It may be observed that in a case in which the evidence was so voluminous, only the substance could be given, and that the question would, of course, be whether the substance on both sides was fairly given. And at the opening of the next letter there was a statement which actually amounted to an anticipation of a verdict of acquittal of the murder: "It was pretty plainly said by the President to-day that the proofs of murder are insufficient, and that the hypothesis of suicide is tenable." And afterwards, with reference to the evidence of the experts, "They each and all shrank from the terrible obligation of asserting on oath that suicide in this case was an absolute impossibility." And then, "The President turning to Risk Allah apprised him that the Court had, on the evidence of the experts, formed the opinion that it was possible for the deed to have been Readly's own." But there afterwards was this, “But though Risk Allah will doubtless be acquitted of the crime of murder, he will not now, as before, be discharged a free man. The proofs of forgery and fraud are overwhelming, and on these he is to be detained for another trial." In the next letter it was stated that, "Two of the five gunmakers, and also Dr. Schoppens, the surgeon, this day withdrew the opinion that they had expressed that the shot which killed Readly might have been possibly fired by his own hand. . . . When the President evoked yesterday the admission of a possibility of Readly's having killed himself, the flood-time of Risk Allah's dark and turbulent tide did indeed seem to have been taken for his advantage. But to-day that tide was unexpectedly turned, and the case for the defence has gone less swimmingly than it seemed at first to be going. The opinion of the experts, given with qualifying doubts, has been in three cases retracted; and the evidence is at present but evenly balanced for and against the bare possibility that this could have been suicide and not murder. Two Antwerp gunmakers and M. Charrin, lieutenant de place, hold to the theory that suicide was possible; the officer even goes so far as to say that it was in his belief more likely, from all the appearances, than the act of an assassin. On the other hand, Messrs. Jansen and Montigny, the Brussels gunmakers, and Dr. Schoppens, the Antwerp surgeon, having reconsidered the question, with the help of fresh experiments, decidedly state that the young man could not have destroyed his own life and left such appearances as were observed." Afterwards the remarkable experiment made by Lieutenant Charrin, which so powerfully conduced to the acquittal, was described very dramatically. Then it was added, "The difficulty was, then, to account for the position of the arms, which were stretched downwards in the composed attitude of slumber, notwithstanding the fact proved by surgeons that instant paralysis must have been caused by the shattering of the spinal column. Dr. Devisme combatted the theory; and cited the example of a soldier who had made five or six steps, holding his musket in his hand, after having received such a wound. Dr. Schoppens, however, persisted in declaring that a movement necessary to bring Readly's arms into the position in which they were found could not have occurred after the instantaneous death he must have died. Moreover, the way in which the coverlet was disposed over the upper part of the body and arms could not possibly be reconciled with the hypothesis of suicide. Those gunmakers who had with much hesitation subscribed to the theory of Readly's having possibly shot himself, now asked permission to withdraw their testimony, saying that their conclusions must, in a measure, be formed on the surgical testimony. If,' said Dr. Montigny, Dr. Schoppens declares that the move ments were impossible, I retract the opinion which I gave in support of the suicide theory.' And M. Jansen said the same thing, perhaps a little more strongly. In the midst of this conflicting evidence of experts, each of them in turn got upon the bed and tested the practicability of pointing the gun in such a manner as to commit suicide, as Readly is supposed by the defenders of Risk Allah to have committed it." Then followed a statement of the speech of the Procureur-Général against the accused, and in the next letter it was continued. In the next, the speech of M. Lachaud, the eloquent advocate of the prisoner, was stated, as appeared, with still greater force, the best passages being given verbatim, though, on the other hand (as observed by the Lord Chief Justice) the speech of the prisoner's counsel, which-less eloquent, but, perhaps, more important, as it dealt with the facts-was omitted. In a word, the letters were evidently directed to the giving a general idea of the case than a regular report. Then the result, a verdict of acquittal, was stated; and it was added that "when it was announced there was great applause and enthusiasm in court." Such was the substance of the letters. Then came a leading article, of which the effect seemed to be that Risk Allah had escaped, but that the evidence was, to say the least, strong against him: "He has been declared 'Not Guilty,' in a word, in spite of terrible suspicions." And again, "A polished gentleman, whose wife had unfortunately perished, and whose ward was found one morning with a gun-shot wound on him." And at the close, "We defy any one to read the record of that long trial without coming to the conclusion that the result might have been different had the defence been less skilfully conducted." Such was the substance of the alleged libel, of which, as the action was founded thereon, it is essential to give the effect. It is equally essential to give the substance of the voluminous evidence adduced, with a view to show that these publications were not legal, and were libellous, because not fair reports nor fair comments thereon. The plaintiff had also been tried at Brussels, for complicity in a forgery committed by one Osman Effendi, a Pole or Russian-and actions had been brought against him in the Probate Court and in the Court of Chancery, in reference to some share transactions between him and a gentleman named Bingham; but the result was that Risk Allah was cross-examined, the suit in Chancery was compromised, and all imputations against him were withdrawn, the Court of Chancery striking out as impertinent and scandalous