I do not agree with that. In the first place, these other countries are differently constituted from ours. Our Executive is elected by the people. The State Department and the Executive negotiate treaties.

In England, the Prime Minister negotiates treaties in the name of the Crown, but he is elected by the House of Parliament. In case he should negotiate a treaty which Parliament, who elected him, did not agree to, he would at once lose his position as leader in the House and his government would fall. That does not happen in our country. Our country has a vastly better system. At the point of negotiation and approval of treaties, we bring to bear a two-thirds majority of our upper House. That does not occur in any other country.

This system was debated in the Constitutional Convention quite a good deal. Some wanted treaties to be negotiated by the legislative, some by the Executive, and they wound up by having them negoti ated by the Executive and concurred in by this two-thirds majority of the upper House.

It is a unique mingling of the legislative and the executive departments not found in any other country that I know about. It is not a good argument, in my humble judgment, to say that we ought to bring our procedure into parity with that which is said to exist in other countries and other systems that do not have as good a system as we have.

In the first place, it is not quite comparable for the comparison is not perfect in view of the fact that our legislative department and our executive department are independently responsible only to the people and not to the Members of the House.

So I am very firmly convinced that we can do all with our present protections that England or Canada or any other country can do with theirs, and we have better protection at the beginning than they have.

Of course, if I may be pardoned for launching out on what seems to be another subject, there is a distinction between self-executing treaties and those which require action of the Congress to implement their execution. I think that the Genocide Convention falls within the latter class, and will require implementation. If it does not, the Senate can put a reservation on it that will make it do it.

Self-executing treaties are the kind that we are used to. If this country engages with France that their nationals shall have the benefit of our laws of land ownership and devolution of estates provided our nationals in their country shall have the benefit of their laws on land ownership and devolution of estates, and if it requires an act of our Congress to make that applicable as internal law, we would be in a position of having to await the action of Congress on that subject, and there might be sectional resistance to an act of Congress to carry out such a program. The program would, of course, have to be held in abeyance in France.

I use that as an illustration. That is not a true situation. A proposal now it to abolish the distinction between self-executing and nonself-executing treaties. I think that distinction ought not to be abolished, because the time lag in friendly reciprocal relationship arrange ments such as the one I have just mentioned, the time lag for the se

curing of legislation here might defeat the very purpose of the treaty itself, at least hold it in abeyance for a long time unnecessarily.

But to make it necessary to pass legislation to validate all treaties as international law seems to me an additional hardship that would do us more damage than it would the countries that we might be entering treaty relationships with.

Entering into a treaty relationship with a foreign country involves their knowledge of the law of our country. They have no hesitation in making these reciprocal arrangements now. If we fix it so they have to go through this long waiting period and the hazards of passing an implementing law through Congress, one would wonder why they would want to enter into such agreements with us. It would make it harder, or so it seems to me, to get agreements of that kind with them. Perhaps I went more afield than your question warranted. Senator SYMINGTON. That is very interesting.

That is all the questions I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the staff any questions to ask?

Mr. SMITHEY. I think probably we ought to develop one phase of this matter which has been discussed but which I think would stand further development.

Mr. Lashley, is it your contention that the matter of atomic energy is a matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States?

Mr. LASHLEY. I do not know enough about that to be dogmatic in the expression of an opinion on the subject. I have read a number of interpretations of good constitutional lawyers in whom I have confidence, who say that it would not be practicable for a supervisory board to come to this country without doing some things in connection with the investigation of our facts on our supply of arms or atomic bombs that would not be in the field of domestic rights, rights of the people, as distinguished from rights of the country or the rights of States.

Mr. SMITHEY. In the light of your answer, sir, can you tell me whether you think that under the present provisions of the charter to which Senator Dirksen has referred, that is, article II, section 7, the United Nations in entertaining the suggestion of the United States, the so-called Baruch proposal, has exceeded its authority, because it says in that section:

Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United States to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State.

