Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Do you want me to go to section 336? Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): (a) It is hereby made the duty of the clerk of each and every naturalization court to administer the oath in the clerk's office to each applicant for a declaration of intention made before such clerk, and to retain the original of such declaration of intention for the permanent files of the court, to forward the duplicate thereof to the Commissioner within thirty days after the close of the month in which such declaration was filed, and to furnish the declarant with the triplicate thereof. That is following existing law. Mr. REES. Subsection (b) follows the existing law? Mr. REES. And subsection (c) is the present law? Mr. REES. And subsection (d)? Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct. Mr. REES. And subsection (e) is the present law? Mr. REES. Subsection (f) is practically the present law? Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct. Mr. REES. Section 337, revocation of naturalization, I think that is the present law, isn't it? Mr. SHOEMAKER. The present law does not provide for the revocation and setting aside of the certificate of citizenship. It provides for canceling it, and that is a good addition. Mr. REES. All right. What about subsection (b)? Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is substantially the existing law. Mr. REES. All right. Subsection (c)? Mr. SHOEMAKER. There is a difference right at the start-10 years instead of 5. You notice that change, Congressman, 5 to 10? Mr. REES. Yes. It seems to me if a man leaves the United States and is gone for 10 years Mr. FLOURNOY. If he leaves the United States within 10 years and establishes a permanent residence abroad. Mr. REES. That is right. I was mistaken. Why change that to 10 years? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Do you know why that change was made, Mr. Flournoy. I do not know. Mr. FLOURNOY. It was changed because we had so many cases of naturalized citizens going abroad and establishing themselves permanently in foreign countries, not always the country of origin but any foreign country, and then calling upon our Government for protection, that was the reason for it. Mr. REES. I know, but I was wondering why you changed it to 10 years. Mr. FLOURNOY. The change from 5 to 10 was to get more cases, to have a ground for denying protection in more cases than we have now. Mr. REES. If he goes out at any time after 10 years Mr. FLOURNOY. There is the explanation given on page 51 of this document here. Mr. REES. Yes, I have read that but I just wondered if you would care to give your comment on it. All right, the next? Mr. SHOEMAKER. That (d) is a new addition entirely: If within five years after admission to citizenship a naturalized person is convicted in a State or Federal court of a felony involving moral turpitude, it shall be presumed that such person was not at the time of naturalization a person of good moral character; and, in the absence of countervailing evidence, it shall be sufficient in the proper proceeding under this section to authorize (1) the revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship, and (2) the cancellation of the certificate of naturalization. That is entirely new legislation. I think it is self-explanatory. Mr. REES. I think it is rather strange that a court can say that when a man has his hearing, he has been here for 5 years and complied with all the requirements of the law, and he is a citizen, and then in 4 years afterwards, say, although the certificate was issued to him, the fact is now that he is not a man of personal good moral character, as the court said he was on the previous occasion. Mr. SHOEMAKER. I could not fail to agree with you on that under those circumstances. Mr. REES. I have no objection to the law as it is now. Mr. SHOEMAKER. This (e) follows substantially the existing law (reading): (f) Whenever an order admitting an alien to citizenship shall be revoked and set aside or a certificate of naturalization shall be canceled or both, as provided in this section, the court in which such judgment or decree is rendered shall make an order canceling such certificate and shall send a certified copy of such order to the Commissioner; in case such certificate was not originally issued by the court making such order, it shall direct the clerk of the naturalization court, in which the order is revoked and set aside, to transmit a copy of such order and judgment to the court out of which such certificate of naturalization shall have been originally issued. It shall thereupon be the duty of the clerk of the court receiving such certified copy of the order and judgment of the court to enter the same of record and to cancel such original certificate of naturalization, if there be any, upon the records and to notify the Commissioner of the entry of such order and of such cancellation. A person holding a certificate of naturalization or citizenship which has been canceled as provided by this section shall, upon notice by the court by which the decree of cancellation was made, or by the Commissioner, surrender the same to the Commissioner. That is substantially the existing law, except the provision providing for the surrender of the certificate, which appears to be a good one. Mr. REES. Your subdivision (g). Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): The provisions of this section shall apply not only to any naturalization granted and to certificates of naturalization and citizenship issued under the provisions of this chapter but to any naturalization heretofore granted by any court, and to all certificates of naturalization and citizenship which may have been issued heretofore by any court or by the Commissioner based upon naturalization granted by any court. That extends that clause to the certificates which have been issued by the Commissioner, as well as by the court. Mr. REES. Yes. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Certificates of derivative citizenship. Section 338: A person who claims to have derived United States citizenship through the naturalization of a parent or through the naturalization or citizenship of a spouse may apply to the Commissioner for a certificate of citizenship. Upon proof to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the applicant is a citizen, and that the applicant's alleged citizenship was derived as claimed, and upon taking and subscribing before a member of the Service within the United States to the oath of allegiance required by this chapter of a petitioner for naturalization, such individual shall be furnished by the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner with a certificate of citizenship, but only if such individual is at the time within the United States. That changes existing law to provide that a person who has married a citizen of the United States may get a certificate where under existing law he cannot. They may get a certificate when they marry an alien who is naturalized but they cannot get one if they marry a person who is a citizen of the United States prior to the marriage. Mr. REES. Let us study that just a moment. Mr. SHOEMAKER. In construing that provision, it was held by the Department, under the old section, that any individual over 21 years of age who claims to have derived United States citizenship through the naturalization of a husband can get a certificate if the husband were naturalized subsequent to the marriage, but if the husband were a citizen, having been born here, or having been naturalized prior to the actual marriage she could not get a certificate. This makes it much plainer, and very properly so. I cannot see any distinction between those two kinds of cases. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Section 339: The Commissioner is authorized to cancel any certificate of citizenship or any copy of a declaration of intention or certificate of naturalization heretofore or hereafter issued by the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner if it shall appear to the Commissioner's satisfaction that such document was illegally or fraudulently obtained from the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner; but the person to whom such document has been issued shall be given at such person's last known place of address written notice of the intention to cancel such document, with the reasons therefor, and shall be given at least sixty days in which to show cause why such document should not be canceled. There is no such provision on the statute books today. I think it is a good clause to enable us to cancel certificates or copies of declarations of intention which have been issued, but the cases will be infrequent I anticipate. Mr. REES. I would like to go back just a moment to section 338. Mr. REES. We have had a lot of discussion about this Harry Bridges case. How would this section affect the Bridges case? Mr. SHOEMAKER. I tried that case, you know, Congressman. Mr. SHOEMAKER. It would have no application to it at all. He was not naturalized. He would be enabled to become naturalized through the naturalization of his wife, if she is a citizen of the United States, under the act of May 24, 1934, if found to come within the terms of that act; that is to say, if he is a man of good moral character, his wife is actually a citizen, and he otherwise complies with all the terms. He would have to prove 3 years' residence under existing law and he would have to prove good moral character during that time. Mr. REES. We are all, I think, particularly interested in making sure that we do not leave any bars down or make it any easier for individuals of that kind. I know that we two members who are sitting here feel that we should be in a situation where we can be further protected and have more protection than we have now against persons of that kind and character. We had rather make it easier for the Government to dispose of them than to make it harder. Mr. SHOEMAKER. This would not have any relationship to his case? Mr. REES. It does not make it much easier for the Government now than it was before under this law. Don't you think you could make it a little more strict than it is, or do you? Maybe not. Mr. SHOEMAKER. This only changes the law to this extent as I have said. A person may get a derivative certificate under this clause as drawn who married a citizen of the United States, a native-born citizen, or married one who was naturalized prior to the marriage. They cannot get that certificate today. We do not issue it. That is practically the whole change in that section 338. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Section 340 (a): A person who claims to have been naturalized in the United States under section 322 of this chapter may make application to the Commissioner for a certificate of naturalization upon proof to the satisfaction of the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner that the applicant is a citizen and that he has been naturalized as claimed in the application, such individual shall be furnished a certificate of naturalization by the Commissioner or by a Deputy Commissioner, but only if the applicant is at the time within the United States. I would like to refer back to section 322. I cannot see any possible objection to that clause. I think it is a good clause. Mr. REES. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): (b) If any certificate of naturalization or citizenship issued to any citizen, or any declaration of intention furnished to any declarant, is lost, mutilated, or destroyed, the citizen or declarant may make application to the Commissioner for a new certificate or declaration. If the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner finds that the certificate or declaration is lost, mutilated, or destroyed, he shall issue to the applicant a new certificate or declaration. If the certificate or declaration has been mutilated it shall be surrendered to the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner before the applicant shall receive a new certificate or declaration. If the certificate or declaration has been lost, the applicant or any other person who may come into possession of it is hereby required to surrender it to the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner. That is substantially following the existing law, except making provision for the surrender of the certificate or declaration which may later come into his possession. He is required to surrender it to the Commissioner. Mr. REES. Subsection (c). Mr. SHOEMAKER (reading): The Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner shall issue for any naturalized citizen, on such citizen's application therefor, a special certificate of naturalization for use by such citizen only for the purpose of obtaining recognition as a citizen of the United States by a foreign state. Such certificate when issued shall be furnished to the Secretary of State for transmission to the proper authority in such foreign state. That follows substantially existing law. Many of these persons who are naturalized are required to send back to the old country of their nationality some evidence of their citizenship here. They want to keep the certificate issued to them, and Congress authorized us to issue a special certificate to satisfy the petitioner and secure exemptions from any claim on him for military service or anything of that kind. It follows substantially existing law. Mr. REES. I do not think you need to read subsection (d). That is the present law? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes. Mr. REES. Now, subsection (e). Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is existing law, too. Mr. REES. That is the present law? Mr. SHCEMAKER. Yes, sir. Mr. REES. Then we get down to section 341, and there is no question about the amount of the fee to be charged? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. Mr. REES. Aren't those fees the present fees? Mr. SHOEMAKER. They seem to be identical fees. Mr. REES. Subsection (b). Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is a raise of $8. Mr. REES. $18 instead of $10. All right. Mr. SHOEMAKER. The certificate of arrival is the same. Mr. REES. Application for a declaration of intention, $1. That is the present charge, isn't it? Mr. SHOEMAKER. I think that is correct. Mr. REES. I think they charge a dollar for a copy. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes; but I am not certain. Mr. REES. These are just the various charges that are made. Mr. SHOEMAKER. Exactly. Mr. REES. Now, that goes on down through subsection (c), which says that the clerk of the court shall be entitled to one-half of the fees up to $6,000. Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is the existing law. Mr. REES. That is the present law. Subsection (d). Mr. SHOEMAKER. There is one up above there that is slightly different. It is a new clause: (9) Reasonable fees, with the approval of the Secretary, in cases where such fees have not been established by law, to cover the cost of furnishing to other than officials or agencies of the Federal Government copies, whether certified or uncertified, of any part of the records, or information from the records of the Service. Such fees shall not exceed a maximum of twenty-five cents per folio, with a minimum fee of fifty cents for any one such service, in addition to a fee of $1 for any official certification furnished under seal. Mr. REES. That is information the Government requires. Mr. SHOEMAKER. I think that is a good clause. We are frequently put to the necessity and to a lot of difficulty to furnish these things, and I think the Government should receive some compensation for that. I think the Government should get some compensation for things of that kind, and it is not placing any hardship upon anyone by the small fee exacted or provided. Mr. REES. All right. Subsection (e) just has to do with the account. ing by the clerk? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. Mr. REES. And subsection (f) requires him to pay his additional clerks. Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is the existing law. Mr. REES. Subsection (g) follows the existing law? Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is correct. Mr. REES. Subsection (h)? Mr. SHOEMAKER. That is existing law except that there is an excep tion provided there. Mr. REES. In subsection (h)? Mr. SHOEMAKER. Yes except where legal action before a court requires extended legal services when the court may approve a reasonable fee in excess of $25. |