the charges made against him in the bill, and ordering that he should receive his costs. This matter was also brought up against him at the trial in Brussels, and the observations made upon it in the defendants' newspaper formed one of the subjects of the present action. The most important part of the evidence adduced, with a view to show that these publications were not legal, and were libellous because not fair reports nor fair comments thereon, was that which related to the statements of the experts. It was not charged that the writer of the reports had any personal feeling against the plaintiff, or any intentional unfairness; but it was complained that the letters were on most important points entirely untrue; that the whole report was compiled from the Echo du Parlement, and hastily and carelessly compiled, and that it was manifest that the writer was not in court at all, or, at all events, even if he were, had made no notes nor bonâ fide report of his own, but had merely got it up very carelessly from other men's materials at second-hand. The most important part of the evidence for the defence, it will be manifest, was the evidence of the" experts," and it was proved that the passage in the letters stating that the "experts" had retracted their opinions in favour of the prisoner was in a great degree-indeed almost entirely-untrue; that, in particular, this passage was just the reverse of the evidence actually given : "If," said Dr. Martigny, "Dr. Schoppens declares that the movements" (of the body) "were impossible, I retract the opinion which I gave in support of the suicide theory." It was proved that the witness said just the reverse, viz. that if Dr. Schoppens declared the movements possible, he (the witness) retracted the opinion which he had given against the theory of suicide. And, again, as to the statement that the gunsmiths examined for the defence retracted their opinions in its favour, it appeared that they all firmly adhered to it, so there was a serious fault in the omission of certain evidence as to the door being locked inside. And then, again, in the omission of much material evidence in favour of the plaintiff. These were the most important instances of absolute misstatement of material matters. There were many other instances adduced, however, of a want of correctness or completeness in the report, and it was, indeed, complained that the letters were not really reports at all, but rather highly-coloured representations. And in the course of the address of the plaintiff's counsel the Lord Chief Justice pointed out that five of the experts who were described as having given evidence in favour of the plaintiff on one day and then retracted it the next day had actually not been examined until the next day at all, showing, as the Lord Chief Justice observed, that the writer of the letters was not really a reporter, and had not really written reports, but had compiled his letters from materials derived from other sources. Mr. Coleridge, Q.C., addressed the jury for the defence. He admitted, he said, that reckless reports or comments of the Press were actionable not less than those which were personally malicious. And he admitted, also, that this was no question of the liberty of the Press, but a question whether that liberty had been abused-that is, whether the reports or the comments were consciously unfair. But he desired the jury to understand what was the real issue before them, which was not whether the plaintiff, Risk Allah, was really guilty, but whether the letters and articles upon his case were or were not recklessly unfair. The plaintiff, however, tried to make these proceedings the means of a general rehabilitation of his character at the expense of the defendants. Coming as he did before a jury for damages for supposed injury to his character, it was material to know what manner of man he was, for, in common sense and justice, the measure of damages for injury to a man's character must be the value of his character. And for this reason he had entered somewhat into the antecedents of the plaintiff, the kind of associates he had had, and so forth. Adventurers were men who shrouded their whole life in obscurity, and by false pretences obtained a position which did not really belong to them. The learned counsel commented on the extraordinary character of the plaintiff's statement, and then proceeded to the death of Readly. He did not, he contended, say that Risk Allah committed the murder; but this he said, that all the circumstances of the case would have well warranted a conviction, and that, though the accused escaped conviction, yet the circumstantial evidence bore strongly against him. The real guilt or innocence of the party tried was not the proper test of the responsibility of a public writer in commenting upon a trial for murder; the question would be what appeared at the trial. The Lord Chief Justice then proceeded to sum up the case to the jury. Gentlemen, he said, the case divides itself into two distinct subjects, to be looked at with reference to different principles and considerations, and therefore essentially distinct. The plaintiff complains, first, that in a series of communications professing to be reports of what passed at the court in Brussels, at a trial in which he was charged with forgery and murder, an unfair and prejudicial report has been published; and, secondly, that after the trial had ended in his acquittal the defendants, in an article commenting upon the trial and the reports, published a repetition of the charge. Now, take the two parts of the case in the order in which I have stated them, and, first, as to the reports. I am glad that all are agreed as to what is the law, and that, whatever may have been thought in past times, now-a-days, at all events, we are all agreed that a fair and impartial report of the proceedings of a court of justice, although, as incidental to them, it may embody matter defamatory to an individual, is, nevertheless, privileged and protected, the public interest and advantage in having the reports published preponderating so much over the inconvenience to individuals as to justify the sacrifice of private inconvenience to the public good. But the condition upon which alone the privilege can be maintained is that the report shall be fair, truthful, honest, and impartial. It need not be a report of