faithful representation of what passed at the trial, but that the reporter has gone beyond the legitimate bounds of his privilege by introducing statements of his own injurious to the plaintiff, and which turn out to be unfounded, then it will be your duty to find for the plaintiff as to the publication of the letters. Then there is the other cause of complaint, as to the article published after his acquittal. It has been suggested that it did not convey the impression that he was guilty, but only that he was innocent, and had had a very narrow escape; but if it conveyed the impression that he was guilty, and had for some reason had a narrow escape, then the accused, if innocent, would have a good ground of complaint. Another just question, therefore, would be, what the article really meant. The Lord Chief Justice then went through it, dwelling upon the passages which have been quoted, especially the sentence, "the Syrian gentleman whose wife perished, and whose ward was found with a gunshot wound in his head." What did that mean? What could the whole article be understood to convey? Did it mean that he was guilty, and had had a narrow escape? or did it mean that he was innocent, and had had such an escape? If the jury thought that it meant that a man who had been acquitted by a verdict of a jury was really guilty, then the question would be whether it could be excused, under the circumstances, by the privilege which the law wisely allowed to public writers in the discussion of matters of public interest. It was admitted that the administration of justice was so important to the well-being of society that public writers have the right of discussing it, even although in so doing they may bear hard upon individuals; and therefore, although they should turn out to have been erroneous in their observations, yet if they have written in good faith, with an honest desire to discharge their duty, bringing to it a reasonable judgment, they are not legally liable, and therefore the jury were rightly invited to consider whether the circumstances were such as to allow of the claim of privilege, even although it was intended to impute that the crime of murder was really committed. And with a view to the consideration of that question it was necessary to go into the circumstances of the case, and to inquire what were the facts proved against the plaintiff, and what were in his favour. Now no doubt the circumstances of the case were such as that when they were first looked at they must naturally suggest the idea of guilt; but after they had been examined into, the question was whether such an article could be written in a fair spirit, and with a reasonable exercise of judgment. What were the facts? That Risk Allah had insured the youth's life; that the youth had received a shot as he lay in bed; that at first sight there seemed no probability of suicide. Such was the aspect of the case at first sight; but, even looking at it thus there were two facts calculated to dispel the idea of murder; the fact of the youth's shirt being taken off, and the fact of the paper found in his handwriting bearing the words, "I have done it." There was no reason to doubt that the youth usually slept in a shirt of some sort, and it was not found upon him.. There was no rational possibility of its having been taken off by any one else, and he must have taken it off himself. Nothing was said about a shirt being found stained with blood-a fact which, had it occurred, would not have escaped the attention of the prosecutors. Then, assuming the shirt to have been found (as seems to have been assumed at the trial) clean and free from blood, it was impossible not to see that he must have taken it off; and this was a fact almost conclusive as to suicide, for, with what possible motive could he have taken it off except with a view to suicide, in order (as was suggested) to avoid the possibility of its catching fire? Then as to the paper, the experts proved it

P

to have been in the youth's handwriting; and there was no reason to impute forgery to the plaintiff; so that there seemed no ground for doubting that it was the youth's own writing. If so, it was all but conclusive as to suicide. Then there were the experiments of the experts, and their evidence. The majority of these were in the plaintiff's favour; one went so far as to say he was certain it was suicide. Then there was the evidence as to the character and health of the youth, who was irregular in his mind and epileptic in his habit of body. Then came the rejection of his offer of marriage upon that account, which, beyond all doubt, had preyed upon his mind. Several respectable witnesses stated that after this the youth had spoken in a desponding and despairing way, and it was plain that disappointment and despair were preying upon his mind. Taking all these circumstances into account, could any one fairly say that the verdict was wrong? It was true that Risk Allah would gain 50007. by the youth's death, but that was all. It was said he had insured the youth's life for 10007.; but the youth had acknowledged to several witnesses that he owed the plaintiff 7001. Therefore the notion that the plaintiff had insured the youth's life with a view to get rid of him appeared to fall to the ground. Thus the case of Risk Allah as to motive was relieved of that. The Lord Chief Justice then said that under all the circumstances it was for the jury to say, not merely whether they did not think that Risk Allah was innocent, but whether they thought that in the fair, honest, reasonable exercise of a public writer's privilege, an article could be written imputing that the plaintiff was guilty. If they thought that the writer had rashly, recklessly, and wantonly represented a man who had been acquitted as guilty, they should give a verdict for the plaintiff. The Lord Chief Justice then entered into the matter of Osman's forgeries, putting it to the jury whether they were or were not satisfied with the plaintiff's explanation. The plaintiff had been acquitted at Brussels, and if a public writer challenged the verdict, he should do so in a fair and proper spirit and in the exercise of an honest and reasonable judgment. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff for 9607.

V.

MARTIN v. MACKONOCHIE.

RITUALISM.

