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Mr. REES. Does this change the present law?
Mr. FLOURNOY. The law, as I understand it, in regard to children born in foreign countries, of persons who are not citizens of the United States, is very uncertain. I am not sure that it requires nationality at all. Maybe the representative of the Labor Department has some view on that, but section 1993, Revised Statutes, relates to citizens. It is not broad enough to take in nations also.
Mr. SHOEMAKER. There is no law on the subject.
Mr. FLOURNOY. There is no law on the subject, so far as we know. Mr. REES. There is no law on it now at all?
Mr. SHOEMAKER. No.
Mr. FLOURNOY. That relates to citizens.
(c) A child of unknown parentage found in an outlying possession of the United States, until shown not to have been born in such outlying possession.
That explains itself, I think.
Section 204 relates to a class of cases that has given us a good deal of trouble because of the uncertainty as to existing law.
SEC. 204. The provisions of section 201, subsections (c), (d), (e), and (g), and section 203, subsections (a) and (b), hereof apply, as of the date of birth, to a child born out of wedlock, provided the paternity is established during minority, by legitimation, or adjudication of a competent court.
In the absence of such legitimation or adjudication, the child, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of the child's birth, and had previously resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, shall be held to have acquired at birth her nationality status.
Some years ago the question came up from the State Department as to what was the nationality of a child born out of wedlock to an American father and a mother of perhaps foreign nationality, and we held that unless there was legitimation, obviously the child could not acquire it through the father, but we also held that where the father had taken some act to legitimate and had legitimated the child, the child would be treated then just as if it had been born legitimately, and therefore acquired citizenship. That ruling has been followed for years. This is to make it entirely clear that where the child is legitimated, it is treated with regard to nationality just as if it had been born legitimately.
Mr. REES. And if not, then it would depend on the mother's nationality?
Mr. FLOURNOY. Then it would have to depend upon the mother. Under existing law, if the mother is an American national, the child may acquire it through the mother. But I was referring to the old law, where citizenship was acquired only through the father. Also the cases where the mother may be a foreign woman, of course under the present law a foreign woman does not acquire citizenship by marrying an American, but if there has been legitimation, then the child acquires citizenship through the father.
Mr. REES. But if there is not legitimation, and the mother is a national, the child does not become a national because you have already said that both parents must be nationals?
Mr. FLOURNOY. Well, legally there is only one, I suppose, strictly speaking, one legal parent. The second paragraph says:
In the absence of such legitimation or adjudication, the child, if the mother had the nationality of the United States at the time of the child's birth, and had previously resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, shall be held to have acquired at birth her nationalty status.
The CHAIRMAN. Which would mean what? That the child is a citizen?
Mr. FLOURNOY. A national. We have a corresponding provision in section 201 in regard to the child born out of wedlock to an American mother, I think.
Mr. REES. Let me interrupt there. According to this section, if a child is born out of wedlock with a national mother, the child can become a national? Is that correct?
Mr. FLOURNOY. He is a national; born a national.
Mr. REES. But over here in a prior section you say that a child can become a national only if both parents are nationals.
Mr. FLOURNOY. It does not say exactly that. It says that such a child, if both parents-that means not both natural parents, but both legal parents-both parents in the sense of the law-are nationals, the child is born a national. If the child only has one legal parent, because it is illegitimate, if that parent, the mother, is a national, the child acquires nationality.
Mr. REES. Even though the father may not be a national?
Mr. FLOURNOY. Yes. The next chapter deals with nationality through naturalization.
The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other chapters that the Department of State is to be heard on?
Mr. FLOURNOY. I think the chapter on loss of nationality. We are very much interested in that.
The CHAIRMAN. We will get to that, I suppose, next week.
Mr. REES. Now let us hear from Mr. Hazard of the Immigration Service. We are dealing now with chapter III, "Nationality through naturalization." Let us hear your comments on the general provision.
