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in the Treaties and Other International Acts Series represent some 1,527 rnational agreements other than treaties (including large numbers of mere nsions, modifications, supplements, etc.). The numbers in the Treaty Series in the Treaties and Other International Acts Series representing treaties ght into force beginning with 1928 aggregate 299.

I first glance there may appear to be a considerable disparity between those res; 1,527 on the one hand and 299 on the other hand. There is no basis comparison.

y analogy, an attempt at comparison merely on the basis of total figures ld be somewhat like trying to compare a thousand hand grenades with one mb. The analogy may be a bit exaggerated, but it conveys the basic idea. ngle treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation, for example, contains prehensive provisions in regard to such matters as the rights of entry, lence, and occupation of nationals, the treatment of corporative enterprises, guarantee of various liberties, the inheritance of or succession to property, movement of commercial vessels, salvage, economic development, the imation of goods, wares, and merchandise, and related subjects. Such a treaty well be, quantitatively and qualitatively, vastly more important than a red or more agreements regarding such matters as exchange of official ications, assignment of advisory missions, determination of civil air routes, uct of anthropological research, allocation of broadcasting frequencies, ction of passport visa fees, cooperative educational programs, and others. is a matter of perspective. Numbers mean little from the standpoint of parison. How, for example, can one compare a peace treaty with an exge-of-notes agreement regarding communication between amateur radio ons?

Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, Treaty Affairs, January 953.)

he CHAIRMAN. Secretary Dulles, are you ready for questioning? ecretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

he CHAIRMAN. Senator Wiley.

enator WILEY. Mr. Secretary, there has been quoted heretofore Statement that you made in Louisville in 1952, that you are pretty acquainted with.

ecretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

enator WILEY. I read it: You said:

e treatymaking power is an extraordinary power, liable to abuse. Treaties e international law, and also they make domestic law.

o you want to amplify that much of that statement?

ecretary DULLES. Senator Wiley, what I said there is the same gwhich I said in the statement which I have given, namely, that power is liable to abuse. Certainly the treatymaking power, like y other power given by our Constitution, is a power which is susible to abuse. I believe that there is required constant vigilance revent abuse of this power as every other power. You will recall at address I also pointed out that

he CHAIRMAN. Have you a copy of that address here? -cretary DULLES. Yes, sir.

he CHAIRMAN. Would you like to make it a part of the record? cretary DULLES. Yes, sir. I pointed out, "There is room for st difference of opinion as to whether our Constitution needs to mended as proposed or whether the President and the Senate ld retain their present powers for possible emergency use, and at same time insuring more vigilance to the end that treaties will undesirably or unnecessarily encroach on constitutional distribuof power. Whatever one's views on this matter, it is surely in public interest that the whole problem should be thoroughly red."

The CHAIRMAN. We will put that whole speech in the record. (The document is as follows:)

TREATYMAKING AND NATIONAL UNITY

Address by John Foster Dulles at the regional meeting of the American Bar Association, Louisville, Ky., April 11, 1952

The treatymaking power is an extraordinary power, liable to abuse. Treaties make international law and also they make domestic law. Under our Constitution, treaties become the supreme law of the land. They are, indeed, more supreme than ordinary laws for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the Constitution. Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President; they can take powers from the States and give them to the Federal Government or to some international body, and they can cut across the rights given the people by their constitutional Bill of Rights.

This extraordinary power seems to have been deliberately intended by our founders, in order to give the Federal Government untrammeled authority to deal with international problems. They apparently relied upon the fidelity of negotiators to our form of government, and upon the vigilance of the Senate, with the necessity for a two-thirds vote, to protect against abuse of the treatymaking power.

Today, many have come to feel that the Executive uses the treaty power to encroach on congressional power and the the Senate gets its opportunity to "advise and consent" so late that it has either to accept Constitution-stretching treaties it does not like, or imperil our international position by rejecting what has already been agreed upon with foreign governments.

When it came to negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty and the security treaties with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the Philippines, we tried to adhere faithfully to what, I believe, was the constitutional intent.

1. We avoided a security formula which might have increased the constitutional power of the President and diminished that of the Congress;

2. We avoided making human rights a matter of international, rather than domestic, concern; and

3. We brought the Senate, through its Foreign Relations Committee, into the treatymaking process from the beginning.

THE SECURITY FORMULA

The security treaty between Japan and the United States places no obligations of any kind on the United States because the Japanese were not yet in a position to give any undertakings of their own with respect to contributing to the common cause of security. There is no reason why the United States should assume onesided commitments. Therefore under the treaty the United States gets an option to station its Armed Forces in and about Japan, but the United States is under no obligation to do so nor are we legally bound to defend Japan. So long as Japan is threatened and unable to defend herself, we shall no doubt find it to the mutual interest of the Japanese and ourselves to exercise the options which the treaty gives us and thereby deter hostile action against Japan. However, that is for us to decide in accordance with our constitutional processes and the treaty does not alter those processes by one iota.

