that there never was a case so difficult precisely to define, because it had been complicated by all sorts of grievances, arising from the well-known fact that the Northerners, expecting from us sympathy and support in their quarrel, would not have been satisfied by the most rigid neutrality. The lapse of time had facilitated the cool discussion of the case, and the state of it was this:We had offered to refer our liability for the ravages of the "Alabama," and the United States required that we should also refer the question whether we had rightly recognized the belligerent rights of the South. We had, in fact, conceded all that had been asked for at the commencement of the controversy, and if Lord Russell at the first had agreed to arbitration in the same shape as he himself had, the question of recognition would never have been heard of. But he professed himself entirely unable to decide what the two points had to do with each other. No one would deny that at some time of the war the South were entitled to be considered belligerents. If so, then at what time? Surely if ever they were belligerents it must have been after their great military successes in July, 1861, when for a time they seemed to have the military superiority, and threatened Washington. But the "Alabama" did not escape until April, 1862, and how could our liability for that event be affected by the recognition having taken place six months instead of eleven months before? No Government had insisted more strongly on the sovereign right of a country to recognize the independence of another state than the United States, and in illustrating this Lord Stanley quoted passages from the despatches of American Ministers in reference to the proposed recognition of Hungary by the United States, and the admission of Texan ships into American ports. It did not, therefore, lie in the mouth of the United States to contend that we ought to be fined for exercising this discretion of an independent Government. Suppose the Southern States had achieved their independence, would they have been entitled to claim damages for our tardy recognition of their belligerent rights? And yet the two claims stood entirely on the same footing. Strongly impressing on the House that this was not an ephemeral question, but would set an important precedent, Lord Stanley recapitulated the grounds of his objection to Mr. Seward's proposal. The question of recognition was irrelevant to the "Alabama" claims; it was a question of state policy, and not of legal obligation; the United States in parallel cases had distinctly refused any responsibility for a similar course; and lastly no arbitrator could be found who would undertake such an indefinite reference. What we had done was to recognize on the 13th of May a certain state of things as constituting a civil war, which Mr. Seward himself, in three public documents, dated nine, twelve, and sixteen days before, had so described, and which the Supreme Court had also declared to be a condition of war. If there was no war there was no blockade, and if there was no blockade, then the capture and condemnation of British ships for breaking the blockade

were illegal. The rupture of negotiations had not come from us; but he did not in the least fear that the question could lead to war between the two countries, for opinion in America was visibly changing in reference to this question of recognition, and no party in America would be insane enough to rush into a costly war in such a cause. No man could be more anxious to settle it than he, and whatever we might have to pay if the decision went against us-though our claims would amount to no inconsiderable set-offwould be cheaply spent in getting a settlement of these nice questions of international law. In conclusion, Lord Stanley intimated that there might still be a solution of the difficulty besides arbitration. Mr. Seward had thrown out hints of something in the nature of a general Commission to which the claims on both sides should be referred, and he had requested him to put the suggestion into a more formal shape. If the substance could be agreed upon, neither the Government nor the country would be disposed to stand too much on the form.

Mr. W. E. Forster did not agree with Mr. Shaw-Lefevre that the negotiations had failed. There had been a hitch, but another solution might be found, and looking to the possible dangers to our commerce by leaving the question unsettled, he suggested that Lord Stanley should intimate his willingness to give indemnity for the past, if the United States would come to some understanding by which the ravages of future Alabamas might be prevented. He did not sympathize with the position which Mr. Seward had taken on the question of recognition, but he held that Lord Stanley had mistaken his meaning. What he contended was, not that the arbitrator should decide on the opportuneness of recognition, but that the United States' Government should be at liberty to urge that as an argument in the consideration of our liability for the "Alabama."

Sir G. Bowyer argued that a neutral had as much right to sell a ship as any other article contraband of war. The belligerent's remedy lay in his right to seize it if he could. The Foreign Enlistment Act, he maintained, did not affect the liability of our Government. It was an Act which could have been put into operation by any private individual, and the Government, in undertaking to enforce its own municipal law, had done a work of supererogation which no foreign State had a right to require from it.

Mr. Mill pointed out that both the preceding speakers had confounded the sale of contraband with the right to make the neutral's territory the basis of operations. Our responsibility rested, not on our municipal law, but on the nonfulfilment of our international duties; and if our municipal law did not correspond with them, foreign States had a right to require its alteration. He agreed with Mr. Forster's interpretation of Mr. Seward's meaning; and as the point had now been reduced to a small compass, and as the offer of arbitration might be taken as a confession that we

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owed reparation, he suggested the appointment of a Mixed Commission to ascertain what damages the United States were entitled to claim. The very admission that we owed reparation would of itself settle the disputed point of international law.

Mr. Gladstone admitted that though Lord Russell had refused arbitration, Lord Stanley, in accepting it under altered circumstances, had not compromised the national honour. He professed himself quite unable to gather from Mr. Seward's language how he meant to use the question of recognition, and, differing from Mr. Mill, he denied that we had in any way admitted that reparation was due. The very question to be referred to arbitration was whether we had been guilty of any laches, but if we were of opinion that we were in the wrong, it was our duty to offer reparation without waiting for arbitration. In the same manner, he did not agree with Mr. Mill that our acknowledgment that reparation was due would settle the question of international law. That could only be done by an agreement between the leading nations. Expressing his gratification at hearing from Lord Stanley that the matter was not altogether closed, he promised to support him in the attempt to bring it to a satisfactory settlement.

There can be no doubt that the effect of this debate, and in particular of the sensible and temperate speech of Lord Stanley, produced an excellent effect on public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic, and contributed with other causes to the renewal of the endeavours for a pacific settlement of the "Alabama" question, which were happily made before the close of this year.