every thing, nor of all the proceedings of a long trial; the report may be long, or it may be more condensed, but still you must have an honest and impartial and substantially fair account, or there is no privilege for the publication of defamatory matter. Of course, if there is no defamatory matter, there is no occasion for privilege. But if the reporter adds facts or statements of his own, which are defamatory, then he cannot claim the benefit of the privilege. Whether the trial of a British subject by a foreign tribunal is within the privilege is a question which has not been raised to-day. But the proposition is not contested that unless the reports are fair they are not privileged. Having thus told you what is the law, I ask your attention to the series of letters or reports, with the view of your forming your judgment as to whether they come within the privilege. Gentlemen, they are certainly in a different style from what we are accustomed to in the reports of our English courts. The style has been described as “sensational "—perhaps it might be called a foreign style. There is a tendency abroad to dramatize every thing, and this is in that style. It may be attractive, but it is dangerous to pass from facts to fancy. The report, which ought to be truthful, is apt to become fanciful and fantastic. And if the reporter draws upon his fancy, and has particular views upon the subject, he may unconsciously convey that impression in place of the real facts. I hope, therefore, that we shall in our courts continue to adhere to the simple, truthful mode of reporting. But it is not because you may think this sensational style is in bad taste that therefore you are to allow any feeling of that sort to weigh with you in considering the limit of the privilege. The Lord Chief Justice then went through the various matters complained of in the report. As to the first, a statement which was a little ambiguous, as to whether it was taken from the acte d'accusation or was the reporter's own statement, his Lordship said he thought, on the whole, that it was meant as taken from the acte d'accusation. Alluding to the passage in which it was stated that one half of the personal testimony was in favour of Risk Allah, but that some people seemed to think he looked a cross between the serpent and the tiger, his Lordship observed that remarks of that sort could not be justifiable in a report, but that mere matters of personal description were not of much importance one way or another. Then came what the writer called a "damaging story," as told by a particular witness, as to which the Lord Chief Justice said the witness certainly did so state, and it was "damaging," so that this did not seem to be justly matter of complaint. But it was questionable whether the writer had a right to add that the witness was reticent," so as to convey the idea that he rather understated the case. He would now come, however, he said, to more important matters. There was a passage insinuating by means of an allusion to a passage in Shakespeare, that Risk Allah was a villain. The jury would judge how far that was consistent with the fair privilege of a report, and whether it was not going far beyond the function of a reporter to state that the person accused was a “villain." Adverting to another passage in which the writer spoke of Risk Allah's beard whitening, the Lord Chief Justice observed that if this was meant as mere matter of dramatic description it did not much matter; but if it meant to convey that the evidence was pressing upon the accused, and that he felt it oppressing him, then it went far beyond the proper function of a reporter to make observations of that kind, which were most prejudicial to the accused. Then, as to the important evidence of the "experts," the Lord Chief Justice entered fully into the effect of the statement in the report, which he said was entirely erroneous, and conveyed an impression quite the contrary of the truth, for the real fact was that the majority of the "experts" were from the first in favour of the theory of suicide, and not only never retracted that opinion, but adhered to it; and, indeed, one of them went so far as to assert his positive belief and certainty that it was a case of suicide. Moreover, the Lord Chief Justice remarked that it was manifest from the discrepancy between the statement in the letter and the actual fact as to the day on which the "experts" were examined that the writer was not in court at all. Referring to the report in the Echo du Parlement, and reading this part of it at length, the Lord Chief Justice showed that the writer could not have been in court, and that his statement as to the "experts" having retracted their opinion in favour of the plaintiff was the opposite of what really occurred, for they not only, after repeated experiments, maintained it, but with greater certainty. And it was utterly incorrect to say that though the plaintiff was discharged as to the murder the proofs of forgery and fraud remained, and that he was detained upon them. It was not true; he had been tried as well upon those charges as upon the other, and equally acquitted; and he was not detained. Then came the further statement as to the evidence of the " experts," that they were evenly balanced. This was quite incorrect; for only one retained his view contrary to the theory of suicide; the others were strongly in favour of the theory, and one of them went so far as to say that he was certain of it. The writer stated that one of them said the theory of suicide was impossible. This only showed that the writer could not have been present at the trial and must have taken his facts secondhand; for it was utterly and entirely unfounded. No doubt there was no reason to impute personal ill-feeling to the writer, and no doubt the writer wrote under the honest conviction that the facts told strongly against the plaintiff, and wrote without any intention of doing injustice. But while (said his Lordship) we uphold the liberty of the Press, and especially in the matter of reports of proceedings in courts of justice, and while it is to the interest of the public that they should be made known as widely as possible, we must take care that those who exercise that all-important function should act under a due sense of the duty they have to discharge. If you think the letters do not embody a fair and |