STATEMENT OF HENRY B. HAZARD, DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH, INFORMATION, AND EDUCATION, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
Mr. HAZARD. One of the principal improvements, it seemed to us, that was made in the statement of this chapter, was to segregate various portions of the law into the type of provision, whether they were general, whether they were substantive, whether they dealt with procedure, whether they dealt with the question of fees. One provision with reference to statistics, the penal provisions and the saving clauses, have some logical relationship to each other.
In the main the present form and substance of the naturalization laws have been retained, but there has been an attempt to unify and coordinate the various provisions so that, instead of having a dozen or so unrelated laws passed at different times, and with some difficulty in determining the relationship of one to the other, we have incorporated them all into what we thought was an orderly and systematic form. Shall I begin with the first section?
Mr. REES. Yes.
Mr. HAZARD. Section 301, under the title, "General Provisions," is a statement in subsection (a) of the courts which are authorized to naturalize aliens.
Mr. REES. Let me stop you there. That is the same as the present law, is it not?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes. Subsection (b) is slightly different. Under the present law the requirement is that a person who petitions for naturalization, "being a resident within the judicial district of the court," and that has been interpreted by a good many courts to mean the county in which the person resides, even though there may be several counties in the judicial district or circuit. He might under the bare terms of the law, file in any one of those counties in the judicial district or judicial circuit.
The provision in the proposed code is that the person may petition for naturalization in any court within the State judicial district or State judicial circuit in which he resides, whether or not he resides. within the county in which the petition for naturalization is filed.
Mr. REES. If a man is a resident of Brown County, Iowa, and Brown County is one of the eight counties in a State judicial district, he can file his petition in any one of those eight counties?
Mr. HAZARD. Correct, provided the court has jurisdiction over all of those counties.
Mr. REES. Or he can file his petition, as under the present law, in any United States district court in the State of Iowa?
Mr. HAZARD. Within the judicial district in which he resides. The CHAIRMAN. Or within the judicial district of the State court. Do they not have the same jurisdiction for naturalization as the Federal courts? Am I correct in that?
Mr. HAZARD. They have the same power to confer naturalization. The CHAIRMAN. What is holding that up? I mean, are they not provided with funds? So much play has been made about it that there is some discrimination on naturalization because the Department has failed to provide them with the necessary machinery. `Is there anything in that?
Mr. HAZARD. The reason, Congressman Dickstein, that many petitions for naturalization are filed in the United States district court instead of in the State court is the fact that the law permits the witnesses to be excused after they have testified before a naturalization examiner, and relieves them from the necessity of appearing the second time in open court. That is not true in the State courts, because the law does not grant that privilege.
The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to clear that up, because there has been much criticism and much demand for unification of some kind, since they have original jurisdiction as well as the Federal courts. Mr. HAZARD. Later on this act does put them both on the same basis. The CHAIRMAN. All right.
Mr. REES. Section (c) is the same as the present law, is it not?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes, sir.
Mr. REES. Section (d).
Mr. HAZARD. Section (d) is, in effect, the same as the present law, which says that an alien may be naturalized in the following manner, and not otherwise.
Mr. REES. All right. Section 302.
Mr. HAZARD. Section 302 is merely a restatement of the declaration in the Cable Act of 1922, that the right of a person to become naturalized shall not be denied or abridged because of sex or because the person is a married woman. In other words, it places the man and the
woman on the same basis of equality, and persons who are married may not be denied naturalization merely because they happen to be married.
Mr. REES. And the fact that the wife is naturalized, or the husband, does not make any difference to the other party?
Mr. HAZARD. No. In other words, the other person may become naturalized whether one member of the family is or is not a citizen. Mr. REES. This is a restatement of the present law?
Mr. HAZARD. That is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. That would not change the law that we have amended on the 3-year limitation?
Mr. HAZARD. No. Section 303 contains a fundamental change, an enlargement. The present racial restrictions on naturalization are contained principally in section 2169 of the United States Revised Statutes of 1878, providing that naturalization shall apply to aliens being free white persons and persons of African nativity or African descent. The provision with reference to the naturalization of white persons has been in the naturalization laws continuously since the first naturalization act of 1790. The provision with reference to persons of African nativity or persons of African descent was incorporated in the law in 1870, immediately after the Civil War and as an outgrowth of the conditions that existed then.