Shortly after this debate the same subject was introduced in the House of Lords at the instance of Earl Russell, who called the attention of that assembly, on the 20th of March, to the proceedings of the Royal Commission then sitting on the Neutrality Laws, and also moved for copies of correspondence between our Government and that of the United States respecting the "Alabama" and other claims. After briefly introducing the subject, with which he himself as Foreign Secretary under the preceding Government had been so largely concerned, Lord Russell observed that there was no doubt that among a considerable number of members of both Houses of Parliament a disposition had existed not to do justice to the exigencies of the position of the United States' Government in their late struggle. That source of danger had now happily passed away, but instead of it another of a totally different kind had arisen, and that was the difficulty of preserving the dignity of this country against unreasonable and unfounded demands. Under the pressure of these circumstances he feared the Government might be in danger of conceding positions they ought not to concede. Referring to his correspondence with Mr. Adams, to whom, in passing, Lord Russell paid a high tribute of admiration, he went on to say, that since his departure from the Foreign Office, Lord Stanley had consented to submit the whole question to arbitration, and this was a course in which on most

points he could not agree with her Majesty's Government. He adverted to the cases in which cruisers had escaped the vigilance of the Government, and more especially to that of the "Alabama," the flight of which from the Mersey Lord Russell explained, and contended that it was not possible it could have been prevented. The noble lord said every effort was used to detain or capture her when her character and purpose were known; but she got away, and even then she escaped as a harmless vessel, without guns, stores, or powder. After referring to the depredations committed by American cruisers on Portuguese commerce during the war between Spain and Portugal, and the laws then laid down by America, Lord Russell went on to point out how he had acted in the case of the "Alexandra" and of the iron-clads built at Birkenhead, and how the departure of those vessels had been instantly stopped. In those cases he thought they had not, morally speaking, exceeded the law, but certainly they had stopped the ships when they had not sufficient legal proof in a court of law to justify their seizure at the moment. He illustrated the case by the example of war between France and Prussia, and asked what was there to prevent Prussia from ordering, through a merchant at Amsterdam, a vessel to be built in England, and afterwards to go to sea and receive her armament either at sea or in some neutral port. He thought they had gone quite far enough in their neutrality laws, and if they were once to take upon themselves to seize unarmed vessels, they would incur a very grave responsibility.

The Lord Chancellor said, with respect to the first question as to the report of the Commission on the state of the neutrality laws, he had to inform the House that the report was ready. It had been almost unanimously agreed to, and would be laid on the table in a few days. As to the second question, relative to any further correspondence on this subject, there was none whatever; and, with all due respect to Lord Russell, he declined to follow him into the wide field of discussion his remarks might give rise to. The whole question was now open to arbitration, and it was surely no ground for refusing arbitration that they had such an extremely good case that arbitration was unnecessary. As regarded questions of fact, it was also as necessary they should be referred to arbitration as questions of law. On no tenable grounds, therefore, could the Government refuse to accede to the proposal for arbitration. They had therefore conceded on this point what the American Government demanded, but since that they had put forward another claim questioning the legality of our recognition of the belligerent rights of the Southern States at the time we did. To this it was replied that the question was quite irrelevant, as the United States had recognized the Southern States as belligerents long before England did, and if the United States denied this, then this country would have most heavy claims against them for seizing and condemning English vessels for attempting to break a blockade which they now said was not a proper blockade at all.

Lord Westbury, after explaining the nature and extent of the general principles of modern civilization, which went by the name of what is called international law, went on to say that much more than the mere accidental escape of a vessel was required to establish a breach of neutrality. It was the consistent animus of a Government which must be proved, and not a single case of socalled neglect. That our right to recognize the Southern States as belligerents should be among the questions to be submitted for arbitration arose from the prevalent idea in the American mind that they were not then engaged in civil war, but only in suppressing a revolt. The conduct of the then Government, however, was not to be judged by the one solitary and accidental instance of the "Alabama," but by the generally fair and impartial policy of the Liberal Government, hampered and harassed as it was on this subject by the action of the Conservatives. He hoped, however, that the negotiations would soon come to an amicable conclusion.

The Lord Chancellor explained that if the topic of recognition were to go before the arbitrators, it would rest with them whether they would receive the evidence on it or not. The negotiations were in fact not broken off. Mr. Seward had prepared a general Commission to investigate all claims, and Lord Stanley had asked for definite information as to the scope of this Commission.

Earl Russell's motion was then withdrawn.

Another motion involving similar questions of international obligation was brought forward in the House of Commons by Mr. W. E. Forster, with reference to the law regulating the allegiance of British subjects emigrating to foreign countries, and especially to the United States of America. According to the maxims of British law, no natural-born subject could divest himself of his allegiance, even though he might have gone to live in a foreign country and become a citizen of such country. This, Mr. Forster observed, was the only country that carried out that principle. By the last census of the United States it appeared that 2,420,000 of the population had been born abroad, and of these 1,600,000 were born in Ireland. When an emigrant had resided five years in the United States he was entitled to become an American citizen, and on doing so he took an oath of allegiance to the United States' Government, and renounced his allegiance to Great Britain. And now we had this difficulty, that some of the Irish emigrants who had been arrested in England claimed the rights of American citizens; those rights were refused them by the law officers of the Crown, and a strong feeling had been roused on the subject in the United States. It had been suggested that there should be a Congress of all nations to settle this subject. It did not, however, seem to him to be a matter for treaty; but there would be great advantages in coming to an understanding with the Government of the United States on the subject.

Sir R. P. Collier supported Mr. Forster's view of the inexpedience