in practice, to negotiate for effective international agreement to control the narcotic traffic because it could not be reasonably sure that, in assuming what it considered to be necessary obligations involving national control measures, it was not impairing a right enumerated in the Constitution. Particularly would this be doubtful in the light of he ninth amendment which states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Under the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 43, there would be no doubt as to the impotence of the executive department of Government to become a party to an effective narcotie treaty requiring implementation by Federal legislation ordinarily considered within the reserved powers of the States.

The United States has traditionally taken a leading part in securing the adoption of appropriate international agreements to control the narcotic traffic. As early as 1909, when a conference was called, on the initiative of the United States, of the International Opium Commission which convened at Shanghai, it was recognized that the solution of the narcotic problem necessitated concerted international action. A few years later the United States, with some 65 other world powers ratified or acceded to the International Opium Convention of 1912, which obligated the contracting powers to take such steps as the enactment of laws for control of production and distribution of raw opium, and to limit exclusively to legitimate and medical purposes the manufacture, sale, and use of morphine, cocaine, and their respective salts. Some years later the United States ratified the convention, concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931, for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, and some 67 other world powers are parties to this convention. The principal obligations assumed by the parties under the 1931 convention were (a) limitation of the total manufacture of the dangerous narcotic drugs to that quantity necessary to supply the world's medical and scientific needs, and (b) the application of certain provisions of the Geneva Narcotic Convention of 1925 (not theretofore ratified by the United States) relating to control of persons and establishments involved in manufacture, sale, and distribution of the drugs, and control of international trade in the drugs. Still later, with the discovery and development of synthetic analgesic drugs, not derived from opium, as substitutes for morphine, it became necessary to supplement the 1931 convention by the protocol of 1948, which provides an international procedure for prompt application by all the parties of manufacturing limitation to such of the new synthetic drugs as are determined to be dangerous from the standpoint of addiction liability, thus avoiding overproduction, beyond medical and scientific needs, which would spread drug addiction. The 1948 protocal was ratified or acceded to by the United States and 30 other world powers.

If section 1 of the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 1, in protecting "any right enumerated in this Constitution" is intended to protect only those rights which arise from specific prohibitions in the Constitution of certain types of Government action, it would be unnecessary as the Supreme Court has heid that the treatymaking power of the United States does not extend so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids (Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. 8. 258; In re: Ross, 140 U. S. 453; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416; Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U. S. 332). If the proposed amendment were adopted, therefore, it is very unlikely that section 1 would be considered or construed as merely declaratory of existing law; there would be a broader construction of the term "any right enumerated in this Constitution," which would narrow the application of the principle enunciated in the Missouri v. Holland case that an act passed pursuant to the obligation of a treaty is not invalid where "the only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the general terms of the 10th amendment." The Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942 which was enacted pursuant to an obligation in article 1 of the 1912 convention, was held constitutional by a three judge Federal court in California on much the same principle (56. F Supp. 810), and it is regarded as doubtful that the Opium Poppy Control Act would remain constitutionally valid under section 1 of this proposed amendment There can be no doubt of the invalidity of the act under the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 43.

Section 2 of the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 1 prov des that no treaty shall authorize or permit any international organization to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens enumerated in the Constitution "or any other matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." Under article 14 of the 1931 convention the Permanent Central Board (an international organization) upon finding that any country has exceeded the

otal of its estimates for narcotic drugs, shall immediately notify the high conacting parties, who will not, during the currency of the year in question, auhorize any new export of narcotic drugs to that country with certain excepons. Under the 1948 protocol, the World Health Organization is authorized to ake a definitive finding as to the addiction liability of a given drug, and this nding when communicated to the high contracting parties binds them to apply r not to apply, as the case may be, the provisions of the 1931 convention to the ew drug. In each of these cases an international organization performs a funcon, under a treaty, that is very important in the control of the narcotic drug raffic but which would not be permissible under section 2 of this proposed mendment.

