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Mr. HAZARD. This is a ship, though.
Mr. HAZARD. Yes. That is not very different from the present law, which is stated in rather puzzling terms, and this was an attempt to clarify the language, as well as to give service the standing of residence.
Mr. REES. In other words, a man who comes in here legally, and who is employed on a ship that flies the American flag, can use whatever time he is employed on the ship to apply to his citizenship?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; and before the law has not been clear as to that. It left those seamen up in the air, and in many cases it has been rather difficult for them to prove their cases.
Mr. Rees. If he is on an American ship and enters legally? Mr. HAZARD. Yes. Mr. REES. All right. Now No. 3. Mr. HAZARD. Section (3): Residence in the Panama Canal Zone, either while in the service of the armed forces of the United States, or while otherwise in the employ of the United States or of the Panama Railroad Co.: Provided, That the applicant shall have entered the United States lawfully for permanent residence prior to such residence in the Panama Canal Zone.
Mr. REES. Now, if he comes from France and enters legally, then goes down to Panama and gets a job, or goes down and works for the United States Government, or works for this railroad company, or serves in the armed forces of the United States—but now he is an alien, is he not?
Mr. HAZARD. But this merely gives him the opportunity of counting that time as residence in the United States; otherwise, many of these people who would be in the Panama Canal Zone serving the armed forces or working for the United States Government in territory over which we have sovereignty or the right of sovereignty, would not be able under present law to become naturalized, because the only cases in which residence in the Panama Canal Zone is regarded as residence for naturalization purposes are those of alien declarants who have served in the United States Army, Navy, or the Philippine Constabulary, who have been honorably discharged and have been accepted for either the military or the naval service of the United States on condition that they become citizens, a very narrow class of persons.
Mr. REES. This man does not have to declare his intention to become a citizen of the United States if he gets in the Army.
Mr. HAZARD. This is merely saying that persons in those various categories who are in the Panama Canal Zone are regarded as residing in the United States, if they conform to the other requirements. It is merely a definition of residence, saying that what is not now residence in the Panama Canal Zone, in a large variety of cases will be regarded as residence hereafter.
The CHAIRMAN. That does not waive his right to go through the natural process of naturalization?
Mr. HAZARD. Not at all.
The CHAIRMAN. He has got to take out his first papers and wait 5 years, and all that?
Mr. HAZARD. This merely says, just as it says in the preceding subdivision, that presence in a particular place, or residence in a particular place, will be regarded as residence for naturalization purposes, just as service on board an American merchant ship.
Mr. REES. How does the Frenchman get to the Canal Zone so he can live there?
The CHAIRMAN. He would have to first come into the country legally. Mr. REES. Where?
The CHAIRMAN. Into a regular port of entry, and if he resides in Iowa or New York or Pennsylvania and he is a man of some responsibility and some competency, he has got a job in the Panama Canal Zone, under present law if he goes down there he can work for our Government, the Government of the United States, for 20 years, and it does not stop counting his residence for citizenship if he is a desirable citizen. So therefore, the only question involved here, as I see it, as was well put by the witness, is that it is just a waiver of residence in the States. If he is working for the Government in the Panama Canal
. Zone, that equals residence in the State where he resides.
Mr. HAZARD. In this provision these persons are actually there and are residing there. The only thing we do is to say that if they are there and are residing there, under these circumstances we will count that as residence for naturalization purposes.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not waive his quota, though? You do not waive the necessity for his lawful admission under the immigration law of 1924. You do not waive his first papers, his second papers. You simply provide a means that if he is actually employed by our Government in a place which is no man's land, practically, for the purposes of citizenship, that shall count for him?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes. Section 308, subdivision (a): As to each period and place of residence in the State in which the petitioner resides at the time of filing the petition, during the entire period of at least six months immediately preceding the date of filing the petition, there shall be included in the petition the affidavits of at least two credible witnesses, citizens of the United States, stating that each has personally known the petitioner to have been a resident at such place for such period, and that the petitioner is and during all such period has been a person of good moral character.
May I make this observation, Mr. Chairman, that in the provisions of section 307, the general requirements as to residence and character and attachment to the principles of the Constitution, I should have mentioned that there is a change in the requirements.
Mr. REES. Six months.
Mr. HAZARD. Six months in the State instead of six months in the county in which the petitioner resides. That is a change that I did not mention and it should have been mentioned. The reason for that is that the present requirement that the 6 months immediately preceding the date of filing of the petition for naturalization must be in the county in which he resides at the time of filing the petition would mean that up in your district, Congressman Dickstein, if a man resided in one part of metropolitan New York, in Manhattan, for instance, for 5 months and then moved over to Brooklyn, he would have to remain in Brooklyn for 6 months before he could declare his intention for naturalization.
The CHAIRMAN. And he would be in the same city, under the same domination and same jurisdiction.
Mr. HAZARD. This would relieve a great deal of hardship there.
The CHAIRMAN. Not only in my county but in every other county in the country.
Mr. Rees. Now, the requirements as to proof. Is that new?