THIS case, which involved the important question as to high ceremonial in the church of St. Alban's, Holborn, the incumbent of which was the Rev. A. H. Mackonochie, was an appeal by the promoters of the suit from the judgment of the Dean of Arches to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

Present-The Archbishop of York, Lord Chelmsford, Lord Cairns, Sir W. Erle, and Sir J. Colville.

Lord Cairns delivered the judgment of the Committee as follows:-"The case of Martin v. Mackonochie,' commenced before the Bishop of London, was, under the provisions of the Clergy Discipline Act, sent by the Bishop to the Court of the Archbishop of Canterbury for trial in the first instance; and having been fully heard before the Judge of the Arches' Court, resulted in a decree made on the 28th of March, 1868. Mr. Mackonochie, the clerk in holy orders against whom these proceedings were directed was charged with four offences against the

laws ecclesiastical, viz. :-1. The elevation during or after the Prayer of Consecration in the Order of the Administration of the Holy Communion of the paten and cup, and the kneeling or prostrating himself before the consecrated elements; 2. Using lighted candles on the communion-table during the celebration of the Holy Communion, when such candles were not wanted for the purpose of giving light; 3. Using incense in the celebration of the Holy Communion; 4. Mixing water with the wine used in the administration of the Holy Communion. The learned Judge of the Arches' Court by his decree sustained the third and fourth of these charges, and admonished Mr. Mackonochie to abstain for the future from the use of incense, and from mixing water with the wine as pleaded in the articles. Against this part of the decree there is no appeal. The second charge, as to lights, was not sustained, the learned judge holding that it was lawful to place two lighted candles on the Communion-table during the time of the Holy Communion. Against this the promoter has appealed. As to the first charge, Mr. Mackonochie, while admitting the elevation of the consecrated elements at the times and in the manner alleged, pleaded that he had discontinued the practice before the institution of the suit. The learned Judge, therefore, admonished Mr. Mackonochie not to recur to the practice; but as to the other part of the charge-namely, the kneeling and prostrating himself before the consecrated elements, the learned Judge held that if Mr. Mackonochie had committed any error in that respect it was one which should not form the subject of a criminal prosecution, but should be referred to the Bishop in order that he might exercise his discretion thereon. The promoter appeals from the latter part of the decision of the learned judge on this charge, and he also complains in his appeal that the defendant was not ordered to pay the costs of the suit. The questions thus raised by the appeal were very fully and ably argued before this tribunal, and their Lordships have now to state their reasons for the advice which they propose humbly to offer to her Majesty. They will advert first to the charge of kneeling before the consecrated elements. It is necessary to refer to the whole of the charge on this head as contained in the 3rd and 4th articles, although some of the acts charged are said to have been discontinued before the suit commenced. These articles run thus :

"3. That the said Alexander Heriot Mackonochie has in his said church, and within two years last past (to wit, on Sunday, the 23rd day of December, on Christmas-day last past, and on Sunday, the 30th day of December, all in the year of our Lord, 1866), during the Prayer of Consecration in the Order of the Administration of the Holy Communion, elevated the paten above his head, and permitted and sanctioned such elevation, and taken into his hands the cup, and elevated it above his head during the Prayer of Consecration aforesaid, and permitted and sanctioned the cup to be so taken and elevated, and knelt or prostrated himself before the consecrated elements during the Prayer of Consecration, and permitted and sanctioned such kneeling or prostrating by other clerks in holy orders. 4. That such elevation of the paten, and such taking and elevation of the cup, and such kneeling and prostrating are severally unlawful additions to and variations from the form and order prescribed and appointed by the said statutes, and by the said Book of Common Prayer, and administration of the sacraments, and other rites and ceremonies of the Church, and are contrary to the said statutes, and to the 14th, 36th, and 38th of the said constitutions and canons, and also to an Act of Parliament passed in a Session of Parliament holden in the 13th year of Queen Elizabeth, cap. 12, and to the 25th and 28th of the Articles of Religion therein referred to.'

"Mr. Mackonochie's answer to these articles is as follows:

"3. Whereas in the 3rd article, given in and admitted as amended in this cause, it is pleaded that the said Alexander Heriot Mackonochie has-to wit, on Sunday, the 23rd day of December, on Christmas-day last past, on Sunday, the 30th day of December, all in the year 1866-during the Prayer of Consecration in the Order of the Administration of the Holy Communion elevated the paten above his head and permitted and sanctioned such elevation, and taken into his hands the cup and elevated it above his head during the Prayer of Consecration aforesaid, and permitted and sanctioned the cup so to be taken and elevated, and knelt or prostrated himself before the consecrated elements during the Prayer of Consecration, and permitted and sanctioned such kneeling or prostration by other clerks in holy orders; now, the same is in part untruly pleaded, for the party proponent alleges that, while he admits that the said Alexander Heriot Mackonochie did on the said two Sundays and on Christmas-day, during the Prayer of Consecration, kneel and sanction kneeling by other clerks before the Lord's table, he denies that his said party did on the said two Sundays and on the said Christmas-day kneel or prostrate himself before the consecrated elements, or permit and sanction such kneeling or prostration by other clerks in holy orders, as in the 3rd article pleaded. And he further alleges that while he admits that he did on the said two Sundays and Christmas-day, in the said 3rd article mentioned, elevate and sanction the elevation by other clerks of the paten and cup above his head, as is in the said 3rd article pleaded, yet that such elevation of the paten and cup has been wholly discontinued by the said Alexander Heriot Mackonochie during the administration of the Holy Communion ever since the said 30th day of December, 1866, and long prior to the institution of this suit. That such practice was discontinued in consequence of legal advice, and in compliance with the expressed wish of the Lord Bishop of the diocese of London and with a resolution of Convocation, as was well known to the promoter of this suit before he instituted the same.'

