, and from visiting employes in such busi ness, or those desiring to become employes, in thei homes for the purpose of trying to induce them to leave or not to enter such employ;

"(e) Interfering either directly or indirectly with this plaintiff's business, its customers, employes, o others having business dealings with it.

"2. That the respondents, and each of them, thei servants, agents, representatives, employes and attor neys are hereby strictly enjoined from doing any ac or thing, either directly or indirectly, to compel thi complainant to run its shop, or any shop where arti cles of clothing are being manufactured for it, as closed shop, or one in which only members of th respondent unions are employed, or from interferin in any way with the free flow of labor to such shop o shops."

The Herkert and Meisel Trunk Company, and four other companies, secured an injunction restraining striking employes from acts of interference on the ground that such interference, by preventing production of goods intended for interstate commerce and already contracted for in such commerce, was an unlawful interference with such commerce under the Sherman Act. The decision of the

District Court was reported at 3 Lam and Labor 58. The striking employes, members of the United Leather Workers International Union, appealed this issue to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Five manufacturers of trunks and other leather goods were struck at the same time and their business brought to a standstill by unlawful activities of pickets. At that time the manufacturers had unfilled orders or contracts for sale, manufacture, and shipment in interstate commerce of goods aggregating $327,000. The important question was whether the obstruction of such a business. through the stoppage of production, constituted a combination to restrain interstate commerce under the Federal anti-trust laws or whether it was merely a local interference with production. As to the meaning of the term interstate commerce under the Constitution and the Anti-Trust Act, the Court said:

"Indeed the established rule is that Interstate Commerce within the meaning of that term in the Constitution and the Anti-Trust Act embraces far more than the mere sale, exchange and interstate transportation of the goods. It includes intercourse, it comprehends every contract, trade and dealing between citizens of one state and those of another which contemplates the transportation of goods, persons, or information from one state into another, and every initiatory, negotiating and intervening act of the parties to that trade or deal from the time the intercourse relating to it commences until the transportation and delivery have been completed. * * * (citing authorities) * "Under these authorities the contracts evidenced by the unfilled orders were contracts and transactions in interstate commerce. The acts of the customers in sending the orders were initiatory acts in contracts and interstate commerce. The receipt and acknowledgment of the receipt of the orders, the manufacture of the goods pursuant thereto, the packing, loading, shipping of them were intermediate steps and parts of, and the delivery and payment for the goods were the final steps of contracts and transactions in interstate

*

*

commerce, and the direct restraint, and for a time the complete prevention and thereafter the partial prevention of the taking of these steps by the unlawful means used by the defendants proved by the evidence, whether that restraint was imposed upon the selling, the making, the packing, the loading, the shipping, or the transportation of the goods, was the very restraint denounced by the Anti-Trust Act and brought the subject matter of, the parties to the suit, and the relief the court granted far within the jurisdiction of the federal court under the Anti-Trust Act.”

Continuing the discussion of authorities and citing Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 221, 242, the Court said:

666 When Congress has enacted a statute such as the one in question, any agreement or combination which directly operates, not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation and delivery of an article of interstate commerce, by preventing or restricting its sale, etc., thereby regulates interstate commerce to that extent and to the same extent trenches upon the power of the national legislature and violates the statute.' The execution of the combination or conspiracy of the defendants had exactly that effect. It directly operated and that operation was its patent and inevitable effect, not alone upon the manufacture, but upon the sale, transportation and delivery of the articles the plaintiffs had contracted to sell, make and deliver in interstate commerce."

Taking up the evidence, the Court found that for years prior to the stoppage of their operations by the activities of the defendants, the plaintiffs had been " continuously conducting vast currents or streams of interstate commerce." Two of the plaintiffs sold goods in interstate commerce of the value of $2,950,000 per year. The Court said:

"This course of business determined and demonstrated that the transactions of these plaintiffs in causing and conducting these currents including the order contracts for the sale, making, transportation and delivery of the goods in other states, the selling, the manufacture, the loading, shipping, and delivery of these goods at their destinations constituted interstate commerce."

The maintenance of this current of interstate commerce was the business of the plaintiffs which they had a right to have protected.

"The rights of the plaintiffs to keep their business running, to the continuous flow of their currents of

interstate commerce, were property rights which they were legally entitled to exercise."