Mr. HAZARD. Six months in the State instead of the county. But there is one other point with reference to these two provisions that I should mention, and that is that there has been omitted from the character requirements the specific provision of present law, that an alien who is a polygamist may not be naturalized, on the theory that the practice of polygamy is purely a moral matter, and it is included in the provision for good moral character.
The CHAIRMAN. In other words, he would be knocked out on the good moral character requirement?
Mr. HAZARD. You could not be of good moral character and be a polygamist, too. So it is just surplusage.
Mr. Rees. So you just leave out the word "polygamist”? Mr. HAZARD. Correct. Subdivision (b): At the hearing on the petition, residence in the State in which the petitioner resides at the time of filing the petition, for at least six months.
That, Mr. Chairman, is the same as the present law, in substance, about the proof at the final hearing by citizen witnesses for the entire period of time for which they qualify.
The CHAIRMAN. Now you have got (c).
Mr. HAZARD. Subdivision (c) is new, and fills a gap in the present law in the case of persons who, under the law, may be absent from the United States for extended periods if they are in the employ of the Government of the United States or furthering American trade or commerce, or representing an American institution of research. The present law requires that during all the time they are absent, they must conform to the same requirements as to proof of their good character and attachment to the principles of the Constitution, and yet it is physically impossible for them to do it because they cannot bring, as a rule, from Liberia, we will say, witnesses who are citizens of the United States to testify to their good character while they were there. This provision takes care of that,
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a) and (b) of this section the requirements of subsection (a) of section 307 as to the petitioner's residence, moral character, attachment to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and disposition toward the good order and happiness of the United States may be established by any evidence satisfactory to the naturalization court.
That is a provision by which the petitioner, if he desires-I beg pardon. I had best read (d):
The clerk of court shall, if the petitioner requests it at the time of filing the petition for naturalization, issue a subpena for the wi sses named by such petitioner to appear upon the day set for the final hearing, but in case such witnesses cannot be produced upon the final hearing other witnesses may be summoned upon notice to the Commissioner, in such manner and at such time as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may by regulation prescribe. If it should appear after the petition has been filed that any of the verifying witnesses thereto are not competent, and it further appears that the petitioner has acted in good faith in producing such witnesses, found to be incompetent, other witnesses may be substituted in accordance with such regulations.
That is merely a means of making regular the efforts on the part of the applicant at the last moment to substitute witnesses for others who may not be present. It also relieves a good deal of hardship that is present now, if through no fault of the applicant he finds, after the petition has been filed, that a witness is not competent because he is not a citizen, or because he checks back and finds he is 1 month short of knowing him for 5 years, and under present practice the petition is invalid and must be dismissed under the ruling of the circuit court of appeals. Now, if he acted in good faith, he can produce another witness and proceed with his petition.
Mr. Rees. With witnesses who can testify to the things that this other man could not testify to. The only thing I can see wrong about it-it is not wrong, probably—is, here I petition for citizenship and have you two men as my witnesses and one of you happens to find out that he is not a citizen, but I can go out and pick up some man who has been known to me for quite a while and can bring him right into court on the day of the hearing in place of the other man, and he can testify for me?
Mr. HAZARD. This says, “subject to rules to be established by the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary of Labor.” But the intention there is merely to safeguard the Government against, not against you, but against the person who purposely says that his witnesses are not on hand, and where the Government wants an opportunity of inquiring into the eligibility, the credibility, the competency of this witness, whom you have brought in at the last minute.
Mr. Rees. I can see where a hardship would be worked, and I am sure has been worked a good many times against the petitioner for citizenship because of the things you have mentioned. A man may be unable to say that he has known him for 41/2 years, or whatever the requirements may be, instead of 5 years, or he may have found, as I have seen in experience I have had with a couple of cases, where men found out for the first time that they themselves were not citizens.
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; where the examination of our examiner has revealed the fact that, although he acted in perfect good faith and had voted, possibly had held public office as a citizen, he found out at the last minute that he was not.
Mr. REES. But I would not want the thing loosened up or placed in such shape that some petitioner would take advantage of a thing of that kind.
Mr. HAZARD. I think this is carefully safeguarded, Congressman Rees.
Mr. REES. All right. Now, the next one, married persons.
Mr. HAZARD. Next we get into this highly technical field of the status of married women and the status of the applicant who is married to a citizen, depending on the date when the marriage occurred. Shall I proceed? Mr. REES. Well, this is a long, complicated section.
The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to start fresh on that at the next hearing.
Mr. REES. I would like to move it along.
The CHAIRMAN. I think in the next hearing we should start earlier than 10:30. I think we ought to start at 10 o'clock.
Mr. HAZARD. Mr. Chairman, I should say that I will have to be in St. Louis the early part of next week on official business, but Mr. Shoemaker is thoroughly competent to go ahead and discuss it.
The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we fix it for next Tuesday at 10 o'clock and go along until about 1 o'clock.
Mr. REES. All right.
The CHAIRMAN. We will let it go till next Tuesday. Maybe we can take 2 days next week. We left off at page 17. Meanwhile I want to read this myself. I suppose you will want to read it, too. We will adjourn until next Tuesday morning at 10 o'clock.
(Whereupon, at 11:45 a. m., the subcommittee adjourned until 10 a. m., Tuesday, February 27, 1940.)