Mr. LASHLEY. I doubt whether I could help the committee by an expression of view on that subject. I think I will not try.

Mr. SMITHEY. You mentioned in the course of your statement that these was some question so far as treaties were concerned, as to constitutional limitations that might be imposed on treaties, and that the limitation may be whether the subject matter of the treaty is one appropriate for international agreement. Is that correct?

Mr. LASHLEY. Yes, and we would have to bring in the United States Supreme Court to decide that in any given case, I suspect, in the last analysis.

Mr. SMITHEY. In an analysis of what is appropriate for an international agreement, are you aware of the contention voiced many times before this committee in the hearings that the State Department

has contended that there is no longer any real distinction between foreign and domestic affairs? Were you aware of that statement?

Mr. LASHLEY. I have seen it used somewhere, and I did not understand it very well.

Mr. SMITHEY. If that analysis is allowed to stand, can it no longer be said that there is an implied limitation on the treatymaking power insofar as the subject matter is concerned?

Mr. LASHLEY. If I am to answer on the assumption that that statement was made by somebody, I would not know how to answer. I do not understand precisely what whoever made it intended by it. I do not have the context which led up to or explained it. So I would merely be romancing to attempt to answer it. I do not know too well what is meant by there no longer being any distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. To me, there is a good deal of distinction between them.

Mr. SMITHEY. If a matter once becomes a matter for discussion— Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smithey referred to that analysis, if that is allowed to stand. And I did not know that analysis had ever been established.

Mr. SMITHEY. I think you will find it is in the record with the citation, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. Who established it? Who had the power to establish it?

Mr. SMITHEY. That was a declaration, and it is the opening sentence of a State Department publication. I can give you the num ber. No. 3972, of the General Foreign Policy Series No. 26, released 1950, with a foreword by President Truman. The first statement is as I quoted it:

There is no longer any real distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. Senator KEFAUVER. That does not establish anything as the law of the land. That is somebody's opinion.

Mr. SMITHEY. Senator, I was not attempting to establish anything as the law of the land. I was asking him if, in the light of that, it could be said that if that be true, there is any implied limitation on the subject matter of a treaty.

Senator KEFAUVER. Your question was: "If this analysis is allowed to stand." You were asserting it as if it was the law of the land at the present time, and I do not think that impression should be left in the record.

Mr. SMITHEY. Senator, if I gave any impression that that was the law of the land it was unintended. However, it certainly is the assertion or was the assertion of the Department of State. It is not judicial law. I intended to ask the witness-—

Senator KEFAUVER. Who signed the document?

Mr. SMITHEY. It is in the Foreign Policy Series, and it is here for your examination if you care to examine it, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Chairman, I do not think we are getting off on the right basis by taking some statement out of a pamphlet which, as far as I can find, is not signed by anybody, and saying that that is the analysis of the State Department.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no harm in the opinion, anyhow.

Senator KEFAUVER. I guess not.

Mr. SMITHEY. It has been presented to the committee on a number of occasions.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked many witnesses the same question. Mr. LASHLEY. There may be an argumentative sense in which certain matters of foreign relations and domestic relations are the same, but the statement could not go, in my own mind, without having studied it, as a general proposition. I think there is a difference between foreign relations and domestic relations.

Mr. SMITHEY. I asked you that primarily because in the course of your statement you had sought to encourage certain international agencies in their endeavor in certain fields.

Mr. LASHLEY. I believe that to be our duty, yes.

Mr. SMITHEY. Insofar as the agreements, say, of the International Labor Organization are concerned, where they deal with such subjects as maternity protection, do you think that those are appropriate matters for the consideration of international agreements?

Mr. LASHLEY. I do not know. I have no idea. I do not believe I could be of any service to the committee in discussing this proposed constitutional amendment by going into the details of various social subjects that might be discussed around the table in educative process of these various committees associated with the United Nations. I have not enough information on the subject to be of any value to the committee.

