Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of HungaryCentral European University Press, 1 mar. 2016 - 336 pagini Having won a two-third majority in Parliament at the 2010 elections, the Hungarian political party Fidesz removed many of the institutional obstacles of exerting power. Just like the party, the state itself was placed under the control of a single individual, who since then has applied the techniques used within his party to enforce submission and obedience onto society as a whole. In a new approach the author characterizes the system as the ?organized over-world?, the ?state employing mafia methods? and the ?adopted political family', applying these categories not as metaphors but elements of a coherent conceptual framework. The actions of the post-communist mafia state model are closely aligned with the interests of power and wealth concentrated in the hands of a small group of insiders. While the traditional mafia channeled wealth and economic players into its spheres of influence by means of direct coercion, the mafia state does the same by means of parliamentary legislation, legal prosecution, tax authority, police forces and secret service. The innovative conceptual framework of the book is important and timely not only for Hungary, but also for other post-communist countries subjected to autocratic rules. ÿ |
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... conflicts of interest, were shadowed by behind-the-scenes deals across the major political parties, and allowed resources and players to float between economy and state in ways that allowed many political actors to xvii Foreword.
... interests hold an illegitimate sway in state and local government decisions concerning allocation of resources, procurements, concessions, and entitlements. As a result, illegal barter deals are concluded between discrete economic ...
... interests and reciprocities wholly irrespective of political sympathies. Both sides now court one another: not only was business looking for contact with members of the new political class, but also the reverse. Reciprocal favors were ...
The Case of Hungary B lint Magyar. The threat of such illegitimate intertwining of interests was even greater outside the range of central party financing. Since the election campaigns of local governments and mayors also required ...
... interests. Though after the regime change in Hungary criminal groups from the organized underworld did come to the fore with the intention of gaining influence in politics, their progress could not be described as state capture. Vast ...
Cuprins
1 | |
15 | |
from the functional disorders of democracy to a critique of the system | 57 |
4 Definition of the postcommunist mafia state | 67 |
a subtype of autocratic regimes | 73 |
6 The legitimacy deficit faced by the mafia state and the means to overcome it | 209 |
the ideological arsenal | 231 |
8 The Criminal State | 255 |
9 Pyramid schemesthe limits of the mafia state | 269 |
Annexes | 297 |
List of accompanying studies | 304 |
Former publications | 306 |
Index of Names | 309 |