Concerning the purpose of the defendants to restrain this commerce since such restraint was the inevitable result of their acts and the real means of injuring the business of the plaintiffs in the hope of bringing them to terms, the Court said:

"Counsel argue that the defendants had no purpose to restrain the interstate commerce of these plaintiffs, that their only purpose was to force the plaintiffs to employ none but union men and to grant other demands which the defendants made, but one can hardly wink so fast as not to see that the real purpose of their prevention of the plaintiffs from manufacturing the articles they had contracted to sell, make and deliver in interstate commerce and their prevention of the flowing of the currents of these articles in interstate commerce was to deprive the plaintiffs of their income from the sales and deliveries of the goods and by this continuing loss of income to compel the submission of the plaintiffs to their demands. Moreover, the natural and inevitable effect of the prevention by the defendants of the making by the plaintiffs of the articles they had made interstate contracts to sell, make and deliver was the prevention of their performance of their contracts and the prevention or partial prevention of their interstate commerce, and this result was so evident and unavoidable that the defendants could not have failed to know, to purpose and to intend that this should be the result."

The Court held that the defendants must face the consequences of the means which they employed, saying:

66 The defendants cannot be credited here with an innocent purpose or intent, and even if they could be they were guilty of combining to use and of using unlawful means, assaults, threats, too many pickets, following employes to their homes and like intimidating acts that scared the plaintiffs' employes to leave them and prevented those desiring employment from taking it. A combination or conspiracy to use unlawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose, and its execution by the use of such means, is as violative of the Act as a conspiracy to accomplish an unlawful purpose by lawful means."

The inseparable relation between manufacture and the interstate commerce of the goods manufactured in contemplation of interstate commerce, is described by the Court as follows:

"It is contended that because manufacture is not commerce and is not interstate commerce, the restriction or prevention of the manufacture of articles which, by interstate commerce contracts and transactions, sellers have agreed to sell, make, transport to and deliver in other states, and the prevention of existing interstate commerce in such articles in this way, is not remediable by federal courts under the Anti-Trust Act. It is true that manufacture alone is not interstate commerce. But it is equally true that when manufacture becomes an essential part of or an indispensable step in the execution of an interstate commerce contract or transaction, or in the continuously

flowing current of interstate commerce, as such manu facture was and is in this case, it becomes a part of o step in that interstate commerce to such an exten that a federal court of equity is vested with the powe and is subject to the duty to enjoin the execution of combination or conspiracy to prevent or practically prevent the performance of such contracts or to pre vent or drastically restrict such interstate commerc by preventing the manufacture which constitutes one of its indispensable intermediate steps or parts. While manufacture alone is not interstate commerce, neither is buying or selling or contracting to buy or sell the goods, or loading or packing or shipping the goods when considered by itself alone, interstate commerce yet each and all of these may become parts of and steps in interstate commerce, and when they so become, the restriction or prevention of these steps which has the necessarily intended direct and inevi table effect of stopping or drastically restraining that interstate commerce by the execution of the conspiracy to restrain or destroy it, may be lawfully adjoined by a federal court.

"In United Mine Workers of America, et al. v. Coronado Coal Company, et al., 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 570 at pages 583 the Supreme Court, summing up the relation of coal mining to interstate commerce, said: 'Coal mining is not interstate commerce and obstruction of coal mining, though it may prevent coal from going into interstate commerce, is not a restraint of that commerce unless the obstruction to mining is intended to restrain commerce in it or has necessarily such a direct, material and substantial effect to restrain it that the intent reasonably must be inferred.' The corollary conclusively follows that if the obstruction to coal mining is intended to restrict interstate commerce or necessarily has such a direct material and substantial effect to restrain it that the intent reason

ably must be inferred, then such an obstruction to coal mining is an unlawful restraint to interstate commerce. So, while manufacture is not interstate commerce, its relation to interstate commerce is governed by the same rule. If the obstruction to it is intended directly to restrain interstate commerce or if such obstruction necessarily has such a direct, material and substantial effect to restrain it, that the intent so to do reasonably must be inferred, then such obstruction to manufacture is a direct restraint of interstate commerce remediable by the federal court under the Anti-Trust Act. The case in hand falls directly under this rule. The obstruction and prevention of the manufacture of the articles which the plaintiffs had made interstate commerce contracts to make, sell and deliver, and to pour into their continuously existing currents of interstate commerce could not have been made without the knowledge of the defendants that their direct, material, necessary, substantial and inevitable effect would be to restrain or to prevent the plaintiffs' interstate commerce in such articles and thus to deprive them of their income, nor could it have been made without their reasonably inferred intent and purpose to obtain that result."

