Imagini ale paginilor

the United States and its outlying possessions of parents, both of whom are citizens of the United States," and stop there. I would like to know whether that is the attitude of Labor or not; if they want the whole thing or just part.

Mr. HAZARD. Mr. Poage, I want to be just as helpful as I can, but I cannot go beyond the limits of my knowledge. In the first place, the technical advisory committee, of which I happened to be a member, agreed upon a code which was submitted to the Secretaries of the Departments, and later I understand there were some conferences between representatives of the three Departments after the work of the technical advisory committee had gotten to the point where it was felt they had done what they could.

I am not very familiar with what took place after the advisory committee completed its work. If I did know the details, I should be very happy to make them known to you.

Mr. POAGE. What are your own views on it?

Mr. HAZARD. I represent my Department. I am not authorized to express my personal views as to what ought to be the law, as against the Department's.

Mr. POAGE. Then let me ask you a little further. What in the world' can this committee hope to gain by listening to you gentlemen if you are only authorized to tell us, "That is what my Department recommends. I can't give you my views on it; I can't tell you why the Department recommends it, and I can't tell you anything further than this, that it is their recommendation." I know that. You don't have to come down here to tell me that. It is an utter waste of the Government's good money to pay you and pay me and these other good gentlemen to sit around here to be told the Departments recommend this. Hell, I knew that long ago. What are you going to tell me? If you can't tell me a thing in the world except what the Department recommended, if you can't give me your own opinion, what are you going to add to this discussion?

Mr. HAZARD. I can give you my opinion.

Mr. POAGE. I want it. I am asking for it.

Mr. HAZARD. Which is represented by the proposed code.

Mr. POAGE. In other words, you tell me now your opinion is just that of the code?

Mr. HAZARD. Yes.

Mr. POAGE. Then what are you going to add to the discussion?
Mr. HAZARD. Possibly I am not adding anything.

Mr. POAGE. I didn't mean that personally, but what is anybody going to add to any discussion who comes down here from a Department hamstrung like that, and tells the members of this committee that they cannot tell what they know?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I don't feel hamstrung. I have no hesitancy in expressing my views.

Mr. POAGE. All right.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I was not a member of this nationality committee at all, yet I feel I know something about nationality, inasmuch as I have dealt with it for a period of over 30 years, and I can give you some reasons in my judgment why it is good to include (b) and (c) and these other clauses, if you want to hear them.

Mr. POAGE. That is fine; that is what I want to hear.


Mr. SHOEMAKER. Take (c), for instance; it refers to a person born outside of the United States and its outlying possessions of parents, both of whom are citizens of the United States. There we have a child who would acquire citizenship because of the nationality of both of the parents. Let us take the next case; that refers to a child born outside the United States and its outlying possessions too, let us say anywhere outside of any place which belongs to the United States, of parents, only one of whom is a citizen of the United States and the other is a national. I can see a whole lot of reasons why that child should be a citizen of the United States, which appeal equally to me to be as strong as the reasons in favor of the child who happens to be born to parents, both of whom are citizens of the United States. Mr. POAGE. Do you think that a child born in France, for instance, and I have no prejudice in the world against France, where one of the parents had at one time lived in the United States for a few years and had gone back to France, and the other parent possibly had not ever lived in the United States-because there is no requirement that they have to live in the United States; in fact, neither one of the parents would have, under this bill, been required to live in the United States. They may simply have been born of parents who had lived in the United States-could that child born in France, have any conception of Americanism, the parents having had no privilege of living in the United States and getting the American feeling of things? Would that child, brought up in French schools, taught to speak French, have any conception of Americanism as we know of it? What would there be in that home to make that child have a concept of Americanism, as we think of Americanism?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That child would have just as much concept of Americanism as a child born in France to two parents, both of whom were citizens of the United States, who had lived here but a short time and then had continued to live abroad. The case you refer to is the exception, not the rule. I say a person, who for instance happens to be born in France to an American parent, who has lived here practically all his life, where the other parent is a national, let us say from Puerto Rico, and has not yet acquired American citizenship, may have all the attributes and all the knowledge and understanding of Americanism and would make just as good a citizen of the United States as a child born in Paris to parents who were citizens of the United States and who lived in Paris the rest of their lives, although those two parents happened to be American-born citizens.