Section 3 of the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 1 provides hat a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only hrough the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress. By the terms f the 1912 and 1931 conventions, it is specifically recognized that the provisions f these two conventions be implemented by appropriate domestic legislation. The 1946 protocol does not by its terms require the enactment of domestic legisation because this protocol was designed merely to transfer supervisory funcions under narcotic treaties from organs of the old League of Nations to correponding organs of the United Nations. The 1948 protocol likewise did not in erms require the enactment of domestic legislation since it was designed to proide a reasonably expeditious procedure for subjecting to international control ew drugs found to be dangerous, similar to morphine and cocaine, from the tandpoint of addiction liability. It will be seen that the basic narcotic treaties, t least, already observe the principle sought to be established by section 3 of his proposed amendment, but this section would seriously handicap the obtainng of any international agreement on narcotics, no matter how necessary and esirable it might be regarded by the executive department of Government, as the ther high contracting parties would have no reasonable assurance that the reaty would be given effect by domestic legislation, even though it had been made with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under section 1 of the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 43, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to obtain international agreements on narcotic control as the imlementation of many important provisions of such agreements require implementing Federal legislation which would not be valid in the absence of the treaty, otwithstanding that such implementing Federal legislation would not and could ot contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.

Section 4 of the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 1 relates to ill executive or other agreements between the President and any international organization, foreign power, or official thereof, such agreements to be made only n the manner and to the extent to be prescribed by law. Such agreements are o be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties, or the making of treaties, by the proposed amendment. Section 1 of the amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution 43 provides that executive agreements shall be subject to reguation by the Congress and to the limitations imposed on treaties by "this article." The Bureau of Narcotics wishes to make the observation that it is interested in ust one informal international arrangement in the nature of an executive agreenent. This is an arrangement for the direct exchange of information concernng narcotic traffic between those officials of the various countries who are in lirect charge of controlling the narcotic drug traffic in their respective countries. The arrangement covers the exchange of seizure reports and information regardng persons suspected of being engaged in the illicit traffic, including such nformation as photographs, criminal records, fingerprints, descriptions of the nethods which the persons in question have been found to use, the places from which they operate, and the names of their associates. The arrangement was nitiated in 1928 by an exchange of notes between the State Department and the uthorities of the United Kingdom, and since that time a similar arrangement, y exchange of notes, has been entered into with many other countries. In the United States the official designated for this purpose is the Commissioner of Narcotics. Article 15 of the 1931 convention affirms generally the establishment of such an arrangement because it obligates the high contracting parties to reate a special administration (in the United States, the Bureau of Narcotics) or the purpose, among others, of “regulating, and controlling the trade in the rugs," and "organizing the campaign against drug addiction, by taking all iseful steps to prevent its development and to suppress illicit traffic."

It may be argued that the informal arrangement thus described does not mount to an "executive or other agreement" under Senate Joint Resolution 1

or Senate Joint Resolution 43 because technically it was not entered into by the President. However, it was entered into by an executive department and would, no doubt, be considered to come within the purview of each proposed amendment. The informal arrangement for the exchange of information relative to illicit narcotic traffic has now been in operation for some 24 years, and has been of considerable benefit to narcotic law enforcement. There has been no complaint, and it is believed that there has been no ground for complaint of the operation of this informal arrangement interfering with the legal rights of any citizen. The observation is made that it would be very cumbersome to apply either proposed amendment to such an administrative agreement.

EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

A number of executive agreements in the field of international finance would be affected by the adoption of either of the constitutional amendments proposed in Senate Joint Resolution 1 and Senate Joint Resolution 43. Constitutional limitations on the powers of the Executive in this field would seriously impair the flexibility necessary to achieve the international cooperation requisite for carrying out policies and operations in the field of international finance.