In the case of the security treaties with Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, we used the Monroe Doctrine formula, namely, that the parties recognize that an armed attack on any of the others would be dangerous to i's own peace and security and would act to meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional processes.

This formula had shielded this hemisphere for 125 dangerous years and the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines found that formula entirely acceptable to them.

Thus we achieved collective security without encroaching on the constitutional powers of the Congress,

HUMAN RIGHTS

The Italian and satellite peace treaties had made human rights a matter of treaty obligation and there is under negotiation an International Covenant en Human Rights. Few will question that human rights are of paramount import

e and that there is desperate need of influence and education which will bring ut greater respect for human rights. There is, however, a wide difference Opinion as to whether human rights can actually be promoted by trying to orce them from without as international obligations.

is always tempting to look on treaties as an easy way to make high ideals he true. Actually it may do more harm than good for one nation to attempt treaty to impose its moral standards on another people. Human rights uld have their primary sanction in community will and when treaties ignore t, and try to substitute an alien will, the treaties themselves usually apse through disrespect, dragging down the whole structure of international , order, and justice.

Within 20 months after peace treaties with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria me into force our Government found that their human rights provisions had n "deliberately and systematically" violated and we have not been able to anything but talk about it.

t the Japanese Peace Conference, I said "80 million people cannot be comed from without to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of ir fellows." On that account, we drew the Japanese peace treaty so as not to the Japanese under international compulsion in these respects.

t was, ironically enough, the Soviet Union which demanded a "human rights" use in the treaty, obviously because such a clause would give them the right ntervene in the domestic affairs of Japan.

However, the Japanese Government and people, remembering their old police te, wanted to make a solemn public declaration of their intention to respect man rights, and many other governments also wanted the Japanese to do S. So that was done by a preamble declaration by Japan. But the treaty itE does not make human rights a matter of international obligation. n the Senate debate on the Japanese peace treaty, Senator John W. Bricker ongly commended this handling of the human-rights matter. This was gratify, because he has taken a lead in studying the constitutional aspects of the blem and has made important proposals for a constitutional amendment which ald prevent treaties from impinging on present constitutional rights of the gress, the States, and the people. There is room for honest difference of nion as to whether our Constitution needs to be amended as proposed or ether the President and the Senate should retain their present powers, for sible emergency use, at the same time ensuring more vigilance to the end that aties will not undesirably and unnecessarily encroach on constitutional disutions of power. Whatever one's views on this matter, it is surely in the lic interest that this whole problem should be thoroughly explored.

SENATE PARTICIPATION

The manner of negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty and the three Pacific urity treaties established somewhat of a precedent in that the Congress s from the beginning a party to all our thinking and planning. We consulted ularly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the 4 members of Far Eastern Subcommittee, 2 Democrats and 2 Republicans, shared intimately tasks and problems of negotiation. Never have I had a happier relationship n that with these four Senators, John Sparkman of Alabama, Alex Smith of w Jersey, Walter George of Georgia, and Bourke Hickenlooper of Iowa. take particular pride in the fact that the Foreign Relations Committee their unanimous report said, “rarely, if ever, have any members seen such islative-executive teamwork as that which characterized the negotiation of treaties."

This teamwork paid off when it came to the final Senate action. The Japanese ce treaty, taking account of the officially recorded positions of the absentees, s approved by 82 for and 10 against; and all proposed reservations were eated by large majorities. That is an unusual result for an election year en partisanship runs high. The overwhelming Senate support of the Japanese ce treaty and the three security treaties came about because the Senate had ticipated so actively in the making of the treaties that the Senate was largely ling with its own handiwork.

UNITY BEHIND FOREIGN POLICY

We ought to have nonpartisan executive-congressional cooperation in reon to all treaties and, indeed, to major foreign policies. It is true that Constitution gives the President the exclusive initiative regarding foreign

affairs. But he cannot succeed if he cannot get his treaties ratified, if he cannot get the money to implement his policies, or if foreign governments believe that his policies are liable to be reversed every 2 years in consequence of congressional or presidential elections.

I can testify, being myself an exhibit, that the President and the Secretary of State really want bipartisanship in foreign policy and I can further testify that, in the matters they entrusted to me, they give me 100 percent backing. For that I shall always be grateful. I also know that leading Republicans and Democrats in and out of Congress accept the need for national unity in these dangerous times. However, it is not enough merely to want to have national unity; it is necessary to find the way to get it.