Mr. POAGE. You are going on an entirely different theory from what I said. You have the same right to your belief that I have. I frankly don't see why we should confer upon anybody any more than we have to under the Constitution-and I know the Constitution forces us to confer certain rights upon people born within our territory-but I don't see why anybody who does not live within the United States and who does not have the opportunity to take part in American institutions, who does not have opportunity to grow up to be what we look upon as an American and to speak the English language, who doesn't have any contact with our form of governmentI don't see why that person, no matter what their birth, what their lineage, I don't see why we should confer citizenship upon them, no matter whether both their parents are American citizens by statute.

Your view is we ought to go as far as we can toward bringing all of these back to the United States. My idea is the minute they, by their own voluntary act, get out of the United States, kiss them good-bye and tell them "Fare thee well, look to somebody else for your protection."

My observation is that these people have gotten awfully patriotic along about the time that they have had trouble abroad. They rush to the State Department, waving the American flag in one hand and holding out the other to be pulled into the United States, just as soon as there is trouble. But as long as it is a matter of making money outside the United States, and as long as they do not need Uncle Sam's protection, they don't have any great interest in what is going on over here. Your idea is to bring in everybody you can. Mr. SHOEMAKER. You haven't got me right. Let me make this plain to you. In the United States, insofar as the question of citizenship is concerned, the doctrine of jus soli applies.

Mr. POAGE. And the Constitution makes that apply.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Then we come to the question of jus sanguinis. Mr. POAGE. Blood; yes.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. When that question of blood first came up it involved children of missionaries, and that was the beginning of this whole section of the revised Constitution. It was designed and enacted primarily for that purpose when it was first considered in the years gone by. Now, a child born abroad to parents who are missionaries, is raised under an American environment quite as much so as a child born in the United States.

Now, if you don't want to include any of the children born abroad, if the jus soli is entirely to control, then there is no reason why the jus soli should control insofar as both parents are concerned. If one parent is an American citizen and the other is a national, shall we require 10 years' residence on the part of that individual?

Mr. FLOURNOY. I want to correct one misapprehension-That is as to section (g). There has never been any controversy about that insofar as giving citizenship to a child having one parent a citizen of the United States and the other a national but not a citizen. We have all agreed on that. What difference there is is related to a child born abroad of one parent having American citizenship and the other parent being an alien. The only differences relate to those cases. That brings us over to subsection (g).

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I don't have the slightest misapprehension or misunderstanding with reference to it. You said, Mr. Flournoy, you would have stopped at the end of (c), you would not have included (d).


Mr. SHOEMAKER. Well, if you are going to change that, go to (g). That requires 10 years' residence in the United States.

Mr. POAGE. Don't you think that is a good thing?

Mr. FLOURNOY. It is better than what we have.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I think it is a grand thing.

Mr. POAGE. I think so too. In other words, are we agreed on this; that it is well to require the parents of these children to have some real American background?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I think that was the thought in the minds of the persons who drew up the bill.

Mr. POAGE. I am not suggesting you have not improved the existing law, but I am wondering, if we agree this is an improvement of the existing law, whether we can't go further and say those people who have been away from the United States all their lives, even though they have technically acquired citizenship here at one time, should' not be able to pass citizenship down to their children, generation after generation. As I see this thing, a person can come over here and get naturalized, and pass down that citizenship for generation after generation.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. They can't do it.

Mr. POAGE. Why?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. They can't do it under existing law or under this law.

Mr. POAGE. Why do you say that?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Suppose, for instance, I am born in the United States; I go to Paris, and I have a boy, and he in turn has a boy. Mr. POAGE. All born in France.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Those two.