There has been a change in the way of enlargement during the wartime legislation of May 9, 1918, which permitted, and still permits, a native born Filipino with service of 3 years in the United States Navy, Marine Corps, or United States Coast Guard, to be naturalized after honorable service.
Mr. REES. If he has served 3 years in the Army?
Mr. HAZARD. No; not the Army.
Mr. REES. If he has served 3 years in the Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard, he has a right to make application for citizenship? Mr. HAZARD. Yes; regardless of his race.
Mr. REES. That is, even though he is a Filipino?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes; regardless of his race. That is, if he is a nativeborn Filipino.
Mr. REES. That only applies to Filipinos, though, the thing you are talking about now?
Mr. HAZARD. Yes.
Mr. REES. But if he has been in the Army, that does not help him? Mr. HAZARD. It does not help him under the present law. There was also an enlargement with reference to race in one of the veterans' laws in 1935, which was really a curative statute, because a number of persons racially ineligible to naturalization have been naturalized by reason of service in the armed forces of the United States during the World War.
Mr. REES. Under what law did they do that?
Mr. HAZARD. That was under the act of June 1935. But that was in effect only for a short time, and has since ceased to exist, except that their certificates of naturalization may be validated by being submitted to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.
Mr. REES. And whom did they include under that act of 1935? Mr. HAZARD. Any person who had rendered the required military service and who had been naturalized because of that service, and who would have been racially ineligible for naturalization otherwise. This
present act adds to Filipinos descendants of races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere, and that was brought about through the desirability that was felt of not prohibiting from being naturalized natives of those races in the Western Hemisphere, countries which were so closely tied to the United States by bonds of friendship. The number who might be naturalized was felt to be very small, and it was felt that the good to be accomplished by such a provision far outweighed the possibility that a few persons who would otherwise not be racially eligible might become naturalized.
Mr. REES. Let us get this just a little more definite. You are restating the present law, of course, as far as white persons are concerned, or people of African descent? You are including the Filipinos. You are restating the law so far as Filipinos are concerned, except that you are including the Army along with the Navy and the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard?
Mr. HAZARD. That is correct.
Mr. REES. Now, then, tell us in a few words how you are extending it. Mr. HAZARD. By making eligible for naturalization descendants of races indigenous to the countries of North and South America.
Mr. REES. Who are they who are not at present racially eligible? Mr. HAZARD. Well, there would be Peruvian Indians, for instance, the Indian races of British Columbia and of South America.
Mr. REES. Well, I just thought in glancing this over that you were including that you are making a provision here whereby natives of any country in the Western Hemisphere could become citizens who might not otherwise become citizens.
Mr. HAZARD. No; that was not the intention, Congressman Rees. The intention in using the term, "races indigenous," was to take in those that were natural to the countries of the Western Hemisphere, and they are principally Indians. In the United States all the Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States have been declared to be citizens by the act of June 2, 1924, but the native Indians of British Columbia, say, are not included, because they are of neither white nor African descent. That would prove true also of the native races, and they are principally Indians of South America.
Mr. REES. And Negroes of South America?
Mr. HAZARD. They are eligible now, on the theory that they are descendants of the African race.
Mr. REES. This does not include people of the yellow or brown races, then?
Mr. HAZARD. Not of the yellow race. They are not indigenousif you mean Orientals, and not the brown races, if by that is meant the Malay race from either the islands of the Pacific or Asia.
Mr. REES. It is your opinion, then-to put it another way, what you really intended to do was to include the Indians of the Western Hemisphere?
Mr. HAZARD. Because they are the predominant group that would be included.
Mr. REES. Well, put it another way: All other natives of countries in the Western Hemisphere can become citizens of the United States under the present law, except Indians? Am I right? They are not excluded?
Mr. HAZARD. Would you repeat that again please?