United States participation as a member of the International Monetary Fund was specifically authorized by the Congress in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, approved on July 31, 1945. The provisions which raise the greatest difficulty in this respect are section 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 1, prohibiting any treaty which authorizes or permits any international organization "to supervise, control, or adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States within the United States enumerated in this Constitution or any other matter essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States," and section 4 of the same resolution, which provides: "All executive agreements * shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties *** by this article." While, in general, the articles of agreement of the fund do not vest power in the international organization to take affirmative action requiring member countries to do particular things, the organization does have significant veto powers. Thus, each of the member countries is obligated not to change the par value of its currency (except for certain minimal changes) without the concurrence of the fund. Similarly, member countries may not suspend gold convertibility, or impose exchange restrictions, or engage in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency practices, or establish too wide a spread between buying and selling rates for currencies, unless authorized by specific exceptions in the articles of agreement, or unless permitted by the international organization. In all these cases, the control over the practices of the United States is theoretic rather than real, since we do not engage in any of the forbidden praetices, and do not plan to do so. These obligations are considered important by the United States because they tend to limit the spread of disorderly currency practices throughout the world. However, we could hardly expect other countries to incur such obligations if we were not prepared to do so ourselves. Moreover, the complexities of international finance are such to preclude the possibility of spelling out in precise detail in the agreement itself every possible permissible exception from the general obligations which form the basic structure of the fund agreement. Unless there is a measure of flexibility to permit swift action in the case of financial emergencies, no country would be willing to obligate itself by international agreement, and the only way to prevent such flexibility from providing a wide-open and uncontrolled escape clause is to give a power of decision to an international body which can act swiftly.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which the United States also joined after congressional approval in the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, does not typically involve regulatory functions or oblizations on the part of this Government. The provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1 and 43 would not affect, by themselves, our present situation with respect to the bank. However, both of these proposed constitutional amendments provide that executive agreement shall be subject to legislative regulation The ĥ mi and extent of congressional regulation cannot, of course, be forecasted in advan e. But there is a proposal before the Senate now (S. J. Res. 2) which has attracted a good deal of interest, which would constitute regulation of international agreements. One of the provisions of this resolution word terminate the obligations of the United States under an executive agvement 6 months after the ends of the term of the President during whose terore it was negotiated, unless extended by proclamation of the succeeding President.

such a requirement were to become mandatory in the making of executive greements, it would seriously interfere with the possibility of setting up an fective international banking institution. Other countries, if they were prered to negotiate with us at all on such a basis, would undoubtedly insist at they, too, have the same freedom based upon the tenure of their incumbent overnments. The International Bank now has over 50 member countries. ince governmental administrations are always changing somewhere in the orld, the bank would find itself in a constant state of instability as each member ountry took advantage of its 6-month period to reconsider adherence to the stitution. It is difficult to see how a bank so constituted could expect to aintain the confidence of the investing community to which it must look for e major part of its loanable funds.

Apart from the major executive agreements described above, which were both tered into under explicit congressional authorization, there are a number I agreements of lesser significance affecting day-to-day administrative responbilities of the Treasury Department in the foreign financial field which might e affected by congressional regulation. Indeed, under the language of Senate oint Resolution 1, section 4, executive agreements, if the proposed amendment ecomes effective, could not be made at all until the Congress had acted to rescribe the manner and extent of making such agreements. Some examples f the wide variety of detailed agreements of this character are: Agreements nder the Trading With the Enemy Act for handling conflicting custodian probms and certifications necessary to establish beneficial ownership of financial ssets, agreements with foreign central banks covering the establishment of reasurer's checking accounts in foreign banking institutions, and agreements with respect to uses of balances of foreign currencies which may have been cquired as a result of agreements such as those dealing with the disposal of urplus property.

TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AFFECTING COAST GUARD OPERATIONS

The operations of the Coast Guard involve a considerable number of treaties nd executive agreements dealing with subjects such as maritime safety, communications, aviation, and conservation of fisheries. These agreements are ypically very technical in character, and, for the most part, would not be irectly affected by the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 1 or 43, since they o not involve regulatory measures affecting persons within the United States. But there are two treaties which do have important significance in the regulaory field, and these would be affected differently by the proposed amendments. Section 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 forbids a treaty which authorizes or ermits a foreign power or an international organization "to supervise, control, r adjudicate rights of citizens of the United States" or other matters “essenially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States." Under the Teleommunications Convention of 1947, the registration of frequencies with the Inernational Frequency Registration Board endows the first nation which is peritted to register on a particular frequency with all rights thereto. Where an pen frequency is thus preempted by a foreign nation, the frequency is withrawn from possible use by a United States national. It may be said that in his way the foreign nation filing for the frequency and the international oranization accepting the registration is exercising control over United States roperty rights in the domestic field. However, any action which would prelude international agreements of this kind would ultimately leave each sepaate nation to act entirely independently, and the conflicts of frequency use, articularly in areas in close proximity to other nations, could result only in haos in the field of radio communications.