Asserting that "while the law governing cases of this class is the same in all cases the conspiracies alleged, the

evidence to sustain them and the results in the various cases necessarily differ," the Court pointed out that in the Coronado case the plaintiffs were defeated

"because their entire production of coal was so small in proportion to the entire production in the nation that the complete prevention of the plaintiffs' production could not have had any direct material effect on the alleged attempt to monopolize all the coal production of the nation. In the case before this court now, the gravamen of the complaint is not that the defendants attempted to monopolize all interstate commerce but that the defendants conspired and were executing that conspiracy by unlawful means to prevent if possible, and to restrain as far as possible the flow of the plaintiffs' existing continuous currents of interstate commerce and the performance of the interstate commerce contracts which they had made to sell, make and deliver the articles which were the subjects of that commerce to customers in states other than Missouri."

The Court held that independently of any scheme to restrain all interstate commerce in the class of articles made by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs had a right to have their own interstate commerce protected from interference.

"It was not essential to the right of the plaintiffs to relief by injunction by the court below that the object or effect of the defendants' conspiracy and its execution should obstruct all interstate commerce or all interstate commerce in that class of articles with which the plaintiffs were conducting interstate commerce, or that it should increase the price of such articles throughout the country. It was sufficient that the defendants' conspiracy was with the necessarily inferred intent, and that, as unlawfully executed by them, it had the effect directly and substantially to interfere with, restrain and obstruct the large volume of interstate commerce which the plaintiffs were conducting to their irreparable injury. In the absence of the Anti-Trust Act the plaintiffs had the right to conduct this interstate commerce. Congress has imposed no restraint upon it or them. The failure of Congress to impose any restriction on this commerce was in effect a declaration by that body that this interstate commerce should be free and untrammeled.

"Not satisfied that this declaration by inaction was sufficient, the Congress granted to the federal courts the power to protect the freedom of this interstate commerce by the Anti-Trust Act. That Act provides that 'Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.' In the succeeding section it denounces the monopolization of any part of trade or commerce among the states. While monopolies of interstate commerce and of parts of that commerce thus fall under the ban of the Act, it denounces with equal force, clearness and particularity every combination and conspiracy which directly and unreasonably restrains, interferes with or obstructs, although it does not monopolize or tend to

monopolize, interstate commerce or any class of it. Direct and substantial restraint, obstruction or destruction of interstate commerce, or of substantial parts of it, pursuant to a conspiracy or combination is as violative of the Act as a monopoly thereof."

The Court then set forth the holding in the Debs case that if a state, with its recognized powers of sovereignty, is, under the Constitution, impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, it cannot be maintained that any mere voluntary association of individuals within the state has such power. The evidence of an attempt to exercise such power warranted the issuance of an injunction. Court said:

The

"Evidence of the interstate contracts, of the plaintiffs' currents of interstate commerce, of the unlawful acts of the defendants, of the times and manners of their commission and of their direct and inevitable effect in preventing the performance of the plaintiffs' interstate commerce contracts, and in obstructing the currents of their interstate commerce fully sustained the finding by the court below of the formation and existence of the conspiracy, of its execution by unlawful means, and of its inevitable effect, and well warranted the issue of the injunction."

After further consideration of authorities, the Court summarized its holdings as follows:

"When the combination or conspiracy of the defendants in this case was formed and when its execution commenced by the strike, by the withdrawal at one time of nearly all the plaintiffs' workmen, the quick picketing with too many pickets of their plants, and the complete stoppage of their manufacture for the time being, the plaintiffs had made unfilled intertheir customers in other states, goods of the value of state commerce contracts, to sell, make and ship to more than $300,000.00. They had existing continuously flowing currents of interstate commerce from Missouri to other states in the nation which carried their goods of the value of more than $2,500,000.00 per annum. In the execution of their combination by threats, by following to their homes, and by other too many pickets, by intimidation by numbers, by unlawful and violent acts the defendants scared many of the plaintiffs' remaining employes into withdrawing from their employment, and deterred those who wished to work for the plaintiffs from taking employment to such an extent that until they were restrained by the preliminary order of the court below they prevented the making of the articles the plaintiffs had contracted to sell, make and deliver in interstate commerce and stopped the flow of the plaintiffs' currents thereof. And after the restraining order was issued they continued the execution of their conspiracy and their unlawful acts to such an extent that they continued to obstruct and restrain to a very large and damaging extent the amount of the plaintiffs' manufacturing and of their interstate commerce so that but a small per cent of their normal currents of interstate commerce could flow. The necessary and inevitable effect of this prevention and restriction of the making of the articles the plaintiffs had contracted to make,