Mr. POAGE. Yes.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That second generation does not get American citizenship.

Mr. POAGE. Why not?

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Because the parent did not reside in the United States prior to

Mr. POAGE. What about subsection (c):

A person born outside the United States or its outlying possessions, both of whose parents are citizens of the United States, and one of whom has resided in the United States or one of its outlying possessions prior to the birth of such person.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That would cover that very part.

Mr. POAGE. So far as you have got, one of the parents should have resided at some time in at least one of the possessions of the United States.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is right.

Mr. POAGE. It requires no length of time, merely coming through and renting a post-office box would be sufficient.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. The question of construction is one, as you know, that is always open to considerable debate and argument.

Mr. POAGE. But fundamentally, don't we allow them under thisand I am not saying this is not an improvement on what we havedon't we still allow people to come to the United States, acquire citizenship, go back to the land from whence they came, and again, for all practical purposes, reinstate themselves in the society of that land and stay there, and still pass on and on and on American citizenship? Mr. SHOEMAKER. We have a provision to take care of those cases in chapter IV. You are speaking now of the naturalized citizens who go back?

Mr. POAGE. That is right, or a person born here. A person who would come here, parents come here from Italy; there are 8 or 10 children born, and they go back to Italy.

Mr. FLOURNOY. They remain citizens.

Mr. POAGE. And the children are citizens in Italy, even though they never saw American soil in all their lives. The children remain citizens.

Mr. FLOURNOY. If they are born here.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. They don't remain citizens even if they are born here, under an opinion of the Supreme Court.

Mr. FLOURNOY. That is a different proposition.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes; that is a different proposition, but the law is there. That is the Elg case.

Mr. FLOURNOY. That relates to children of naturalized parents.
Mr. SHOEMAKER. It relates to nationality, nevertheless.

Mr. FLOURNOY. That doesn't say that a child born here of alien parents ever loses its citizenship.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is a matter of opinion. By construction it can read exactly that way. I have made a study of it.

Mr. FLOURNOY. The case related to a child born here, and who was naturalized through the naturalization of the parents.

Mr. POAGE. On the presumption that a child, when he went back, showed by his own actions he did not desire that citizenship, there is sound reasoning there, but you can't get away from the constitutional right a child has in being born here.

Mr. FLOURNOY. There is nothing in our law at present, Mr. Chairman, which provides that a child born here of alien parents loses his citizenship by residence abroad.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is a matter of opinion. I want to say this; here is the case of a child born in the United States, let us say, of persons who happen to be nationals of another country. That child has a dual allegiance. The child leaves the United States at an early age; he goes abroad; and after attaining his majority, manifests allegiance to the foreign country of which his parents happened to be nationals. Read the opinion and see whether it covers that or not.

Mr. FLOURNOY. It certainly does not.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. Well, read it.

Mr. FLOURNOY. I would like to add that we tried to get into this code a provision which would fit such cases. We had a provision that such a child, if he lived in a foreign country, of which the parents were nationals, he was also a national when he reached the age of 21, and continued to reside there 2 years thereafter, and as a result of such residence loses his citizenship, and the Departments of Labor and Justice wouldn't agree to that. I think the idea was it was unconstitutional. My point is this; if you can't put it in a statute, how can you say it is the law without a statute?

Mr. POAGE. Certainly you can't say it is a law without a statute. Mr. FLOURNOY. The Elg decision didn't apply to a case of that kind. It applied to a case where there was naturalization.

Mr. SHOEMAKER. I think I can find in the decision that which will make clear what I mean by my statement.

Mr. POAGE. It seems to me that this whole thing gets astray from the point which seems to me important. The question in my mind is, "Do we want to follow the policy, if we can, such as the State Department suggested there, of making these people who leave the United States lose the benefits of American citizenship as quickly as we can, or at least, within a reasonable time after they have shown they have

« ÎnapoiContinuă »