Mr. SMITHEY. The only reason I asked you the question, sir, was because of your earlier reference that you would encourage them to go into these field as much as possible.

Mr. LASHLEY. Yes.

Mr. SMITHEY. If I misinterpreted you, I wanted to give you an opportunity to answer that question.

Mr. LASHLEY. At the time you began asking me, in answer to Senator Symington I was saying or was about to say-perhaps I may not have finished the point-I was about to say, I think, that the Government does not have the power to make treaties which are contrary to the prohibitions of the Constitution any more than the Congress has power to pass laws which are contrary to the prohibition in the Constitution. The Constitution is the background against which treaties must be measured, against which acts of Congress must be measured, as to their validity.

Mr. SMITHEY. Were you present at the Louisville, Ky., regional meeting of the American Bar when Mr. Dulles made his statement which has been widely quoted?

Mr. LASHLEY. No, I was not.

Mr. SMITHEY. To the effect that treaties can override the Constitution?

Mr. LASHLEY. In a pamphlet published by the committee on peace and law of the American Bar Association, I saw an excerpt from his speech to that effect, and I did not have the rest of the speech. I do not know whether the bald language that was quoted has been modified by further exposition in the speech. I do not know that. But so far as the categorical statement you have just quoted is concerned, I would not agree with that.

Mr. SMITHEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank you very much for coming. You always help out this committee. It was a very fine thing for you to do.

Mr. LASHLEY. Thank you so much, Senator Langer.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Albert Edelman?

STATEMENT OF ALBERT I. EDELMAN, ATTORNEY AT LAW AND MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. EDELMAN. I am Albert I. Edelman, an attorney with offices 30 Pine Street, New York City, and a member of the board of directors and executive committee of the American Association for the United Nations.

I appear before this committee in two capacities, one as an individual citizen and member of the board of American Association for the United Nations, and, secondly but primarily in my capacity as chairman of the resolutions committee of a conference that was held here in Washington just 2 weeks ago which dealt with United States responsibility for the world leadership. It was held at the Shoreham Hotel on March 1, 2, and 3.

The conference was attended by delegates and observers from 120 national organizations. The conference was opened with a message from the President, and it was addressed by the Secretary of State and by distinguished representatives of both political parties. It was the third annual conference of its kind, each one called by the American Association for the United Nations, dedicated to discussion of United States responsibilities in international affairs, and dedicated to the common purpose of strengthening American support of the United Nations.

Senator DIRKSEN. Mr. Edelman, tell us a little more about the Association for the United Nations. I would like to know a little about the background of the organization.

Mr. EDELMAN. Yes. The American Association for the United Nations, Senator, is a membership corporation which is the successor to the League of Nations Association, which existed for many years prior to World War II. It has a board of directors

The CHAIRMAN. Give us the names of your board of directors.

Mr. EDELMAN. The members of the board of directors include: Mr. Thomas J. Watson, Mr. Sumner Welles, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, Mr. Harry Bullis, Mr. Herman Steinkraus, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt. I can add to those. I am a member of the board. The CHAIRMAN. Will you furnish a complete list?

Mr. EDELMAN. May I furnish complete list to the committee? Senator DIRKSEN. That will be good. Furnish a complete list of the board. I suppose it has officers, also?

Mr. EDELMAN. Yes; it has officers. The honorary chairmen are Mr. James T. Shot well and Mr. Sumner Welles. The president is Mr. William Emerson, of Boston. The vice presidents are Mr. John W. Davis, Mr. Douglas Fairbanks, Jr., and there the two others.

May I furnish you with a list of officers? The executive director is Mr. Clark Eichelberger.

Senator DILKSEN. And all of the directors. I think it would be helpful if you could furnish at least a little identity. I assume, for instance, Harry Bullis is identified with General Foods or General Mills. Would that be right?

Mr. EDELMAN. Yes, sir.

Senator DIRKSEN. Give us some idea.

Mr. EDELMAN. You would like a description in each case?