The International Civil Aviation Convention makes different arrangements n a somewhat related field, which would apparently not run afoul of the cited provision of Senate Joint Resolution 1. The ICAO organization establishes recommended practices" as to the operation of aircraft in international flight, ncluding qualifications of personnel. The international organization urges all member nations to conform to these "recommended practices," but any nation s privileged to file a notice of noncompliance with any particular recommendaion, in which case, the nation filing such notice is not obligated in any way o comply with the "recommended practice." Another similar example is the proposed Rome Convention dealing with damage caused by foreign aircraft to hird parties on the surface of the earth and negotiated within the framework 30572-53-65

of ICAO. At a convention held in Rome last October, delegates from other countries agreed to a proposed convention that is entirely inacceptable to the United States. Our delegation did not sign and apparently there is no inclination to sign at a later date and subsequently ratify this convention. The reason is that certain rights of the United States would be adversely affected. Even though this convention is ratified by all other nations engaged in international aviation, it will not affect the United States in any way, whether third parties on the surface are in the United States or in a foreign country; nor would the nationality of the aircraft make any difference. In this field, while there is obvious importance to international uniformity, the need for common acceptance is not as sharply presented as in the case of two broadcasting stations trying to use the same frequency at the same time.

There is appended hereto a list of treaties and executive agreements affecting operations of the Coast Guard to indicate the wide variety of its activities involving relationships with foreign countries.

TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS RATIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE

Maritime safety

International Conventions for the Safety of Life at Sea (1914) (1929) (1948). These conventions are the basic documents controlling regulations for the safety of life at sea on the international level. They include provisions relating to the construction of vessels, lifesaving appliances, communications requirements, the carriage of grain and other special-type cargoes, basic provisions for rules to prevent collisions, and provisions for the establishment and maintenance of the international ice patrol.

International Load Line Convention. London 1930. Ratified by the United States June 10, 1931.

Treaty between the United States and Canada defining certain waters of the west coast of North America as "sheltered waters." Ratification exchanged July 26, 1934.

Officers' Competency Certificates Convention. 1936. Ratified by the United States October 29, 1939.

Minimum-Age Convention (revised 1936). Ratification by the United States deposited on October 29, 1938.

Communications

Safety of Life at Sea Conventions (1914) (1929) (1948).

International Civil Aviation Convention, Chicago. Signed December 7, 1944, effective April 4, 1947. In implementation of the Civil Aviation Convention many international gatherings, regional meetings, sometimes bilateral, some times unilateral, have been held to work out the myriad of technical details necessary to make a civil international aviation organization function.

International Telecommunications Convention, Atlantic City. Signed October 2, 1947. Ratification advised by the Senate 1948,

To implement the Telecommunications Convention, Atlantic City, 1947 (above), an Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference was held in Geneva in 1949 to bring into force a table of frequency allocations and to make other technical regulations. This is an example of the type of detail that must be worked out by succeeding conferences under basic treaties,

Conventions between the United States and other American countries relating to communications matters, Habana, 1947. Ratified by the United States June 30, 1938. To implement this convention other gatherings have been held for the purpose of working out technical details. The last of these was the Fourth Inter-American Conference the report of which was signed at Washington July 9, 1949.

Ariation

International Civil Aviation Convention, Chicago, 1944. Signed December 7, 1944, effective April 14, 1947. In implementation of the Civil Aviation Convention innumerable international gatherings, regional meetings, sometimes bilateral, sometimes unilateral, have been held to work out the myriad of technical details necessary to make a civil international aviation organization flise tion.

Conservation

Convention between the United States and other powers for the regulation of whaling. Ratified by the United States June 17, 1932.