No one in a position of responsibility should be expected automatically to rubberstamp the policies of another and the country expects such persons to exercise an independent judgment. Cooperation requires enough foresight and initiative on the part of the Executive so that his representatives can sit down and talk out in advance with congressional leaders what the United States should do. We had that kind of initiative in relation to the Japanese peace treaty and the Pacific security treaties, and as a result we achieved a considerable, though limited success. But often we have not had foresight or initiative. Our foreign policy has not consisted in doing what we wanted or planned to do, but in hurriedly doing what we did not want to do but felt compelled to do to meet emergencies which had been created by our opponents.

If you will think back over the past 5 years, you will see that most of our major international acts have been reactions to Soviet Communist actions.

Most of our crises could have been foreseen sufficiently in advance to have permitted adequate consultation with the appropriate congressional committees and there could have been a national unity which was solidly based on free will rather than ephemeral unity achieved under a sense of compulsion. If, today, our Nation is more divided on foreign policy than at any time since Pearl Harbor that is largely due to the lack of vision of the administration or to its reluctance to make Congress a partner in policy making.

I believe, however, that the trouble goes even deeper. The United States has too much been on the defensive. We have been conducting a series of rearguard actions. Many of them have been well conducted. But this Nation of ours ought not to be dancing to whatever tune the Soviet leaders choose to play. That is not our historic role and we do not play it well.

We are accustomed to having the initiative and being the Nation which originated the impulses which swept through the world. This Nation, from its beginning, was a dynamic force in the world and feared by all despots because what we did, in freedom, aroused in all men a desire for freedom. We did not have to fight our way, or buy our way, to security because no despot wanted to try to lead his people to crush the great American experiment, which they admired and in the fruits of which they shared.

We need, today, foreign policies which are faithful to our great tradition. They will not be policies imposed on us from Moscow. They will be policies made in America, and behind them there will be a united America.

Senator WILEY. You also say that

Treaties, for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give them to the President.

Do you want to comment on that?

Secretary DULLES. I believe that a treaty can, by its provisions, probably give the President certain powers with reference, for example, to the stationing of troops abroad. That was a very controversial question that came up as to the proper interpretation and meaning of the North Atlantic Treaty. I was in the Senate at that time, and participated in that debate. I believe it is possible to create a situation by treaty which will enlarge the President's powers with reference, for example, to stationing troops abroad, and things of that sort. That is the kind of thing I referred to at that time.

Senator WILEY. Do you mean that a treaty would as a matter of absolute fact or simply as a matter of power take constitutional powers away from one branch of government and give to another!

ecretary DULLES. I did not mean to take the Constitutional powers y. What I had in mind was, for example the fact that when the th Atlantic Treaty says that an attack upon a foreign country uld be the equivalent of an attack upon the United States, I eved that may have enlarged the power of the President, as against present existing powers which Congress has.

On the other hand, it is also a fact that the Congress by assertion of own can take that power back. There were actually, I believe, past olutions by the Congress dealing with that subject, which were sequent to the adoption of the treaty, and which clarified the rective roles of the Senate and the Congress and Executive with relato that particular matter.

enator WILEY. Would that get in the field of war powers or in the 1 of emergency powers?

ecretary DULLES. Well, there again you know better than anyy else, I guess, the borderline which exists between the use of force i police action, and the use of force which amounts to declaration

var.

enator WILEY. You made the statement that all of the Supreme rt cases which deal with the subject are uniform to that effect. I er to the paragraph on page 1 where you have said:

reaties made by the President, concurred in by two-thirds vote of the Senate, me the law of the land, no limitation on treatymaking powers are extly confined in the Constitution or decisions of the Supreme Court. re the Supreme Court decisions all uniform to that effect? ecretary DULLES. I think the Supreme Court decisions are all form to the effect that the treatymaking power is not an unlimited wer. All of them, I believe, suggest limitations upon that power. enator WILEY. I think this statement that you made back on April did much to arouse the apprehension of thinkers in America to the ger of the treatymaking powers, if it is in the hands of folks who not exercise discretion in the utilization of it, but your statement re also was to the effect treaties can take powers from the States I give them to the Federal Government or to some international Do you want to go that far to take powers from the States itrarily?

y.

ecretary DULLES. Yes, sir. Most of the treaties dealing with trade, merce, controls of various kinds, deal with matters which are in the n reserved to the States. They are similiar to the situation dealt h in the Migratory Bird case in Missouri against Holland, where held the Federal Government against the States did not have the at to control migratory birds, but once the matter became of interional concern and subject to treaty, that then the Federal Governat could deal with them.

f you were going to have an international control of atomic pons with provisions adequate to insure that citizens of the Soviet on would not secretly make atomic weapons, you would have to e comparable power to that same body in the United States. enator WILEY. Have you any particular suggestion to make in tion to any amendment or amendments to any one of these resolus?

ecretary DULLES. I can say to you what I said to Senator Bricker w days ago when we were having lunch together about this mat

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