"Before turning to the evidence in support of this charge, it will be proper to consider a preliminary objection which was taken to the articles, and to the letters of request and citation by which they were preceded. It was said that although the articles alleged that the respondent knelt or prostrated himself before the consecrated elements during the Prayer of Consecration,' the letters of request and citation were for bowing, kneeling, or prostrating himself before the consecrated elements during or after the Prayer of Consecration.' It was contended that the citation showed no offence, for it might be taken, as in an indictment, in the sense most favourable to the accused, and as affirming nothing more than that he bowed after the Prayer of Consecration, which, it was said, would or might be innocent. And the articles, it was argued, by omitting this alternative, were a departure from the citation. To this it might be sufficient to reply that the objection taken to this citation-a citation which it is not disputed does contain other charges cognizable by the Ecclesiastical Court-is an objection of a strictly technical character, and one which would be waived by the appearance of the respondent as he did appear, without protest, and by praying for articles. But, passing from this, it is to be observed that the supposed analogy between the citation and an indictment, on which this objection is founded, entirely fails. The Act of Uniformity, 1st Elizabeth, c. 2, contemplates two modes of procedure for enforcing its provisions-one by indictment under section 4, and the other by process for admonition before the Ordinary under section 23; and it is

under the latter, and not the former, section, that the present proceedings are taken. Moreover, in the case of an indictment followed by judgment, the indictment and judgment become the record, and the judgment is read with reference to the indictment; and if the indictment is open to a construction which is innocent, and would not sustain a judgment, the judgment would be vicious, and must be arrested; whereas the citation is followed by articles, which in turn are met by a plea; and the Court, after hearing evidence, defines by its sentence how much of the charge it considers to be relevant and to have been proved, and thereby corrects any excess of averment in the citation. The preliminary objection, therefore, on this charge their Lordships feel themselves obliged to repel. It is necessary now to examine the evidence adduced in support of the charge; and in doing this, and in considering the character of the charge itself, their Lordships will confine their attention to the conduct and acts of the respondent as the celebrating or consecrating minister. The allegations and proof as to "Sanctioning and permitting other clerks' are so vague, that no weight could be, and in the argument little weight was attempted to be, given to them. The chief witness in support of the charge is Mr. Beames. He has not been crossexamined, and no evidence has been adduced for the respondent. The statement of Mr. Beames may therefore be taken to be uncontroverted. He speaks of the 23rd and 25th of December, 1866. On both of these occasions the respondent was the celebrant at the Communion Service. The effect of the answers of Mr. Beames may be stated to be that the respondent commenced to read the Prayer of Consecration standing; that on reaching the words 'the same night that He was betrayed' he elevated the paten above his head, returned it to its place on the Communion-table, and then knelt on his knees towards the table, inclining or prostrating his head towards the ground; that he then rose and resumed the prayer; that when, in the further course of the prayer, he took the chalice, he elevated it above his head as he had done the paten, replaced it on the Communion-table, and knelt or prostrated himself as before. The elevation of the elements has, as already said, been discontinued, and as to the kneeling after the consecration of the chalice, it might be possibly suggested that it was a kneeling after finishing the Prayer of Consecration, and with reference to the next part of the service, in which the celebrant becomes himself the recipient. Omitting, therefore, for the present, the elevation and the second kneeling, the evidence remains that the respondent, after commencing the Prayer of Consecration standing, paused in the middle of the prayer, knelt down, inclining or prostrating his head towards the ground, and then, rising up again, continued the prayer standing. In order to bring the conduct of the respondent on this head to the test of ecclesiastical law, it is proper now to turn to the Rubric of the Order of the Administration of the Holy Communion. The Lord's prayer and the collect, with which the services commence, are to be said by the priest standing at the north side of the table.' The priest is then to turn to the people and rehearse distinctly all the Ten Commandments, the people still kneeling,' implying that the priest is still to stand. This is to be followed by one of the collects for the Sovereign, the priest standing as before,' and by the collect for the day. The priest is then to read the Epistle and Gospel, and to say the Creed, during which no change of attitude is indicated. After the sermon, when the priest has returned to the Lord's table, the sentences of the offertory, the prayer for the Church Militant, and the exhortations are to be 'said' by the priest, without any direction as to change of posture, and then, at the confession, he, as well as all the people, is directed to