unnecessary. Their needless adoption at this time would weaken the confidence of other nations in the future international policies of the United States, and would be particularly damaging at a time when we have been urging federation on Western Europe. The conference resolution closes with these words: "The security of the United States is vitally dependent upon the success of the United Nations. Proposals such as the Bricker amendment, which would make it impossible for the United States to fulfill all of tis responsibilities as a member of the world community, would jeopardize our chances of obtaining lasting peace." THE BRICKER RESOLUTION Resolution Adopted by the Conference on United States Responsibility for World Leadership in 1953, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., March 1, 2, 3, 1953 We are strongly opposed to the Bricker, Watkins, and other proposed constitutional amendments which would seriously impair the capacity of the United States to play an effective role in world affairs by imposing limitations on existing power to make treaties and executive agreements, and by setting up additional obstacles to putting such treaties and agreements into effect. any One of the proposed amendments contains an article which states that "no treaty shall authorize or permit any foreign power or any international organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.” A major objective of treatymaking has always been the protection of American citizens abroad. This implies that we must give reciprocal protection to foreign nationals in the United States, which might be impossible under the foregoing provision. In developing measures for our own security, it may in the future become essential for us to have the constitutional power to grant to other nations or international organizations, regional or otherwise, the same rights in territory under our jurisdiction which have been given to us in connection with military bases which we have established abroad. Our legal authority to enter into such agreements would be doubtful if the quoted article were adopted. Nor could we enter into any agreement regarding international inspection of atomic bomb facilities such as that proposed by our Government. Also, the United States has in the past secured important benefits from participation in international agreements or organizations concerned with communications, conservation, labor, agriculture, health, banking, international crime and other fields where international cooperation is essential to successful action. The provision quoted above would prevent us from continuing to enjoy these benefits. Other provisions would prevent any treaty or executive agreement from becoming effective as internal law unless special legislation were enacted by both houses of Congress. These would impose cumbersome and rigid procedures in a field where flexibility and rapidity of action are essential and would seriously weaken the power of the President to act promptly in emergencies. They would also present a danger that any one of the states might prevent the application in its territory of a treaty to which the United States was a party. The real danger presented by the proposed amendments to the Constitution is that the hands of the President and the Senate would be tied in advance. They indicate a distrust of existing constitutional safeguards, of the wisdom of our elected Senators, and of the judgment of the President. Some of the prope, s are mere repetitions of already established constitutional doctrine, sice Do treaty can impair constitutionally guaranteed rights. Their needless, a loption at this time would weaken the confidence of other members of the United Nations in the future international policies of the United States and would be parti ular y inappropriate at a time when we have been urging federation in Western Fur pe There is nothing now which prevents the Senate from rejecting any treaty wish it finds unacceptable, undesirable, or inimical to American interests, or from accepting it subject to reservations. We believe that the procedures now in thei Constitution are adequate to prevent the United States from becoming colla,”tes] to ill advised international agreements. Any restrictions, such as those mentioned above, on the conduct of interna tional relations could not be removed, even in times of crisis, except through the dangerously slow process of further constitutional amendment. The security of the United States is vitally dependent upon the success of the United Nations. Proposals such as the Bricker amendment, which would make it impossible for the United States to fulfill all of its responsibilities as a member of the world community, would jeopardize our chances of obtaining lasting peace. Mr. EDELMAN. Having presented this specific resolution of the conference, I should like to add to this presentation some thoughts of my own which I will make as brief as possible, which are not contained in the matter presented in print. Leaving the careful analysts of constitutional doctrine to those who have already ably covered the matter, I limit myself to two primary observations. The first relates to the genius of our Constitution. I think its genius lies in its fine balance of certitude with adaptability. As we have grown in numbers and strength, the Con-. stitution has given full play to the needs of changing times and changing conditions. But for all its adaptability, it has preserved intact the fundamental structure of our Republic. It has held inviolate the safeguards of our individual liberties and has maintained the delicate balance of powers as between the three branches of our Government. James Bryce, the keen English observer of American affairs, said of our Constitution, I quote: Yet after all deductions, it ranks above every other written constitution for the intrinsic excellence of its scheme, its adaptation to the circumstances of the people, the simplicity, brevity, and precision of its language, its judicious mixture of definiteness in principle with elasticity in details. The provisions now sought to be inserted into this immortal document bid fair to rob it of these attributes of its greatness. They are a glaring departure from that simplicity, brevity and precision of language which have so distinguished it as a workable blueprint of government. The judicious mixture is being threatened with dilution and distortion. Never before in our history as a Nation have we exhibited such unsureness about our structure of government, such distrust of the office of the Presidency and of the Senate. I would like to say at this point with respect to the observation you made to Mr. Lashley, Senator Dirksen, that the problem of seeking absolute security from our own misjudgment is to me an unrealistic problem, because if we seek absolute security from possible misjudgment I think paralysis must necessarily set in. If two-thirds of the Senate cannot be trusted, why a majority of the House, why a majority of the Supreme Court, why a majority of the people? Section 2 gives us no protection against mistakes of judgment. It sets up the word "domestic" as if we constitute a word for our capacity to govern ourselves. This committee has been reminded by prior witnesses of the lengthy and careful debates of the constitutional convention on the subject of the treaty-making power and the eventual repudiation of the alternative proposals. No single voice, as I understand it, has been raised before this committee to condemn or even to question any treaty that an American President signed or a United States Senate ratified. All the voices that have been raised in favor of the radical alteration of the structure of our Government are voices of fear for what might happen in the future. Wise lawmakers I think legislate to wipe out existing evils. They do not battle specters and apparitions. Here the Congress and the whole people are being urged not merely to legislate, but to alter our Constitution and its scheme of separation of powers by reason of imagined threats of intrusion upon our domestic affairs. I recall that one of the witnesses in the prior proceedings spoke of preserving the old treasures of our Constitution. I submit that among its greatest treasures is its fine scheme for the structure of our Government and the balance of Federal powers. It is my view that Senate Joint Resolution 1 proposes a radical renovation of our constitutional system in language that is indefinite, inflexible, and I submit unworkable. Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Edelman, would you mind an interpolation at that point? Mr. EDELMAN. Not at all, Senator. I would welcome it. Senator DIRKSEN. Do you follow the activities of the members of your association insofar as they give attention to cases that are pending in court that may involve and arise from responsibilities flowing out of the United Nations Charter? Mr. EDELMAN. Do our members—— Senator DIRKSEN. I say do you give any attention to it? Mr. EDELMAN. So far as I am able I maintain an interest in developments that might arise out of United Nations affairs. Senator DIRKSEN. Would you know whether or not the American Association for the United Nations intervened as amicus curiae in a case that went to the Supreme Court, the October term, 1947? It was a case that arose out of Missouri and the petitioners were J. D. Shelly and others, Louis Kraemer, Orsel McGhee, Benjamin J. Sipes, Frederick E. Hodge, and a good many others. I think that can go into the record. (The brief referred to follows:) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OCTOBER TERM, 1947 No. 72 J. D. SHELLEY, ET AL, PETITIONERS v. LOUIS KRAEMER, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI No. 87 ORSEL MCGHEE, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. BENJAMIN J. SIPES, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN No. 290 JAMES M. HURD, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FREDERICK E. HODGE, ET AL. No. 291 RAPHAEL G. URCIOLO, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. FREDERICK E. HODGE, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA MOTION OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE The American Association for the United Nations respectfully requests this Court for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae in the above-captioned cases. We have received the consent of counsel to both petitioners and respondents in Nos. 87, 290, and 291. We have not received any answer to our letters to counsel in No. 72. The American Association for the United Nations is a nationwide, non-profit organization whose members are vitally interested in adherence by this Government to the provisions and to the spirit of the United Nations Charter. We have filed this brief because of the extraordinary importance of these cases, particularly with reference to the good faith of this country in observing the intent of the Charter. We believe that, if this Court were to uphold the decrees below enforcing racial restrictive covenants, the guarantees of fundamental human rights contained in the Charter would be vitiated and the international prestige of this country would be greatly impaired. We further believe, although this point will not be elaborated upon in our brief, that these decrees violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constituion. On the other hand, reversal of the decrees by this Court would be a magnificent affirmation of the principles to which this country has subscribed in the United Nations Charter and in the United States Constitution. The American Association for the United Nations, therefore, respectfully requests leave to file this brief amicus curiae. BRIEF FOR THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri in No. 72 (R. 153159), is reported at 198 S. W. 2d 679. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan in No. 87 (R. 60–69), is reported at 316 Mich. 614. The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Nos. 290 and 291 (R. 417-432) is reported at 162 F. 2nd 233. JURISDICTION This Court's jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 344 (b) and § 357 (a). QUESTION PRESENTED This brief will be primarily concerned with the question of whether by enforcing racial restrictive covenants (a) so as to preclude petitioners, as negroes, from purchasing and/or occupying realty, (b) so as to preclude other owners of realty from selling or leasing their property to negroes, and (c) so as to eject negroes from property already occupied by them, the Courts below violated Articles 55 (c) and 56 of the United Nations Charter. The second question discussed is whether the enforcement of racial restrictive covenants by the Courts below does not constitute improper interference with the public policy enunciated in Executive Agreements and Declarations, made in the conduct of the foreign relations of the United States. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. Enforcement of racial restrictive covenants is a violation of Article 55 (c) and 56 of the treaty known as the United Nations Charter. a. Interpretation of Articles 55 (c) and 56. b. The obligations of the United States under Articles 55 and 56 are not qualified by Article 2, Paragraph 7 thereof. II. As part of the "Supreme Law of the Land", treaties invalidate conflicting provisions of state common law or state statutes. III. Both state and federal courts are prohibited from taking affirmative action which contravenes the declared foreign policy of the United States of eliminating racial and religious discrimination. IV. Court orders enforcing racial restrictive covenants constitute governmental action. I ENFORCEMENT OF RACIAL RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IS A VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 55 (c) AND 56 OF THE TREATY KNOWN AS THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. A. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 55 (C) and 56 Insofar as presently relevant, Article 55 (c) of the United Nations Charter provides: the United Nations shall promote *uniform respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, and religion." Article 56 of the Charter embodies the following commitment by the ratifying nations to implement the provisions of Article 55: "All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." The United Nations Charter was ratified by the President of the United States, after consent had been given by the Senate pursuant to Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution. 51 Stat. 1031. Accordingly, the Charter is a "treaty made under the authority of the United States” and is "the supreme law of the land Unless assured equal access to housing and shelter, minority groups are discriminatorily deprived of liberty and property. Hence it seems to us plain that |